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 In 1890, members of the Brotherhood of Professional Base Ball Players elected to secede 
from the National League and form their own organization, which they called the Players 
League.  The players objected to several business practices of the National League, including 
aspects of the reserve clause in player contracts, the Brush Classification Plan to control their 
salaries, the buying and selling of players, and fines for various infractions.  This dissertation 
explains how these events combined to produce the revolt by the players at the conclusion of the 
1889 season.  It also examines various other important aspects of 1880s baseball, including abuse 
of alcohol, treatments of umpires, physical training techniques, violence on the field, cheating, 
gambling, mascots, team finances, and racism in baseball.  The dissertation illuminates various 
social and economic aspects of life in Gilded Age America as well.  Finally, it helps explain the 
importance of a little-understood era in the baseball’s history that lasted from 1885-1889 and 
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Why Write a Dissertation on 1880s Baseball? 
 
 
 Why write a scholarly dissertation about baseball?  I found myself answering that 
question nearly every time someone asked me what my PhD dissertation was about, as everyone 
from my academic advisor to my mother was a bit skeptical at first.  Furthermore, when I told 
them it was about baseball in the 1880s, and the decision of major league baseball players to start 
their own league separate of the existing ones in 1890, I had to answer a few more questioning 
looks.  Given enough time, however, I eventually worked out some answers. 
 First, and most importantly, it is something that deeply interests me.  It is nearly 
impossible to write a work of this length if not fully invested in your subject, and the previous 
topics I had considered, while interesting and important, just did not quite grab hold of me as this 
one did.  However, there have to be some good academic reasons, too, as telling your doctoral 
committee you really like your topic is not enough by itself.  Among these good academic 
reasons is the fact that very little scholarship exists that specifically addresses this period in 
baseball’s history.  For whatever reason, the late 1880s have escaped the attention of most 
baseball writers.  There is some baseball literature mentioning events in these years, certainly, 
but few have attempted to put these years at the center of the story and describe why they are 
important in their own right.  As it turns out, they are.  What happens in the second half of the 
1880s leads directly to the Players League and the Brotherhood War of 1890, and the 
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consequences of the Brotherhood War do much to shape the landscape of baseball in the 1890s.  
The problems that arise in the 1890s because of the failure of the Players League eventually 
contribute to the rise of the American League in 1901.  And so it goes.   
 Originally, my plan was to write a dissertation that told the story of the Players League 
and the Brotherhood War with the National League in 1890.  There are a handful of books on 
this event, some better than others, and I hoped to contribute something new to the study of what 
happened in 1890.  As I went deeper into the research, however, I discovered that the causes of 
the conflict were more numerous and multifaceted than the existing literature generally 
indicated.  As the preparatory chapters became both greater in number and more lengthy, I 
realized that these events, in and of themselves, were really their own story.  Therefore, I ended 
up with a dissertation dedicated to describing the causes of the Brotherhood War, rather than the 
event itself.  Maybe someday, I will write a sequel that follows my original plan of describing 
the Players League and its history.  We will see.  If I ever do, it will certainly be different from 
what I envisioned when I began this project, thanks to some of the things I have discovered in 
the process. 
 At the most basic level, the quarrel between the players and owners that erupted into 
baseball’s version of war in 1890 was about the same things that workers and employers always 
argue about, that is, wages, hours, and conditions of work.  That the two sides argued over salary 
is not a surprise at all, and these arguments are the most important engine driving the events in 
this dissertation.  However, considerations such as hours and conditions of work mattered, too.  
For example, the baseball season generally began in mid-April and ended in October.  Did a 
player have a responsibility to his club before that time, in the form of mandatory training?  
Could a club control the actions of its players after working hours by, say, using detectives to spy 
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on them and make sure they were not drinking after hours, and punishing players who did?  
Similarly, questions arose regarding conditions of work.  If a player got hurt and could not play, 
was the team obligated to pay him or not?  Did it make a difference if the injury occurred on or 
off the field?  Could teams blacklist players for certain unsavory behaviors, and if so, what 
behaviors qualified a man for blacklisting? 
 In the larger sense, this dissertation is also about the attempt of the players to have some 
say in the answers to these questions.  Part of the problem was that clubs often engaged in 
decisions that, even if merited to some extent, were arbitrary.  Too often, the interpretation of the 
rules was whatever the clubs said it was, and this inevitably led to abuses that angered the 
players and hurt relations with management.  Having the ultimate power, the clubs could usually 
get their way, but in the process, they often alienated players to the point that the player was 
unwilling to return to their team the next year and agitated for his release during the off-season.  
Even worse, the player might play poorly on purpose to convince management it had no choice 
but to let the player go.  Sitting such a player on the bench until he straightened up was not 
always an option, because most teams had but one or two substitute players on hand at any given 
time, fearing the expense of carrying extra men. 
 These are all among the reasons that players in the National League formed the 
Brotherhood of Professional Base Ball Players in 1886.  Realizing that when they negotiated 
with their teams individually they had little strength, the players banded together, hoping to 
achieve better results through a group with a common purpose.  For the players, better results 
meant not just more money, but also a role in developing new rules, negotiating consequences 
for unacceptable behaviors such as excessive drinking, and other questions of that nature.  They 
believed that their interests were compatible with those of the owners.  Higher quality baseball 
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meant more patronage at the ballpark, which meant teams made more money, which meant they 
could afford to pay their players more, which made everyone happy.  The question was, then, 
how to achieve higher quality baseball.  The owners, as we will see, did not always look at things 
in the same light.   
 While the discussions and arguments over salary and work conditions were very 
important, and receive the greatest share of attention, other issues need consideration as well.  
For the National League especially, the owners obsessed over how to raise the image of baseball 
in the eyes of the public.  The National League had to, considering that its tickets cost more than 
those of the American Association.  Marketing the game towards the “respectable” classes 
guided many of the League’s decisions in the 1880s.  That is why the crusade against drinking 
was so important, and why this dissertation contains an entire chapter dedicated to alcoholism in 
baseball.  True, drinking cost games on the field, as inebriated players struggled to compete with 
sober ones, and if several influential members of the team began lushing at the same time, the 
consequences would be severe in the standings.  Equally important, however, as long as baseball 
had an image as a ruffianly sport played by ill-educated, drunken boors, “respectable” people 
would stay away from the ballpark, and teams would make less money.  Therefore, fighting 
alcohol abuse was not necessarily about helping players be healthier, or solely about winning 
more games.  It was about making more money, although of course winning games helped make 
money, too.   
 The same was true, albeit to a somewhat lesser extent, with umpires.  If baseball was to 
have a clean image among patrons, the games needed to run as smoothly as possible.  This 
required competent umpires who could manage the games and keep the teams in line.  Every 
time a riot erupted over the calls of the umpire, and police had to storm the field and swing their 
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clubs to restore order, “respectable” men and women turned up their noses at what they saw and 
were less likely to return to the ballpark the next day.  As with alcohol, the game needed quality 
arbiters not solely to ensure the best team won on the field, but also to ensure the wealthiest fans 
continued patronizing the game. 
 It was the same with player fitness.  Baseball was very much a game of motion in the 
1880s, much more than it is today.  When the rule makers met each winter to discuss new rules 
to refine the game, their intent typically centered around how to produce more action on the 
field.  More hitting of the ball meant more action for the fielders, and more men on base meant 
more attempts at base stealing, all of which fans enjoyed and would pay to see.  The worst 
possible scenario, in the eyes of baseball’s magnates, was a dull game featuring wild pitching, 
few swings by the batters, and few balls put in play for the fielders to deal with.  Because of this 
emphasis, players needed mobility and athleticism, which required some kind of physical 
training to stay in the pink of condition, as observers put it in the Gilded Age.  Teams, therefore, 
encouraged players to stay in shape.  As with alcohol and umpires, however, the point of this 
encouragement was that fans would pay to see athletic players, more so than ice wagons, to use 
another term of the day. 
 Another important aspect of the game in the 1880s was, just as in the game today, the 
size of the market available to each team was an important determinant of success.  Some 
baseball fans want to believe that the vast discrepancy in the cash available to each team, and the 
impact of that discrepancy in the standings, is a recent phenomenon.  Some want to lay the blame 
at the door of free agency, saying that it destroyed the competitive balance in baseball.  The 
facts, however, say that wealth and success frequently go together in baseball, and always have.  
Financial firepower was extremely important in the Gilded Age.  Of the eighteen championships 
 6
awarded in the National League and American Association in the 1880s, sixteen of the eighteen 
were won by cities ranking in the top ten in population in the United States, with only 
Providence in 1884 and Detroit in 1887 breaking the pattern.   
 It is clear, then, that money plays a considerable role in this story of 1880s baseball.  How 
to get more of it, and how to distribute it, are questions at the root of many of the events herein 
described.  The idea that players once played for the love of the game, the thrill of competition, 
or the glory of a championship was an antiquated one even by this time.  If I were to quote every 
player or team executive who said as much in the newspapers of the day, that might constitute a 
chapter all to itself.  This conclusion that money drove most of the choices made in 1880s 
baseball is, I realize, decidedly not revolutionary.  While it may be pedestrian, it is true 
nevertheless, and I see no reason to sugarcoat the fact or romanticize the story.  The banality of 
the cause notwithstanding, the story remains very interesting because, as all good historians 
know, the fun is in the details.  Certain people made certain decisions at certain times in response 
to certain circumstances, and those choices make the story unique. 
 Beyond these considerations, there are other good reasons for a scholarly dissertation 
about 1880s baseball.  Among these is that many baseball observers, even seasoned ones, know 
little about the game in the nineteenth century.  For some reason, many baseball enthusiasts act 
as if the game never mattered much, or was somehow different and less important, until 1901, 
when major league baseball took the form it retains today with two leagues, the American and 
the National.  It is true, this era saw great experimentation with rules, the equipment was 
primitive, and players had not worked out all of the strategies that are commonplace today.  All 
of the essentials were there, however.  Nine men played on each side, in the same places they do 
now, the pitcher still delivered the ball to the batter as the centerpiece of the action, and someone 
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magically teleported back in time to 1888 would still clearly recognize the game as baseball.  In 
fact, just to pick some arbitrary dates, one could make a strong argument that the game of 1890 
resembled the game of 1915 much more than the game of 1915 resembled the game of 1930. 
 In this respect, baseball in the 1880s is to baseball history what the 1850s are to 
American history generally.  Most baseball fans and historians look at the 1880s as a time with a 
few important events, but essentially see this decade as leading to something else, such as the 
creation of modern baseball with the American and National leagues in 1901.  We might say the 
same about the 1850s.  True, some important things happened, but it is easy to see those things 
only in terms of how they led to something else, namely, the Civil War.  Baseball players of the 
1880s, like Americans living in the 1850s, did not see things in that way, of course.  They had no 
idea of what might happen a few years down the road, any more than we do today.  It is 
important, therefore, to remember that they made the best choices they could based on the 
information they had at the time, and that they made those choices without the hindsight that we 
possess. 
 As a result of this desire to recall attention to how men played baseball in the Gilded Age, 
this dissertation also provides some mini-biographies of players well-known at the time but 
almost forgotten today.  Some of the names, Cap Anson, for instance, are familiar, but how many 
know anything about Pete Browning?  He is the man with the highest batting average not in 
baseball’s Hall of Fame, ranking tenth all-time with a gaudy .341 mark.  There are also stories in 
these pages about players with decidedly unremarkable baseball careers but very interesting 
baseball lives.  Whether it be someone like Billy Taylor, unknown today and known chiefly at 
the time for his ability to consume alcohol, or John Gaffney, a man with no record as a major 
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league player but who was nonetheless very important for his innovative umpiring, this 
dissertation seeks to tell a bit of their stories as well. 
 In order for a dissertation about baseball to have much general meaning and hold the 
interest of those not excited by the minutiae of the game, it should also reveal something about 
how baseball fit in to the United States as a whole in the 1880s.  The most obvious connection is 
to labor history.  In the United States, the 1880s saw a great deal of conflict between workers and 
management.  It witnessed the American Federation of Labor’s 1886 strike that led to the 
Haymarket Affair, the massacre of blacks striking for a dollar per day in the sugar fields of 
Louisiana, and reformers such as Henry George.  Workers throughout the nation joined labor 
unions of all shapes and sizes in hopes of bettering their working conditions, so for baseball 
players to form their own Brotherhood was certainly in line with the times, and the saga of what 
happened to the Brotherhood might be of interest to labor historians and those interested in the 
history of working people in the United States.  Owners such as Albert Spalding and Arthur 
Soden might not have been on the level of John Rockefeller or J.P. Morgan, but Spalding was a 
multi-millionaire who practiced both vertical and horizontal integration and sat on the board of 
directors of several corporations, just as his more illustrious contemporaries did. 
 Beyond this, the last quarter of the nineteenth century was also notorious for the rise of 
the social philosophy known as social Darwinism.  In short, social Darwinists such as Herbert 
Spencer and William Graham Sumner took Charles Darwin’s ideas regarding the role of natural 
selection in evolution and applied those ideas directly to people and societies.  These ideas, along 
with general racism, appeared in baseball in various guises during the Gilded Age.  Notable 
examples include the treatment of mascots, detailed in one chapter, but also the cutthroat 
competition to eliminate rivals by any means, even if those means sometimes also injured the 
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victorious party.  By the time this narrative begins, in 1885, major league baseball had already 
drawn its color line, barring African Americans from the field of play.  As a result, the stories of 
African Americans in baseball appear here only occasionally, but I have described several 
examples of how the game reflected the racist attitudes of American society even without any 
black players at the major league level. 
 In addition, to make this work more accessible to the general reader, I chose to go easy 
on statistics and statistical analysis.  Too often, baseball gains a reputation as a sport for folks 
who really love crunching numbers in order to make points about the greatness of players that 
seem hopelessly obscure to the average person.  Over the past decade or so, there has been a 
veritable explosion of new statistics, as if baseball did not have enough of them to begin with.  
Personally, I enjoy statistical analysis a great deal.  It provides solid evidence, and some of the 
statistics have the virtue of being comparable across eras of baseball history, making them 
valuable research tools.  However, not all readers will share this taste for statistics, so while the 
reader will find them in places, all in all, I have employed them sparingly.  I have also included 
an appendix on statistics in baseball that should be mandatory reading to understand fully 
everything presented here.  Before reading the rest of the dissertation, the reader should also 
examine the appendix on the terminology of the 1880s, so that terms such as “coaching” and 
“crank” will convey the intended meaning. 
 Finally, a word about sources.  At first glance, there seems a lack of them in writing this 
dissertation, but as with many first glances, this is misleading.  The best source I uncovered was 
a sporting paper titled The Sporting Life.  This weekly newspaper, with usually eight but 
sometimes twelve pages, devoted about three-quarters of its space to baseball matters.  The 
writers of its columns were not strictly employees of the paper, but men who wrote for city 
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newspapers around the nation and contributed to its columns on the side each week.  Therefore, 
while it appears to be one source, in reality, it represents twenty or twenty-five sources.  Each 
major league city had its own correspondent, and in addition, The Sporting Life printed weekly 
pieces from men in minor league cities as well as essays from freelance writers, most notably 
O.P. Caylor but also men like James Hart and Charles Foley who had been in baseball for many 
years.  To give a few examples, the paper’s Detroit correspondent also wrote for the Detroit Free 
Press.  Its Boston writer, William Sullivan, also worked for the Boston Globe, while Henry 
Chadwick also wrote pieces for the Brooklyn Eagle, edited Spalding’s baseball guides, and 
wrote for Outing magazine.  I found The Sporting Life an excellent help partly because of this 
great diversity of writers, but also because it allowed those writers to give their own views with 
little editorial oversight (the paper’s editor, Francis Richter, corrected them at times but did not 
censor them, so far as I could tell) and gave them space to explore off-field topics, especially to 
fill space in the winter.  These facts made The Sporting Life a better source than many individual 
newspapers, as most daily papers had good coverage during the season, but lacked the depth of 
reporting during the off-season and also had weaker coverage of the off-field dealings of the 
various teams. 
 Another sports newspaper, The Sporting News, began publication in 1886 an operated in 
the same format.  This paper also employed men who wrote for various US newspapers to write 
in its columns.  For instance, Tim Murnane sometimes wrote for The Sporting News and worked 
with Sullivan at the Boston Globe.  In general, this source was a bit less useful than its weekly 
competitor was, as its writers did not explore the game off the field in quite the same detail, but 
once again, its great diversity of views equaled many sources and served as a useful counterview 
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to The Sporting Life.  The Sporting News, based out of St. Louis, was also especially valuable in 
writing about baseball in the western parts of America. 
 Not to neglect other newspaper sources, I searched through the archives of a few other 
major papers in the United States in the 1880s, especially the New York Times and the Chicago 
Daily Tribune.  Not only were they important newspapers with large circulations, but New York 
and Chicago were the home of some of baseball’s most successful teams and three of the owners 
who appear so many times as movers and shakers in 1880s baseball, Al Spalding in Chicago, 
Charles Byrne in Brooklyn, and John Day in New York.  The drawback of using daily 
newspapers, however, was that they tended to report on the big issues in baseball, but not the 
mundane ones of marginal interest to their daily readers but essential for a dissertation such as 
this.  Despite this drawback, there is, by necessity, a certain dependence on newspapers, both 
daily and weekly, in a work of this type.  They are the primary sources for writing about sports 
like baseball.  Their reporters attended all the home games and sometimes traveled to road games 
as well, interviewed the players regularly, spoke with team owners on a weekly basis, and 
corresponded with each other.  No one was in a better position to report on what happened each 
week. 
 A few books were useful as well.  However, as mentioned earlier, most works on this era 
of baseball history pay little attention to the issues I chose to address, and so while these books 
provided background and gave form to the general line of the narrative, their overall contribution 
to this text is a marginal one.  A close perusal of their lists of sources will reveal they used many 
of the same newspapers I did, in any case, but in a far less comprehensive way.  I do not 
necessarily mean this as a criticism of their work, as they often had a different outcome in mind 
for their books than I did here, and some authors did their research before the internet became 
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available, as well.  I have also referenced the biographical information compiled by the Society 
of American Baseball Research, known as SABR, in cases where such biographical information 
was available. 
 Throughout this dissertation, I have attempted to answer the questions beloved by all 
historians, those being what happened, why it happened in that particular way, and why it was 
important.  Although this work grew into something much larger than I ever intended when I 
began the project, I hope it can provide baseball fans and general readers with some sense of 
what baseball was like in the 1880s, especially off the field.  There was a great deal going on, 






The State of Baseball in 1885 
 
  
 Among the greatest ironies of Gilded Age baseball is that its most disastrous season, 
1890, followed on the heels of a campaign that was perhaps the most exciting of the entire 
nineteenth century.  To the sixteen men who owned major league baseball franchises, the future 
of the game must have looked bright indeed as the 1889 season came to a close.  It had been one 
of the best in the admittedly brief history of major league baseball.  The National League (NL) 
concluded its fourteenth campaign with a monumental race between the New York Giants and 
Boston Beaneaters.  On October 1, Boston defeated the Cleveland Spiders while the Giants 
stumbled against the mediocre Pittsburgh Allegheneys, leaving the Beaneaters a single game 
ahead with four games to play.  The Giants recovered, however, beating Pittsburgh the next day, 
then sweeping Cleveland in three games.  The Beaneaters, meanwhile, lost the concluding game 
of the Cleveland series on October 2, dropping them into a tie with the Giants.  They won the 
first two games of their series with Pittsburgh, meaning the race remained deadlocked until the 
last day of the season, October 5, but then fell 6-1, giving New York the championship.  It was 
the second straight pennant for the Giants after several years of frustrating failures and near 
misses that had left their fans wondering if their costly collection of star players would ever 
triumph and occupy first place in the National League. 
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 Baseball’s other major league, the American Association (AA), boasted a championship 
race almost as dramatic.  The Association’s eighth season featured a thrilling campaign 
culminating with the Brooklyn Bridegrooms (several team members had married in the 
preceding two years, thus the unusual nickname) barely outdistancing the St. Louis Browns.  
Things seemed secure enough for the Bridegrooms as late as September 15, when they held a 
five game lead in the standings with just nineteen games to go on their schedule.  St. Louis 
refused to go quietly, however, winning fifteen of its next seventeen games, including twelve in a 
row, so that by October 10, Brooklyn’s lead was a mere two games.1  After all, the Browns had 
won four consecutive Association pennants, and team captain Charlie Comiskey would not allow 
his team to go down without a good fight.  The Bridegrooms did hold on, finishing two games 
up, but St. Louis’s finishing flourish ensured the outcome remained uncertain until the season’s 
final two days.  In fact, the Bridegrooms were not secure in their possession of the championship 
until a few days after the regular season ended, for reasons discussed later. 
 Along with the terrific drama on the field, this nerve wracking ending meant, above all 
else, three things to major league baseball.  First, for the quartet of cities involved in the pennant 
race, it meant lots of money.  Thousands of fans streamed to major league ballparks to watch 
these teams play during the season’s final month, and the season’s dramatic conclusion 
heightened enthusiasm for the World Series that inevitably followed the championship season.  
                                                 
1 In 1889, the schedules of the respective leagues did not finish simultaneously in the manner 
that is common in major league baseball in the twenty-first century.  This is because the two 
leagues, while not exactly at war in the sense of each actively trying to eliminate the other, were 
two separate organizations, each with its own league offices and league presidents.  They were 
competitors in the business of baseball, rather than partners as the American and National 
leagues are today.  Thus, the leagues played schedules of different lengths, and their schedules 
finished about a week apart.  In addition, teams did not always make up games lost to rain or 
darkness.   In 1889, the Giants played in 126 games, going 83-43, while their World Series 
opponent, the Bridegrooms, played 137 times, winning 93. 
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In addition, it obscured the attention of most baseball observers, fans and the press alike, from 
the most important off-field event of the entire nineteenth century, the decision of the 
Brotherhood of Professional Ball Players (BPBP) to part ways with the National League and start 
its own league for the 1890 season.  While the Brotherhood had not made its decision public yet, 
this possibility hovered in the background, like a nightmare waiting to spring from the shadows.  
In late September and early October, however, most people ignored this issue, entranced by the 
drama in New York, Brooklyn, St. Louis, and Boston.  Finally, the American Association race 
highlighted an important rivalry shaping the destiny of baseball, that between St. Louis president 
Chris Von der Ahe and Brooklyn president Charles Byrnes. 
  All three of these issues, the unceasing search of baseball teams and their owners for 
more money, the relationship of the players to the teams that employed them, and rivalries 
between the teams themselves, have deep roots and important consequences.  They rate among 
the central factors shaping baseball in the Gilded Age.  In order to comprehend why this is true, 
we must understand how each of these threads developed during the 1880s, then wound together 
in 1889 to produce the rebellion of the Brotherhood of Professional Ball Players.  Let us begin 
with some of the relevant pieces of baseball history prior to 1885. 
 
* * * * * 
 
Ideas about how to run the game of baseball, as a business, were still evolving, but a few 
fundamentals seemed clear by the mid-1880s.  As a group, baseball’s owners took many of the 
practices so popular in their business pursuits and began adapting them to the game of baseball in 
an effort to limit competition, control as large a market share as possible, keep labor under 
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control, and the like.  In the first half of the 1880s, the two major leagues had fielded teams in 
competition with each other in some cities, such as New York, Philadelphia, and St. Louis.  By 
1889, this pesky competition was nearly a thing of the past, as major league baseball boasted 
sixteen teams operating in fifteen different cities.  (New York and Brooklyn constituted separate 
entities until 1898, when Gotham absorbed the City of Churches.)  Philadelphia was the only city 
in which the leagues competed directly.   
At the time, these efforts to increase stability through limiting competition were quite 
important to team owners because team turnover was a chronic problem.  Of the eight franchises 
that founded the National League in 1876, only two, Boston and Chicago, remained in 1889.  No 
fewer than twenty-two clubs had occupied the other six slots in the league over that span.  The 
Association, with its shorter history, had done a bit better, but franchise instability was certainly 
on the minds of baseball’s magnates.2  Collectively, they decided that limiting the competition 
for fans within cities would aid their search for greater profits and greater continuity. 
A second issue for owners was their perceived need to tighten control over the labor of 
their players.  Towards that end, major league baseball owners had two measures at their 
disposal by the end of 1880s that would lead directly to the Brotherhood War of 1890.  The first 
of these, the reserve clause, had existed since 1879 and, over the past decade, baseball owners 
slowly realized the various ways they might use this instrument to depress player salaries and 
                                                 
2 Had the owners been able to see into the future, they would have known this problem was 
nearly over.  Of the eight franchises competing in 1889, five (Boston, Chicago, Philadelphia, 
Pittsburgh, and New York) are still members of the NL, although the Boston club is now the 
Atlanta Braves and the New York Giants now play in San Francisco.  Two other members of 
today’s National League, the Cincinnati Reds and the Brooklyn (now Los Angeles) Dodgers 
were in place by 1890, so that seven of the eight teams that constituted the NL before the 
expansion of 1962 were members by that year.  The remaining team of the eight, the St. Louis 
Browns (now Cardinals), arrived in 1892 following the dissolution of the American Association 
after the 1891 season. 
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limit player mobility.  (More on the reserve clause in the next chapter.)  New to their toolbox in 
1889 was the Brush Classification Plan, credited to John T. Brush, owner of the National 
League’s Indianapolis Hoosiers.  The plan called for a salary scale based on a five-tier 
classification of player performance, ranging from a minimum of $1,500 to a maximum of 
$2,500.  Included in the classification scheme was a clause stating that the classification system 
would take into account a player’s “habits, earnestness, and special qualifications,” all nebulous 
considerations, to say the least, which could limit not only the salaries, but the personal 
independence of the players as well.3   
Baseball’s barons had discussed such a plan on and off for several years.  Back in 1885, 
for example, they had discussed a graduated plan for player salaries (discussed in chapter two) as 
a means to reduce salaries and “to protect their own interests by mutual agreements and 
concessions.”  Proponents, worried that only clubs in larger cities would turn a profit under 
existing conditions, professed a hope that a graduated salary scale would provide incentives for 
players to improve their play and move up the scale, though once again the “record, habits, & 
co” of the player would also factor into their salary rating.  Technically, the clubs did agree to a 
simplified version of this scheme, capping salaries at $2,000, but from the outset it proved 
unworkable, as there were no penalties for circumventing the rule.  However, this did cause 
significant unease amongst players at the time, as discussed in the next chapter.  Other owners 
called for a simple blanket on top salaries and arbitrary salary reductions of 20-40%, but these 
calls also went unheeded in 1885.  By 1889, however, the owners felt the time was right for 
                                                 
3 Peter Levine, AG Spalding and the Rise of Baseball: The Promise of American Sport (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1985), 58; John Thorn, Baseball in the Garden of Eden: The 
Secret History of the Early Game, (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2011), 227-228, 232-233. 
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revisiting the salary reduction idea, and voted in favor of the Brush Plan.4  (For more on the 
Brush Plan and its consequences, see chapter sixteen.) 
Whatever major league owners tried to do to maximize their profits and limit player 
independence, the one owner seemingly always at the bottom of any plan was Al Spalding of the 
Chicago White Stockings.  One of his hometown newspapers, the Chicago Daily Tribune, 
described him as “endeavoring to create a baseball trust,” while The Sporting News had accused 
him of plans for “one great stock company” and being “a one-league monopolist” throughout the 
summer of 1887 in regards to a potential scheme for uniting the two major leagues into one.5  
These plans, first unveiled in 1886, did not come to fruition right away.  “President Spalding, of 
the Chicago Club, is still working on his one-association scheme for next season . . . the 
exposure of the scheme has killed whatever chance of success it had for next season, but Mr. 
Spalding is not easily discouraged, and he will stick to his pet theory till the last.  The American 
clubs . . . are a unit in favor of keeping their own organization intact.”6  Spalding later saw his 
wish fulfilled, as we will see, after the demise of the Players League in 1890 and the American 
Association in 1891. 
                                                 
4 “From Providence” M.C.D., The Sporting Life, August 26, 1885, 1; “Graded Salaries” 
Olympic, The Sporting Life, August 26, 1885, 1; “Conferees to Meet Monday” NA, The Sporting 
Life, August 26, 1885, 1.  The salary limit approved in the winter of 1885 and 1886 technically 
remained in force even when the National League adopted the Brush Plan for 1889.  However, as 
there were no penalties attached for violating the provisions of the 1885 rule, adherence to the 
measure was almost non-existent, and players often earned money outside their official salary by 
various unofficial means.  Still, it was a concern to ballplayers throughout this era because, 
should management ever enforce this rule consistently, it would drastically reduce salaries for 
some players.  “The Base Ball Compact” NA, The Sporting Life, October 28, 1885, 1. 
5 Levine, AG Spalding and the Rise of Baseball, 56-57. 
6 “Caught on the Fly” NA, The Sporting News, September 13, 1886, 5. 
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In addition, it was Spalding, not Brush, who was probably the true author of the Brush 
Classification Plan to limit player salaries adopted in November of 1888.7  Likewise, in 1889 
Spalding proposed a plan to codify the financial structure of all of baseball.  In July he wrote a 
letter to Nick Young, president of the National League, proposing a system wherein all baseball 
leagues, major and minor, would enter into an arrangement featuring the two major leagues at 
the top and all minor leagues organized into a four-tier structure below.  Depending on its 
classification, each minor league team would limit player salaries to $60 per month or $600 per 
year (class D) to $200 per month or $2,000 per year (class A).  Furthermore, each league would 
pay the major leagues $1,500 to $2,000 per year, depending on classification, and in return, the 
major leagues would allow each minor league club to reserve its players, protecting them from 
having their players enticed away by other teams.  The exception was that teams of a higher 
classification could purchase players from clubs of a lower classification level by giving notice 
one week in advance and paying $1,500.  Few outside of the sixteen owners of major league 
teams endorsed Spalding’s plan, citing its tendency to enrich a small group at the expense of the 
rest of organized baseball.  The Chicago Herald denounced it as a plan for a “baseball trust” and 
a “scheme for the monopoly of the business.”8 
As one of the prime movers behind the scenes in baseball, Spalding’s background merits 
some description.  His rise to influence mirrors that of several of his capitalist brethren in late 
nineteenth century America, the main difference being in the details rather than the general 
storyline.  Like most of the men known alternately as “captains of industry” or “robber barons,” 
                                                 
7 Thorn, Baseball in the Garden of Eden, 232-233. 
8 The description of Spalding’s plan and the quoted material is from Levine, 57-58.  The plan 
also garnered criticism from writers F.H. Burnell and Harry Palmer of The Sporting Life.  
“Brunell’s Budget,” F.H. Brunell, The Sporting Life, July 24, 1889, 8, and “Chicago Gleanings” 
Harry Palmer, The Sporting Life, July 24, 1889, 8. 
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depending on the individual’s point of view, Spalding’s story was hardly rags to riches, however 
much he liked pretending that it was.  It is more accurate to describe his life with a slight 
modification of the oft-quoted baseball metaphor, “he was born on third base and went through 
life thinking he hit a home run.”  Spalding grew up amongst the mahogany furniture and gold-
banded china of his parents’ home in Byron, Illinois.  For Spalding’s father, James, “managing 
his investments and buying and training his horses seem to have occupied his working hours.”  
Spalding’s mother, Harriet, who contributed a large inheritance herself to the family finances 
from a previous marriage, described James as a man who “took life leisurely, and was 
prosperous in every way.”9  Far from being rags to riches, the real story behind Spalding’s rise in 
the business world is worthy of the financial elite of which he was a well-established member by 
1889. 
It began in true robber baron fashion, by disregarding one contract for another, more 
advantageous, one.  By the conclusion of the 1875 season, baseball observers regarded Spalding 
as the premier pitcher in the game, based on his record of 54 wins and 5 losses for the Boston 
Red Stockings, a team so dominant it won 71 games that year against just 8 defeats, including 
winning all 37 of its home games.  Besides Spalding, the Red Stockings lineup featured three 
other Hall of Fame players, “Orator” Jim O’Rourke, George Wright, and Deacon White, not to 
mention Cal McVey (lifetime batting average of .346) and Ross Barnes (lifetime batting average 
of .360).  The club was a member of the National Association (NA), a predecessor of the 
National League that would dissolve following the 1875 campaign.  The NA had both eastern 
and western teams, but the eastern teams dominated the standings, much to the chagrin of 
Chicago coal magnate William Hulbert, a man described as “rugged, self-willed, blunt and 
                                                 
9 Levine, AG Spalding and the Rise of Baseball, 3. 
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determined, but possessed of great executive ability and unflagging energy.”  Believing western 
clubs could succeed, both on the field and in the account books, Hulbert made overtures to 
Spalding about returning to his native Illinois for a yearly salary of $2,000 (longtime baseball 
observer Henry Chadwick claimed it was actually $4,000), further sweetened by the positions of 
team captain and field manager, plus 25% of the team’s gate receipts. Despite his association 
with the Boston club, and the National Association’s prohibition on engaging players already 
under contract to other clubs, Spalding accepted.10   
When Spalding reached Chicago, he was not alone.  With him were three of his old 
Boston teammates, McVey, White, and Barnes.  This was part of Hulbert’s plan, as well.  In his 
communications with Spalding, Hulbert wrote, “bring with you to Chicago the pick of the 
Eastern club talent, or as much of it as you can induce to come, and I shall be in a position to 
offer you such inducements as I think will be more than satisfactory to yourself, and fully so to 
the players you bring with you.”  Spalding also netted two of the top players of the Philadelphia 
Athletics for his new employer in the Windy City, Ezra Sutton and Adrian “Cap” Anson, 
although Sutton later had second thoughts and returned to the Athletics.11  This was, without a 
doubt, one of the greatest transfers of talent in the entire nineteenth century, ranking with the 
                                                 
10 Levine, AG Spalding and the Rise of Baseball, 22-23;  “From Chicago” Harry Palmer, The 
Sporting Life, February 2, 1887, 2; “America’s National Game” Harry Palmer, Outing, (July 
1888), 353-354; “Chadwick’s Chat” Henry Chadwick, The Sporting Life, February 9, 1887, 2.  It 
is also worth noting that in the early years of the game, the position of field manager was quite 
different from what it is in the twenty-first century.  The team captain typically performed the 
duties of today’s manager.  The manager of the 1870s was essentially a business manager, 
sometimes the owner of the team, who oversaw ticket receipts, corresponded with other 
managers to set up exhibition and regular games, kept track of the team’s finances, and the like.  
For more, see Chris Jaffe, Evaluating Baseball’s Managers: A History and Analysis of 
Performance in the Major Leagues, 1876-2008, (Jefferson, North Carolina: McFarland & 
Company, 2010), 65-66. 
11 Palmer, “America’s National Game,” 354. 
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exodus of Louisville’s entire corps of quality players to Pittsburgh after the 1899 season, or the 
move of Buffalo’s “Big Four” to Detroit for 1886.12 
The deal went down in, at best, a quasi-legal fashion that was emblematic of the business 
world of Gilded Age America, although the exact details of what really did go down depend on 
which baseball writer the reader would like to credit.  According to Chicagoan Harry Palmer, 
(who was, admittedly, Spalding’s mouthpiece in the press) Hulbert was angry over losing out on 
a third baseman and shortstop named Davy Force.  In the days of the National Association, Force 
was, true to his last name, a force when at bat, as well as enjoying a reputation as a nice 
defensive player.  In the five years the National Association lasted, he put up OPS+ numbers of 
96, 179, 137, 113, and 140.  Hulbert wanted to bring Force to Chicago very badly, and believed 
he had signed “Wee Davy” (his official playing measurements were a height of five-foot-four 
and a weight of 130 pounds) to a contract for 1876, but was, in his eyes at least, cheated out of 
                                                 
12 The difference is that in both the Louisville and Buffalo cases, the team was about to disband.  
In the Louisville case, the owner of the team, Barney Dreyfuss, also had bought into ownership 
of the Pittsburgh Pirates and served that club as its president.  With Louisville set to disband, he 
transferred most of the best players to Pittsburgh, including Fred Clarke and Honus Wagner, 
easily the best player of the first decade of the 20th century.  This situation, of one man owning 
shares in more than one franchise, was quite common in the 1890s, just as in the corporate world, 
single individuals sat on the board of directors of countless corporations.  According to Harold 
Seymour’s research, in fact, by the year 1900 every single owner of a National League franchise 
actually owned shares in more than one franchise.  The consequences of this for competitive 
balance, or in this case the lack thereof, are not hard to imagine.  In the Buffalo case, one team, 
the Detroit Wolverines, purchased the entire Buffalo franchise in order to obtain the quartet of 
Dan Brouthers, Hardy Richardson, Jack Rowe, and Deacon White.  However, Buffalo continued 
to exist as a franchise, fielding a replacement team of marginal players.  Harold Seymour, 
Baseball: The Early Years, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1960), 170, 303-304.  
Speculation regarding such a heist smoldered all through the off season, with The Sporting Life 
advocating that one franchise acquire the entire quartet, as Detroit eventually did, in order to 
challenge the strongest clubs in the league, the Chicago White Stockings and the New York 
Giants.  As Chicago had just finished with 87 wins against 25 losses, and New York at 85-27, 
this may not have been poor advice, considering the third place club of 1885, the Philadelphia 
Quakers, had managed all of 56 wins and finished 30 games back of Chicago.  New York’s 
winning percentage of .758 remains the best ever compiled by a second place team.   “Notes and 
Comments,” NA, The Sporting Life, October 28, 1885, 3. 
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getting his man when the Philadelphia Athletics swooped in and also signed Force to a contract 
fraudulently dated before the Chicago deal.  When he took his complaint to the National 
Association’s annual meeting, Hulbert discovered that Philadelphia had packed the meeting 
against him, and that he would not prevail.  His anger, according to Harry Wright, was volcanic.  
“Hulbert was a sight to look upon that day.  He was simply one magnificent spectacle of rage 
and wrathful indignation—a thunder cloud of suppressed fury that it did me good to look 
upon.”13 
That solon of baseball writers, Henry Chadwick, recalled things a bit differently.  In 
Chadwick’s recollection, it was Chicago, not Philadelphia, which had tried the nefarious trick of 
antedating its contract with Force; it was the fact that he had failed to sign Force legally, not the 
rage over Philadelphia cheating him, which fueled Hulbert’s anger all through the 1875 season.  
Bill James sides with Palmer, however.  He asserts that Chicago had indeed signed Force first, 
but that when a Philadelphia Athletics executive, Mr. Spering, became the head of the National 
Association, he called another meeting at which the Judiciary Committee reversed its old 
decision.14  Al Spalding also claimed that Philadelphia had acted unjustly, not Chicago, although 
as an interested party, perhaps his words require one or more grains of salt.15   Whatever the 
truth, it is safe to say that Hulbert’s ambition led to what happened next.   
Chicago’s coal baron plotted revenge over this “outrage.”  He started a correspondence 
with Spalding to try to get the star pitcher to sign a deal and come to the Windy City in 1876.  
The two men exchanged letters through the early months of the 1875, and in June (during the 
season and therefore in violation of the prohibition on negotiating with players already under 
                                                 
13 “From Chicago” Harry Palmer, The Sporting Life, February 2, 1887, 2. 
14 Bill James, The New Bill James Historical Baseball Abstract: The Classic, Completely 
Revised, (New York: The Free Press, 2001), 33. 
15 “From Chicago” Harry Palmer, The Sporting Life, February 16, 1887, 2. 
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contract), Hulbert made his move.  He traveled to Boston to meet Spalding in secret, hoping to 
lure him back to the West.  He got to the Hub City at 10 PM and traveled straight to his hotel, 
meeting Spalding by appointment there.  They talked all through the night, until 4 AM, at which 
time Spalding agreed to sign a Chicago contract.  The next morning, Hulbert inked Ross Barnes 
to a Chicago pact by 9 AM, Cal McVey by 10, and Deacon White by 11.  Later that same day, 
Boston management discovered in the Boston morning papers that Hulbert was in its city, and 
immediately located the Chicagoan, wining and dining him for two consecutive days in hopes of 
keeping him away from their players.  “For two days they never left him; invited him to dinner, 
to breakfast and to supper; took him to the theatre, slept with him, and froze to him tighter’n a 
brother.”16 
It was not enough.  At the end of the two days, Hulbert and Spalding were to meet at the 
Old Colony rail depot and catch a train for Philadelphia, in order to meet with Anson and Sutton 
and complete the talent heist.  The magnate was not as enamored with these men as with the 
Boston quartet, but getting even with Philadelphia for Force by swiping two of their best players 
in return seemed justified to Hulbert.  At first, things did not go according to plan.  When 
Hulbert arrived to meet Spalding at the depot, Boston’s team president and secretary were still 
with him.  Spalding hid in a baggage car until the train made it out of Boston, then returned to 
coach and located Hulbert, who was reportedly shaking in fear that Spalding had changed his 
mind.  The pair reunited, then they proceeded southward and signed their men in Philadelphia, 
with the understanding that everyone would keep their negotiations secret.17   
The secret lasted all of two weeks.  As all these events transpired in the middle of the 
1875 season, fan reaction in Beantown was unmerciful towards the “secessionists,” while Boston 




management hatched all kinds of schemes to try to get Spalding and friends back into the fold.  
Boston’s owners also took heat from their fans over not paying their star players enough to keep 
them from deserting.  None of the schemes worked, although after Ezra Sutton decided to return 
to Philadelphia, Cap Anson wavered and nearly decided to join him.  Chicago dominated the 
new National League in 1876 with a 52-14 record and, despite the significant cash outlay to draw 
the “Big Four” plus Anson to the shores of Lake Michigan, the team turned a profit during the 
nation’s independence centennial year.18 
As the one player who, in 1889, stood most firmly on the side of the National League in 
its dispute with the Brotherhood, we should also introduce Cap Anson and describe his story in 
some detail.  Although Anson was just 23 at the time of the 1876 move to Chicago, his 
connection with Spalding was already well established.  Back in 1870, when Spalding pitched 
for the Rockford Forest City club, the team played an exhibition series in Anson’s hometown of 
Marshalltown, Iowa.  Anson played so well that Rockford offered him a contract for the 
following season, which he accepted rather than continue his on-again, off-again efforts at 
attending the state college in Iowa City, today the University of Iowa.  He thus embarked on a 
professional career in which he played regularly for 27 seasons, not retiring until 1897.  His 
association with Spalding strengthened further in 1874 when Spalding, now with Boston, and 
Anson, now with Philadelphia, participated in an exhibition of baseball in the British Isles.  
Boston’s manager, Harry Wright, was born in Sheffield, and wanted to prove the superiority of 
the American game over cricket to his former country (and perhaps his father Sam, as well, who 
was president of New York’s St. George Cricket Club).19   
                                                 
18 Ibid. 
19 Levine, AG Spalding and the Rise of Baseball, 18-19; Anson’s biography at the Society for 
American Baseball Research’s (SABR) website, http://sabr.org/bioproj/person/9b42f875, 
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The tour of the British Isles took Spalding’s Boston club and Anson’s Philadelphia nine 
to Liverpool, Manchester, Sheffield, London, Nottingham, Dublin, Glasgow, and other stops in 
Great Britain.  “The object of the voyage is to give Englishmen a practical illustration of the 
beauties claimed for the American game.”  The Brits proved gracious hosts, and a few 
commented favorably on the “scientific” nature of baseball, but they remained largely 
unconvinced of baseball’s future in Britain, preferring the “dignity, manliness, and system” of 
their own native sport.  The duo might have failed to wean the British from their allegiance to 
cricket, but Anson’s friendship with Spalding proved enduring, and Anson became the field 
manager of the Chicago White Stockings by 1879 and eventually owned a small share of the 
team’s stock.20 
Besides his longevity and excellence on the field, baseball historians today associate 
Anson with two other rather unseemly things during his playing and managing career.  His 
ability to belittle and berate both opposing players and umpires was legendary.  Although most 
baseball records give his nickname as “Cap” for captain, or sometimes “Pop” because he 
managed to play to such an advanced age, many in the 1880s nicknamed him “the Baby” 
because he whined and kicked so energetically against umpires.  Because he was successful as a 
manager, other teams copied these practices and took them to a level Anson never reached.  St. 
Louis Browns captain, and future Chicago White Sox owner Charles Comiskey, excelled at this 
practice as well, and Comiskey’s teams likewise had great success on the field.  The result was 
that by the 1880s and 1890s, the game on the field was rowdy in the extreme, featuring foul play, 
                                                                                                                                                             
accessed January 14, 2014.  The England tour is described in “The Trip To England In 1874” 
NA, Spalding’s Official Base Ball Guide, 1889, (Chicago and New York: A.G. Spalding & Bros, 
1889), 91-93. 
20 “The United States” NA, London Times, August 4, 1874, 3; Levine, AG Spalding and the Rise 
of Baseball, 18-19.   
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foul language, dishonest tactics, and frequent on-field violence against both opponents and 
umpires.  Observers of the day recognized the change, and many did not like it.  On June 24, 
1883, The Sporting Life criticized a Philadelphia news writer for disparaging umpires in print, 
thus serving to encourage rowdyism, and that same day the paper also drew attention to 
managers removing their teams from the field of play and refusing to continue the game when 
they felt particularly aggrieved by an umpiring decision.21   
The second black mark on Anson’s record is his role in establishing segregation in major 
league baseball.  In 1883 he nearly refused to play the Toledo club, set to join the American 
Association the following year, in an exhibition because the Blue Stockings featured an African 
American, Moses “Fleet” Walker, as their catcher.  Anson’s club played that day when 
threatened with the loss of gate revenue if they refused, but Anson refused to play against teams 
with black players in the future, and thus, the color line became part of major league baseball for 
more than six decades, and part of minor league baseball as well for nearly that long.  While 
Anson was not alone in his desire for segregation by any means, the influence and prestige of his 
name helped give segregationists in baseball the ammunition to draw the color barrier.22 
Spalding, meanwhile, continued up the corporate ladder as his playing career wound 
down.  Having appeared in only four games in 1877, and just one in 1878, by 1883 he was club 
president of the White Stockings (Hulbert died in April, 1882), and his sporting goods company 
was thriving by supplying equipment to baseball teams across the nation.  By now, Spalding had 
realized one of capitalism’s eternal truths.  Any worker, no matter how skilled at his or her craft, 
                                                 
21 “On the Fly” NA, The Sporting Life, June 24, 1883, 5.  For Anson’s career as an umpire baiter, 
or “kicker” in the parlance of the day, see Jaffe, Evaluating Baseball’s Managers, 66-67, and 
Anson’s SABR biography.  For rowdyism in 1880s and 1890s baseball, see Bill James, The New 
Bill James Historical Baseball Abstract, 52-54, as well as chapter ten of this dissertation. 
22 “Toledo and Fleet Walker” John Husman, Society for American Baseball Research, 
Nineteenth Century Notes, (Spring 2010), 4-8. 
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was still a worker, subject to the financial whims of the employer.  The best route to wealth and 
power lay, not with the most skilled performer on the field, but with the most skilled performer 
in the realm of ownership and management.  Spalding even developed his own marketing arm 
for his sporting goods business, Spalding’s Official Base Ball Guide, published yearly.  It 
contained statistical records and summaries of the recently completed season, to be sure, but also 
advertised Spalding’s goods, bore his name, picture, and autograph on the cover, and disparaged 
the products of competitors. 
 Spalding “won” the right to publish the official National League book in 1876, at the 
insistence of his club’s owner, Hulbert.  Although the contract merely stated Spalding had the 
right to publish the official league book (of rules of play and the league’s constitution), and while 
the baseball guide was not an official National League publication, Spalding’s obfuscation of this 
fact by using the word “official” on the cover went unchallenged until 1882.  By then, the public 
mind already associated his name and products with being the official representative of major 
league baseball.23   
 The same was true regarding the Spalding baseball and, later, Spalding’s uniforms.  At 
the NL’s yearly meetings, the league consistently voted (including Spalding, who voted as 
secretary and then, after Hulbert’s death, president of the Chicago club) to adopt Spalding’s 
baseball as the official ball for all National League games.  This allowed the guide to trumpet its 
ball as an official product, and allowed Spalding to utilize one of the time-honored techniques of 
professional advertisers: allowing normal people to take part in greatness through association.  
By 1884, the guide listed other leagues that used the Spalding baseball as a further testimonial 
(five of them in the 1886 guide, those five being the National League, New York State League, 
                                                 
23 Levine, AG Spalding and the Rise of Baseball, 75-76. 
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Eastern League, New England League, and the College Association24), and by 1890, it touted the 
advanced technology used in their manufacture.  The ball’s patented plastic cement, the guide 
claimed, “makes it more elastic. . . . soft to the hands, and at the same time . .  . retains its perfect 
shape.”  Spalding’s catalog for his sporting goods also received free publicity when, for example, 
The Sporting Life mentioned it in its columns in the spring of 1886.25  By that year, the catalog 
was even offering a newly invented baseball item, sliding pants.26 
 Like any good captain of industry, however, Spalding did not stop there.  Instead, he 
continued to achieve both vertical and horizontal integration of his company.  Horizontal 
integration, the practice of increasing market share through expanding production, buying out 
competitors, and so forth, came as more and more leagues began using his products.  However, 
Spalding also engaged in vertical integration, controlling more than one link in a product’s chain 
of production.  Not only did Spalding sell balls, bats, and uniforms, by 1879, his company 
manufactured all these products for itself, with The Sporting News estimating a production level 
of 1 million bats yearly by 1887.  Soon, AG Spalding & Bros. also manufactured bicycles, 
skates, golf equipment, tennis rackets, dumbbells, caps, uniforms for multiple sports, and hunting 
equipment and clothing.  Indeed, AG Spalding & Bros. even designed the original basketball 
used by Dr. James Naismith in Springfield, Massachusetts.  As did many of his fellow tycoons, 
in 1892 Spalding reincorporated his company in New Jersey to take advantage of that state’s 
lenient corporate laws, with the venture capitalized at $4 million.  He may not have been Andrew 
Carnegie, but for a $3,800 investment made just 16 years earlier, it was impressive growth, 
                                                 
24 “Something Extraordinary” NA, The Sporting Life, March 3, 1886, 2. 
25 Levine, AG Spalding and the Rise of Baseball, 77-78; “Something Extraordinary” NA, The 
Sporting Life, March 3, 1886, 2. 
26 “From Chicago” Remlap, The Sporting Life, March 3, 1886, 5.  Remlap was Harry Palmer, 
who signed his articles for The Sporting Life with his name spelled backwards for a time. 
 30
demonstrating both Spalding’s business acumen and the power of using an insider position to 
secure business contracts.27 
 
* * * * * 
 
 These events, then, helped set the stage for the break between players and owners in 
1889.  As Spalding consolidated his emerging empire of sporting goods, he also led the faction 
of National League owners who hoped to use the reserve rule and the Brush Classification Plan 
to expand their control of major league baseball by tightening their grips on player salaries and 
players’ freedom to choose where and with whom to play.  This effort, however, met resistance.  
The players, led by John Ward and the Brotherhood of Professional Base Ball Players, the 
organization of players of which Ward was president, had other ideas.  Even as the 1889 season 
wound towards its dramatic conclusion, there were events unfolding in the background that 
would shake baseball to its very foundations.   
 Ward and the BPBP spent much of the 1889 season attempting to negotiate with 
baseball’s moguls over the issues raised by, and abuses of, the Brush Plan.  The owners spent the 
season ignoring those attempts.  Perhaps the owners underestimated the organization of the 
Brotherhood, or perhaps they decided it was time for a showdown with the players and provoked 
confrontation intentionally.  Either way, they refused Ward and his Brothers a hearing, and Ward 
and other BPBP members began reaching out to interested financiers not yet involved with the 
game, but with money to fund a new baseball league.  In the process, they decided to challenge 
not just the Brush Plan, but the reserve rule and the entire financial structure of baseball as well. 
                                                 
27 Levine, AG Spalding and the Rise of Baseball, 78-81. 
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 In order to understand why and how such a dramatic break came about, it is necessary to 
consider how relations between players and owners reached such a low point.  The first step of 
this story is to understand what the reserve clause was, and why it became so important in major 





The Reserve Clause 
 
 
 Major League Baseball’s official historian, John Thorn, once described the evolution of 
the player-management relationship in baseball by writing: 
 
Earlier attempts to monetize the game had come first through owning the field and 
charging admission, then by owning the clubs and leasing the services of star players who 
would serve as the attraction.  Men like the Wrights and Spalding and Reach next thought 
to capitalize upon the game by selling its implements of play, creating baseball 
equipment manufactories that might one day monopolize a disaggregated but nationally 
vibrant marketplace.  Finally, those in club management thought they might insulate 
themselves from competition by controlling the raw material—by owning the players 
outright as if they too were sporting goods, the exponents of play if not exactly its 
implements.1 
 
In their efforts to achieve this level of control, no tool of management was more potent than the 
reserve clause. 
 Prior to 1879, standard practice was that players signed contracts for a single playing 
season, which lasted about six months.  At the conclusion of the contract, they were free to sign 
with whomever they chose for the next season.  From the perspective of the team owners, this 
had both advantages and disadvantages, but by 1879, experience seemed to indicate that the 
disadvantages were more numerous.  It was true that this system of one-year contracts allowed 
them to raid other teams freely, and allowed the possibility of building an imposing team in a 
single off-season by signing talented players away from competitors, as Hulbert had done with 
                                                 
1 Thorn, Baseball in the Garden of Eden, 210. 
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Spalding and associates in 1876.  Talented players came at a price, however, and by 1879, many 
owners had concluded that this system was unsustainable, or perhaps insufficiently profitable 
would be a better term, from a business standpoint.  National League owners first tried to 
ameliorate this problem of free agency among players by passing a rule stating that clubs could 
not negotiate with the players of other clubs during the season.  They intended this rule to 
prohibit the commonplace practice of teams negotiating agreements for the following season 
with opposing players whenever their respective clubs met on the field.  This did not solve the 
basic problem posed by a free market economy, however.  As long as the players could sign with 
the team of their choice for their fair market value, keeping player salaries in check, and the 
labor force under their collective boot heels, remained agonizingly out of reach for baseball’s 
magnates. 
National League owners’ answer, spearheaded by Boston’s parsimonious and baronial 
Arthur Soden, was the first version of the reserve clause in 1879.2  The terms of the reserve 
clause were simple enough.  It gave each club the right to “reserve” five players, meaning that 
when the player signed a contract, while they signed for that season only, the club reserved the 
                                                 
2 See Soden’s SABR biography for more details, at http://sabr.org/bioproj/person/a1b2e0d0, 
accessed May 22, 2014.  Describing Soden as parsimonious is charitable.  According to his 
biography, he booked the cheapest hotels for his players to stay in while on the road.  He forced 
Boston’s players to collect tickets before games, cut the grass of the ballpark, battle fans to 
retrieve foul balls, pay for their uniforms, and pay the cleaning costs of their uniforms.  Soden 
also charged the wives of the players full price to attend games, while eliminating the press 
section in order to seat more paying customers.  He offered his players a bonus if they could 
make their shoelaces last for two years rather than one.  In 1887, he refused to split the gate 
revenue from Boston’s Labor Day game with Philadelphia (it was tradition that for holiday 
games, which typically drew substantial crowds, the two teams split the gate) because Labor Day 
was made a holiday after the schedule’s creation.  “From The Hub” Mugwump, The Sporting 
Life, September 14, 1887, 3.  Soden comes across as about as dislikable a man as there was in 
baseball in the 1880s, perhaps deserving of comparisons with someone such as Henry Clay 
Frick.  Mugwump was the pen name of a Harvard graduate and assistant city editor of the Boston 
Globe, William D. Sullivan. 
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exclusive right to negotiate with that player the following season.  (This was out of fear that the 
more profitable teams would outbid the others for their top players if the other teams could not 
protect those players in some way, as well as to depress the earning power of the best players, 
who could no longer negotiate with other clubs for their services.3)  Essentially, it meant that 
every contract signed by a reserved player was a one-year deal with a team option for the 
following season.  Because the terms were the same in the contract each year, with the option of 
reservation renewing each year, the reserved player was now the possession of his club 
permanently.  All other NL clubs were bound to respect the reserve lists of their competitors, and 
could not play games, regular or exhibition, against teams featuring a player reserved by one 
club but attempting to play for another.  The only way for a player to escape was to secure a 
release from the reserving team, but even then, upon signing his next contract, he would fall 
under the umbrella of the reserve clause once again.  Even this escape route was not a clear path, 
however, as any other team in the league could claim a released player within ten days of the 
release, thus obtaining his services and the right to reserve him in the future.   
In addition, two other little-known aspects of the original reserve rule are interesting.  
First, it was secret.  The owners who agreed on the rule in 1879 did not publicize it, and the rule 
did not actually appear in the language of player contracts until 1887 (see chapter fourteen).  It 
was also an ex post facto rule, meaning that the league owners implemented the rule for 1879 
after already agreeing to player contracts for the 1879 season.  The players had signed their 1879 
contracts without the knowledge that the reserve rule existed, yet the owners applied the reserve 
provision to those contracts.4  Rather than deny the secret nature of these proceedings, the 
                                                 
3 Seymour, Baseball, 108. 
4 Thorn, Baseball in the Garden of Eden, 172; Seymour, Baseball, 108.  The prohibition of 
exhibition games was no small matter.  Teams often played exhibitions outside of their regular 
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architects of the rule fully admitted to such practices.  A.G. Mills, another of the reserve clause’s 
creators, said as much in a letter to baseball’s senior sportswriter of the era, Henry Chadwick.  
When Chadwick asked about the history of the reserve rule, Mills answered that, prior to 1883, 
“such reservation did exist to a limited extent, but it was accompanied by a secret agreement 
between the clubs, whereby each club obligated itself to abstain from negotiating or contracting 
with certain specified players at the time under contract with the other clubs.”5 
In order to understand the relationship between players and their teams more precisely, 
this is also a good time to note that the status of major league baseball players does not exactly 
translate into modern terms.  Although both the National League and American Association 
claimed the title of “major leagues,” other leagues, even if known officially as minor leagues, 
were not necessarily inferior.  In the twenty-first century, most minor league teams are members 
of an organization headed by a major league team.  The minor league team does not actually own 
its players, the major league team does, and the major league team controls the movement of 
those players throughout its organization.  This was not the case in the nineteenth century.  At 
that time, minor league teams did not affiliate with major league teams.  They were their own 
entities, had control of their own players and finances, and their leagues operated independently 
of major league baseball for the most part.  They might sell players to major league teams, but 
these sales were voluntary business transactions, not forced moves dictated by the major league 
teams.   
                                                                                                                                                             
schedules to bring in more revenue.  During the 1879 season, for instance, teams played, on 
average, 78 games against other league teams even though the league schedule stretched over 
more than 150 calendar days.  The off days from the league schedule allowed for travel and 
exhibition matches.  These exhibitions could be quite lucrative, especially when teams from the 
American Association played their counterparts in the National League, as in the yearly 
matchups between the St. Louis Browns and St. Louis Maroons or Philadelphia Quakers and 
Philadelphia Athletics. 
5 “A New Point” A.G. Mills, The Sporting Life, January 25, 1888, 1. 
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This meant that not all of the best baseball players were major league players in the 
1880s.  A high quality minor league featured many players who were every bit as good as most 
major league players were, and especially in the early 1880s, a few of these minor leagues 
offered their men comparable pay as well.  To cite one example, a sportswriter once asked 
Louisville Colonels owner Zach Phelps if he meant to acquire a pitcher from the Northwestern 
League during the winter of 1887 and 1888.  Phelps replied, “Well, no.  The Northwestern 
League pays higher salaries than the American Association does, and it is difficult to obtain a 
man from that body.  We are likely to look somewhere else.”6  This reality presented major 
league owners with a quandary.  What happened if one of their players, upset by the confinement 
of the reserve clause, decided to sign with a minor league team that offered him a similar salary 
but without the reserve clause to hold him in place from year to year?  The owners eventually 
arrived at the obvious answer: extend the reserve clause to include more players, and enter into 
agreements with minor leagues that required them to respect the reserve rule. 
This took some time, as the National League had several difficulties to overcome.  At 
first only five players per team fell under this provision, the rest retaining their traditional 
freedom to sign with the team of their choosing for each new season.  The teams selected which 
five men to reserve, and while the teams did not write the reservation into the player’s contract, 
eventually sports newspapers began publishing who the men were, so it was no secret.  In 1879, 
however, players in other leagues remained unaffected and, as mentioned previously, there were 
plenty of minor league teams that played very competitive baseball and paid reasonable salaries.  
Teams in these leagues were more than happy to acquire top talent and were under no obligation 
to respect the reserve lists of National League franchises.  The American Association was a case 
                                                 
6 “Falls City Gossip” J.A., The Sporting Life, November 16, 1887, 5. 
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in point.  In 1882, the Association announced its intention to compete with the National League 
as a major league and immediately began trying to lure National League players into its new 
circuit with generous contracts an no reserve clause.  It also offered the spectators of its games 
tickets for just twenty-five cents, as opposed to the NL, which had set ticket prices at fifty cents, 
in an effort to build its fan base, especially in cities where it competed directly with the League. 
National League owners eventually overcame these problems, however.  They achieved 
peace with the American Association in 1883, although at the cost of acknowledging the new 
league’s status as a fellow major league.  The nation’s economy appeared fully recovered from 
the Panic of 1873, and it appeared there might be room for more than one professional league 
after all, provided the leagues could minimize competition within cities through granting local 
monopolies.  Their agreement, signed after a meeting known as the Harmony Conference, also 
included one of the strongest minor leagues of the day, the Northwest League.  Under the 
Tripartite Pact, later known as the National Agreement, all three leagues agreed to abide by the 
reserve rule and respect each other’s player contracts.   
The Harmony Conference also established a blacklist for players who tried to flout the 
reserve clause by leaving their club in order to sign in leagues outside the National Agreement, 
and this combination of the National Agreement and the blacklist eliminated both of the primary 
routes by which players had previously escaped being reserved.  Not only was the blacklist 
public knowledge, as sporting papers such as The Sporting Life published who was on the list 
each week, but the terms of the blacklist were, like so many aspects of baseball’s disciplinary 
system, rather arbitrary.  By 1886, the American Association’s constitution, for instance, stated 
in Section 39 that the “Association may also in its discretion inflict upon any player such penalty 
as it may consider proper under the circumstances who at any time may have been guilty of 
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dishonorable action.”7   This included the potential of blacklisting them, of course.  The 
Harmony Conference also increased the number of players falling under the umbrella of the 
reserve clause.  Both the National League and the American Association upped the number of 
players each team could reserve to eleven, as the advantages that management obtained from the 
reserve system became more obvious.  Later, the number of reserves per team rose again, to 
twelve in 1886 and fourteen in 1887, which in this era meant essentially the team’s entire roster.8 
Teams did not hesitate to blacklist players, either.  In 1887, the American Association 
adjusted its rules to allow more latitude in applying the blacklist.  At its spring meeting, the 
Association’s moguls amended Section 33 of their constitution to read, “and in case any player 
under reserve shall willfully hold off and refuse to sign a regular contract with the club that has 
him reserved for the purpose of harassing the club, or compelling them to increase his salary . . . 
shall, on satisfactory evidence being furnished from the club so engaged, be placed upon the 
black-list . . .”  On paper, at least, players trying to hold out for more remuneration now risked 
losing their career and livelihood.9  Even Chicago’s Al Spalding, staunch supporter of the reserve 
though he was, thought the rule draconian.  “The American Association has gone altogether too 
far in passing a resolution to blacklist reserved players if they refuse to sign a contract.  That’s 
going too far and will be apt to cause trouble.”10  As F.H. Brunell pointed out, however, this was 
an about face on Spalding’s part, as were so many of his statements.  Just three years prior, he 
voted for the Day Amendment (along with other leading lights in the National League, such as 
                                                 
7 “Threetees’ Meditations” TTT, The Sporting Life, March 17, 1886, 2.  TTT was Baltimore 
sportswriter Albert Mott. 
8 Seymour, Baseball, 108-109; Thorn, Baseball in the Garden of Eden, 174-175.  A typical team 
of 1887 featured a starting eight players in the field, two or three substitute players, most of 
whom were catchers, and three regular pitchers with a fourth or fifth man pitching occasionally.  
People often called these extra pitchers “change pitchers.” 
9 “A Blow At The Dead-Heads” NA, The Sporting News, March 12, 1887, 1. 
10 “Base-Ball” NA, Chicago Daily Tribune, March 15, 1887, 3. 
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Day, of course, but also Arthur Soden of Boston) against the reserve clause jumpers to the Union 
Association, which stated, “all men reserved by a club party to the National Agreement, not 
reporting to the club reserving them by April 1, should be blacklisted, and club party to the 
National Agreement has any power to engage or reinstate such a player after April 1, 1884.”  
Spalding either had learned his lesson from 1884, or was being duplicitous.  Knowing Spalding’s 
character, either one was equally likely.  As Brunell put it, “It’s quite a nice thing to go back 
among the returns, when the League-ites hide their cloven feet and get on a gaudy platform of 
innocence and justice.”11 
Even among the teams of the Association, it was controversial.  Originally, only the New 
York Metropolitans opposed the resolution, largely due to the influence of manager O.P. Caylor, 
with Brooklyn and Cleveland wavering, but Chris Von der Ahe of St. Louis succeeded in 
pushing it through.12  The sporting press was mum on whether or not Von der Ahe had the 
backing of general Philip Sheridan on this measure, although the old soldier did attend the 
meeting, remarking favorably on the game and the fitness of baseball players for service should 
the need arise.13 
It seems that almost no one, outside of the six Association owners who voted for the 
amendment, thought the change for the better.  The Sporting Life minced no words in its 
description of the new rule, lambasting it as both illegal and stupid.  “As a matter of fact the 
amendment is altogether illegal alike in common law and under the National Agreement.  
Refusing to sign a contract is not an offence in any sense of the word, and therefore is not 
punishable, and any player blacklisted under the amendment would have ample cause for legal 
                                                 
11 “From Cleveland” F.H. Brunell, The Sporting Life, March 30, 1887, 4; “The Weak Spot” F.H. 
Brunell, The Sporting Life, April 20, 1887, 5. 
12 “The Association” F.H. Brunell, The Sporting Life, March 16, 1887, 1. 
13 “Chadwick’s Chat” Henry Chadwick, The Sporting Life, March 16, 1887, 3. 
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action.”  The owners trying to make the rule stick operated on the supposition that putting a 
player on the reserve list was the legal equivalent of signing him to a contract, and these men 
“fail to recognize there is a vast difference between the two, and that a player not under contract, 
although reserved, is not amenable to discipline. . . . The player so reserved is, of course, unable 
to sign elsewhere, but the reserving club has no control over him, and cannot discipline him in 
any way until he is under contract . . .”  Finally, the amendment injured the Association in the 
opinion of both the public and the players.  “Aside from the question of legality such a law will 
do the Association considerable harm, alike in public estimation and in the goodwill of the 
players, who have been hitherto, as a body, rather partial to the liberal Association.  The 
amendment to Section 33 is calculated to bring the Association into odium with players and 
public alike, and its adoption was contrary to good business policy.”14 
 By 1887, some baseball observers thought the practice of blacklisting might be obsolete, 
anyway, as “its primary object was the suppression of criminal crookedness, but it has been 
abused in its application to minor offenses” and they worried how it would stand up to a legal 
challenge, should such a challenge ever arise.  (In fact, one almost did.  In 1887, the 
Pennsylvania state legislature considered a bill to ban the practice.  As it only applied in 
Pennsylvania, however, and the penalties for violating the act were easy to evade and not very 
stiff, the bill made only the slightest of ripples in baseball circles.15)  Some also held the opinion 
that it was unnecessary for discipline, when fines could accomplish the same result without the 
negative side effect of the team losing the services of its blacklisted player.16  Despite such 
concerns, however, the practice continued.   
                                                 
14 “An Association Mistake” NA, The Sporting Life, March 16, 1887, 4. 
15 “Much Ado About Nothing” NA, The Sporting Life, March 9, 1887, 1. 
16 “From Baltimore” TTT, The Sporting Life, January 19, 1887, 2. 
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O.P. Caylor, one of the nation’s best-known sportswriters and also the sole delegate to 
the Association’s convention who voted against changing Section 33 to broaden the uses of the 
blacklist, was another who thought teams abused the proper use of the blacklist all too often.  
“There should be an application of that severe punishment only in case of extreme offences.  It is 
hardly probable that the cause of base ball with the public will be subserved or bettered by taking 
up the blacklist shackle every time a player gets a little unruly.  The law is already unpopular and 
it should be carefully guarded.”17  As a manager, Caylor certainly believed that players asked for 
extortionate salaries from time to time, but like Spalding, believed that the Association’s 
approach in this case was like fighting cancer with a chainsaw.  Another of the game’s venerable 
authorities, Philadelphia Quakers manager Harry Wright, sustained Caylor.  “I think this 
blacklisting business is being carried entirely too far, and has become so common that it has 
almost lost its terrors to the players.  To be effective it should be used only in cases where 
contracts had been deliberately broken, or where the player had been convicted of dishonest 
playing, and then I think it should be enforced fearlessly and finally.”18   
In Chicago, Harry Palmer agreed.  He called the Association’s decision “schoolboyish” 
and feared it had “brought down the earnest condemnation of all thinking friends of the national 
game.”  If enforced, it would “prove injurious to the interests of the game at large” and “foster 
the growth of elements most dangerous to the structure of our national game.”  Palmer stated it 
was no surprise that the ballplayers had formed a union (see chapter four) when faced with such 
heavy-handed action on the part of their employers.19  Fortunately, it only took a few weeks 
before the Association’s managers realized this Neanderthal approach to the salary question 
                                                 
17 “Caylor’s Screed” O.P. Caylor, The Sporting Life, March 16, 1887, 5. 
18 “Chadwick’s Chat” Henry Chadwick, The Sporting Life, March 30, 1887, 2. 
19 “From Chicago” Harry Palmer, The Sporting Life, March 30, 1887, 3. 
 42
would not answer.  “It will cause no trouble, for the reason that it will not be enforced.  The 
Association managers have tumbled to the blunder they made, and even if the amendment is not 
repealed it will become a dead letter.”20 
This was for the best, as even A.G. Mills, former National League president and one of 
the architects of the reserve rule in the first place, thought that such tyrannical behavior by 
management could only do damage to the game.  While pledging his continued allegiance to the 
reserve rule, “the mainstay of professional base ball,” he reminded readers that “the substance of 
the rule is that no club shall negotiate with a reserved player excepting only the club reserving 
him.”  The problem was,  
some club managers have negotiated with and made offers to players reserved by other 
clubs, thus committing a plain violation of the rule.  What has the aggrieved club 
manager done about it?  Has he taken his fraudulent partner by the throat and demanded 
that the penalty of a heavy fine or expulsion be adjudged against him?  Not at all.  Instead 
he has actually legislated to inflict upon the unoffending player the very punishment due 
the offending club manager . . . no possible excuse can be framed for this utterly unjust 
and suicidal scheme of blacklisting a player for refusing to contract with his club under 
the circumstances cited.21 
 
Abused or not, when combined with the reserve clause, the blacklist was a potent weapon 
in limiting the freedom of players to realize their free market value.  In using such measures, 
baseball owners were acting in imitation of the leaders of the business world.  Contrary to the 
views of some, it would be a misrepresentation to call the American economy of the late 
nineteenth century true free market or laissez faire capitalism.  Protective tariffs spared 
American industry from nearly all foreign competition.  Employers could count on the courts to 
rule in their favor in nearly all labor disputes, and in those cases when the plight of working 
people became so desperate that they struck anyway, state or national troops were usually 
                                                 
20 “It Will Not be Enforced” NA, The Sporting Life, March 30, 1887, 1. 
21 “Mills’ Views” A.G. Mills, The Sporting Life, April 6, 1887, 1. 
 43
available to put down this labor “unrest” and help employers break unions.  Government grants 
of vast portions of the public domain, most notably to transcontinental railroads, the brutal, 
inhuman, hellish prison labor system employed throughout the South, the peonage and debt 
slavery of the sharecropping system, the lack of laws regulating trusts, pools, and holding 
companies, the State Department’s willingness to interfere diplomatically and militarily in the 
affairs of foreign nations to protect US corporations, the list of distortions of a true free market 
economy goes on and on.   
Although its methods were markedly more peaceful than most, baseball surely ranks 
among the businesses most successful in disciplining labor and avoiding the vagaries of the free 
market.  Along with the reserve clause and the blacklist, it had fines, suspensions, temperance 
oaths, at times a salary limit, and the potential of release from a major league club.  Some teams 
even enforced bed checks on their players, and from the 1886 season forward, Al Spalding in 
Chicago hired Pinkerton detectives to ensure his players abstained from alcohol consumption.22  
Other owners did the same, on and off.  By 1886, both leagues required players to supply 
uniforms out of their own pockets, the Cincinnati Red Stockings of the American Association 
appearing relatively magnanimous when the club offered its players an additional uniform for 
road games at club expense in 1887.23  Teams achieved all of this through ownership’s control of 
player contracts, largely thanks to the reserve clause. 
 
* * * * * 
 
                                                 
22 Warren Goldstein, Playing for Keeps: A History of Early Baseball, (Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 1989), 150. 
23 “Notes and Comments” NA, The Sporting Life, March 17, 1886, 3; “Notes and Comments” 
NA, The Sporting Life, January 26, 1887, 3. 
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The legality of the reserve clause was something baseball observers debated.  In 1887, the 
Chicago Daily Tribune asked a prominent Chicago lawyer to examine the clause.  This man 
believed the clause itself unlawful, stating, “that National Agreement is simply a compact of a 
combination of men who are illegally trying to control the base-ball business of the country.  The 
reserve rule is clearly ultra vires, and any court will so decide.  Its operation is clearly illegal, 
and the only question is the remedy of the victim.”  He added,  
utterances as old as the days of Chief Justice Taney and the recent decisions of Justice 
Cowan in the boycott cases in New York have held that any effort to coerce the 
employment of an individual or individuals, or to put a territorial limitation on the 
services of an individual or individuals, is against the policy of the law, the spirit of the 
age, and the institutions which are dominant in the country in which we live.  With the 
law laid down so clearly there appears to be no reason why ball-players should submit to 
the operation of the reserve rule.24 
 
 At times, other players penned letters to the sporting press trying to make some of these 
same points.  For instance, the New York Sun printed an account from Boston Beaneaters second 
baseman Jack Burdock in February of 1887 where Burdock pleaded for his release from Boston.  
He was dissatisfied with his situation in the Hub City because of his general unpopularity with 
the cranks there, and claimed he could not play his best ball as a result.  Boston management had 
reserved him but not offered him a contract for 1887 as of early February, in essence threatening 
to lay him off without pay.  In his letter, Burdock stated, “The Boston Club has laid me off 
without pay, and I am now for sale, and cannot earn a dollar by playing base ball until I am sold.  
                                                 
24 “Base-Ball Sensations” NA, Chicago Daily Tribune, December 18, 1887, 16.  The Latin term 
ultra vires means “beyond the powers” and refers to when an organization exceeds the legal 
powers of the law. 
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If the Boston people want to get rid of me let them give me my release, so that I can earn my 
living.  If this is not slavery, what is?”25 
Interestingly, some observers noted from the beginning that, rather than increasing 
competitive balance, the reserve rule might weaken it.  In June of 1883, The Sporting Life stated 
its belief that the new, eleven-man reserve rule would not stand because the weaker teams of the 
league were struggling to fill their rosters with enough capable players.  It is also true that the 
owners could ignore the reserve rule, or more precisely the penalties for violating it, when doing 
so suited their purposes.  The best example of this came in the winter of 1884-1885.  In 1884, 
Henry Lucas, a wealthy St. Louis businessman, along with other financiers such as Baltimore 
mattress maker A.H. Henderson, organized a third league claiming major league status, and 
succeeded in luring a fair number of players, most notably Fred Dunlap, from the NL and AA 
into their new circuit, dubbed the Union Association (UA).26  Lucas believed the reserve rule an 
insult to American freedom, and refused to honor the contracts of players reserved by teams in 
the NL and AA.  The UA folded after the 1884 season, although Lucas survived the league’s 
demise and became the new owner of a St. Louis franchise in the NL for its 1885 season.  When 
the dust from the UA battle had settled, one question remained.  What should major league 
baseball do with the quality players who had jumped their contracts and joined the UA?   
At first, the National League was dead set against allowing these men back, and told 
Lucas that four key players (second baseman Fred Dunlap, outfielder George “Orator” Shafer, 
                                                 
25 “Why Burdock Has Played Poor Ball” Jack Burdock, The Sporting Life, February 9, 1887, 1.  
Another reason that Burdock played poor ball is that he was yet another player who struggled to 
keep up his guard against alcohol, frequently engaging in binge drinking.  For more, see his 
SABR biography at http://sabr.org/bioproj/person/834f6239, accessed June 30, 2014. 
26 Despite the claim of Lucas and some others that the Union Association was a true major 
league, and the fact that baseball histories tend to regard it as such, the actual talent level of the 
UA makes this classification hard to uphold.  See James, The New Bill James Historical Baseball 
Abstract, 21-34, for more on the quality of players in the 1884 UA. 
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outfielder Dave Rowe, and pitcher Charlie Sweeney) would not be allowed back into the 
National League on the new nine he planned to field for 1885.  Lucas complained that, as he was 
an accessory to these men breaking their contracts, and the National League had allowed him to 
join, it was unfair to impose a different penalty on the players.  He compared the situation of his 
players to that of Tony Mullane (see chapter three), who “has broken more contracts than he has 
fingers and toes, and still he is not blacklisted.  They are doing wrong, Sir.”27  The League 
eventually relented, and allowed some men, notably “One Arm” Hugh Dailey, Emil Gross, 
Dunlap, and Orator Shafer, to return upon paying a $500 fine, while “Pebbly” Jack Glasscock, 
Charlie Sweeney, Jim McCormick, and Frederick “Dupee” Shaw had to part with $1,000 to 
escape the blacklist.28  The difference, or so the League’s magnates claimed, was that the former 
quartet was merely guilty of jumping the reserve rule, while the second group of men broke their 
contracts.29 
The trouble was the National League owners had adopted the Day Resolution (after John 
Day, owner of the New York Gothams, who proposed it in November 1883) in March of 1884, 
stating that no blacklisted players could rejoin the NL.  The American Association adopted the 
same measure in December of 1883.  The NL owners passed the Day Resolution partly to 
discourage established players from jumping to the upstart league, and partly to prevent 
themselves from trying to lure any jumpers back with offers of better salaries than the UA teams 
were offering, thus rewarding the players for their opportunism.  A.G. Mills stated he “was never 
more earnest in his life than when he said that these players should never play with any club 
connected with the National Agreement.”  Once the UA was out of the picture and the danger 
                                                 
27 “Arranging the League Games” NA, New York Times, March 8, 1885, 2. 
28 “Lucas Triumphant” O.B.S., The Sporting Life, April 22, 1885, 3. 
29 “Base-Ball” NA, Chicago Daily Tribune, April 19, 1885, 11. 
 47
averted, however, club owners eventually relented and allowed some of the renegade players 
back under the financial terms outlined above.30  At least publicly, they did so only grudgingly.  
One unidentified magnate stated, “These men should be shown no mercy.  Why, I would not be 
the least bit surprised to hear of Craver and Nichols playing in some League club before the 
season closes.”  (The National League booted Bill Craver and Al Nichols from the game for life 
after they were involved in a gambling scheme in 1877.)31   Observers took note, the New York 
Sun offering,  
the League, comprising the most powerful clubs in the country, made a set of rules 
which, if any player broke, he was to be forbidden to play on any of the associated nines.  
A St. Louis nine, under the control of Mr. Lucas, was this year admitted to the league, 
and Mr. Lucas has also under engagement to him seven good players who, by breaking 
their contracts, have made themselves ineligible for a League club.  The curious part of it 
is that there is a very strong sentiment within the League itself in favor of relaxing its 
own rules and letting the contract breakers play.  Because these have all come together 
they make a first-rate nine, and consequently they would add interest to the struggle for 
the championship.32 
 
In true robber baron style, the League would not allow mere rules (even if they were the 
League’s own rules) to get in the way of maximizing profit.  “For look at it as you will the fact 
sticks out baldly that in this case principle has been surrendered to financial considerations,” 
wrote The Sporting Life, and “there are some things in this world better than filthy lucre, and the 
                                                 
30 Seymour, Baseball, 152-154.  Interestingly, the so-called Union War also spawned the first 
farm teams in baseball history, as the established leagues created “reserve teams” and played a 
regular schedule of games with an admission price of 25 cents, half of what the National League 
charged.  The purpose of these reserve teams was to both keep talented players and paying 
customers away from the Union Association, as well as keeping underperforming players on 
major league clubs in fear for their jobs.  They did not become a permanent fixture once the 
Union War was over, however, even though “Boss President” Chris Von der Ahe of the 
American Association’s St. Louis franchise suggested this possibility.  Ibid., 151-152.  The New 
York Giants also tried the idea for 1887, hoping to develop some of the city’s young talent for 
their benefit.  No Title, NA, The Sporting News, April 2, 1887, 4. 
31 “Baseball News” NA, New York Times, April 20, 1885, 8. 
32 “A Singular State of Affairs” NA, The Sporting Life, April 22, 1885, 5.   
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bending of the League to Mammon cannot fail to leave an unpleasant impression in the public 
mind.”33  These events also left a sour taste in the mouth of A.G. Mills, and following the 1885 
campaign, he resigned his honorary membership in the National League.34  Mills had done all in 
his power to prevent the reinstatement of these men, and on two occasions prior to April of 1885, 
he had participated in a unanimous vote among National League owners stating that the League 
would not reinstate them.  Mills also pointed out that the “fines” applied to the men were not 
even paid by the players themselves, but rather that their new teams covered their “fines” for 
them once they signed National League contracts.35 
Others disagreed, however, the Chicago Daily Tribune believing that, “the action of the 
league . . . will be commended and approved of by impartial lovers of the game throughout the 
country.  St. Louis will now be able to enter the championship season with a strong team . . .”36  
National League owners parroted this same line in their official explanation of why they finally 
chose reinstatement.  They wanted to strengthen St. Louis so that the Maroons could make a 
stronger showing for 1885, which meant more money for all.  Owner John Day of New York 
said the League was “forced” to reinstate the players for this very reason.  “I was not in 
sympathy with these men, and I proved that by suggesting a heavy fine.  The Directors viewed 
the affair in a business light, and found that by having a strong team in St. Louis it would benefit 
every nine in the association.  St. Louis is one of the best baseball cities in the country, and it 
was a matter of dollars and cents for us to have a strong League team there.”37 
                                                 
33 “The League’s Flop” NA, The Sporting Life, April 22, 1885, 6. 
34 “Discordant Clubs” NA, The Sporting Life, November 25, 1885, 1.  For a full discussion of the 
events surrounding the Day Resolution and the threat of the Union Association in 1884, please 
see “Base Ball History” A.G. Mills, The Sporting Life, June 13, 1888, 2. 
35 “Base Ball History” A.G. Mills, The Sporting Life, June 13, 1888, 2. 
36 “Base-Ball” NA, Chicago Daily Tribune, April 19, 1885, 11. 
37 “Baseball News” NA, New York Times, April 20, 1885, 8. 
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* * * * *  
 
 Following the successful skirmish with the Union Association in 1884, the magnates of 
the game continued to revise and refine the reserve clause in order to bolster their control of the 
players and fatten their wallets.  In the off season of 1885, the League and the Association met to 
modify the reserve clause to “better control the players,” and “to control and retain the players 
now under contract therewith, in order to shut off the ruinous competition which has been the 
main cause of the excessively large salaries . . .”  Their plan called for modifying the release rule, 
in this case by allowing other clubs to bid for any player released from their present team, rather 
than allowing that player to sign with the team of his choosing, or even a team in another league 
who might offer better pay.38  A Board of Arbitration, consisting of NL representatives Nick 
Young, John Day, and Arthur Soden of Boston, and Association owners Charles Byrne of 
Brooklyn, Zack Phelps of Louisville, and Chris Von der Ahe of St. Louis, would adjudicate any 
questions arising regarding the legality of operations.   
Another adjustment included in this gentleman’s agreement, as mentioned above, was 
that each league now reserved its players, rather than the individual teams.  The leagues intended 
this measure to ensure that NL and AA teams would avoid the temptation to bid for each other’s 
players, thus driving salaries higher as the two leagues competed for top talent.  It also meant 
that, should a team disband operations, their players would remain reserved, rather than being 
free to sign where they wished, as would happen with Kansas City and St. Louis before the 1887 
                                                 
38 “The Baseball Compact”, NA, The Sporting Life, October 28, 1885, 1.  For more details on the 
technicalities of the release rule as finally adopted, see page 1 of The Sporting Life for either 
November 25, 1885 (National League) or December 2, 1885 (American Association). 
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season.  Furthermore, they agreed to honor the contracts of the various minor leagues, but only 
after a period from October 20 through December 8 in which League and Association teams 
could sign such players freely.39  One writer described this last provision by writing “after we 
have robbed you of all your desirable men, you can come into the fold and nobody shall harm 
you.”40  Another, describing the Eastern League, opined, “as soon as there is no material left in 
the League worth having, the giant monopolies will extend the right hand of fellowship to the 
young organization and give it the protection of the National Agreement.”41  H.B. Bennett, 
former president of the Union Association and now director of the minor league Washington 
Nationals club, echoed these views, stating, “It’s a clean steal. . . . They are going to shake the 
tree, gather all of the best fruit, shoot us if we attempt to get near and give us all that is left 
rotting on the ground after they have gone through.  Such generosity would make a crocodile 
weep.”42 
Bennett was right to fear the outcome of such a rule.  In the 1885 off-season alone, major 
league teams deprived him of a stable of quality players.  During the 1885 season, Bennett had 
contemplated making a move for major league status in 1886, hoping the Association might find 
his club attractive.  By the end of November, however, things appeared bleak.  The Baltimore 
Orioles swooped in and pilfered pitcher Abner Powell, catcher Chris Fulmer, and 
infielder/outfielder Buster Hoover.  The Louisville Colonels signed away infielder Bill White 
                                                 
39 “The Arbitration Committee” NA, The Sporting Life, October 28, 1885, 1; “The Reserves” 
NA, The Sporting Life, October 28, 1885, 1. 
40 “Diamond Drift,” NA, The Sporting Life, October 28, 1885, 4. 
41 “Hub Gleanings” Mugwump, The Sporting Life, November 18, 1885, 3.   
42 “Bennett Unloads” NA, The Sporting Life, November 4, 1885, 2.  While it is certainly possible 
that Bennett held a grudge against the established leagues, considering his experience with the 
UA, this sentiment appears a general one amongst minor league officials. 
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from his roster as well.43  While none of this quartet exactly dominated in 1886, the best being 
Fulmer’s work in Baltimore, they surely would have been an improvement over what the 
Nationals fielded that season.  This was all the more tragic because, ironically, Bennett’s 
Nationals did gain major league status for 1886, although with the National League rather than 
the American Association.  Putting a brave face on his plight, he claimed that the franchise was 
profitable, and that it saw an average attendance of 1,600 fans for the prior two seasons as well.44  
It worked, and Washington joined the National League to take Buffalo’s place, but with so few 
capable players left, the Nationals stumbled to a miserable 28-92 record, including twelve 
consecutive losses at one point.  Their lineup, with the singular exception of terrific outfielder 
Paul Hines, was dismal.  Aside from Hines, no regular player managed to hit the league average, 
with third baseman Buck Gladmon compiling a dreadful .138/.201/.230 batting split. 
The Nationals were so weak a team that some observers offered an extreme explanation 
for their incompetence: opium smoking.  “No man can ‘hit the pipe’ and play ball, too; he must 
give up one or the other.  There are at least two members of the Washington Club who are 
regular patrons of a Georgetown opium ‘joint.’ . . .  If manager Scanlon wishes their names for 
his own information we are prepared to furnish him with the proof.”45  Furthermore, “one of 
them is a great favorite with Washington audiences, and if the fact were generally known that he 
is a slave to this vile habit we have no doubt that he would be driven in disgrace from the club.  
                                                 
43 “From the Capitol” NA, The Sporting Life, November 11, 1885, 1. 
44 “From the Capital” RHW, The Sporting Life, November 18, 1885, 1.  RHW were the initials of 
correspondent R.H. Wood, also known as WUD.  He wrote for The Sporting Life until 1887 
when, surprisingly given the information detailed in chapter eight, he gave up writing and 
attempted to become an umpire.  This did not go as planned, however, and by July of 1888, he 
was a minor league manager instead.  “Toledo Fires Frank Mountain” NA, The Sporting News, 
July 21, 1888, 1. 
45 “Notes and Comments” NA, The Sporting Life, August 4, 1886, 5. 
 52
If those two men continue to indulge in this thing we shall deem it a duty to admirers of base-ball 
to print their names.”46 
Other minor league teams fared no better than the soon-to-be major league Nationals.  
Haverhill of the Eastern New England League (ENEL) lost promising pitcher Ledell 
“Cannonball” Titcomb to Philadelphia, while Al Spalding swooped in and netted John “Jocko” 
Flynn (for a salary rumored at $3,000, no less) from the ENEL Lawrence club to be the third 
pitcher for his White Stockings.47  What made all this hard to stomach for these minor league 
clubs, besides the obvious fact that they were losing their quality players, was the double 
standard of major league baseball’s owners.  One justification often given by major league teams 
for the reserve rule was that if a team invested in a young player, nurtured him and trained him 
so that he eventually developed into a quality performer, the reserve rule would protect that team 
from losing the now-established player as soon as someone willing to open their wallet and offer 
the player more money came calling.  Yet, this was exactly what major league teams were doing 
to minor league ones.  Minor league teams also signed, developed, and brought along young 
talent, yet as soon as a major league team willing to offer $3,000 for a Jocko Flynn came along, 
they were helpless to match offers from clubs with greater financial firepower such as the 
Chicago White Stockings.  As the Southern League correspondent for The Sporting Life wrote, 
“if a club takes the trouble and goes to the expense of developing a young player, there is no 
reason why they should not receive some benefit for the same, either by being permitted to retain 
his services or be paid for his release.”  This led him to conclude, “the minor leagues should have 
the reserve rule, at least within themselves. . . . When a manager hits upon such a combination he 
is fortunate indeed, and should be permitted to hold his combination together . . . it was this that 
                                                 
46 “Diamond Dust” NA, Chicago Daily Tribune, August 4, 1886, 3. 
47 “Hub Gleanings” Mugwump, The Sporting Life, November 18, 1885, 3. 
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brought the reserve rule into existence, and if it was necessary to the League and Association it is 
just as necessary to the minor leagues.”48 
 While a few writers offered support and justification for these measures allowing major 
league teams to raid minor league rosters for talent, not all their sports reporting brethren were so 
charitable.  For instance, the Fall River News of Massachusetts lamented that the agreement 
offered no protection to ball clubs outside of the National Agreement, leaving minor league 
outfits vulnerable to the vultures of the League and Association swooping in to snatch their top 
players at inopportune moments for the hometown team.  It further derided the major league 
teams with their “poverty stricken but bursting treasury,” and opined that no jury in America 
would uphold the legality of the reserve clause.49  The Sporting Life even editorialized that the 
teams themselves were to blame for their self-proclaimed financial straits, shining its spotlight on 
the League’s policy of charging 50 cents for admission, thereby reducing attendance.  “This 
fifty-cent tariff is the millstone that has been dragging the League down slowly but surely, and 
the League leaders have not been slow to recognize the fact.  But pride has rebelled against a 
reduction.  The ability to exact and command a higher rate has always been considered a mark of 
superiority over all other organizations,” but, “these arguments, once potent, will no longer bear 
discussion.”  The Association, on the other hand, with its 25-cent tickets,  
has from its inception held to the lower tariff, which indeed has been the main element of 
success, and has in a great degree contributed to the widespread and remarkable revival 
of interest in the National game.  The lower rate has popularized the game in that it has 
brought it within the reach of thousands who were unable to meet the demands of the 
League, and thus gave the game the go-by altogether. . . . If, all things being equal, the 
one body can exist and flourish by offering a first-class entertainment at twenty-five cents 
why should another body exact and receive double that amount for an entertainment not a 
whit better? 
 
                                                 
48 “Minor League Claims” Creole, The Sporting Life, October 5, 1887, 1. 
49 “Don’t Believe It” NA, The Sporting Life, October 28, 1885, 2. 
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The League’s answer to this, as described in chapter one, was monopoly.  Instead of allowing 
multiple teams in the same market and being at the mercy of competition, so that market 
conditions determined the ideal ticket price, it chose to limit each city in major league baseball to 
one team, continue charging fifty cents for admission, and compensate for reduced attendance by 
slashing player salaries.50  Only the Philadelphia Quakers had the League’s permission to charge 
twenty-five cents, because Philadelphia was the one city where the League and Association both 
fielded teams.51   
 
* * * * * 
 
Although the reserve clause did not actually appear in player contracts until 1887, the 
language found in player contracts already leaned heavily towards ownership’s side, to say the 
least.  Through the 1887 season, all contracts in the American Association, for instance, 
contained the following provisions: 
 
1. The player will play base ball and render all services connected therewith that may be required 
of him by the club from date of same to a certain day. 
 
2. The player agrees to give his exclusive services to the club during said period, and not to play 
with any other club without consent of his club; that he will not conspire or attempt to lose any 
game, nor willingly contribute or aid in the same; that he will not be interested in any pool or 
wager on any game, but will at all times during said period render his best service to the club. 
                                                 
50 “Bend or Break” NA, The Sporting Life, November 4, 1885, 5. 
51 “Home Rule” NA, The Sporting Life, November 25, 1885, 2. 
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3. That during all of said period he will well and truly perform all duties that may be assigned by 
the club or its officers; that he will well and truly serve the club in such capacities or positions 
for play that may be assigned him from time to time, as often and in such manner as may seem 
fit to the club; and will yield cheerful and prompt obedience to all directions of the club, and 
hold himself subject to its orders at all times during said period. 
 
4. The player shall strictly obey and comply with all regulations that are, or may be, adopted by 
the club for the government of its employees, and also obey and be subject to the constitution 
and rules of the American Association. 
 
5. The player will absolutely refrain from drunkenness and all and any excess or dissipation 
whatever, from gambling in any form, and from all conduct or behavior dishonorable, 
disreputable, or contrary to the spirit of the rules and regulations which have been, or may be, 
instituted and made by the club; and that he will use his best endeavor to protect and keep his 
health, strength and skill as a base ball player during the term of his employment by the club. 
 
6. The player assumes all risks of accident or injury in play or otherwise and of illness from 
whatever cause, and of the effects of all accidents, injuries or illness occurring to him during said 
period. 
 




8. It is mutually agreed by the club and player, that should the player at any time or times, or in 
any manner fail to comply with the covenants and agreements above, or any of them, or with any 
of the rules and regulations of the American Association, or with the rules and regulations of the 
club, which now are or may hereafter from time to time be made or instituted, or should the 
player at any time or times be careless, indifferent, or conduct himself in such a manner as to 
injure or prejudice the interests of the club, or should the player become ill or otherwise unfit, 
from any cause whatever in the judgment of the club, to fulfill in a satisfactory manner the duties 
which may be required of him, and thereupon, the club shall have the right to discipline, suspend 
or discharge the player, as to it shall seem fit; and the club shall be the sole judge as to the 
sufficiency of the reason for such said discipline, suspension or discharge. 
 
9. The player agrees to provide himself with uniform and keep it in repair.  After all the above 
the club agrees: 
 
10. That in consideration of the full and complete performance of the above agreements it will 
pay the player the sum of _____ dollars, at the rate of _____ dollars per month, so long as the 
contract remains in force.  Upon condition that deductions shall be made for all suspensions, 
fines, etc., and that the player shall only be paid until the time of his discharge for any cause.52 
 
                                                 
52 “Players’ Contracts” Veteran, The Sporting Life¸ November 3, 1886, 5.  “Veteran” was the pen 
name of Jimmy Williams, who managed the St. Louis Browns in 1884 and the Cleveland Blues 
in 1887 and 1888.  His team did well in his short stint with the Browns, winning 51 against 33 
defeats, but his second try was not so favorable.  Cleveland went 59-136 in his time at their 
helm, though as a new team in the American Association in 1887, the Blues were not 
overflowing with talent. 
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 A few things stand out upon analysis of the contract terms, beside the obvious one that of 
the ten clauses, nine required certain actions of the players, and only one required action of the 
clubs, and then only in the case that the player fulfilled all nine other clauses first.  Both clause 
two and clause five, for example, attempt to prohibit gambling by the players.  We can assume 
that such language would not appear in the contract if gambling were not a potential problem.  
Clearly, team owners saw gambling on games by players as a major concern in the present, the 
recent past, or both.  Clauses three and four, while they seem obvious enough (the player should 
perform the duties required and obey the team rules) are vague enough to allow enough leeway 
for the club to find fault with any number of things a player might or might not do.  What 
constitutes cheerful and prompt obedience, for example?  In addition, by requiring the player to 
comply with regulations the club might adopt in the future, however onerous, these parts of the 
contract allowed for an array of potential disputes. 
 The rest of the fifth clause might bring a hearty laugh, considering the number of players 
who observed this rule only in the breach.  (See chapter six.)  It made good sense for the clubs to 
attempt this, of course, as intoxicated players cost all teams games over the course of the season, 
but the fact that each club enforced the rule differently, and often arbitrarily, in many cases did 
more harm than good.  Clause six is rather harsh by the standards of the early twenty-first 
century, but this was standard during the 1880s.  In many, possibly most, lines of employment, 
the law stated that workers assumed the risks of their job when accepting employment.  The 
reasoning was that workers knew the risks of injury when they took a position, and if injury 
occurred while on the job, it was their responsibility.  
 In fact, some teams enforced this rule harshly, others less so.  For instance, the 
Philadelphia Athletics docked the pay of stalwart pitcher Bobby Mathews during the 1886 
 58
season when he suffered from a sore arm.  The Athletics laid him off without pay while he 
recuperated.  He started just two games after July 21, and his club denied him $541 due to 
inactivity.53  After the season ended, Mathews tried to retaliate by refusing to sign a contract for 
1887 until the club paid him back the money it withheld in 1886.  While the team held out 
against his demands, he began coaching a college team to bring in some cash while waiting for 
his employer to see the light.54  Management refused to budge, with team official Billy Sharsig 
making the case that not only did Mathews provide no value while hurt, but that after returning 
he appeared just three times while receiving $600 compensation for those three appearances.55  
This was a truly unfortunate situation, as Mathews, who participated in the original 
National League season back in 1876, had given the Athletics quality service for several years, 
winning exactly 30 games three years straight, 1883-1885, while averaging more than 400 
innings pitched over the three seasons prior to his 1886 arm troubles.  Clearly, he was not one to 
shirk legitimate duty.  Mathews was also probably an even better pitcher than observers of the 
1880s gave him credit for.  Recalling that the three things pitchers can control are walks allowed, 
strikeouts, and home runs allowed, Mathews excelled in two of these three categories.  Twice he 
led his league in fewest walks allowed per nine innings, and he led his league in most strikeouts 
per nine innings in four different seasons.  Between 1882 and 1885, he posted his league’s best 
ratio of strikeouts to walks in three of the four seasons.  He finally signed a contract for 1887 in 
late March, although sadly, the sporting press did not specify whether he got his money back or 
                                                 
53 For more on Bobby Mathews, see his SABR biography at 
http://sabr.org/bioproj/person/e7ad641f, accessed July 4, 2014; “Local News” NA, The Sporting 
Life, February 9, 1887, 5.  This man is surely the least known pitcher in baseball history with 297 
or more wins. 
54 “The Quaker City” NA, The Sporting News, February 19, 1887, 1; “The Philadelphia Players” 
NA, The Sporting News, March 5, 1887, 1. 
55 “Philadelphia News” NA, The Sporting Life, March 16, 1887, 5. 
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not, saying only that Mathews reached an “amicable adjustment” with the club.  Later reports 
indicated, however, that he got the money due him.56  Sharsig did not hold a grudge, apparently, 
stating that Mathews’ velocity was as good as ever, as was his arm, and that he could probably 
pitch three times per week if needed.57   
As it turned out, however, 1887 was the final campaign for Mathews.  His arm was not 
actually in very good condition, and he toiled only seven games for the club before leaving major 
league baseball as a player at the end of the season.  He did appear on the diamond in 1888, but 
as a coach for the younger pitchers the Athletics employed that year.  He claimed that with the 
new rules (the number of strikes required to strike out a batter changed from four to three that 
winter) he would be as effective as of old, but was unable to persuade the Athletics to let him 
appear in the pitcher’s box one more year.58 
The 1887 situation in New York concerning first baseman Dave Orr was like that of 
Mathews, but even less clear-cut.  The team fined the burly first baseman in September when he 
sat out some games.  Orr claimed illness and a lame arm, but as team executive O.P. Caylor 
explained, “he was not too ill, however, to get into a row at home and whip an officer, 
whereupon I telegraphed for him to report at Cleveland, which he failed to do on account of a 
lame arm.  I found that the lame arm was due to a fall down stairs during the fight mentioned.”  
Caylor concluded, “as he was not injured in the discharge of his duty there was no reason why he 
should be paid for his loss of time and I justly mulcted him.  Thereupon he became abusive and 
                                                 
56 “Spalding and His Surplus Players” NA, Chicago Daily Tribune, November 3, 1887, 6. 
57 “Philadelphia News” NA, The Sporting Life, March 30, 1887, 5. 
58 “The Quaker City Players” Redart, The Sporting News, February 25, 1888, 1.  In the 1880s, 
unlike today, the pitcher pitched from a box marked out on the field, rather than from a pitcher’s 
mound. 
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his suspension followed.”59  Both Orr, and the New York Court of Special Sessions, had a 
different view of things.  He claimed he had been injured at his boarding house at 241 East 112th 
Street on August 16 while defending his landlady against drunken assault on the part of the 
lawyer serving her with divorce papers.  In Orr’s effort to remove the offender from the 
premises, both men fell down the stairs and Orr sustained injuries to his arm, thumb, and ankle.  
After the landlady, Mrs. Heinzel, corroborated his story, the courts immediately discharged Orr, 
thus clearing his name.  The fine still stood, however.60  Despite this fact, Orr may still have 
gotten the best of things in the end.  Early in 1888, New York sportswriter George Stackhouse 
spotted the hefty first baseman near City Hall Park, with none other than recent divorcee Emily 
Heinzel on his arm.61 
Perhaps the reason that Caylor suspected Orr of falsifying his status was that such 
behavior was in keeping with Orr’s reputation.  For example, in 1888 he again told his team 
(now the Brooklyn Bridegrooms) that he could not take the field because of an injured foot.  
When Brooklyn dispatched its team physician, Dr. McLean, to evaluate Orr’s condition, McLean 
found Orr away from home, and his new landlady told the doctor she thought he had gone to 
Coney Island for the day.  This behavior was trebly frustrating to Bridegrooms management, as 
Orr was a terrific player, and the team’s captain, and the team’s opponent that day was the team 
the second place Bridegrooms were trying to catch in the standings, the St. Louis Browns.  The 
result was that, once again, Orr’s team attempted to make the big first baseman respect its 
authority.  “Dave Orr, the captain of the team, is no longer acting in that capacity.  In fact he is 
                                                 
59 “The New York Clubs” NA, The Sporting Life, September 14, 1887, 1. 
60 “David Orr As A Bouncer” NA, Chicago Daily Inter Ocean, October 28, 1887, 2. 
61 “New York Mention” George Stackhouse, The Sporting Life, January 11, 1888, 4. 
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not even playing on the nine, neither is he drawing any salary.  He has been suspended without 
pay until he concludes to play ball and discontinue monkey-shines.”62 
The 1888 case featuring Detroit Wolverine right fielder Sam Thompson was not cloudy 
in the least.  The big outfielder hurt himself early in the season and played in only fifty-six 
games for the year.  In late July, tired of seeing their great player sitting out games, Detroit 
decided to lay him off without pay until he was ready to perform once more.  Thompson 
threatened to sue them to recover his pay.63  He later tried to go back into the outfield, but his 
arm injury was so severe that he could barely throw the ball to an infielder, thus providing 
indisputable evidence that his ailment was quite real. 
 Not all teams chose a hard line on this issue, however, and sometimes, those clubs 
showing more understanding towards their players realized all the benefits that came from 
treating their men magnanimously.  Consider the case of Henry Boyle.  Pitching for the St. Louis 
Maroons of the National League in 1886, he had a wonderful, but shortened, season, as 
“Handsome Henry” led the NL in ERA.  Because of an arm injury, however, he pitched in just 
25 games (and because of weak offensive support, won 9 games against 15 defeats despite his 
low ERA) that year, working 210 innings.  When it came time to discuss salary for 1887, the St. 
Louis club offered him a moderate raise, but a salary not quite commensurate with leading the 
league in earned run average.  Boyle signed anyway, out of gratitude for the fact that the team 
had continued paying him as usual while hurt.64 
Whatever his other faults may have been, St. Louis Browns owner Chris Von der Ahe 
also took this liberal approach to his injured players.  In 1887, when top pitcher Dave Foutz and 
                                                 
62 “A Turn-Up At Brooklyn” George Stackhouse, The Sporting Life, August 8, 1888, 1. 
63 “Detroit Dotlets” MAT, The Sporting Life, August 1, 1888, 5.  MAT was Charles Matheson, 
sporting editor of the Detroit Free Press. 
64 “From St. Louis” Joe Prtichard, The Sporting Life, March 30, 1887, 2. 
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frontline catcher Doc Bushong suffered injuries, Von der Ahe continued paying them on 
schedule.  The fact that this earned him praise from the sporting press indicates that not all, 
perhaps even not most, owners did the same.65  The Baltimore Orioles also realized the 
advantages of this strategy in 1888.  On August 14, 1887, one of their catchers, Chris Fulmer, 
injured his finger to the extent he could not catch another game that season.  The Orioles 
continued delivering regular paychecks to their incapacitated backstop.  When it came time to 
sign a contract for the next season, Fulmer said, “I have been treated fairly, and even generously, 
and I appreciate it.  Last season I was the last to sign; this year I am going to be the first.  So give 
me a pen and shoot out that contract.”  The Orioles did so, and signed their man on the spot.66 
Even umpires might face this dilemma at times.  Being an umpire was extremely 
dangerous, given the primitive state of protective equipment in the 1880s, and sometimes injuries 
occurred on the job due to foul tips and stray pitches.  One umpire, named Cuthbert (probably 
Ned Cuthbert, a former outfielder of the 1870s and 1880s), even went so far as to sue the 
American Association in 1887 for back pay, claiming he sustained an injury on the job that was 
so bad he could not stand up.  He wired Association president Wheeler Wikoff, asking for a 
substitute until he could recuperate and resume his duties.  Wikoff proceeded to fine Cuthbert for 
not reporting for his next umpiring assignment, then fire him when Cuthbert protested the fine.  
The bewildered man stated, “when I return to St. Louis next week I propose to see whether a 
contract is a contract.  I was injured in the discharge of my duty, gave notice in time for the 
appointment of a substitute, and was released without explanation and without cause in addition 
to being illegally fined.”67  (Sportswriter F.H. Brunell, however, responded to Cuthbert’s claim 
                                                 
65 “From St. Louis” Joe Prtichard, The Sporting Life, September 7, 1887, 4. 
66 “Baltimore Budget” TTT, The Sporting Life, April 11, 1888, 2. 
67 “A Little More Trouble” NA, The Sporting Life, September 21, 1887, 1. 
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by writing, “the Association ought to set up his incompetency as a defense.  That’s surely a cause 
for his removal.”)68 
 In addition to the issue of paying players while hurt in the line of duty, another part of the 
American Association contract that is interesting is clause seven.  This clause, that players must 
keep informed on changes in rules and regulations, seems obvious and straightforward enough, 
but recall that many Americans of the late nineteenth century were illiterate.  (This is one reason 
that the political parties of the day developed symbols to stand for their party, so that illiterate 
voters would know which candidates to cast their ballots for.)  This was also, of course, nearly a 
century before baseball players had player agents to deal with legal matters for them.  As a 
result, for many players, this clause was much more difficult than it appears on the surface.   
 Finally, clause eight is probably the most questionable of all.  After wading through the 
excessive verbiage, it states, essentially, that clubs can discharge players whenever they want to 
and for whatever reasons they wish, and that the players have no appeal, whatever the 
circumstances of the case might be.  This clause, above all the others, disturbed many players.  
No matter how many faithful years of service they had supplied their team, how strong their 
performance, how valuable their skills might be, or how large an offer of salary they might 
receive from another ball club, their team had complete control over their future.  Because of the 
reserve clause, they could not leave their club under any circumstances, while the club could let 
them go at any time and for any reason. 
 Following the 1887 season, American Association owners Charles Byrnes of Brooklyn 
and Zack Phelps of Louisville, both lawyers, put their heads together to work out a new contract 
                                                 
68 “From Cleveland” F.H. Brunell, The Sporting Life, September 28, 1887, 5.  Regrettably, the 
sporting press sometimes identified people by last name only, and so in some cases, I have been 
unable to discover the first names of some of the more obscure people mentioned in the press. 
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that they hoped would make it more “legal and binding.”  (The language of this new contract is 
in Appendix D.)  The improvements, from the owners’ point of view, amounted to the fact that 
all the individual acts the earlier contract attempted to legislate against, gambling, drinking, and 
so forth, now fell within the purview of one clause, with the terms remaining so vague that the 
powers thereby granted to the team could encompass almost any action on the part of the player.  
The extra legal verbiage and terminology also must have intimidated the average player, whose 
level of literacy might not be up to par with understanding all the legalisms replacing the simpler 
and more direct language of the earlier contract. 
 
* * * * *  
 
Its legality and terms aside, the issue of the need for a reserve clause and its justifications 
is an important one.  Its supporters cited several reasons for its necessity, outside of the obvious 
financial ones.  Probably the most common of these reasons was that the reserve clause would 
bring player salaries more in line with what a typical worker made.  The players, so the argument 
went, were workers, but because they only worked two hours per day for about seven months of 
the year, there was no reason they should pull down an extravagant salary.  A related argument 
was that because players only “worked” at baseball six or seven months of the year, and were 
free to take “regular” jobs in the off season, their clubs were not obligated to pay them a salary 
that would support the player for an entire year, only the portion of it they spent playing ball.  
National League president Nick Young also offered, echoing the views of the liberal reformers 
of the 1870s, that it was pointless to pay high wages to the players, because the players simply 
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squandered those wages on gambling and drink.  Paying lower wages, so that players had little 
disposable income with which to dissipate themselves, was thus the morally correct thing to do.69 
The reserve clause’s role in maintaining competitive balance between the teams was 
another frequently offered justification.  Without the clause, defenders argued, the richer teams 
would be able to corral the most expensive talent, and eventually fan interest in the poorer teams 
would decline to such a level that those teams would have to cease play because they would be 
broke, leaving the wealthiest teams with no one to play.  Therefore, the reserve clause was 
necessary because it worked to the benefit of both players and owners by creating franchise 
stability and maintaining a stable collection of teams.70 
                                                 
69 Seymour, Baseball, 106.  One great flaw in these arguments, besides the fact that a player 
deserves whatever the market will pay him for his talents, is that people playing professional 
sports have but a limited time to capitalize on and make money from their talent.  The careers of 
sports figures rarely last beyond the mid-30s of the performer, and so an athlete must make the 
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70 The fact that, by 1891, the structure of the National League would remain unchanged until the 
1960s, described in the previous chapter, might seem solid proof of this argument.  However, it 
is also true that, mathematically speaking, baseball has been more competitive since the advent 
of free agency in the 1970s than it was during the reserve clause era.  Bill James calculates the 
level of competition in his index of competitive balance (a higher percentage means more 














All percentages taken from James, The New Bill James Historical Baseball Abstract, 13, 39, 57, 
75, 97, 124, 148, 200, 224, 252, 279, 298, 311.  It is also important to note that the greater 
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Originally, it appears that not all players were against the concept of the reserve rule.  
After all, it did guarantee a job for the following season.  In 1882, NL president Hulbert stated, 
“on the contrary, they are all anxious to be reserved, and their only fear is that they won’t be.”71  
One of Hulbert’s successors as National League president, A.G. Mills, even tried to portray the 
rule as a measure to protect the players, stating, “the course of professional base-ball playing in 
this country is strewn with the wrecks of clubs which have undertaken to carry a salary list they 
were utterly unequal to, resulting, of course, in the high priced players being stranded in mid-
season, with considerable amounts due them by such clubs, which they have never yet 
received.”72 
Whether or not these sentiments are actually true, and their veracity must be somewhat 
suspect given the sources, by the middle 1880s, the players realized clearly enough that the 
reserve clause was a potent weapon in ownership’s arsenal.  The owners imitated those in the 
business world who proclaimed, as true believers in the free labor ideology, that the interests of 
labor and capital were identical.73  Some sports publications and writers agreed, such as Francis 
Richter, the editor of The Sporting Life, who announced, “The intention of The Sporting Life is to 
always treat with equal fairness, and to offer good advice to, both classes, club-owners and 
                                                                                                                                                             
stability of the game following 1890 reflects other measures taken by the leagues to promote 
continuity.  For instance, in January 1886 the National League implemented a policy requiring 
all new clubs to deposit $5,000 with the league president as surety for “the contractual relations 
between the several members of the League.”  The teams also provided each other with mutual 
bonds for the same purpose, also to the sum of $5,000.  “Eight Clubs” NA, The Sporting Life, 
January 20, 1886, 1.  “The League” NA, The Sporting Life, March 10, 1886, 1, describes this 
policy in detail. 
71 Quoted in Seymour, Baseball, 108. 
72 Quoted in Goldstein, Playing for Keeps, 149. 
73 For a full description of this ideology, see, for example, Eric Foner, Free Soil, Free Labor, 
Free Men: The Ideology of the Republican Party Before the Civil War, (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1995), and for the many ways in which this ideology had become outdated by 
the 1870s and 1880s, also see Eric Foner, A Short History of Reconstruction, (New York: Harper 
& Rowe, 1990). 
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players, capital and labor.”  This was because “Just as in any other branch of business where 
wages are paid, either class is helpless without the other, and these foolish articles which tend to 
embitter ball players against their employers, rank with the dangerous and inflammatory 
editorials to workingmen in socialistic and labor-reform journals.”74   
In most cases, however, the players were not buying it.  They, in opposition to the 
owners, could produce many reasonable arguments to bolster their case.  First, the idea of a 
white man being unable to work for whom he pleased, and being unable to leave that 
employment when he pleased, seemed distinctly un-American.75  Even owners and their 
supporters admitted as much in their more candid moments, although quickly following with 
justifications for why the reserve rule was necessary all the same.  As to ensuring competitive 
balance, the fact that the New York Yankees won 20 world championships and made nine other 
appearances in the World Series during the reserve clause era would indicate that it did not 
hinder the wealthier franchises too greatly.  The New York Giants added five more 
championships, and sixteen total playoff appearances, from the inception of the World Series, in 
1903, until 1975 when the courts finally struck down the reserve rule.  This was because, as 
some astute critics pointed out, the artificially low salaries produced by the reserve clause 
allowed owners to be either miserly, or incompetent, or both, and still profit whether their 
product on the field was any good or not.  By shielding these owners from the workings of the 
free market, critics believed the reserve clause allowed for inefficiency, ineptitude, and poor 
player development and evaluation models to continue, unimpeded by the negative economic 
                                                 
74 “Ball Players’ Salaries” NA, The Sporting Life, November 11, 1885, 4. 
75 This statement must, unfortunately, include the adjective “white,” as blacks suffering peonage 
as sharecroppers, or in the prison labor system of the Jim Crow South, certainly could not work 
for whom they pleased, nor could Native Americans confined on reservations, or Chinese in 
western states, the list goes on and on. 
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consequences that should have accrued from putting an inferior team on the field year after 
year.76 
One of the most cogent and coherent set of arguments against the reserve clause appeared 
in an essay from Lippincott’s, a prestigious literary magazine, in August 1887, authored by New 
York Giants shortstop John Montgomery Ward.  In the essay, Ward posed the question, “Is the 
Base-Ball Player a Chattel?”  Ward discussed three reasons for implementing the reserve rule.  
The first was stability.  Without some stability from year to year, investors would be reluctant to 
finance baseball teams, as it was very difficult to gauge the value, and the potential return on an 
investment, in teams that gained or lost valuable players on a yearly basis.  As a result, teams 
frequently joined leagues but lasted only a handful of seasons as their finances rose and fell.  If, 
however, a club could hold over most of its players from one year to the next, or at least the best 
ones that the team absolutely depended on, investors could put money into teams with greater 
confidence, improving franchise stability.   
Greater stability aligned with Ward’s second reason for the reserve rule, limiting salaries.  
With all clubs competing for the best talent each year, players demanded, and often received, 
healthy salaries.  If these players were not available, there would be fewer bidding wars for top 
talent, depressing the total amount of money spent on salaries.   
The third goal of baseball’s magnates, in Ward’s view, was monopoly.  If the National 
League could reserve all of the top talent to itself, and gain a reputation for superiority in the 
eyes of spectators and the sporting press, the League could dictate terms to both players and 
competing leagues alike.  No monopolist of industry could have put it better. 
                                                 
76 For a broader discussion on the merits and demerits of the reserve clause, see Seymour, 
Baseball, 110-115.  I have mention what seem the most salient parts of the discussion here. 
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Ward had some sympathy with the need for stability.  Clearly, some continuity was in the 
best interests of the sport as it grew and matured.  The connection between spectators and players 
was just as important then as it is today, and he recognized that if each club fielded a brand new 
nine each season, these bonds would not develop, and attendance might suffer.  However, in the 
rest of his essay he described how management manipulated the reserve rule to reduce players to 
a state of near-slavery.  As more leagues in organized baseball entered into the National 
Agreement, the players’ choices narrowed to playing in a fringe league for miniscule pay or 
taking what their major league team offered in exchange for a career of service with one team.  
This led Ward to state that however bad a player’s situation might be, or how he might try to 
escape the reserving team, he was always  
at the disposition of his former club.  Like a fugitive-slave law, the reserve rule denies 
him a harbor or a livelihood, and carries him back, bound and shackled, to the club from 
which he attempted to escape.  We have, then, the curious result of a contract which on 
its face is for seven months being binding for life, and when the player’s name is once 
attached thereto his professional liberty is gone forever. 
 
Clubs, on the other hand, could release players at their option by giving the player ten days of 
notice, with no further liabilities under the contract.  “That is to say, the club may hold the player 
so long as it pleases, and may release him at any time, with or without cause, by a simple ten 
days’ notice; while the player is bound for life, and, no matter what his interests or wishes may 
be, cannot terminate the contract even by ten years’ notice.”77 
 Following this, Ward provided readers with several examples of how clubs had abused 
the reserve rule, rendering it a detriment to the game.  Besides describing the ex post facto nature 
of the rule, Ward referenced the case of Curry Foley.  This man had a modest career as a pitcher 
                                                 
77 “Is the Ball-Player a Chattel?” John Montgomery Ward, Lippincott’s, (August, 1887).  Copy 
of the article obtained from Michigan State University, 
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 70
and outfielder for the Buffalo Bisons and Boston Red Stockings between 1879 and 1883.  He is 
also the first recorded major league player to hit for the cycle.78  Sadly, in 1883 he developed 
rheumatism, which eventually left him both physically incapacitated and broke.  His team at the 
time, Buffalo, refused to release him, however, claiming he was faking in order to get his release.  
To rub salt in the wound, Buffalo’s management did not pay him for the days he missed trying to 
fight his illness.  Due to the reserve clause, he could not escape from his contract with the 
Bisons.  These circumstances of having to remain with a Buffalo team that would not pay him 
drained Foley’s finances to the point where he had to reside in an asylum.  Things were so bad 
that other ballplayers organized a relief benefit for Foley in the winter of 1885-1886 out of 
sympathy for his plight.   
 Another serious abuse of the rule occurred when clubs used it to deny pay rightfully 
earned by their players.  Ward wrote that, earlier, clubs could release players at any time by 
providing notice twenty days in advance.  Taking advantage of this, several teams served their 
men with twenty days notice on September 10, and then on October 1 released all reserved 
members of the team, when the contracts lasted to November 1, thus depriving their men of their 
final month of pay.  However, because all the released players were reserved with the releasing 
team, they had no choice but to go back and sign with the same team for the following season.   
 The reserve rule also inflated the sum a team could obtain for selling a player.  Ward 
noted that when Chicago sold the legendary Mike “King” Kelly to the Boston Beaneaters for 
$10,000 prior to the 1887 season, the reserve clause made that price tenable from Boston’s 
perspective.  The Beaneaters were not just buying Kelly’s services for 1887, but for the rest of 
                                                 
78 A “cycle” is when a player hits a single, double, triple, and home run all in one game.  It has 
happened almost 300 times in major league baseball history as of 2014, making it about as rare 
as a pitcher throwing a no-hit game. 
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his career, potentially.  The fact that Chicago sold Kelly without his input, and that Kelly did not 
see a single penny from the sale, reminded Ward of the slave trade of old.  Later, when some 
defenders of the reserve rule pointed out that players often did very well financially after their 
sale to a new team (Kelly made in the neighborhood of $5,000 per year playing in Boston), Ward 
answered, “the assertion that the player is always benefited by an increase of salary, though not 
necessarily true, would only prove the injustice of his former reservation by showing that the 
selling club had paid him a less salary than he was really worth.  The reserve rule was made that 
a club might retain its players, not that it might sell them.”79 
 Finally, there was the St. Louis Maroons-Kansas City Cowboys debacle.  Following the 
1886 season, the National League expelled these two teams from its ranks.  While one might 
assume this freed their players from the reserve clause, as their former teams no longer existed to 
reserve them, such was not the case.  Prior to the 1886 season, the National League modified the 
reserve rule so that all players were reserved by the league, rather than by their individual teams.  
This meant that all of the Kansas City and St. Louis players were still under contract to the 
National League, despite having no team to play for, and therefore they could not seek to sign on 
with another team (either in the NL or some other league) that might want them.  Instead, the 
players had to wait while the league office shopped them to other NL teams.  In April, the 
League finally released those players for whom it found no takers, but now they were at a 
significant disadvantage in finding teams for 1887 because the rosters of most teams were full 
already.80  This came after the 1886 incident in which National League president Nick Young 
complained about a Southern League team, Nashville, doing exactly the same thing.  “The club 
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of that place has disbanded entirely . . . yet they retain control of a lot of their best players and 
are trying to sell them to the highest bidders.  Now this is entirely wrong in letter and spirit, and 
President Young said that his mail was loaded down with protestations against such proceedings 
. . .”81  After observing these shenanigans, John Ward commented, “it is all well enough to keep 
the reserve list in force.  This is a good thing and I believe in it, but I fear that this way of saying 
to a man, you shall go here or you shan’t go there, is too much. . . . the next thing is to deliver the 
goods if some of these men should refuse absolutely to go to Indianapolis.”82 
 Some in the sporting press saw these abuses of the reserve rule as well.  One, referring to 
the Maroons-Cowboys situation and sounding rather like Ward in tone (and also implying that 
the rule was dubious in its legality in the process), complained about holding players from 
signing with a team of their choice, because by the time the National League office finished 
shopping them, there were too few openings available.  “This is one of the abuses of the reserve 
rule that should be legislated upon for the benefit of players. . . . and if it is not remedied some 
day some intelligent player will go to law about it, and then away goes the iron rule which is an 
excellent one in its proper use, but tyrannical in its abuse.”83 
 The National League perfected another variant of this practice by 1889.  Just before that 
season began, the Cleveland Spiders released one of their men, infielder Gus Alberts, so that he 
could sign to play in Milwaukee, a minor league city at the time.  Alberts decided, however, he 
preferred not to play in the Cream City, and as Cleveland had released him, he was looking 
forward to signing wherever he chose.  At the last moment, however, the Washington Nationals 
swooped in and claimed him under the rule giving other teams from the same league ten days to 
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sign a released player.  The Nationals did not even want Alberts for themselves.  They simply 
acted to prevent him gaining his freedom once they discovered his intent not to go to Milwaukee.  
The Nationals released Alberts in turn, allowing Cleveland to reclaim their recently departed 
player and return him to the team’s reserve list.  Alberts did not stay with Cleveland long enough 
to begin the 1889 season, as he eventually agreed to play in Milwaukee as per the original plan, 
but the fact that his league could manipulate him in this way was another sign that baseball’s 
magnates had stretched the reserve rule far beyond its original intent.84 
 
* * * * * 
   
It was, perhaps, poetic justice that the reserve rule began backfiring on the major league 
clubs within a couple of seasons.  By the winter of 1887-1888, the prices that teams paid for new 
blood were spiraling upward, and there seemed no way to stop the trend, other than giving the 
right of reservation to the minor leagues.  What had happened was predictable enough, as it was 
exactly what had caused major league teams to create the reserve rule for themselves in the first 
place.  Minor league players began auctioning their services to the highest bidder.  This, in turn, 
caused established players already in the major leagues to ask for greater salaries.  They knew 
that they were worth more than an untried newcomer, and, understandably, expected that their 
salaries would reflect that fact.   
 Because of these escalating costs, early in the winter of 1887-1888 baseball’s powers that 
be reconsidered the issue of whether or not major league baseball should extend the reserve rule 
to minor league baseball.  This is interesting because, in all other regards save cost, doing so 
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seemed against the best interests of major league teams.  Major league baseball teams were used 
to swooping in, like a hawk on the wing, to sign players from the various minor league teams 
after the conclusion of their championship seasons.  Giving minor leagues the right of 
reservation of their players might cut down on this practice and slow the accretion of talented 
newcomers into the major leagues. 
 The logic behind the idea of extending the reserve rule seems based on a few factors.  
First, some clubs were considering developing a reserve team to feed talent to the major league 
club, and protecting this investment with the reserve rule would aid in that endeavor.  Chicago, 
St. Louis, and New York had already moved in this direction, signing hordes of new players to 
contracts over the winter, while Boston and Detroit were considering it.  This move towards a 
reserve team was another response to the fact that, in the winter of 1887-1888, the new talent 
teams pursued for the 1888 season wanted exorbitant remuneration for their signatures over and 
above what they had sought in past.  They “wanted the earth” in the parlance of the day.  Teams 
began to balk at the thought of paying hefty prices for unproven players, but also needed new 
players to fill holes in their rosters, so putting together reserve teams of their own offered a way 
out of this dilemma.   
Ultimately, this idea of creating reserve teams did not really take hold, as there was little 
talk of it by the winter of 1888-1889, and the idea did not take firm root at this time.  Part of the 
explanation is that, by the winter of 1888, the National League announced the Brush Salary 
Classification Plan to control the salaries of all newcomers in the League (see chapter sixteen) 
and the NL teams decided to set aside these other methods for the time being.  The other critical 
reason was that teams found creating and maintaining a reserve team too costly.  This led one 
paper to write an obituary for the idea of a reserve team, stating, “the reserve team craze seems to 
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have gone the way of the other base ball fads.  Very few major league clubs will sign many more 
men than they expect to have regular use for, and in the minor leagues, where even more rigid 
economy is necessary, few extra men will be carried.  Retrenchment is the order of the day.”85 
 More sinisterly, extending the right of reservation to minor league teams would also give 
ball clubs, major league and minor league, greater control over the players in general, and this 
appeared the primary attraction of the idea.  If minor league players were reserved, they could no 
longer offer their services to the highest bidder.  Their clubs could, but as individuals, they could 
not.  Top talent might still cost major league clubs a significant outlay, as teams could auction 
off their best men to the highest bidder, but the money realized from the sale would go to the 
team, not the player.  (Predictably, given the financial rules of baseball and their constant 
flirtations with financial insolvency, some minor league teams could not resist temptation and 
began falsifying the statistics of some of their men to the press, thereby artificially inflating the 
sale price they received.)  Major league teams liked this idea because, after purchasing the minor 
league player, they might offer a lesser salary to the new man now on their reserve list, and this 
would help them keep down their leading recurring cost, player salaries.  This was especially 
relevant for 1888, as the new contract League owners agreed to with the Brotherhood of 
Professional Base Ball Players in the fall of 1887 stipulated that reserved men could not have 
their salaries reduced unilaterally by their teams (see chapter fourteen).  Additionally, if major 
league clubs paid the money to the minor league teams rather than the players, this would keep 
the minor leagues more solvent, thus strengthening the pipeline that funneled players to the 
majors.   
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Why would minor league teams sell under these circumstances?  Because, playing in 
smaller markets than major league cities, most minor league teams found themselves in constant 
need of cash.  In any given year during the second half of the 1880s, only a few minor league 
teams made any significant profit, and many times teams struggled to make it through the season 
financially.  If offered enough money, the temptation to sell was hard to resist.   
 Of course, this move to extend the reserve clause in 1888 would not be strictly legal.  
Many minor league players had already signed deals for 1888, and so extending the reserve 
clause to them after the fact was indeed Machiavellian, another ex post facto extension of the 
rule.  As the Chicago Daily Tribune wrote, “to tie up with a reserve rule players who have signed 
contracts for 1888 with the minor leagues, never dreaming they would be subject to reservation, 
will be a confidence game alongside of which three-card monte or bunko will become 
respectable.”86  Brooklyn’s Charles Byrne, a member of baseball’s Arbitration Committee, tried 
to allay this fear by stating, “There is a mistake about that.  My opinion is that men who signed 
contracts before that amendment to the National Agreement was adopted cannot be reserved 
under it. . . . Anything else would be gross injustice.”87  Others disagreed.  Philadelphia president 
John Rogers, who was also on the Arbitration Committee, told his minor league petitioners they 
could reserve all their players, regardless of when the player signed the contract.  This led the 
Daily Tribune to state, “it is not likely that Mr. Byrnes’s views will prevail.”88  In any case, 
baseball observers left the matter to hang until the final decision on minor league reservations 
took place.  In the meantime, the Daily Tribune went on to describe the motives at play. 
But that is precisely what is expected from the Board of Arbitration at its meeting today.  
The managers of the minor league clubs are making all sorts of specious arguments in 
                                                 
86 “Sports And Sportsmen” NA, Chicago Daily Tribune, December 7, 1887, 6. 
87 “Caruthers Goes To Brooklyn” NA, Chicago Daily Tribune, December 14, 1887, 1. 
88 “Base-Ball Sensations” NA, Chicago Daily Tribune, December 18, 1887, 16. 
 77
favor of “full protection” for themselves, still they are one and all frank enough to say 
that they want a chance to realize on the valuable young players who may develop under 
their management.  They appear to imagine that in the interest of the game they should 
have a right to realize on such players.  If they honestly sought the protection of the 
National Agreement in order to hold their clubs together and with the intention of paying 
valuable men as good salaries as they could get elsewhere their position might be entitled 
to some support.  They are, however, simply in the show business with a view to 
furnishing a certain quality of entertainment for a certain price, and they are actuated by a 
desire to make money. . . . That they can have no legal or moral right to prevent the 
player from getting the full value of his services is so manifest that few of them have the 
audacity to make any pretensions of rights, yet all agree that if the practice be tolerated in 
the leading organizations it ought to be in the minor ones.89 
 
 Rogers’ view prevailed, of course.  Matters on this score came to a head when a pitcher 
for the Syracuse Stars of the International League, Con Murphy, sued the team when it tried to 
reserve him for 1889, as Murphy was among those who had signed before the International 
League received the right of reservation.  Murphy claimed his contract was with Syracuse 
management for 1888 only, and therefore the reserve rule could not apply to him.90  The team 
later papered over its differences with Murphy, however, and the case did not go to trial, as 
Syracuse probably feared what a court might decide should a judge consider the reserve rule on 
its legal merits. 
Protection for the minor leagues would come at a price, however.  According to the 
scheme advocated by Al Spalding, as stated in a letter to Brooklyn president Charles Byrnes, 
“for the protection now given and this additional right of reserve I think it would be fair and 
equitable and agreeable to the minor league clubs to assess each association a certain sum of 
money each year, making one price where protection for the season only is given, and a higher 
price where protection and the right of reserve is given.”91  The minor league team owners would 
                                                 
89 “Sports And Sportsmen” NA, Chicago Daily Tribune, December 7, 1887, 6. 
90 “Washington Whispers” Bob Larner, The Sporting Life, January 23, 1889, 4. 
91 “Chicago News” Harry Palmer, The Sporting Life, November 30, 1887, 3. 
 78
face no penalty if they did not agree to the protection scheme proposed by Spalding, but they did 
have to agree to pay $250 per team to the secretary of the Board of Arbitration (for distribution 
amongst the major league teams) in order to enjoy a right of reserving players that the major 
leagues would recognize.92  After some debate about the advisability of asking for the right of 
reservation with no protection money, the minor league delegates to the meeting, E.E. Menges, 
C.M. Sherman, and Sam Morton of the Western Association, C.D. White of the International 
Association, Maurice Kauffmann and T.J. Brennan of the Southern League, W.H. McDermith of 
the Ohio League, E. Cheney of the New England League, and James Kennedy of the Central 
League decided to accept the terms offered.  It seemed they preferred this system to anything 
involving a draft, as outlined in the Millenium Plan (see chapter fourteen).  They disliked the 
idea of a draft because with the right of reservation, set at fourteen men per team, a team in good 
financial shape did not have to part with its top players who wished to leave and play in the 
major leagues.  They could hold them, either to get a higher price the next year or to increase 
their chances at a championship, as they saw fit.93 
 Some writers saw this scheme for what it was.  Baltimore’s Albert Mott wrote in his 
weekly column for The Sporting Life, 
What is the protection?  Protection from the protector—a sort of pay me so much and I 
won’t rob you—give me fifty dollars and you can keep your watch worth a hundred.  
Charming knight errantry, isn’t it?  But then, it is a necessary evil—oh yes, necessary to 
the stronger, but not to the weaker unless he is to be squeezed out of his property or its 
equivalent.  This thing cannot be gotten around by any right thinking person.  You cannot 
plead justification because the minor bodies practice the slavery of reservation thereby, 
for two wrongs never yet made one right. . . . The base ball man looks at it through 
another pair of goggles.  He says, first I must have discipline, and reservation is necessary 
for that.  I must have protection in my property from the grasp of my brother manager, 
and reservation is necessary for that.  I must control wages within reason, and reservation 
                                                 
92 “The Annual Meeting” NA, The Sporting News, December 10, 1887, 1. 
93 “Minors Win” NA, The Sporting Life, December 14, 1887, 1. 
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is necessary for that.  I must have a regular influx of young blood playing material from 
the weaker organizations, and I will have it, or be paid an equivalent for not taking it.94 
 
 Another interesting aspect of extending this right of reservation to the minor leagues was 
that it did not encompass and protect its minor league signatories as thoroughly as the major 
leagues’ reservation system did.  For instance, when the Detroit Wolverines decided to cease 
play after the 1888 season, the team did not resign its place in the National League until March 
of 1889, and continued in the League, with full powers of reserve over its players, until that time, 
even though the club announced its decision to quit by October of 1888.  This enabled it to sell 
its men for whatever price they might bring.  Likewise, when the National League decided to 
boot out Kansas City after the 1886 season, the League retained the right of reservation over the 
team’s former players, and dispensed them to any who were interested.  With the minor leagues, 
on the other hand, these same rules did not apply.  When the Chicago team of the Western 
Association took a much less drastic step for 1889, and simply decided to move from Chicago 
and merge with Minneapolis, it did not retain the right of reservation over its players that it 
wanted to transfer from Chicago, although the Minneapolis men remained under reserve because 
they had not moved or changed status.95  Likewise, when the Central League made a decision to 
expel its Easton franchise following 1888, exactly as the National League had done with Kansas 
City in 1886, the Central League tried to reserve the Easton players.  The major leagues 
disallowed this move.96 
 
* * * * * 
                                                 
94 “Baltimore Bulletin” TTT, The Sporting Life, February 22, 1888, 4. 
95 No title, NA, The Sporting Life, January 16, 1889, 2. 
96 No title, NA, The Sporting Life, January 30, 1889, 2. 
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 Given the myriad abuses that took place under the reserve rule, it is surprising that the 
players did not mount some kind of challenge to the rule.  The Brotherhood of Professional Ball 
Players did not challenge the rule, at least not until it decided to challenge the entire structure of 
major league baseball in 1890.  Perhaps they refrained because they knew that the owners would 
not give up the reserve rule under any circumstances short of revolution, or perhaps the 
organization truly believed the rule would remain useful if the Brotherhood could only force the 
League’s moguls to stop abusing it.  Several incidents arose between 1885 and 1889 that seemed 
to offer prime opportunities to test the rule in the courts, yet no player ever took such a drastic 
step.  We can only speculate as to why no one ever did, but from the general tone of what players 
said in public, one of the reasons was that they truly believed that ownership would listen to 
reasoned arguments about the rule’s abuses and that the owners were willing to make changes in 
a spirit of fairness because they wanted to do what was best for the game.  It took many years, 
until the middle of 1889, for the players to realize beyond doubt that this was not true.   
 Of all the abuses mentioned, the sales system bothered the players the most.  Partly 
because the players created value through their performance on the field but saw none of that 
value when teams sold them somewhere else.  That is why players occasionally refused to sign 
contracts with their new team unless they received a portion of the money from their own sale.  
This was not the only abuse in the system of selling players, however.  Many times, teams would 
reserve their full complement of men from the season before.  This total was fourteen men by 
1887, as fourteen was roughly the number of players any team carried on its roster at any given 
time.  Preparatory to the next season, however, teams often signed a handful of new players, 
looking for talented young blood to help them challenge for more wins.  This meant clubs often 
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entered April with between sixteen and twenty players, all the while only intending to keep 
fourteen of them.  The unlucky men who did not make the final fourteen ended up in a 
precarious situation.  By the time they found out their teams would not keep them, they could 
only scramble to find a new team to play for, and by then those pickings were very slim because 
it was so late in the preseason.    
 Back in 1885, however, the worst of these evils, from the perspective of the players, were 
still ahead.  The sales system was not yet in full bloom, and the reserve rule did not yet ensnare 
all players.  By the end of that year, they had a more pressing and immediate problem.  During 
the winter of 1885, major league baseball owners initiated the next phase of their plan to control 





The 1886 Salary Limit 
 
 
At the conclusion of the 1885 season, with the reserve rule firmly in place to limit the 
movement of most major league baseball players, baseball’s owners looked around for other 
ways to strengthen their hand in relations with their players.  As both major leagues held their 
winter meetings to take stock of the state of the game, they came to a few decisions in this 
regard.  As always, the need for more profit was foremost on their collective minds.  As a result, 
one major change preparatory to the 1886 season was a significant lengthening of the 
championship season.  In 1885, the championship schedule for both circuits had been 112 games, 
with each team playing sixteen games against each of their seven opponents.  For 1886, the 
National League decided to add two more games against each opponent, which increased its 
campaign to 126 games, while the American Association went all the way to a 140-game slate 
featuring twenty games against each opposing team. 
Not all observers regarded this increase as a good thing, because it required playing 
championship games in April and October, when the weather could be very questionable in 
northern cities.  It was an open question as to whether fans would show up in numbers great 
enough to generate any profits even with teams playing several more games.  In addition, this 
longer schedule required more “work” on the part of the players.  Most of them seemed not to 
mind this, however.  Complaints regarding a longer schedule were rare, probably because the 
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players were used to playing so many exhibition games before and after the season, so the 
change really did not increase by much the number of days when they expected to play.  From 
their standpoint, the most ominous decision taken by the owners in the winter of 1885-1886 
concerned their salaries.  The owners agreed to cap player salaries at $2,000 for the coming 
season, and clubs could reduce the salary of any player above the cap in the negotiations for 
1886 contracts.  With the Union Association War of 1884 over, and the threat of a bidding war 
with another league over players eliminated for the time being, baseball’s magnates hoped to 
reduce their costs by diminishing player salaries.  The new salary cap was a bold effort to do just 
that.  This, when combined with a longer schedule of games, meant that players now received 
less pay for more work.  While there were no stated consequences for failing to observe the new 
cap on salaries, and teams found various ways around this “official” limit in their efforts to 
secure talent, none of these future means of skirting the rule was obvious as the leaves fell from 
the trees in autumn and the winter of 1885-1886 got underway.   
Even though there was speculation right from the start about whether or not the new cap 
would hold up in practice, as a group the owners did all they could to pretend that it would.  The 
Pittsburgh Alleghenys announced their strict adherence to the new salary rule.  Denny 
McKnight, president of the Association, believed all parties would live up to the new rules.  
Owner Charles Byrne of Brooklyn proclaimed, “This thing of giving these fellows every cent 
that we make during the summer is played out.  We have toadied to them long enough.  Now 
they will have to come to our terms.”  When asked how to deal with players reluctant to sign for 
reduced salaries, he answered, “Then, sir, they can go and break stone for a living, for they will 
never play ball again. . . . They will have to come to our terms or starve.”  Finally, responding to 
the notion that players with sterling reputations brought credit to the game and deserved 
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compensation accordingly, Byrne, recalling the recent brouhaha with the Union Association but 
also dodging the question by reframing it, replied, “He who asks justice must show he has done 
justice.  Do you think we can respect such fellows as Dunlap, McCormick, Glasscock, Shaw, 
Mullane, Gleason, Bradley and the rest of them?  Have you any idea the amount of money, labor 
and trouble these fellows have cost the League and Association?”1   
(Byrne later denied these comments, claiming that their source was an illegitimate 
eavesdropper, and earned an apology from The Sporting Life.2  That same paper was much more 
charitable the following winter, when it announced that all of Brooklyn’s players signing by 
January received salary increases “unsolicited,” and wrote, “this fact speaks volumes for Mr. 
Byrne’s management.  He knows how to treat ball players well and yet retain their confidence 
and respect.  No man is more thought of by players, and yet none is less imposed upon.”3  The 
Sporting News, however, reported later that the players did not receive actual raises, but a $50 
New Year’s gift instead.4  Based on Byrnes’ other actions, it is likely that while the quoted 
statements probably are close to his personal views, he was much too careful in his public 
statements to say things quite so bluntly.) 
Similarly granite-like in his public support of the rule was Chris Von der Ahe, owner of 
the St. Louis Browns.  He stated that his players “will all sign for $2,000 and less, too.  I see it 
stated in an Eastern newspaper that this rule can be easily evaded, and that it is charged that 
every manager in the country will violate it.  Well, here is one that won’t, and I know that no one 
else will.”  He continued, “no player is worth any more than that sum, and if there is anyone in 
                                                 
1 “From Pittsburgh” NA, The Sporting Life, November 4, 1885, 4; “M’Knight on the Agreement” 
Allegheny, The Sporting Life, November 4, 1885, 4; “A Talk With Mr. Byrne” NA, The Sporting 
Life, November 4, 1885, 4. 
2 “Mr. Byrne Makes a Denial” C. H. Byrne, The Sporting Life, November 11, 1885, 1. 
3 “Notes and Comments” NA, The Sporting Life, January 26, 1887, 3. 
4 “Caught on the Fly” NA, The Sporting News, February 12, 1887, 5. 
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my club who thinks he is he will find out his mistake when he suggests any plan for me to give 
him a greater sum.”5  This apparently united front was disconcerting enough to the players that it 
spawned vague rumors about the possibility of their forming a union. 
Some critics doubted from the beginning that baseball’s owners, all protestations to the 
contrary, would succeed in following their own salary plan.  Ted Sullivan, a former manager in 
the Union Association who managed a minor league club in Milwaukee in 1886, believed “no 
legislation of that kind can be made to work.  If a club thinks it to its interest to pay a player 
more than $2,000, there is no way, so far as I can see, to prevent it being done. . . . There are a 
thousand ways such a rule can be broken.  All the big players will receive more than the limit.”6  
It was not long before rumors claiming exactly this started circulating.  When the Pittsburgh 
management failed to sign a pair of players, Jim Manning and Arthur Irwin, it accused the teams 
successfully signing the players, the Detroit Wolverines and Philadelphia Quakers, respectively, 
of offering above the maximum to secure each man’s services.7 
 A few commentators opposed the rule on free market principles.  One editorial writer for 
The Sporting Life offered several points to this effect.  The author pointed out that a contract was 
a business deal, and teams would not offer a high salary unless they deemed the player a worthy 
investment of the funds.  Furthermore, paying salaries in excess of $2,000 had not prevented 
some clubs from profiting during the prior season.  He even echoed the free labor advocates 
(and, whether he knew it or not, classical economists such as Adam Smith) of pre-Civil War days 
in his belief that a maximum salary would deprive players of motivation and incentive to 
improve.  If a player earned the maximum salary, as long as he played well enough to avoid his 
                                                 
5 “From the Mound City” Olympus, The Sporting Life, November 4, 1885, 4. 
6 “Sullivan’s Views” NA, The Sporting Life, November 11, 1885, 1. 
7 “From the Smoky City” NA, The Sporting Life, November 18, 1885, 1. 
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team replacing him with another player, why should he strive for improvement?  There was no 
financial incentive for the player to better himself, and this hurt the performance of the team, and 
might lead to discord in the ranks, as well.8 
 George Wright echoed these thoughts in an interview in November 1885.  He was one of 
the true pioneers of the game, widely respected, a man who “has forgotten more about base ball 
and base ball players than some of the present managers of mushroom growth ever knew.”  Thus, 
his words carried some weight.  Wright believed the limit a mistake because it gave players no 
incentive to perform at their potential.  “You can’t get first-class work out of any player if he is 
not satisfied with what he is earning, and if you don’t have a winning nine you don’t make much 
money.”  He advocated (presaging what would happen a few years later in the Brotherhood War) 
that top players who were worth more than $2,000 should receive a portion of the ticket receipts 
after ticket sales passed a certain point.  This scheme, Wright believed, provided the proper 
incentive to a high level of play, because the greater the number of fans in attendance, the more 
compensation the player received.9 
 The story of “Honest” John Morrill speaks to this issue of risking player dissatisfaction 
by unilaterally cutting their pay.  A quality first baseman for the League’s Boston Beaneaters, he 
was also the field manager and captain of the club.  Entering his eleventh season in 1886, all of 
them with the Beaneaters, he decided to hold out for something above $2,500 because of his 
skills, various responsibilities, and long service to the ball club.  Some of the Boston press 
certainly sympathized.  “John feels very sore.  He thinks it is worth more than $2,500 to play 
                                                 
8 “The Other Side” Layman, The Sporting Life, November 18, 1885, 2.  Layman was the pen 
name of lawyer James Blackhurst, who later served the Brotherhood of Professional Base Ball 
Players in a legal capacity. 
9 “What Geo. Wright Thinks of the Salary Question” NA, The Sporting Life, November 18, 
1885, 3. 
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first base, captain and manage the team, and there are a great many who are of the same opinion.  
The management certainly has made a mistake, for John will never again be able to take the 
interest in the club which he has formerly shown.  Such is his reward for years of faithful 
service.”  When the Boston sportswriter asked George Wright for his views on the matter, the 
veteran observer agreed, stating 
Well, now, that’s a pretty way to treat John Morrill.  I see they want to cut down his 
salary.  If there is a man who has worked hard and conscientiously for the Boston Club it 
is John Morrill, and he is worth every cent he got last year. . . . There are few ball players 
who can captain and manage a team, but John Morrill is one of the few, and when one of 
the players can act as manager, it is cheaper in the end . . . if they don’t want to pay him 
what he is worth here why don’t they release him and give him a chance to make as much 
as he can. . . . I don’t know why base ball should be different from any other kind of 
business, but it seems to be.  The harder a man works the less he seems to be 
appreciated.10 
 
Soon actual, rather than rumored, violations of the rule started surfacing.  Despite his 
dramatic protestations to the contrary, even Von der Ahe evaded some of his own rules before 
the year was out.  True, he made known a uniform salary plan for his St. Louis club.  Outfielders 
(Tip O’Neill, Curt Welch, & Hugh Nicol) received contracts for $1,800, infielders (Charlie 
Comiskey, Yank Robinson, Bill Gleason, and Arlie “The Freshest Man on Earth” Latham) 
earned $1,900, and pitchers and catchers pulled down the full $2,000.  First baseman Comiskey 
lost $1,000 in pay under these circumstances and catcher Doc Bushong $800.  However, 
Comiskey was also the field manager for the team, and thus recouped $500 for the extra burden 
                                                 
10 “From the Hub” Mugwump, The Sporting Life, March 3, 1886, 5.  Recall that at this time, the 
team captain was the equivalent of a team manager in modern baseball, making game decisions 
regarding strategy, setting the team’s lineup, and so forth.  The team’s manager was more of a 
business position than anything else, and so serving in this role entailed a significant amount of 
extra work for a player, and could reward the team financially if done well. 
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of these duties.  Bushong earned an extra $10 for every game in excess of two he caught each 
week.11   
Bushong provides an example of why the public held players at certain positions in high 
regard, and why player salaries did not always seem to match their statistical output.  Despite his 
pitiful hitting skills (lifetime OPS+ of just 56), Bushong earned wide admiration because of his 
defensive abilities and durability.  Bushong also gained renown for his skill in handling pitchers 
and his ability to catch nearly every pitch, no matter how wild.  He also helped pioneer the 
practice of catchers crouching to receive a pitch, as they do today, rather than stooping over and 
catching the ball from a standing position, and was among the early catchers to give the pitcher 
signs signifying what type of pitch to throw, as well.  One might think that these technical 
achievements helped earn him his nickname of “Doc,” but Bushong was an actual doctor, 
practicing dentistry on occasion during his career and consistently after hanging up his spikes.  
This avocation is a bit surprising, considering the amount of wear and tear, to their hands 
especially, baseball catchers endured, (it was not until the second half of the 1880s that catchers 
began using gloves to help protect their hands while catching pitches, doing so bare-handed up 
until this era) but Bushong’s abilities as a receiver drew praise from all.   
                                                 
11 “Von der Ahe’s Plan” NA, The Sporting Life, December 2, 1885, 1.  Speaking of Arlie 
Latham, in addition to being the freshest man on earth, he was also one of the fastest in the game.  
While it may not enter into our discussion directly, at one point he took part in a footrace against 
another of the game’s greyhounds, Billy Sunday.  To the chagrin of Latham’s teammates, who 
apparently bet heavily on their man, Sunday won the race by a decent margin.  Charges that 
Latham had tanked the race intentionally circulated immediately afterwards.  Sunday, of course, 
eventually became a household name across America for his preaching in the 20th century.  He 
began his public career, however, in baseball, fashioning a mediocre career OPS+ of 86 and 
WAR of 3.0 in his eight seasons.  Interestingly, during Sunday’s playing days, there was a rumor 
that he intentionally sharpened the spikes on his shoes to lacerate anyone who got in his way on 
the bases, but if true, presumably he atoned for this sin in later years.  “Notes and Comments” 
NA, The Sporting Life, April 20, 1887, 11. 
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The amount of physical punishment a catcher endured over the course of a season is also 
why they could often commanded a salary that seemed out of line with their production level as 
batters.  Teams, and spectators, too, recognized how difficult it was for catchers to stay healthy 
and rewarded them, compared to their fellows at least, as a result.  Following his contributions to 
the St. Louis Browns in their World Championship year of 1886, Bushong’s admirers in the 
Mound City’s Merchants’ Exchange presented him with “a dozen each of tea and table spoons, 
knives and forks, salt spoons and an elegant rattle box for ‘the baby,’ all of solid silver, and put 
up in a beautiful morocco case.  They were all appropriately engraved.”12 
Von der Ahe, sometimes nicknamed “Der Boss President” because of his fiery 
temperament and because he was also a recent immigrant who spoke with a heavy accent, was 
not alone in finding ways to supplement the official salary of major league baseball’s better 
players.  Harry Stovey, for example, received an extra $100 “gift” that was “purely voluntary” on 
the part of his team, the Athletics, and “unexpected” by the outstanding and defensively versatile 
player.13  Thus it was not surprising when an anonymous player, seeing through the potential 
loopholes, stated, “it is not unlikely that a manager who wants to secure a player not under 
contract will go to him and say: ‘I can only give you $2,000 salary, but there is a gentleman in 
the city where we play, and who likes you enough, to make you a present of $1,000 if you play 
with us.’”14   
At times, extravagant rumors made their way into print, as in the case of John Francis 
“Phenomenal” Smith.  In November, the New York Times reported that the Beaneaters of Boston 
had interest in the young left-hander, and that they offered the phenomenal sum of $4,000 to 
                                                 
12 “From St. Louis” Pritchard, The Sporting Life, November 3, 1886, 2; Bushong’s SABR 
biography, available at http://sabr.org/bioproj/person/5d4b5fe8, accessed June 6, 2014. 
13 “Notes and Comments” NA, The Sporting Life, December 9, 1885, 3.   
14 “The National Game” NA, New York Sun, October 20, 1885, 3. 
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place Smith in the pitcher’s box the following year.15  Smith did not end up with Boston in 1886, 
but rather with Detroit, although he pitched a mere 25 innings for the Wolverines when they 
decided to bolster their sagging pitching staff in an energetic but ultimately unsuccessful late-
season effort to gain the National League pennant.  When Smith signed with the Baltimore 
Orioles for 1887, some writers blamed his lack of dominance on the fact that Detroit’s catchers 
did not know how to work with him, but predicted better things now that he was pitching to 
better catchers.  This notion, that certain pitchers worked well with some catchers who were 
familiar with them, but  would not perform as effectively with unfamiliar catchers behind the bat, 
held a lot of credence to observers in the 1880s.16  The idea does not make much sense in 
Smith’s case, however, as Detroit catcher Charlie Bennett generally rated among the best 
backstops in baseball.  In any case, the only thing that turned out to be phenomenal about 
Smith’s career was how often he changed clubs, working for seven different teams in eight 
seasons, including three separate tours of duty with the Philadelphia Athletics and two each with 
the Philadelphia Phillies and Pittsburgh Alleghenys. 
                                                 
15 “Baseball Notes” NA, New York Times, November 2, 1885, 8.  Incidentally, the press 
commonly referred to promising young players as phenomenons or phenomenals, and in Smith’s 
case, it happened so often that observers just called him Phenomenal, rather than John. 
16 “Pitcher Smith’s Engagement by Baltimore” TTT, The Sporting Life, November 10, 1886, 1.  
The idea that some catchers are better at handling pitchers than others is one of those ideas that is 
rather difficult to measure.  It is quite possible that a pitcher will feel comfortable working with 
certain catchers more so than others, but it is questionable how much difference this really makes 
in performance.  For a time, in the late 1980s and early 1990s especially, observers attempted to 
quantify this effect through a statistic known as CERA, which stood for Catcher’s Earned Run 
Average.  This measured what the team’s earned run average was with its different catchers 
behind the plate, with the idea being that some catchers would demonstrate their superior 
handling of pitchers by having a lower CERA than their more pedestrian counterparts.  As it 
turned out, however, this statistic did not really catch on, pardon the pun, because there was little 
consistency from one year to the next.  Players with a CERA below their team’s average one 
season frequently had a higher than team average CERA the next, or vice versa, and so most 
baseball observers concluded that it was not a very useful statistic, because it was hard to 





* * * * * 
 
 
 Players had a mixed response to the semi-official salary limit, and the 1885-1886 off-
season featured many player-management disputes attributable to the worsening contract 
situation.  Most of the contention, unsurprisingly, surrounded the premier players, formerly well 
compensated, who faced major cuts in salary under the new plan.  For Al Spalding, trouble 
lurked in his own backyard, in the person of one of Chicago’s star pitchers, Jim McCormick.  
Coming off of a season of 20 wins and 4 losses for Chicago (he also pitched a few games for the 
Providence club that year), the hefty Scotsman had long been a mainstay of major league 
pitching staffs, with five seasons in excess of 500 innings pitched to his credit.  After meeting 
with Spalding in November 1885, McCormick declined to sign a contract for the following 
season, claiming a desire to look after business interests in New Jersey.17  Given that McCormick 
had jumped to the Union Association for the 1884 season for a salary increase, remunerative 
considerations probably played a part in his decision, but if true, McCormick’s public comments 
hid the fact well.  “I have a prosperous little business at home in Paterson, New Jersey, and it is 
profitable enough to enable me to live nicely without the wear and tear of a ballplayer’s life.  For 
this reason I do not want to sign with any club . . .”18 
 The Chicago Daily Tribune also caught up with two of McCormick’s popular teammates, 
pitcher John Clarkson and shortstop Tom Burns, to get their take on the salary situation.  
                                                 
17 “From Chicago” Remlap, The Sporting Life, November 4, 1885, 1; “Chicago to Lose 
McCormick” NA, New York Times, October 28, 1885, 5.  Interestingly, McCormick did make 
good on his threat to retire to private business, but he did so after the 1887 season, rather than 
after 1885. 
18 “Chicago Club Re-signing” NA, St. Paul Daily Globe, October 29, 1885, 1; “Bits of Base Ball 
News” NA, New York Sun, November 8, 1885, 7. 
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Clarkson, a star pitcher who had just won 53 games in 1885, pronounced himself satisfied.  
Burns, coming off a decent but unspectacular season, was more evasive.  “I know what my 
services are worth, and I shall get just as much for them with the limit rule as I could get without 
it.”  When asked if that meant his talents were worth $2,000 per season, he responded, “I did not 
say so” before departing to discuss the issue with Chicago’s team secretary, thus adding to 
speculation that some players were getting unofficial forms of remuneration to supplement their 
official pay.19 
Joining McCormick in refusing to sign a new contract was the noted hurler of the 
Cincinnati Red Stockings, Tony Mullane.  Variously known as “The Count of Macaroni” when 
referring to his dandified wardrobe (“when on dress parade Tony delights in loud ties, a frock 
coat and a high silk hat”20), or “The Apollo of the Box,” when his pitching skills were under 
discussion, Mullane had a history of chafing at baseball’s efforts at salary restrictions, once 
stating, “I am not playing for reputation, but for money.”21  During the Union Association War 
of 1884, he had refused to accept the salary offer of the club that held him in reserve, the St. 
Louis Browns of the American Association.  He agreed to change leagues but not cities when the 
St. Louis club of the UA offered a raise from $1,900 to $2,500.  Due to some behind-the-scenes 
machinations, he eventually landed with the Toledo Blue Stockings of the American Association 
for the same salary.  That was not the end of his salary-seeking escapades, however.  When, 
despite Mullane’s quality pitching, the Toledo club departed from the ranks of major league 
                                                 
19 “Chicago Club Re-Signing” NA, St. Paul Daily Globe, October 29, 1885, 1.  In addition to 
ball playing, Burns also served as a polo referee in the winter of 1885-1886 to increase his pay a 
bit.  In retrospect, the White Stockings probably wished that they had just paid Burns more 
money so he would not need this off-season employment, considering that in February the fans at 
one polo match mobbed their shortstop for his lack of impartiality.  “Notes and Comments” NA, 
The Sporting Life, February 10, 1886, 5. 
20 “Caught on the Fly” NA, The Sporting News, August 9, 1886, 5. 
21 “The National Game” NA, New York Sun, October 20, 1885, 3. 
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baseball at the end of the 1884 season, the Blue Stockings tried to sell Mullane’s services (along 
with two other players, second baseman Sam Barkley and outfielder Curt Welch) back to his old 
club, the St. Louis Browns, who agreed to pay him $3,500.  Not satisfied with such meager 
compensation, at the last moment Mullane faked illness to abscond from the hotel where the St. 
Louis negotiations were taking place and secretly met with representatives of the Red Stockings.  
Cincinnati officials, alerted to the fact that St. Louis had promised Toledo officials some cash in 
recompense for releasing their players so the Browns could sign them, decided to cut out the 
middle man and strike a deal with Mullane directly, now that he had been released.  They offered 
$5,000 ($2,000 in advance) and secured The Count’s signature. 
These shenanigans did not sit well with St. Louis owner Chris Von der Ahe, who thought 
he had covered all angles in his Toledo negotiations in requiring the released players, Mullane 
included, to sign a notarized statement promising to sign with the Browns.  Von der Ahe 
attempted to blacklist Mullane and took his case to the American Association’s Board of 
Directors.  The Board, however, ruled that Cincinnati would retain the rights to Mullane, but that 
Mullane would be suspended for the 1885 season and would have to return half of his advance to 
the Red Stockings for “conduct tending to bring discredit on the base-ball profession, causing 
discontent and insubordination among all professional players, and setting an example of sharp 
practice almost equivalent to dishonesty.”22  In his anger, Von der Ahe refused to pay Toledo the 
remainder of the money for the trio of athletes, but had to yield after Toledo sued in US circuit 
court.23 
This was the situation, then, under which Mullane refused the contract offer of Cincinnati 
for 1886, declaring he would “wait for something to turn up.”  The team, on the other hand, 
                                                 
22 Seymour, Baseball, 168-169. 
23 “Von Der Ahe Sued” NA, St. Paul Daily Globe, January 18, 1885, 3. 
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declared its intent to stick to the new salary rules.24  Perhaps Mullane hoped for an opportunity 
such as that realized by good friend and fellow pitcher Guy Hecker.  The two men pitched no-
hitters just one week apart for the Louisville Eclipse of the American Association in 1882, the 
first no-hitters in the Association’s history, at that.  Before the 1883 season, Mullane moved to 
St. Louis, and Hecker inherited the mantle of top pitcher for the Eclipse, who renamed 
themselves the Colonels for 1885.  He established his reputation as a premier pitcher following a 
52-win season in 1884, but Hecker complained about his salary at times in 1885 and hoped to do 
better financially in 1886.  Wanting to keep its star pitcher happy, but fearful of paying him extra 
cash and setting a bad example by violating the new salary rule before the ink on it was dry, 
Louisville management instead supplied Hecker with $700 worth of stock in the new “Hecker 
Supply Company,” conveniently founded just before the new salary limit went into effect.  
Hecker spent the off-season touring the South (where he suffered an arm injury while throwing 
stones at a dog25) to hawk his new company’s “billiards, pool, cigars, tobacco, stationery, and 
sporting goods.”26  It seems he scored some successes on his Southern tour, even, as The 
Sporting Life later reported, “Hecker is a hustler.  He has also secured the making of 
Chattanooga’s uniforms” and “Guy Hecker is still hustling through the Southern country, getting 
in big licks for business.  He has also secured the contract for Atlanta’s uniforms,” and, 
eventually, six of the eight teams in the Southern League.27 
                                                 
24 “From Cincinnati” WWB., The Sporting Life, November 4, 1885, 1; “Bits of Base Ball News” 
NA, New York Sun, November 8, 1885, 7. 
25 “Caylor’s Screed” O.P. Caylor, The Sporting Life, March 10, 1886, 1. 
26 “Affairs in the Falls City” JIM., The Sporting Life, November 11, 1885, 1. 
27 No title, NA, The Sporting Life, February 24, 1886, 4; “Notes and Comments” NA, The 
Sporting Life, February 24, 1886, 4; “From the Falls City” NA, The Sporting Life, March 3, 
1886, 1. 
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To be fair, Hecker really did have an actual interest in his new business.  One writer 
mentioned, “‘Heck’ ought to develop into a first-class drummer.  He has plenty of presence of 
mind, and his tongue flows like a brooklet.”28  His company, located on Jefferson Street in 
Louisville, also offered patrons “a large bulletin board, on which all the late base ball news is 
posted.  It is the club head-quarters; is a popular resort already.”29  Presumably, it also sold 
copies of Hecker’s Guide to the Art of Pitching.  “It is fully illustrated and explains as clearly as 
A, B, C how to give the ‘ins,’ ‘outs,’ ‘ups,’ and ‘down shoot.’”30  A year later, the Hecker Supply 
Company reported a “thriving” business, and its billiards hall was the winter hangout of choice 
for ballplayers native to or living in the Falls City, such as Tom Ramsey, Al Mays, Lev Shreve, 
Gus Weyhing, and John Kerins.  It also got the supply contract for bats for four of the American 
Association’s teams: St. Louis, Baltimore, Cleveland, and of course Louisville.31  The quality of 
the company’s merchandise and Hecker’s magnetic personality were great drawing cards.  
“There is not a man, woman or child in Louisville and its contingent territory that does not know 
Guy Hecker.  He is worshipped as few heroes are.  His name is a household word, and his manly, 
noble carriage, affable manners and always even temperament, have added greatly to the well 
deserved popularity which his great skill as a knight of the pitching sphere has brought him.”32   
                                                 
28 “Notes and Comments” NA, The Sporting Life, January 6, 1886, 3. 
29 Quotes and material from “Affairs in the Falls City” JIM., The Sporting Life, November 11, 
1885, 1; Hecker’s SABR biography, http://sabr.org/bioproj/person/4b471b76, accessed February 
15, 2014. 
30 “Notes and Comments” NA, The Sporting Life, November 25, 1885, 3.  Hecker’s book did 
elicit some controversy, however, and from none other than the venerable baseball writer Henry 
Chadwick, at that.  Chadwick alleged that Hecker pirated material from Chadwick’s own book 
on the art of pitching, and threatened legal action against the Louisville hurler.  “Notes and 
Comments” NA, The Sporting Life, March 3, 1886, 3. 
31 “From the Falls City” XXX, The Sporting Life, January 19, 1887, 3; “The Louisville Team” 
RWL, The Sporting News, February 5, 1887, 1. 
32 “Base Ball” NA, The Sporting News, February 5, 1887, 5. 
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Things were going so well that Hecker decided to expand his entrepreneurial pursuits.  
Turning day-to-day management of the sporting goods store over to teammate and fellow 
investor John Kerins, he opened a saloon at 406 Fifth Street in Louisville.  “Hecker will 
endeavor to make the place a rendezvous for all the base ball players.  He will add billiards, pool, 
and other such accoutrements as properly belong to a first-class establishment of this kind.”33  
The grog shop opened in late January of 1887, with the baseball players of Louisville invited to a 
“royal feast” with “plenty to wash it down with.”  The new establishment was “a marvel of 
beauty.  He sells nothing but the choicest liquors and cigars.  A scoreboard will be put up next 
week, to report all games by innings.”34  After opening his saloon, Hecker sold his share of the 
Hecker Supply Company to Louis Helburn, perhaps tired of the hustling required of his first 
business for the more convivial atmosphere of the second.35 
More news concerning quarrels over salary drifted in from Providence.  Charles “Old 
Hoss” Radbourn was chomping at his bit after the team informed him of his new $2,000 salary 
for 1886, a fifty percent reduction from 1885. Radbourn was another of baseball’s great pitching 
stars, having won a titanic 193 games in his five-year career thanks to an array of unorthodox but 
effective ways to deliver the baseball to home plate.  He declared he would not play anywhere at 
that price and refused to sign with the Grays for 1886.  This continued a feud with management 
left over from the end of the 1885 season, when Providence’s Director Ned Allen suspended 
Radbourn, along with starting third baseman Jerry Denny (who once allegedly assaulted a young 
                                                 
33 “Hecker’s New Venture” XXX, The Sporting Life, January 26, 1887, 1. 
34 “The Louisville Team” RWL, The Sporting News, February 5, 1887, 1. 
35 “Late News” NA, The Sporting Life, August 17, 1887, 1. 
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woman in a train sleeping car while intoxicated36), on September 11 for “indifferent work.”  
Radbourn did not pitch again that year.37   
As it turned out, the Providence club folded before the 1886 season, sparing Radbourn 
such financially insulting treatment.  Boston Beaneaters owner Arthur Soden bought the entire 
Providence franchise over the winter, allowing him to take the players he wanted, Radbourn 
included, and sell the other players to whomever wanted their services before disbanding the 
team.  Soden bought the entire Providence team, rather than just the players he wanted, so he 
could control the fate of all the players and get recompense for those for whom Boston had no 
use.  Radbourn pitched for the Beaneaters for a reported sum of $4,800.38  After the 1886 season, 
team owner Arthur Soden revealed Radbourn’s actual salary to his city’s correspondent for The 
Sporting Life.  The writer, known by the pen name Mugwump, simply called the figure 
“tremendous” but refused to print the exact amount, having told Soden he would not reveal the 
actual number.  Although not conclusive, this supports those guessing that Radbourn did indeed 
receive a salary significantly north of $2,000.  Before the 1887 season began, the same sporting 
paper gave another estimate, $4,500, for Radbourn’s recompense.39 
Like Radbourn in Providence, in St. Louis Fred Dunlap decided to throw down the 
gauntlet.  Rather than play for the League’s Maroons at $2,000 in 1886, he “tendered his 
resignation” to team owner Lucas and declared he would rather retire altogether than play for 
                                                 
36 “Denny’s Awful Error” NA, The Sporting News, August 2, 1886, 1. 
37 “From Providence” MCD., The Sporting Life, November 11, 1885, 1.  It was typical at this 
time for teams and newspapers to describe the quality of play from players with a reference to 
the quality of their “work.” 
38 “Soden’s Big Scoop” Mugwump, The Sporting Life, December 9, 1885, 1; “Another Baseball 
Deal” NA, Milwaukee Sentinel, December 2, 1885, 3; Radbourn’s SABR biography, 
http://sabr.org/bioproj/person/83bf739e, accessed February 15, 2014.   
39 “From the Hub” Mugwump, The Sporting Life, November 17, 1886, 4; “Notes and 
Comments” NA, The Sporting Life, March 16, 1887, 3. 
 98
such a miserly sum.  To back up his threat, the “Sure Shot” began negotiations to purchase a 
saloon in his native Philadelphia.40  Entering the saloon or restaurant business was a common 
pastime for Gilded Age ballplayers in the off-season.  In Baltimore, pitcher Hardie Henderson, 
along with battery mate Bill Traffley, did the same.  “Should the battery succeed in mixing 
cobblers and cock-tails as well as they can assort the shoots and curves the shekels will no doubt 
be plentiful by the time the robins nest again.”41  Likewise in Chicago, where Charlie Comiskey, 
captain and first baseman of the St. Louis Browns but a Chicago native, opened a saloon on 
Twelfth Street in 1885.  “The place is very commodious and is furnished with all the modern 
improvements, including four brand new pool and one billiard table.”42 
Far surpassing these individual quarrels, however, was the decision by the players of the 
League’s New York Giants elected to hold out en masse.   
They have held meetings and have thoroughly discussed the action of the joint 
conference committee in reference to the grading of salaries, or rather the $2,000 limit 
clause.  A thorough understanding was arrived at, and the club, in a body, have agreed to 
stand by one another in regard to this question of such vital importance.  The upshot of 
the whole thing is that the players will not hear of a reduction in their salaries from last 
season, and, in fact, some few of them even want an increase on the salary they have 
previously received. 
 
“Move Up” Joe Gerhardt, the club’s second baseman, remarked he might accept a minor 
reduction from his current salary of $3,500, but “Orator” Jim O’Rourke, still one of the game’s 
top players after fourteen major league seasons, “very emphatically stated that he is worth every 
cent of the money he received last season and that he will not sign for one cent less than he 
                                                 
40 “From St. Louis” Olympus, The Sporting Life, November 11, 1885, 1. 
41 “Notes and Comments” NA, The Sporting Life, January 6, 1886, 3. 
42 “Notes and Comments” NA, The Sporting Life, January 20, 1886, 3.  Comiskey is also, of 
course, the same man who, as owner of the Chicago White Sox in 1919, played a major role in 
the Black Sox scandal involving eight members of his team throwing the World Series to the 
Cincinnati Reds. 
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received last season.”43  The New York Times quoted an unnamed Giants player (although from 
the vocabulary employed, either team captain John Ward or O’Rourke appear the likely 
candidates) speaking about conditions: 
The time has arrived when the players must take some action in the matter.  Since the 
organization of the League and American Association, the legislation has been solely in 
the interests of the clubs.  The players have been ignored at every meeting, and 
restrictions one after another have been placed upon them until now they can stand it no 
longer.  The first piece of injustice was the adopting of the reserve rule.  A club can 
engage a player, reduce his salary to $1,000, and compel him to play for that sum, 
although he may have a standing offer five times that amount elsewhere. . . . At first, only 
five men could be reserved.  We made an effort to have this broken.  To show 
presumably their contempt for the players they changed the number from five to eleven.  
At Saturday’s meeting they went still further and made it 12.  Players have been treated 
unfairly long enough, and I assure you the stockholders of clubs will find before long that 
they have placed the last straw upon the camel’s back.  We make the money, and it is 
only just that we ought to get a fair share of the profits.44 
 
The New York players also tried to sell the public on the fact that the strict $2,000 limit should 
not apply in New York City because the cost of living there was so much higher than 
elsewhere.45  Team owner John Day remained unperturbed, however, at the united front offered 
by his players, saying, “Wait until the palms of their hands begin to itch, then they will come.”46 
 
* * * * *  
 
 What became of these players claiming pecuniary discontent?  Dunlap came to terms 
early, and apparently did well for himself.  His club, St. Louis, shopped him around, and while 
some teams, the Philadelphia Athletics especially, expressed interest, (nearly agreeing to meet 
                                                 
43 “New York on the Anxious Seat” OBS., The Sporting Life, December 9, 1885, 1. 
44 “Return of the Giants” NA, New York Times, October 19, 1885, 8. 
45 “Notes and Comments” NA, The Sporting Life, December 9, 1885, 3. 
46 “Echoes of the Meeting” NA, The Sporting Life, December 16, 1885, 2. 
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the St. Louis asking price of $3,00047) they would not offer the Maroons sufficient compensation 
to acquire the Sure Shot.  He ended up back with the Maroons, (signing on December 2948), with 
a deal that, while its official terms were unknown, apparently met his expectations and elicited a 
promise to “play real ball.”  Dunlap said, “I never felt so well in my life.  For the past six weeks 
[pitcher “Handsome” Henry] Boyle and I have taken a six or ten-mile walk in the morning, and 
put in several hours a day in the racquet court.  We are both fit to get out and play ball 
tomorrow.”49  The Sporting Life’s St. Louis correspondent described the situation by writing, 
“Dunlap is very reticent regarding the matter.  When the $2,000 salary limit is mentioned he 
smiles a significant smile.  His salary last season was away over $3,000 and he says the sum he 
will receive next season will be quite satisfactory.  So people can draw their own conclusions.”50  
People did indeed draw their own conclusions.  “In view of the fact that Dunlap took an oath, on 
his contract with Cleveland, to never again soil his dimpled hands with the mud which grows on 
the St. Louis diamond; that he would rather subsist on bread and water (fire-water) the rest of his 
days, there must have been some very substantial consideration to induce him to overcome his 
dislike of the Mound City.”51 
 The coda to Fred Dunlap’s story gives more credence to the speculation about ways 
teams avoided the salary limit.  In August of 1886, St. Louis sold Dunlap to Detroit for $4,700, 
the highest sum ever received for selling a player to that point.  Dunlap’s new contract with 
Detroit remunerated him to the tune of $4,500 per year for two years.  Detroit claimed they still 
observed the salary limit, however, stating that the extra pay above $2,000 consisted of a 
                                                 
47 “Price of a Second Baseman” NA, New York Times, December 24, 1885, 1. 
48 “The St. Louis League Team” NA, New York Times, December 30, 1885, 1. 
49 “Dunlap and Boyle” NA, The Sporting News, March 17, 1886, 2. 
50 “Dunlap Signs” NA, The Sporting Life, January 6, 1886, 1. 
51 “Detroit Tips” MAT, The Sporting Life, January 6, 1886, 3.     
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personal services contract with Dunlap, and that they were only paying him the salary limit for 
his baseball activities.  Thus, by signing Dunlap to two separate contracts, the Wolverines could 
observe the salary limit but still acquire the player that they wanted and pay him a salary that 
kept him happy.52 
 Jim McCormick also decided to re-up with his club from 1885, the White Stockings.  
Team owner Al Spalding announced the signing in February 1886 with minimal comment, only 
claiming that McCormick had “signed willingly,” so it appears that little acrimony existed over 
McCormick’s short-lived decision to leave the game.53  As to the question of salary, as usual, 
there was no official declaration, but rumors circulated immediately that Spalding dangled 
$2,500 in front of the workhorse pitcher in order to secure McCormick’s services.54 
 Occasionally, owners admitted that competition between teams forced them to fatten their 
offers to unsigned players.  Baltimore owner Billy Barnie, the “Bald Eagle of Baltimore,” tore 
into Pittsburgh’s management over his difficulties in signing second baseman Sam Barkley.  
Barnie paid St. Louis president Von der Ahe $1,000 to release Barkley, but then the Alleghenys 
swooped in, meeting Barkley in person at his Wheeling, West Virginia home, giving him a 
railroad ticket to Pittsburgh, and offering the maximum $2,000 salary.  Only a personal visit 
from Barnie changed the infielder’s mind, but to secure Barkley’s signature, Barnie had to offer 
the team captaincy, boosting Barkley’s pay to an estimated $2,300.  This left a sour taste in the 
Baltimorean’s mouth, as he had helped Pittsburgh in the past.  “D--- such friendship.  Hereafter 
                                                 
52 “More Sensations” NA, The Sporting Life, August 11, 1886, 1; “A Prince of Ball Players” NA, 
The Sporting News, August 16, 1886, 1. 
53 “From the City of Straits” MAT, The Sporting Life, February 3, 1886, 3; “Base-Ball” NA, 
Chicago Daily Tribune, January 24, 1886, 12. 
54 “Notes and Comments” NA, The Sporting Life, February3, 1886, 5. 
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I’m going to look out for Barnie and the Baltimore Club, and depend upon no one but myself.  
I’m tired of professions of friendship without the performance.”55   
This was not the end of the story, however.  A week later, Barkley’s saga took a new, 
Mullane-like twist.  He was on his way to Pittsburgh after all.  Despite a signed agreement to go 
to Baltimore, duly witnessed by a pair of signatories, Barkley decided to jump ship and head to 
the Smoky City, claiming he regretted the signed agreement.  Pittsburgh further claimed the 
agreement was null, as technically, Barkley was a member of St. Louis club when he signed the 
paperwork, and the Browns still owned his rights.  Once the Browns made the release official, 
Barkley then signed on with the Alleghenys.  Barnie vowed to fight this new turn of events in 
every way possible, in both the Association and US courts, but these gambits did not succeed, 
and Barkley played ball in Pittsburgh in 1886.56  Such contractual infidelity earned Barkley a 
reputation with the press as a man of low character, and his on-field actions did nothing to 
reverse this unsavory verdict.  “Cunning and unreliable Barkley did but poor work with the stick 
at New Orleans.  He failed to distinguish himself in any way except ruffianism, vide his bat-
throwing at Mullane publicly during a game.  This act brands him as a tough.”57  There was 
certainly bad blood between Barkley and Mullane, Barkley later stating (according to Baltimore 
owner Barnie, at least) that he wished he had killed Mullane when he threw the bat at the Count 
                                                 
55 “Barnie Gets His Man” NA, The Sporting Life, January 6, 1886, 3. 
56 “A Mean Act” TTT, The Sporting Life, January 13, 1886, 1; “The Sale of Barkley” NA, New 
York Times, January 18, 1886, 1.  For the full text of the American Association’s decision, see 
“The Association” O.P. Caylor, The Sporting Life, March 2, 1886, 2. 
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of Macaroni in New Orleans.58  Barkley was out for blood because, when the pair were 
teammates at Toledo in 1884, Mullane stole Barkely’s female companion.59 
Nor was this Barkley’s first go round on the team-jumping carousel.  A mere twelve 
months prior, after his release by the same Toledo club involved in the Mullane imbroglio, 
Barkley signed an apparent agreement to play for Louisville.  He did not end up manning second 
base in the Falls City, however, but played for the Browns of St. Louis instead.  While he did 
have a few defenders in the press, and many public figures in his hometown vouchsafed his good 
character, fans in Baltimore and Cincinnati (remembering the similarities to their own Mullane 
fiasco) were rarely so charitable.60  The Sporting Life offered its readers a full hearing of all sides 
of the case, but in the end, also concluded that the second baseman was guilty of treachery and 
that Baltimore stood in the right morally, even if the Orioles did not get their man. 
It would not be Barkley’s last try at manipulating events for his own benefit, either.  
During the 1887 season, still with Pittsburgh, he suffered from an injured arm.  The arm healed 
up over the winter, but Barkley pretended otherwise in his conversations with Pittsburgh’s 
management, so before the 1888 season opened, they sold him to the American Association’s 
new franchise in Kansas City.  Barkley then signed with the Cowboys for a reported $2,800.  
After the deal was complete, he said, “well, I worked the sore arm and strained groin on the 
Pittsburg management pretty well.  My arm is all right and I can throw as well as I ever did.  I 
know the Pittsburg management thinks my arm is completely gone and from what I hear they 
think they have made $2,000 rather easily.  Well, I will show them.”61  (Defensive statistics are, 
                                                 
58 “The Association” O.P. Caylor, The Sporting Life, March 10, 1886, 2. 
59 David Nemec, The Beer and Whiskey League: The Illustrated History of the American 
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60 “Cincinnati News” O.P. Caylor, The Sporting Life, January 20, 1886, 2.   
61 “Barkley’s Release” Circle, The Sporting Life, April 11, 1888, 1. 
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as described in Appendix A, notoriously imprecise for this era, but it appears he did play better 
in the field in 1888.  His fielding percentage improved markedly, from a below average .900 at 
second base in 1887 to an above average .938 mark in 1888.) 
Eventually, the American Association decided to suspend Barkley for his controversial 
actions in 1886, but in time softened their punishment to a $500 fine.  In addition, to satisfy 
Baltimore, Pittsburgh released first baseman and expert hand ball player “Mikado” Milt Scott to 
the Orioles as recompense to smooth over the harsh feelings generated by the case.62  Billy 
Barnie took further satisfaction in helping engineer the ouster of Association president Denny 
McKnight, whom Barnie blamed for duplicity in the Barkley standoff.63  However, the 
controversy left hard feelings amongst some of the owners of the American Association.  
Although it may have been no more than a convenient excuse, Pittsburgh owner Nimick later 
claimed that the way the Association handled the Barkley case spurred his decision to leave the 
Association and join the National League in 1887.64  McKnight, meanwhile, headed west to New 
Mexico Territory to head a ranching operation there, an avocation he pursued for parts of the 
next two years.  Not satisfied with the cowboy lifestyle, by September 1887 McKnight was in the 
mining business.  “He has located a claim at Gold Hill, near Silver City, New Mexico, and is 
now building a mill.  Denny, so his friends say, expects to make a fortune there.”65  After 
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63 “Barkley to be Reinstated” NA, New York Times, April 6, 1886, 1; “Off With His Head” 
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purchasing a crushing and stamping mill from Arizona, McKnight teamed up with “a number of 
El Paso capitalists” to put the operation in motion.66 
These types of controversies were quite common in the 1880s.  Besides the stories of 
Tony Mullane and Sam Barkley, the 1885-1886 off-season also featured a major controversy 
between the New York Metropolitans and Brooklyn Grays over two players, first baseman Dave 
Orr and outfielder Chief Roseman.  After the Metropolitans got the better of things, the two clubs 
immediately started sparring over a third player, outfield Ernie Burch.  This time, Brooklyn got 
the better of the deal.  Roseman had a rather rough off-season, as it turned out, as besides the 
uncertainty over his ball club for 1886, an assailant stabbed him in the arm during a fight with a 
street gang near Penny Bridge.  One of his ball-playing friends became involved in the ruckus, 
and Roseman stepped in to help extricate his pal once the man started getting the worst of things.  
The police finally arrived and took about thirty men, Roseman included, into custody.  After his 
arrest, he explained his role in the fracas, and got off with a slight fine.67   
Barkley’s capers apparently stole the show from the big developments in New York, as 
by January and February most of the key players for the Giants signed contracts to play in 1886.  
Buck Ewing, Joe Gerhardt, John Ward, Jim O’Rourke, and Danny Richardson all inked deals in 
those two months, though the sporting press remained curiously silent as to what caused their 
change of heart.68  The players involved seemed to keep a low profile over their negotiations as 
well, leading to the usual speculation over whether the salary rule had stood up.  One 
sportswriter offered that, “we would like to see the expression on President Young’s face when 
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he reads the contracts of these players preparatory to approval” because the writer believed “this 
salary limit rule, as we remarked some time ago, would be observed only in its breach.”69   
A few members of the New York club continued holding out, however, most notably the 
excellent pitchers “Smiling” Tim Keefe and “Smiling” Mickey Welch.  In addition to sharing 
nicknames, both men also shared the opinion that “they are the main-stays of the New York 
Club” and that “neither will sign until the New York Club comes to their terms.”70  All through 
March and into April, the holdout continued.  Keefe eventually signed, but with almost no 
comment in the press, the terms were open to speculation.  He first appeared on the diamond for 
an exhibition game with Amherst College on April 9.  Welch, on the other hand, who also owned 
a saloon in Holyoke, Massachusetts, could not come to terms with the Giants after two days of 
negotiations in early April, and so decided to attend to his business interests until New York’s 
management was ready to get serious.71  Some commentators pleaded for compromise between 
the two sides.  “Welch has not signed a contract yet. . . . It is thought, however, he will be 
engaged shortly.  The New York Club cannot afford to play without this clever pitcher, and 
Welch cannot afford to remain idle all summer.”72  Team owner John Day protested that “Welch 
only wants the earth for his services, and that his demand is so extortionate that compliance is 
simply out of the question,” and so Smiling Mickey remained unsigned into late April.73  Even a 
mid-April home visit from manager Jim Mutrie could not persuade Welch to come to terms with 
his club.74  He did not sign until the week before the regular season began, and almost certainly 
did not sign for $2,000 or less.  “The exact inducement is not known, of course, but is variously 
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estimated at from $2,500 to $3,500 for the season.  It would be pretty safe to say, however, that 
Mickey’s stipend will exceed the limit.”75 
Throughout February, the stories of two prestigious pitchers stoked further speculation in 
the press.  “Parisian” Bob Caruthers, of the St. Louis Browns, announced an agreement to play 
for 1886.  Caruthers spent the winter threatening the club with various and sundry warnings of 
what might happen should they not meet his terms of a $2,900 salary.  After Caruthers claimed a 
desire to join his brother in the shoe-selling business (a successful one, too, according to reports), 
announced a possible retirement for health reasons, let slip that his parents objected to his 
playing ball for a living, and finally, considered a world tour by steamer at the behest of 
relatives, the Browns finally announced that he intended to sign a contract.  On whose terms, 
however, was an open question, as owner Von der Ahe publicly took a hard line on the question 
of employing Caruthers for 1886.76  There was, likewise, great speculation when ace pitcher 
Charlie Buffinton came to terms with the Boston Beaneaters.  Buffinton pulled down a salary of 
$2,800 in 1885, and no one could confirm how near that was to his figure for 1886.77 
Later in February, however, the Bob Caruthers story took a turn worthy of a soap opera.  
The stories of his signing were premature, after all.  When Browns owner Von der Ahe went to 
Chicago to get Parisian Bob’s signature and make everything official, he found Caruthers absent.  
Instead, he was in Gotham making plans to put to sea on an extended European vacation.  
(Caruthers came from a wealthy family, and had recently inherited a considerable sum as well.)  
When Von der Ahe telegraphed Caruthers at the Windsor Hotel in New York in a final attempt at 
persuasion, he cannot have been pleased when Caruthers answered, “Will stay for $5,000.”  Von 
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der Ahe did not take the bait, and Caruthers set out for Europe with his uncle and a rumored 
$7,000 for gambling purposes.  Some St. Louis teammates continued to hope Caruthers would 
appear in time to toe the rubber at some point in 1886, but one sportswriter had his doubts.  “This 
is not likely. . . . If he desires to go onto the ball field again he will do it with the St. Louis 
Browns and at terms dictated by Mr. Von der Ahe, for the latter says he will hold him down to 
the limit now though the heavens fall.  It is not improbable that Caruthers will not be seen again 
on the diamond.”78 
Despite such dire predictions, Caruthers appeared on the diamond in 1886 after all.  In 
mid-March, Parisian Bob cabled from, appropriately, Paris, (it appears this is where the 
nickname came from) to announce he would join the St. Louis nine for the coming season, 
having received a satisfactory answer to ongoing negotiations with Von der Ahe.79  Some in the 
sporting press speculated that “satisfactory” equated to a $3,500 salary for 1886, later revised 
downwards a bit to $3,000 or $2,800, depending on the week in which the speculation 
occurred.80   
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Not surprisingly, given his history of financial capers, Tony Mullane was among the last 
players to come to terms for 1886.  Despite rumors of a voluminous bankroll held in reserve, he 
was still waiting for something to turn up as of February.  At one point, rumors spread that The 
Count formed a partnership with a former umpire named John Dyler to open a saloon on Vine 
Street in Cincinnati,81 and those rumors soon became fact. 
Tony Mullane is the latest accession to the ranks of ball players who mix long flies, foul 
tips, and strike-outs with mint juleps, sherry flips, and other palatable bar decoctions.  
The great pitcher has not yet signed a $2,000 contract, and he is not likely to while he has 
as much business on hand as he has just now. . . . He has about completed all 
arrangements, however, and will soon open a saloon on Vine street, near Eighth, which, 
to use his own words, will be a ‘dazzler.’  He will call it ‘The Base Ball Headquarters,’ 
and will have for his partner Johnny Dyler . . . the bar fixtures will be of cherry wood, 
and the beveled-edged, plate-glass mirror behind the bar will be in the shape of a base 
ball diamond.82 
 
The Apollo of the Box did finally sign, in mid-March, for terms not disclosed to the 
press, but that did not cause him to abandon his plans to have the finest bar and pool hall in the 
city.  “The place is in a splendid location . . . a large blackboard is mounted in the middle room, 
on which all base ball scores will be posted during the season.  Messrs. Mullane & Dyler will 
make it a strictly first-class, orderly place.”83  Mullane even set aside a room for his new 
Porkopolis teammates that they used for relaxing and entertainment.84  The Count’s 
establishment ran into serious trouble the next year, however, when the city of Cincinnati seized 
his saloon fixtures, and eventually shut down the entire operation, for non-payment of the city’s 
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saloon tax.85  This, combined with a bank failure that cost him $2,000, and paying the bills for 
his brother’s long sickness in 1887, meant that by autumn of that year, Mullane was broke.86 
 
* * * * *  
 
 Whether the $2,000 salary cap worked depends on the definition of “work,” of course, 
but player salaries certainly seem to have shrunk.  St. Louis owner Chris Von der Ahe flaunted 
his financial success in August, showing observers that his wallet was $12,000 fatter than at the 
same time the previous year.87  By the end of the 1886 campaign, he also reported that his 
Browns set a team record for attendance.  Von der Ahe also predicted that salaries for his players 
would continue to stay the same or fall.  When asked about players seeking an increase, he 
responded, “Some of them have but with them I have done nothing.  They will come around at 
the right time.  I have signed others at a rate similar to that of last year.”88 
 There was, however, one thing lacking in all the discussions over salary, the worth of 
players, the rights of team management, and so forth.  What was lacking was a sense of 
proportion.  As mentioned earlier, when Al Spalding incorporated his sporting goods business in 
New Jersey in 1892, the business had a capitalization of $4 million.  By then, his sporting goods 
empire included factories in Chicopee Falls, Massachusetts, manufacturing bicycles, skates, 
tennis racquets, dumbbells, and other sports equipment requiring steel, a baseball bat factory in 
Chicago, and a Philadelphia plant for leather goods.  There were new factories in Ogdensburg, 
New York, for boat manufacture, and Brooklyn, where a new four-story plant of 40,000 square 
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feet employed over 1,000 workers creating bicycle shoes, stocking caps, football shoes and 
pants, jackets, hunting gear and clothing, and other general sportswear.  All told, Spalding’s 
sporting goods company employed about 3,500 workers and pulled in profits of several million 
dollars each year.89  Spalding was the president of no less than five corporations, A.G. Spalding 
Bros., The Spalding Manufacturing Co., The Casino Rink Co., The Chicago Ball Club, and The 
Western Arms and Cartridge Co.90  He had a near-monopoly in the sporting goods industry, 
having bought out his primary competitor, the A.J. Reach Company, in 1889.91  With such vast 
resources, it is difficult to understand why a handful of players earning $2,500 in a season rather 
than $2,000 should matter so much.  It is also unclear why an owner would endanger such a 
profitable system by angering the players who contributed so much to the game’s popularity over 
a couple hundred dollars per year. 
 Boston owner Arthur Soden presents a situation similar to that of Spalding.  Soden, a 
roofing construction magnate, and two others, J.B. Billings (owner of a shoe factory) and 
William Conant (whose business was hoop skirts and, some time later, rubber goods), owned 
about two-thirds of the voting stock in the National League Boston Beaneaters.  Collectively, 
people referred to them as the Triumvirs, and they acted the part of haughty Roman aristocrats.  
Once they had a controlling interest in the franchise, they blocked smaller shareholders from 
sharing in the team’s profits and refused to issue dividends.  Once club official, Chicago White 
Stockings secretary John Brown, described Conant as “the closest fisted Judas I ever ran across.  
His mere connection with the Boston Club sours me against the whole business.  I do not see 
how any player or business man can do business with him voluntarily and maintain his self-
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respect.”  Brown also related how, after one game in which he had requested four complimentary 
tickets for the family members of one player, the Boston treasurer demanded payment after the 
fact.  Brown could not contain his amazement, stating, “your people are the meanest set of 
skunks I ever saw engaged in the business.  By God, sir, they are a disgrace to the game.”  
Brown won his point, but the fact that Boston management was willing to alienate another club’s 
executives over three dollars speaks volumes.92   
In 1880, Soden blacklisted once of the league’s best players, outfielder Charley Jones, for 
having the audacity to ask for his June 1 paycheck on June 1.93  This was either extraordinarily 
petty, extraordinarily stupid, or both.  Jones might not have been a paragon of virtue, as “it 
would be an exception to the general rule to see him retire before two or three o’clock in the 
morning,” but he was one of the best outfielders in the game and at the time was working on a 
.300/.326/.429 season for a gaudy OPS+ of 157, which was actually his worst OPS+ season since 
his rookie year of 1875.  Jones did not get back into major league baseball where he belonged 
until 1883, when the American Association’s Cincinnati club found a place for him after O.P. 
Caylor did some work behind the scenes to get him off the National League’s blacklist.94  The 
Red Stockings were glad to get him into the fold, and he resumed his slugging ways, posting four 
consecutive seasons with an OPS+ of 132 or greater.  He remained one of baseball’s top sluggers 
through the 1885 season, but then began to decline as age took its toll.  There was also the fact 
that his wife tossed Cayenne pepper into his eyes during a domestic dispute in December of 1885 
over alleged marital infidelity, damaging his vision.95  In the meanwhile, however, Soden’s 
profits from the Beaneaters multiplied, to the point where veteran sportswriter and former major 
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league player Tim Murnane estimated the franchise pulled down a profit of $300,000 for the 
decade of the 1880s.  Contemporary estimates put the profits of the Triumvirs at $100,000 for 
1889 alone after that year’s terrific pennant race amplified the team’s popularity and the turnout 
at Boston’s South End Grounds.96 
 Soden was not scared to spend liberally to acquire good players in order to win and draw 
spectators.  In February 1887, he paid Al Spalding $10,000 to acquire superstar Mike Kelly from 
Chicago.  The previous record payment for a player had been Detroit’s purchase of Fred Dunlap 
from St. Louis for $4,700 the previous year.  Many doubted the story, because they did not 
believe a team could afford to pay so much for a player.  Soden displayed a framed photograph 
of the check in a store window to prove otherwise.  At the end of the 1887 season fellow 
Triumvir Billings offered Detroit $12,000 for the versatile Hardy Richardson and outfielder Sam 
Thompson, but Detroit management replied that $20,000 was insufficient recompense for the 
pair.  Also during the winter of 1887-1888, Soden repeated the feat of acquiring a Chicago 
superstar, sending $10,000 more in Spalding’s direction for superb pitcher John Clarkson.  Prior 
to the 1889 season, as the Detroit club looked to sell off some of its premium performers as it ran 
into financial difficulties and prepared to disband its ball club, Soden dropped $30,000 for the 
outstanding trio of catcher Charlie Bennett, first baseman Dan Brouthers, and Richardson, with 
utility player Charlie Ganzel also part of the bargain.  Soden offered $7,500 for shortstop 
“Pebbly” Jack Glasscock that same year, but Indianapolis rebuffed him.  He was a fan of 
Glasscock, having also tried to get the infielder in 1887, when he wrote Glasscock’s team, the St. 
Louis Maroons, “that Boston will give more money for Glasscock than any other city in the 
League, and I mean it.  He can find out what all the others will give for his release, and then we 
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will raise the figure.”  Soden’s figure was, reportedly, $6,000, later raised to $7,500.  Soden was 
at it again in 1890, prying away promising young shortstop Herman Long from the reborn 
Kansas City franchise for $6,000.97  He wanted Long so badly because his efforts to acquire John 
Ward from New York for $12,000 before the 1889 season had not worked, and after all his 
spending, shortstop was about the only position left where Boston could possibly upgrade to a 
better player by that time.   
 While Soden clearly did not mind paying handsomely to acquire choice players to bolster 
the standing of his nine, he was militantly and passionately against paying them any money once 
he acquired them.  The players, for their part, seeing the yawning chasm between their sale price 
and their actual salary in Boston, took note and responded predictably.  Jim O’Rourke, who had 
played in Boston in the pre-Soden days of the 1870s, believed that no player of quality would 
willingly play in the Hub City.  “Good men are obtained by clubs whose backers are noted for 
their good usage of players in days gone by,” opined Boston writer Tim Murnane, who went on 
to describe some of the ways current ownership did not meet this standard.98   
Soden further hurt his popularity by declining to spend much money on the upkeep of the 
South End Grounds where his team played, even after the field earned derision for its poor 
condition in 1887.  “The Boston ground has been so neglected that for the past three months it 
was the worst to play on in the League.  The entire diamond needs re-sodding, else there will be 
great dissatisfaction among the players.”99  Another writer noted that, “Boston has the roughest 
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infield in the League, it being full of ruts, and there is evidently no attention paid to the 
grounds.”  Even when Boston tried to upgrade its facilities, it still alienated some commentators.  
The management constructed a new grandstand at significant cost prior to the 1888 season.  It 
did so, however, at the expense of the sportswriters reporting on the club’s games.  “The men are 
cramped, some have no desk to write upon at all, and, worst of all, receive from above the 
expectorations of the patrons in the smoking pavilion. . . . The Boston reporters and papers give 
more space to their club and get less recognition in return for it than any other set of reporters in 
the country.”  The reason for the cramped accommodations for writers was that this created more 
space for paying customers who fattened the wallets of Boston’s Triumvirates.100  The trio 
repeated the trick the following season, reconfiguring its outfield to add more seats to the 
ballpark.  In Boston, at least, management spared no expense to acquire prestigious players or 
find room for more spectators, but spent little or nothing to provide those expensive players with 
a decent field on which they could display their talents.101  
Observers compared this to the excellent condition of the Recreation Park grounds in 
Detroit that same year.  “There would not be half as many errors made in a season if every club 
would have grounds like Detroit. . . . A player can also slide bases without fear of injury from 
sand and small stones on the Detroit grounds, as the paths are filled up with soft clay.”  Jerry 
Denny, considered the premier defensive third baseman in baseball, certainly favored the Detroit 
grounds.  “Jerry Denny invariably goes into raptures over the Detroit ball ground.  He says it is 
the only place where he can play his game.”102  Detroit, it appears, was one of the few clubs in 
the National League to devote much attention to the quality of its field.  Besides the problems in 
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Beantown, “the New Yorks never cut their grass until a visiting club makes a vigorous kick 
about it; the Philadelphia grounds were new this year, and naturally poor; the Washington 
grounds are very bad, being full of holes in the infield as well as in the outfield, and the Chicago 
and Indianapolis grounds are too hard.”103   
The only other club in the NL to get even lukewarm praise for its grounds was Pittsburgh, 
where writers praised the infield but found the outfield wanting.  “Pittsburg has a good 
diamond—the only skinned diamond in the League—but its outfield is also rough and full of 
ruts.”104  Another writer agreed on the state of the outfield at Pittsburgh’s Recreation Park.  “It is 
claimed that it is full of ruts and a man can never try to stop a ground ball with his hands.  He 
must shin it.  Peter Hotaling, Esq., says it is the worst he ever ran across, and this assertion is 
certainly very sweeping.”105  Another problem in Pittsburgh was all the heavy industry located in 
that city.  “There is a smelting furnace on Grand avenue right near the grounds, and almost every 
game recently has been bothered by a huge supply of smoke blown from the stack.  Several times 
it has been impossible to locate the fielders from the scorers’ box.”106  Not for nothing was 
Pittsburgh known as the Smoky City.  The same was true of where the New York Metropolitans 
played in 1884, Metropolitan Park.  Besides being on low ground near the East River, and near a 
dump to boot, the factories located on the other side of the river belched out smoke and 
chemicals.  When the wind blew in the wrong direction, the smokestacks “wafted noxious fumes 
into the park and made it all but lethal for fans, of which there were precious few.”107 
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This discussion of the quality of the playing fields clearly demonstrates the tendency of 
most teams to choose profit over the quality of play and accommodations they offered to their 
spectators.  It appears most owners concluded that the names of the players drew fans to the park 
more than any other considerations, including the quality of play or the comfort of the patrons.  
As a result, they eschewed expenses that were extraneous to that goal, such as a level and well-
kept playing field. 
Poor decisions by management hurt the grounds in other ways as well.  In its never-
ending quest for more money, the management of the Washington Nationals agreed to lease a 
traveling circus the use of their grounds while the team was away from home in May of 1889.  
The team got its field into good condition for the 1889 season, only to see it ruined after the first 
homestand.  “Prior to the advent of the circus, the diamond and outfield was almost perfection, 
and many visiting players pronounced it unequaled anywhere.  The circus rings, heavy wagons 
and indiscriminate travel over the field during the past week has well-nigh ruined the base ball 
park.  It will be many months before it will be in good condition.”108 
Realizing that grounds in poor condition not only hurt the quality of play, but even more 
importantly to the owners, could injure players in which they had invested financial resources, a 
few clubs tried to improve their facilities eventually.  Prior to 1888, the Indianapolis Hoosiers 
made major improvements to their grounds at Seventh Street Park.  “The diamond will be 
sodded, and it is the intention to dig out the base paths to a depth of about three feet and fill up 
the trenches with clay and soft dirt, from which every particle of sand and gravel will be 
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separated.  Last year the men were often hurt sliding into bases, because of the rough ground, 
and the management will remedy this matter right on the start.”109 
However bad playing conditions were in the National League, things were not exactly top 
notch in the American Association, either.  Baltimore writer Albert Mott described the grounds 
of his home club at Oriole Park in 1887 by writing, “the shed called by courtesy a grand stand is 
anything but grand, unless it be a grand humbug.  It has a roof, but is neither sheltered from sun 
or rain.  Hard, untidy wooden benches are the sittings. . . . Only this and nothing more in the 
creature comforts offered by the managers.”  Mott thought this was especially problematic 
because the Association voted to raise its ticket price to fifty cents for the coming season.  He 
feared that if fans saw no better performance on the field, and did not get to watch the action 
from a more comfortable position, the cranks of the Monumental City would vote with their feet 
and stay away from Oriole games.110   
Things seemed no better at Sportsman’s Park in St. Louis.  While owner Chris Von der 
Ahe vowed to upgrade the facilities significantly, he would not do so unless he had sole 
ownership of the property.  This was an important reason other clubs did not have top notch 
grounds, as teams saw no point in spending too much money upgrading something they did not 
own themselves.111  (This was a fake on Von der Ahe’s part, however.  In reality, he had the 
controlling interest of the property where the Browns played.  This was a ruse to gain sympathy 
from the public.112)  Regardless of the reasons, the results for the quality of baseball were 
disastrous.  In St. Louis, “during the latter part of last season the infield, or diamond, was in a 
rather ‘humpy’ condition and a first-class ground man will no doubt be secured to remedy this 
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matter.  The ground man that was employed at the park last season did not know a hump from a 
hole in the ground.”113     
Given such difficult circumstances, it is no wonder fielders in the 1880s frequently made 
errors.  The players in greatest danger were the outfielders, because chasing fly balls requires the 
fielder to track the ball consistently; they cannot afford to take their eyes off the ball just to 
watch out for ruts in the outfield grass.  Players who were especially skillful at navigating the 
obstacle courses of a rough outfield, therefore, earned special praise.  Joe Sommer of Baltimore 
was one such outfielder.  “He knows the ground thoroughly and so can run with his eye on the 
ball without fear of being balked of his prey by the proximity of fence, ditches, or inequality of 
the surface.  He is as near a dead sure catch as can be gotten.”114 
In sum, this discussion of field conditions reinforces the point that owners often spent 
freely to acquire top players, but did not worry much about the player’s treatment once acquired.  
Returning to the issues with Soden in Boston, the 1887 situation of Charles “Old Hoss” 
Radbourn demonstrated the stinginess of the management in the Hub City.  Radbourn was one of 
the game’s premier hurlers, as we have already seen.  In 1887, however, Radbourn suffered 
through the worst season of his career up to that point, in part because changes to the pitching 
rules hurt his effectiveness, causing his performance, measured as a function of walks and 
strikeouts per nine innings, to fall off.  In any case, in September of that season Soden suspended 
Radbourn “by reason of unsatisfactory work as pitcher.”  In his public comments on the 
situation, however, Soden gave a glimpse of what he thought was really happening.  He stated 
that the Triumvirs “have been played for suckers long enough” and that they did not intend to 
take it any more.  In other words, Soden believed Radbourn, softened by his fat paycheck, was 
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not giving the team his best each day in the pitcher’s box.  By suspending the Old Hoss, Soden 
and company avoided paying him his salary, and because Radbourn’s salary was among the 
highest in the game, they saved several hundred dollars thereby.  Radbourn also believed that 
was the motivation behind their actions, as he stated in an interview, “they are sore because they 
think I have not pitched as well as Madden, who gets a very small salary.  As I get a big one they 
feel that I have somehow cheated them out of some money.  Now, I signed a contract to pitch to 
the best of my ability.  I have done that, and because they are disappointed in my work I am not 
to blame.  I have lived up to my contract.”115  The club countered that Radbourn had, more than 
once that season, pitched with excessively high blood alcohol content levels.  Nonetheless, it 
soon reinstated Radbourn, and thus the salary question became moot.  Boston ownership’s 
actions, however, begs some consideration of the wisdom of purposefully antagonizing one of 
the most important and visible members of the team over, from the team’s standpoint, an amount 
of cash so small it was essentially irrelevant.116 
Not all owners operated by the Spalding/Soden model.  Ironically, considering that it was 
players from his team that formed the original core of the Brotherhood, New York Giants (and 
Metropolitans until selling them to Staten Island developer Erastus Wiman in 1885) owner John 
Day was personally popular among many of his players.  He compensated his Giants players 
better than most (although given New York’s fan base and revenue stream, he could certainly 
afford to without much fear of what it would do to his bottom line), and made sure the team 
traveled in first-class conditions, even traveling with them at times.  Occasionally, he even sided 
with their interests on such issues as the salary limit and the sale of players.  Although he played 
                                                 
115 “From The Hub” Mugwump, The Sporting Life, September 14, 1887, 3. 
116 “Radbourne On Deck Again” NA, The Sporting News, September 17, 1887, 1; “Notes and 
Comments” NA, The Sporting Life, September 21, 1887, 5. 
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an important role for the players in creating the Brotherhood of Professional Base Ball Players, 
Giants outfielder Jim O’Rourke was on good terms with Day, once refuting newspaper rumors of 
a contract language dispute by writing that he considered Day “the very embodiment of honor . . 
. his word is his bond.”  This characterization is somewhat ironic, given that Day had Tammany 
Hall connections (but O’Rourke was also a Democrat, so perhaps he could overlook Day’s ties 
with the sachems of Tammany), but made most of his money from his tobacco business.117 
Another owner who operated by less adversarial standards, at least initially, was John 
Brush.  He was the owner of the first department store in Indianapolis, “The When Clothing 
Company,” and when his Hoosier team joined the National League in 1887 (partly so Brush 
could use the team and ballpark to advertise for his store) and finished a distant eighth place with 
37 wins and 89 losses, he took things in stride.  In an 1890 interview he stated, “I run a ball club . 
. . for the interest I take in the game and the recreation it gives me.  I sell pants for money.”  He 
did very well in his business, too, and so did his partners in Indianapolis.  A writer described 
Brush’s company as “a mammoth concern which is a pride of the city” while another of the 
team’s investors, Henry Levi, operated a rival clothing store named “The Model.”  A third 
investor, Charles Mayer, owned “one of the largest miscellaneous stores in the West” named 
“The Bazaar,” A.J. Treat was one of the city’s leading merchant tailors, M.H. Spades the largest 
dry goods dealer in the city, and Harry New was the editor of the Indianapolis Journal.  These 
backers were worth, in the aggregate, more than two million dollars.  They could certainly afford 
to run a baseball team for interest and recreation.  While his attitude towards the business of 
baseball morphed over the course of the 1890s, and he began leaning strongly towards the hard-
                                                 
117 See Day’s SABR biography, available at http://sabr.org/bioproj/person/c281a493, accessed 
May 30, 2014; “Jim O’Rourke Objects” Jim O’Rourke, The Sporting Life, January 15, 1887, 1; 
Bryan DiSalvatore, A Clever Base-Ballist: The Life and Times of John Montgomery Ward (New 
York: Pantheon Books, 1999), 137-138. 
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core anti-player model in that decade, in the 1880s it was a refreshing change from the way most 
of his colleagues behaved.118   
Even with team owners who generally kept a low profile, such as Baltimore owner Harry 
Vonderhorst, the sporting public clearly understood that the operation of a baseball team posed 
no serious threat to their financial standing in general.  Vonderhorst’s Orioles were more likely 
to finish in the lower half of the American Association standings in the 1880s than in the upper 
half, forcing one of their sportswriters to admit in 1887 that, “the club treasury badly needs all it 
can possibly get in this close of the season to come anywhere near paying expenses.”  However, 
as the same writer also admitted, “Mr. Vonderhorst can, without serious consequence, submit to 
loss on his base ball venture, as it is but a side speculation—indeed, many a wealthy man has a 
more costly hobby.”119  Later, the same writer stated, “Mr. Vonderhorst unhesitatingly volunteers 
the information that he is not in base ball to make money . . . he is infatuated with the game and 
can afford to indulge his desires by running a club.  He would be glad to have financial returns 
from his pleasure, of course, but he would not starve or fret if there was some loss.”120 
 These profiles demonstrate that there were many possible approaches to the issue of how 
to run a team and how teams could compensate their players.  As for the players, there were the 
fortunate few who continued to pull down more money than the official limit allowed, no doubt, 
and many players submitted to the new cap without public complaint.  However, this attempt at a 
salary cap was like the first rolling rock that creates a landslide.  Unknown to most, in 1886 the 
New York players who had held out unsuccessfully as a group formed plans that, in four years’ 
                                                 
118 Charles Alexander, Turbulent Seasons: Baseball in 1890-1891, (Dallas: SMU Press, 2011): 
13; Brush’s SABR biography, available at http://sabr.org/bioproj/person/a46ef165, accessed May 
30, 2014; “In Earnest” GWB, The Sporting Life, January 5, 1887, 1. 
119 “From Baltimore” TTT, The Sporting Life, September 21, 1887, 4. 
120 “Baltimore Bulletin” TTT, The Sporting Life, August 29, 1888, 4. 
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time, would shake baseball to its core.  That winter, two players, John Ward and Jim O’Rourke, 
took courses in political science and law, respectively, Ward at Columbia (he had already earned 
his law degree, cum laude, from Columbia in May 1885) and O’Rourke at Yale.  Led by Ward, 
they laid the groundwork for the Brotherhood of Professional Base Ball Players in the winter of 
1885-1886, although the Brotherhood’s existence was not generally known to the public until 
nearly a year later.121 
                                                 
121 “Baseball Notes” NA, New York Times, November 2, 1885, 8; Di Salvatore, A Clever Base-
Ballist, 175-176, 183; David Stevens, Baseball’s Radical for All Seasons: A Biography of John 
Montgomery Ward, (Lanham, MD: The Scarecrow Press, 1998), 39.  Stevens differs from the 
Times, which wrote that Ward enrolled in the law school, rather than the political science 
department.  Di Salvatore relates that Columbia established a School of Political Science in 1881 
(182).  As Ward already had a law degree, it would appear the Times confused its story.  Ward 





The Origins of the Brotherhood, 1886-1887 
 
 
 The Brotherhood of Professional Ball Players (BPBP), formed October 22, 1885, was 
baseball’s first significant and lasting players union.  The Brotherhood’s charter, primarily 
authored by John Ward, pledged the organization to “protect and benefit its members, promote a 
high standard of professional conduct, and advance the interests of the national game.”1  In 
addition, members pledged to  
• Strive to promote the objects and aims of this Brotherhood, in accordance with the 
Constitution and By-Laws; 
• Never to take advantage of a brother in good standing; 
• Never to permit an unjust injury to be done to, or continued against, a brother in good 
standing, while it is in my power to prevent the same; 
• To assist a brother in distress; 
• To render faithful obedience to the will of the Brotherhood, as expressed by the decree of 
the council, or vote of my chapter.2 
Based on these statements, the Brotherhood appeared to differ little from any number of the 
benevolent associations and societies common in the late nineteenth century.  Many trades and 
                                                 
1 Stevens, Baseball’s Radical for All Seasons, 42.  
2 Di Salvatore, A Clever Base-Ballist, 176. 
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professions had similar codes of conduct for their members.  However, if the Brotherhood’s 
merely served these purposes, why keep it a secret from the public in 1885?   
 Clearly, Ward and company intended it to be much more than a mutual aid society, 
although it certainly could fill that role as well.  In fact, Ward was one of the first players to 
donate to the February 1886 benefit for Curry Foley.  The reason, then, why the organization did 
not announce its existence to the public until nearly a year later was that Ward and the other 
founders wanted to secure a large membership before drawing attention.  They envisioned the 
BPBP as a vehicle to redress their accumulating grievances over such issues as abuses of the 
reserve clause, player sales, and the 1886 salary cap, but knew that in order to do so, the players 
must present a united front to management.  Before the Brotherhood could expand its influence, 
therefore, it was going to need some members.  Ward and Jim O’Rourke, along with New York 
Giants teammates Tim Keefe, Roger Connor, Buck Ewing, Mickey Welch, Daniel Richardson, 
Mike Dorgan, and Joe Gerhardt, formed the organization’s original core.  This group contained 
men who were not only tremendous players on the field (Ward, O’Rourke, Keefe, Connor, 
Ewing, and Welch would all gain election to the Baseball Hall of Fame), but also, in accordance 
with the Brotherhood’s charter, were highly regarded for their comportment off the field.  The 
organization sought to build its reputation through recruiting reputable players who met certain 
standards of morality and sobriety, and who would encourage prospective members to reform if 
necessary before joining.   
All knew of Ward’s learned stature, of course.  O’Rourke, who had been in baseball so 
long that he actually participated in the 1874 tour of England to popularize the game there, was a 
civic leader in his hometown of Bridgeport, Connecticut, who refused both alcohol and tobacco.  
He graduated from Yale’s law school in June 1887 and passed Connecticut’s bar examination in 
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November.  At one time, he declared his intent to run for office on the Democratic ticket.  
Following the Brotherhood War, after retiring from major league baseball, O’Rourke returned to 
his hometown and organized a team there, which included fellow Bridgeport native Harry 
Herbert, who was black, a rare occurrence after professional baseball adopted its color line in 
1883.  He also served on the Bridgeport Paving Commission, was a member of the Royal 
Arcanum, the Connecticut Bar Association, the Bridgeport Elks, and the Knights of Columbus.  
He died, appropriately enough, after contracting pneumonia from braving a blizzard to consult 
with a legal client on New Year’s Day, 1919.3 
O’Rourke was also, undoubtedly, among the most loquacious and sesquipedalian players 
in the game of the 1880s.  So much so that the sporting press poked fun at his polysyllabic 
verbiage from time to time.  In 1887, The Sporting Life printed a mock interview between Orator 
Jim and his team’s owner, John Day.  Here are some excerpts: 
 
Day: “How is everything down in Barnumville?” 
O’Rourke: “You mean Bridgeport, do you not?” 
Day: “Certainly; you don’t suppose I mean any other place?” 
O’Rourke: “I will tell you, Mr. Day, Barnum’s ‘Equescuriculum of Megatherian Monstrosities’ 
have evacuated the town, and the grief of the demoralized and isolated population is inexorable.” 
Day: “What do you think of the umpiring for next season, Mr. O’Rourke?” 
O’Rourke: “I will tell you, Mr. Day, we want unostentatiousness and the effervescence of 
imputrescibility congolomerated, and all umpires who are unsophisticated, incapacitated, or even 
                                                 
3 Stevens, Baseball’s Radical for All Seasons, 42-43; Di Salvatore, A Clever Base-Ballist, 175-
177; O’Rourke’s SABR biography, available at http://sabr.org/bioproj/person/b7e9aba2, 
accessed May 22, 2014; “From New York” Looker On, The Sporting Life, January 5, 1887, 4. 
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men who get intoxicated, should be emasculated.  My mottos are: Sesquipedalia Verba; Sic 
Semper Tyrannis Paregoric; Vive La Republique.”4 
 
 O’Rourke also was considered among the most honest and reputable players in the game.  
The story of how he came to play for the Giants in the first place illustrates the point.  In 1884, 
he was a member of the Buffalo Bisons, and when that team prepared to disband at the end of its 
season, O’Rourke was in great demand from other clubs looking to secure his talents.  Owner 
Day met with O’Rourke, told O’Rourke that he would like to see him in a New York uniform the 
following season, and they agreed the salary would be $4,500.  Shortly thereafter, an agent from 
the Philadelphia Athletics contacted O’Rourke and offered $5,500 to him to play in Philadelphia.  
O’Rourke had only a verbal agreement with Day, not a written contract, and could have easily 
gone back on his word, but did not.  Furthermore, “O’Rourke, while a member of the Buffalo 
Club, was never reserved.  He is one of those players that you don’t have to reserve.  You tell 
him at the end of the season that you want his services next year and if he says ‘all right’ that is 
sufficient.”5   
There was also the time when, while playing for Boston, O’Rourke tried to score but the 
defense threw him out in a close play at the home plate.  The Hub City crowd immediately called 
for the umpire’s head.  O’Rourke calmed them down, shouting, “What is the matter, my friends?  
I was fairly out, and the umpire was clearly correct in his decision.”  The crowd then sat down, 
the game continued, and the umpire avoided an unpleasant confrontation that might have gone ill 
                                                 
4 “Jim O’Rourke’s Return From Yale College” Charles Foley, The Sporting Life, March 30, 
1887, 1.  Bridgeport was also the home of circus entertainer P.T. Barnum, thus the reference to 
Barnumville. 
5 “New York News” George Stackhouse, The Sporting Life, September 19, 1888, 7. 
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for him.  Ironically, the umpire who O’Rourke saved was none other than future National League 
president Nick Young.6 
 The other founders of the Brotherhood were similar in attitude and comportment, if 
lacking O’Rourke’s refined and Latin-laced vocabulary.  First baseman Roger Connor (owner of 
baseball’s record for career homeruns prior to Babe Ruth, at 138, to go with 233 triples, most of 
any player who played exclusively in the nineteenth century) was a quiet and dignified player 
who played in 1,998 major league games without a single ejection and rarely captured the public 
spotlight.  He “seldom, if ever, questions a decision of an umpire.  He is beloved by his 
associates, and always has a kind word for everybody.”  However, Connor held firm views 
regarding the rights of labor, and spoke strongly to encourage player solidarity in the new 
organization.7   
The same was true of ace pitcher “Smiling” Tim Keefe.  An early recruit to the cause of 
labor, following an incident at age twenty when he had to sue simply to collect the wages due 
                                                 
6 “Worthy Of Emulation” NA, The Sporting Life, August 28, 1889, 4. 
7 Quote from “League First Basemen” GNB, The Sporting Life, December 29, 1886, 4; Connor’s 
SABR biography, at http://sabr.org/bioproj/person/4ef2cfff, accessed May 22, 2014.  His power 
was such that in 1886 an anonymous poet wrote some verse in his honor which appeared in The 
Sporting Life: 
 
A comet went whizzing across the night sky; 
A star (stationary) asked: What makes you fly? 
It answered so weary, with voice of deep woe: 
“My head’s a base ball, knocked up here years ago, 
By big Roger Connor, to never drop back, 
And keep me e’er coursing this heavenward track; 
While grabbing stray kites and such things for a tail, 
I sad see my speed will always prevail; 
For, muscle he put on that ‘cloud-piercer’ blow, 
Will keep me e’er circling the firmament, oh!” 
 
It might not quite be “Casey at the Bat” or “Baseball’s Sad Lexicon,” but the author has seen 
worse.  No title, NA, The Sporting Life, August 25, 1886, 1. 
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him for his work as a carpenter, Keefe’s support for the concept of unionization solidified when 
his Troy team placed him on its reserve list in 1881.  He tried to hold out for more money, but 
his gambit failed, and he played for the same contract, $1,500, as he had the previous season.  He 
caught a break when the National League booted Troy out of its circuit before the 1883 season 
and he was free to sign with the New York Metropolitans of the American Association, where 
both his pay, now $2,800, and his performance soared to new heights.  However, he soon grew 
restive over the restraints imposed by the reserve clause and the way team owners manipulated it 
to the detriment of the players.   
The next chapter of his personal story illustrates his frustration, and the manipulations of 
ownership, perfectly.  As the 1885 season neared, one man, John Day, owned both the New York 
Giants of the National League and the New York Metropolitans.  Day favored the Giants, and 
wanted to move Keefe from the Metropolitans to the Giants to strengthen that club.  To do so, 
however, he would have to release Keefe from his reserved contract with the Metropolitans, 
giving Keefe ten days to negotiate with other clubs.  Knowing that a bidding war would result, 
Day instructed the Giants’ manager, Jim Mutrie, to take Keefe and infielder Dude Esterbrook 
(who was not, of course, actually named Dude, but all the sporting press called him Dude rather 
than Thomas because of his efforts to live a stylish, high-class lifestyle8) on a boat to Bermuda to 
visit an onion farm Mutrie owned on the island.  While returning from the Caribbean, on the 
eleventh day of the trip, Mutrie signed Keefe and Esterbrook to new contracts with the Giants of 
the National League.  Keefe did get a three-year contract, along with some rest and recreation 
                                                 
8 One writer met him in 1887 and reported the Dude was wearing salmon-colored corduroy 
pants, a sky blue vest embroidered “liberally” with yellow wreaths, a shirt of red and white bars 
with a flop-cornered white collar, a pea-green necktie, a black hat, trimmed with ribbon, terra 
cotta-colored gloves, and sporting a cane.  “Caylor’s Comment” O.P. Caylor, The Sporting Life, 
October 5, 1887, 4. 
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under the tropical sun, but he also wondered what he might have earned in a free market.9  
(Esterbrook, to finish the story, did not even enjoy the trip very much, as he returned to Gotham 
with an acute case of seasickness that prevented him from manning his position at third base in 
some of the exhibition games the Giants played in mid-April.)10 
 How Jim Mutrie, the Giants manager, became the team’s manager is somewhat similar to 
Keefe’s story.  Mutrie managed the Metropolitans to the American Association title in 1884, the 
team posting a sterling record of 75 wins against just 32 losses.  In the off-season, owner Day 
decided to transfer Mutrie to the Giants, and Mutrie agreed—sort of.  In early March of 1885, he 
showed up at the American Association’s yearly preseason meeting to represent the Mets.  At 
this meeting, the AA passed a resolution to honor the National Agreement.  This included 
provisions whereby the member teams of the NL and AA would honor player contracts.  Mere 
weeks later, however, Mutrie transferred his allegiance officially, and on March 26 departed on 
his notorious Caribbean cruise with Keefe and Esterbrook.  Because of his treachery, the AA 
banned Mutrie and nearly abandoned the National Agreement in anger over this breach of faith.  
They held a vote to expel the Metropolitans from the league, as well, although there was 
insufficient support for the idea when the final vote occurred.  The outrage was futile; Mutrie 
went on to manage the Giants through the 1891 season, by which time the American Association 
was on its last legs and set to dissolve.11  Mutrie’s actions, however, did earn him his derisory 
nickname, “Truthful Jim,” from the angry pen of venerable baseball writer Henry Chadwick as 
well as a reputation from his enemies in baseball for questionable dealings that he never fully 
shook. 
                                                 
9 Keefe’s SABR biography, at http://sabr.org/bioproj/person/6f1dd1b1, accessed May 22, 2014. 
10 “Baseball News” NA, New York Times, April 20, 1885, 8. 
11 Mutrie’s SABR biography, at http://sabr.org/bioproj/person/430838fd, accessed May 24, 2014; 
Seymour, Baseball, 166. 
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 When the opportunity to team with Ward and O’Rourke in forming the Brotherhood 
came around, Keefe wasted no time in joining.  Like O’Rourke, Keefe neither smoked nor drank.  
Though not quite as well educated as Ward or O’Rourke, he studied shorthand at night, and 
when the Brotherhood held its first meeting in November 1885, the group selected Keefe as 
secretary-treasurer.  He played an especially important role in Brotherhood affairs in 1889.12   
  
* * * * * 
 
 The Brotherhood of Professional Ball Players went public in the summer of 1886 as 
President Ward gave a special interview to The Sporting Life on July 27 describing the new 
organization and its goals.  Ward chose his interviewer well, a lawyer friend named James 
Blackhurst, who wrote under the pen name of “Layman.”13  In the interview, Ward was 
conciliatory and careful.  The idea of unionism was not truly novel or radical in 1886, at least not 
to all.  In fact, none other than Al Spalding had tried to form a union almost fifteen years earlier.  
In addition to the usual things in which unions interested themselves, “As far back as 1872 Al 
Spalding, George Wright, Jim White and the other members of the old Boston Reds sat around 
the gymnasium on Eliot street and talked over the question, and finally drew up a paper and 
presented it to members of the other clubs. . . . The object was to play with no club containing a 
player thought to be in the hands of the gamblers.”14 
                                                 
12 Keefe’s SABR biography, at http://sabr.org/bioproj/person/6f1dd1b1, accessed May 22, 2014. 
13 Stevens, Baseball’s Radical for all Seasons, 46. 
14 “From The Hub” Tee Eye Emm, The Sporting Life, October 5, 1887, 5.  Tee Eye Emm was 
filing in for Boston’s usual correspondent, “Mugwump,” (W.D. Sullivan, of the Boston Globe) 
for this week, as Sullivan had married during the preceding week, and this writer was probably 
Tim Murnane.  Not only was Murnane a Boston sportswriter for the Boston Globe, with the 
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Nonetheless, Ward wanted to highlight the respectability of the Brotherhood and 
downplay the threat it posed to the established order within baseball.  The tragedy at Haymarket 
Square in Chicago on May 4, after which eight labor leaders were in prison awaiting trial for 
murders they did not commit while Chicago newspapers offered money to juries to convict them, 
must have been on Ward’s mind.  He disclaimed explicitly any personal desire to eliminate the 
reserve rule.  When asked if the Brotherhood would attack the rule, Ward answered, “I should 
say that it will not be.  I believe that the majority of ball players regard the reserve rule as a 
necessary institution, though they may consider that some abuses have arisen under it.”15  
Instead, the BPBP would “meet the league officials, and in a spirit of fairness draw up a contract 
in which the equities of each might be reasonably protected.”16  Rather than emphasize how the 
new organization would challenge ownership, Ward focused on the mutual compatibility of this 
relationship.   
I believe this organization will be of positive benefit to them.  Base ball, as a profession, 
has many features peculiar to itself.  There is probably no other business in which the 
interests of employers and employees are so nearly identical.  With the possible exception 
of the question of salary, they seem to me to be entirely so, and even here there is not so 
much difference as would appear at first sight. . . . In all other respects I consider the 
interests of the players to be identical with those of the clubs.17 
 
Ward expanded on how the organization would help management, or at least not threaten 
it.  “There is one thing, however, which this organization does not propose to do.  It will not 
protect any man in wrong doing.  If any member of this organization misbehaves and subjects 
himself to discipline by his club, that is a matter with which the brotherhood should not and will 
                                                                                                                                                             
appropriate initials, he was also a player in the National Association in 1872 when this event 
took place, in fact the only player in the National Association that year with the proper initials. 
15 “A Big Surprise” Layman, The Sporting Life, August 4, 1886, 1. 
16 “The Brotherhood of Professional Ball-Players” NA, Chicago Daily Tribune, August 4, 1886, 
3. 
17 “A Big Surprise” Layman, The Sporting Life, August 4, 1886, 1. 
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not have anything to do.”  He did note that if a punishment was extreme or vastly different in 
magnitude from the seriousness of the offense, the Brotherhood might consider action, but he 
hoped these would be rare instances, and that arbitration would suffice to remedy any gross 
injustices that might occur.18   
In addition, both Ward and the interviewer went out of their way to demonstrate that the 
men in the Brotherhood were of the highest caliber morally.   
The organization embraces the entire intelligent and reputable element of the profession.  
It includes among its members such men as Ned Hanlon, John Morrill, Jim O’Rourke, 
Arthur Irwin, Dave Rowe, Ed Williamson, Al McKinnon and Cliff Carroll.  This is an 
array of names of which any organization may be proud.  The mere publication of that 
list will insure the confidence and support of the public. 
 
Finally, Ward announced that the Brotherhood claimed a membership of nearly 100 National 
League players he and his fellows recruited while the 1886 season was in progress.19  Given that 
there were eight National League teams, featuring thirteen or fourteen regular players, this 
signified that almost ninety percent of National League players had joined.  The Brotherhood had 
even turned away a few players, unnamed in the interview, because of their moral failings.  Only 
one Giant was not a member, catcher and outfielder Pat Deasley, who many observers believed 
had the undesirable moral failings in abundance.20 
 In addition to being an organization featuring men of good habits, the BPBP was 
democratic: “It is organized by chapters, each having its local officers; each chapter will choose 
one delegate or representative and all the representatives so chosen (eight in all) will constitute 
the council.  This is the supreme executive and judicial body and its officers are the general 
officers of the brotherhood.”  Furthermore, and in marked contrast to the capricious discipline 
                                                 
18 Ibid. 
19 Ibid.  Writers often referred to Williamson as Ed Williamson at the time, probably because his 
given name was Edward, but most baseball references refer to him as Ned. 
20 “Notes and Comments, NA, The Sporting Life, August 25, 1886, 5. 
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system of the owners that gave players no opportunity for arbitration, “the council shall have 
power to discipline any member by fine or suspension, but only after charges shall have been 
preferred in writing by his chapter or by any three members, and after the accused shall have 
been given an opportunity to be heard in defense.”21 
 In early interviews, members of the Brotherhood continued hammering at these themes 
concerning the organization’s purpose and plans.  In late October, The Sporting Life interviewed 
Sam Crane on these very questions.  When questioned on when the Brotherhood would call its 
first strike, Crane responded,  
I don’t suppose such a thing will ever occur.  That is not the purpose of the order.  People 
think because it is a union, that like other unions, it must get up a strike, but there you 
make a mistake.  The union was established mainly for the purpose of equalizing the 
rights and privileges of contracts between managers and players. . . . It is not the intention 
of the union to meddle with the salary question except that we believe there should not be 
a limit. . . . A man should be paid what he is worth. 
 
Crane also emphasized that nearly all National League players were in the Brotherhood, and for 
that reason, believed that the NL would do the “square thing” and deal fairly with their concerns.  
With possibly two or three exceptions, every man on the League reserve lists is a member 
of the union . . .  we will also probably have all professional players in the union by next 
season.  If the joint committee [of NL and AA owners] . . . should formulate one set of 
rules for the League and Association, it will be but a short while until all Association 
players have combined with us, for then we will all be under the same contract.22 
 
The actions of National League owners often contributed to the ease with which the 
Brotherhood bolstered its ranks.  There was the incident in Detroit, for instance, in which the 
team fined pitcher Charlie “Pretzels” Getzien (also spelled Getzein) $100 for giving up an 
excessive number of runs in the eleventh inning of a game against the lowly Kansas City 
                                                 
21 “The Brotherhood of Professional Ball-Players” NA, Chicago Daily Tribune, August 4, 1886, 
3. 
22 “The Players’ Brotherhood” NA, The Sporting Life, October 27, 1886, 1. 
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Cowboys, then chewed out the rest of the team after the contest ended.  Unsurprisingly, the 
Wolverines’ entire roster proclaimed their willingness to join the Brotherhood shortly afterwards.  
It is true that Getzien may have deserved some of the blame for this fiasco, however, according 
to news reports.  Feeling let down by his teammates and the umpire, he lost his temper and his 
composure, and began laying the ball in nicely for the Cowboys, who teed off and plated ten runs 
in the inning.23  Still, the idea of fining a player just for giving one poor performance did not sit 
well with the Wolverines.   
Nor was this the only time that team manager W.H. Watkins had done such a thing.  “It 
was his custom to threaten to ‘soak’ a player $10 or $25 for a costly error.”  Wolverine players 
despised Watkins so greatly that following their 1887 championship season, they essentially 
demanded his removal by refusing to play for him en masse from that point forward.  Detroit 
management did not buckle under in the face of this threat, however, engaging Watkins for 1888 
“at a handsome advance in salary.”24  Detroit’s president, Fred Stearns, did not really believe the 
threat, anyway, and did not intend to allow his players to dictate to him how to run his ball 
club.25  Stearns and Detroit management later tried to lay the blame for the whole episode on 
malingering second baseman Fred Dunlap (see chapter eleven), claiming he was behind the 
whole scheme in his efforts to extort more salary for 1888.  Dunlap denied this, stating in an 
interview, “some one has accused me of trying to work up the Detroit players not to sign unless 
Watkins ceased to be manager.  That is also a lie.  I never even thought of such a thing.”26  In the 
                                                 
23 “The Home of the Big Four” NA, The Sporting News, August 2, 1886, 1. 
24 “Detroit Dotlets” MAT, The Sporting Life, December 14, 1887, 3. 
25 “Detroit’s Great Loss” Mac, The Sporting News, December 24, 1887, 1. 
26 “Fred Dunlap” Hincker, The Sporting News, December 31, 1887, 4. 
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end, the two sides achieved something of a compromise when Watkins stayed on as team 
manager but did not sit on the players’ bench during games.27 
Most players seemed satisfied, but veteran third baseman Jim “Deacon” White was not.  
White was forty years old by 1888, and had been in the game since before the National 
Association began play in 1871, so he had seen a thing or two.  Evidently displeased with 
Watkins, he maintained his refusal to take the field into March of 1888, to the distress of all 
Detroiters, as the team had no other player to take the Deacon’s place at the hot corner.28  White 
claimed his manager “backcapped” him repeatedly, and adamantly refused to sign a contract.  
Opinions on the justness of White’s decision seemed mixed.  While some saw his move as 
another example of players agitating to gain greater control over their fates, other backed the 
veteran, with the Chicago Daily Tribune writing, “there must be some strong grievance to make 
Jim White angry at anybody, for it is hard to find his equal as a man among ball-players.”29  
When Watkins met White in March at the National League’s meeting, he tried to talk the Deacon 
into signing a Wolverines contract for 1888, but White would not have it.  “In this the manager 
utterly failed, and in addition received an extensive piece of the Deacon’s mind, including the 
information that he would do no business whatever with Watkins.”30   
White felt so insulted, in fact, that by the next week he threatened retirement, while the 
team’s new president, Smith, tried to talk him out of such a drastic step.31  This prompted 
Watkins to issue a public apology through the local newspapers, which appeared partly honest 
and partly intended to lure White back, as the Wolverines scampered about to find another third 
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baseman in case White was unmoved.  The Deacon accepted some of what Watkins said, 
writing, “I accept them as one gentleman is in duty bound to accept an apology from another,” 
but also replied, through the same local papers, that he did not consider the matter settled.  
Private issues did not prompt White’s stance; instead, it was disparaging remarks about White’s 
professional conduct and performance that impugned White’s public reputation.  “As you very 
well know, a ball player’s stock in trade is his reputation as a man at all times and his skill on the 
field.  Mr. Watkins, it is the using of your official position in giving out newspaper items 
intentionally reflecting on my professional reputation of which I accuse you and which I stand 
ready to prove.”32  White finally signed with Detroit for 1888, but this was not the last time he 
entered the lists against the magnates of the National League. 
 Other teams, imposing fines and other punishments in an arbitrary manner, also provided 
Ward and friends with ammunition to recruit new members.  In August, Washington Nationals 
manager Mike Scanlon fined Cliff Carroll one hundred dollars and suspended him for the rest of 
the season.  Simultaneously, he docked second baseman Jimmy Knowles and outfielder Sam 
Crane fifty dollars just for poor fielding.33  Writing about Knowles and Crane, a local 
sportswriter stated, “Of course it was a very bitter pill, but they had to swallow it.  This was very 
harsh, especially so when these men were trying to do their work. . . . The effect of the above 
fines will work against the club, as the other players, not caring to share a similar fate, will not 
attempt to field difficult balls.”  This writer elaborated on Carroll’s punishment as well: 
“Another error of judgment was the suspension of Carroll, which was wholly unwarranted and 
very harsh treatment, simply because he had spunk enough to object to the continual experiments 
with amateur pitchers.  The public is very tired also of these moss-agate failures and think it is 
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about time that some of the profits be used in securing another pitcher.”  The players already felt 
aggrieved when Nationals management released Bob Barr, a mediocre pitcher having a down 
year because of an injured finger, and these episodes simply added fuel to the fire.  At least Barr 
looked on the bright side of things.  “He is happy, however, and several of the players envy him, 
going even so far as to ask how he succeeded in getting the prize they want—his release.”34   
 Carroll’s punishment was so scandalous that Nationals manager Mike Scanlon wrote a 
piece for The Sporting Life in an effort to clear his name and the air surrounding the incident.  He 
claimed that fining Carroll was necessary, “as that player was not only meddlesome and very 
free with his unasked advice, but was unsteady in his habits and independent and insolent to such 
a degree that it could no longer be borne, and a lesson was needed.  He got it, and the result is 
that since his reinstatement, after duly expressed penitence, he has played excellent ball.”  
Rumors continued circulating, however, regarding the poisonous relationship of management 
and players in Washington.  They were so bad that manager Scanlon used the same piece to 
refute claims that he inflicted corporal punishment on some of his ballplayers.35  Whatever the 
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facts of his relationship with his team, it was soon irrelevant, as Scanlon stepped down as 
manager the following week, with ex-umpire John Gaffney taking his place at the helm.   
 Had there been an American Association counterpart to the Brotherhood, its players 
would have voiced some of the same grievances.  Always mercurial, to say the least, Chris Von 
der Ahe in St. Louis was notorious for fining his men for poor play.  Whenever the team went on 
a losing streak, even a short one, and his temper was up, St. Louis players were at risk of fines 
for making mistakes.  In 1888, for example, star left fielder Tip O’Neil was very sick and 
struggled to play his usual hard-hitting game.  Choosing to disbelieve that O’Neil was ill, Von 
der Ahe instead concluded that O’Neil was purposefully dogging it to secure his release from the 
team.  He then mulcted O’Neil seventy-five dollars and laid him off without pay.  At the same 
time, he fined pitcher Silver King one hundred dollars for not pitching at his usual level, then 
accused rival Brooklyn of tampering with O’Neil and encouraging him to play poorly.36 
 Nor was such high-handed treatment of players confined to the major leagues.  In 1886, 
the directors of the Brockton club in the Eastern New England League hit the majority of their 
roster with fines, some major, for their “indifferent playing.”  Team captain Bill “Gunner” 
McGunnigle, who had played in the major leagues as recently as 1882 and is most famous as the 
inventor of the catcher’s mitt, took a twenty-five dollar hit.  Teammates identified as Hawes, 
McCarthy, and Meister fared worse, at fifty dollars per head, while Cudworth, Tuckerman, 
Patton, and Thayer had their wallets lightened by ten dollars each.  “This wholesale fining of 
players excites considerable indignation among their friends, who think the boys have been 
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playing as good ball as they know how.  Captain McGunningle was instructed to administer the 
fines, but refused, and . . . has asked for his release.”37 
 Even players with no particular complaint joined the Brotherhood readily in many cases, 
perhaps in the realization that even if they had no issues with their team at the moment, 
something would probably happen soon enough.  Seven members of the Philadelphia Quakers 
swelled the ranks by mid August, with rumors that the rest of the team would follow in short 
order.38  This was, more than anything else, a response to the general stinginess of Quakers 
ownership when it came to rewarding its players.    
The Brotherhood had not yet signed up any players from the American Association, 
however.  Possibly, this was due to the AA’s reputation as the “Beer and Whiskey League,” 
although this title referred more to how the owners of various AA franchises made their wealth 
outside of baseball, and the fact that the league did allow its teams to sell alcohol at the ballpark, 
rather than to any elevated level of dissolution on the part of its players as compared to other 
leagues.  The BPBP also thought it wise to take on just one league at a time.39  It also reflected 
the fact that Association players and League players did not have exactly the same contracts, and 
so could not negotiate for exactly the same things.   
 
* * * * * 
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 Ownership and management’s reaction to Ward’s announcement was not uniform.  
Although he would change his mind soon enough, National League president Nick Young 
appeared friendly at first, stating,  
It seems to be a move on the part of the most reputable men in the profession to secure 
for themselves and associates fair and equitable treatment at the hands of those in 
authority over them as well as to promote the general welfare of the sport.  With such an 
object the organization is above criticism, and the fact that such men as John Ward, Jim 
O’Rourke, John Morrill, Ed Hanlon and Dave Rowe are the prime movers in the scheme, 
insures for it the respect and consideration of all who may be brought in contact with the 
workings of the institution.40 
 
Ironically, considering the role he would play in the drama to come, Al Spalding also gave the 
Brotherhood a cautious endorsement.  Shortly after the organization came into existence, he 
stated, “if they get the right men at the helm, such an organization can be made a power for the 
general good of the game, and for the benefit of ball players the country over in particular.  I 
have great confidence in Johnny Ward’s ability and energy, and if any man can make a success 
of such an organization he can.”  Spalding hoped, above all, that the organization would prove 
useful to curtail drinking amongst the players.  Clearly, this issue was on his mind constantly, as 
his hiring of private detectives to shadow his men and watch their after-hours behavior 
demonstrates.41 
What did baseball observers think about the Brotherhood?  The Chicago Daily Tribune 
believed the Brotherhood offered the proper balance to the labor-management relationship in 
baseball.  The Daily Tribune praised the organization for its intention to rectify the injustice of 
“the illegal and unjust contracts required in some clubs, where the parties of the one part sign 
away all right and the party of the other ‘reserves’ all.”  Furthermore, regarding the clause in the 
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BPBP constitution stating that the organization could fine or discipline members only after a fair 
hearing, the paper regarded this as “a principle of justice which might fairly command the 
attention of the associations themselves.”  It closed its early coverage of the Brotherhood by 
stating its belief that “this profession shows a most commendable appreciation of the rights of 
the individual members, and the section quoted is only a fair sample of the discrimination and 
conservatism which pervades the entire document.”42 
Another Chicago baseball writer, Harry Palmer, saw the Brotherhood’s emergence as the 
natural consequence of dictatorial and tyrannical moves by the magnates.  As later events 
showed, Palmer was not exactly enamored of the organization and its course of action, but he 
clearly recognized why players joined.  Throughout 1886 and 1887, some owners began 
applying the blacklist with greater frequency than hitherto, and enthusiasm for the practice was 
on the rise among some of baseball’s capitalists.  Palmer, seeing this, was not surprised when the 
players decided to band together.   
When the blacklisting power began to be applied unjustly and innocent men were made 
to suffer by being deprived of the power to earn a livelihood at their profession, when 
fines began to be indiscriminately imposed upon players and other arbitrary measures 
exercised from which the player had no redress whatever . . . the spirit of self protection 
which is strong in every man and only needs to be called forth began to show itself, and 
the result was the formation of the Brotherhood of Ball Players . . .43 
 
Palmer then cut to the heart of the matter regarding salaries, with reasoning both logical and 
prescient: 
Club managers will acknowledge that if the same effect could be obtained through any 
other means it would be better to abolish the reserve rule and the odious black list, and 
yet it is a remarkable fact which no club manager can deny that the clubs themselves are 
directly responsible for the necessity of the existence of such rules and the abuses that 
occur as the result of their existence.  If a club did not feel that some other club would 
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offer a crack player more money than the first club was paying him, there would be no 
reason for reserving that player, for the probabilities are that he would play with his old 
club so long as his salary and treatment were satisfactory.  The manner in which the 
effort to check the exorbitant salary evil was prosecuted by the clubs of the National 
League is an evidence of their own weakness.  The fact that an organization of 
professional ball clubs, organized for their own protection and benefit, should in meeting 
assembled have adopted a measure for their protection against exorbitant salary lists, and 
then each and severally have deliberately planned to defeat its object is a travesty upon 
base ball legislation, and such a policy, if continued, will create a feeling of distrust, 
perhaps open hostility, between players and managers which will eventually result in the 
death of base ball as a professional pursuit.  Men will not be shipped about the country at 
the will of any base ball organization.  Ball players are not nomads or Arabs.44 
 
 
Henry Chadwick, witness to innumerable baseball campaigns, also gave the new 
organization his endorsement.  “Almost every line of labor in this country has its protective 
organization, and why not the ball players?  The idea of the association is to uphold the players 
of the country, and prevent the enforcement of the unlawful rules which the managers have 
adopted . . . these rules are distasteful to the players, as they allow managers to impose fines 
upon them for little or no cause.”  Chadwick also agreed with Ward regarding the mutuality of 
interest for players and teams.  “The interests of the players and of the leagues are of necessity 
identical, for what damages the pecuniary interests of the clubs must injure the Brotherhood.”  
He ended by encouraging the new organization to take some kind of stand on the buying and 
selling of players against their will.  “Its movement against the now prevalent custom of selling 
the release of players . . . is timely.  I trust that the paying of $10,000 by one club to another for 
the virtual sale of the services of a player, held only under the reserve rule, and bound by no 
legal contract, is the culminating point of this new phase of the old slavery times of thirty years 
ago.”45 
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 Not all observes greeted the Brotherhood enthusiastically, however.  The Sporting News 
jabbed at the new organization, remarking, “There is nothing for Messrs. Young and Wikoff to 
do now but resign as John Much Gall Ward and the ball players’ union have assumed the 
management of the base ball business.”46  The overall response of management was muted, 
however, perhaps because, while distrustful of anything that might be termed a labor 
organization, the magnates wanted to wait and see exactly what the new organization would do 
before they decided how great a threat to their arbitrary power it really was. 
 
* * * * * 
 
After seeing how player salaries had suffered the previous winter, The Brotherhood, as 
Sam Crane explained, wanted to do away with salary limits, however easily teams evaded them 
when they believed the situation called for it.  They did not want the reduced salaries of the 1886 
season to become a new baseline of what was normal.  The owners, in contrast, publicly hoped 
that these lower figures did become a new basis for acceptable pay.  In fact, they even wrote the 
salary limit into the second article of the National Agreement in the off-season.  That article read, 
in part, “no club shall pay to any of its players for one season’s services a salary in excess of two 
thousand dollars, nor any advance payment for such services prior to the first day of April.”  
(Regarding this rule, Henry Chadwick observed wryly, “this rule of the National Agreement, 
which is now in force, seems to have been lost sight of by a majority of club managers, or else 
the salaries paid to players have been greatly overstated.)47  In private, however, they apparently 
made no serious effort to hold the line on salaries for 1887.  Chris Von der Ahe of St. Louis was 
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at the forefront of this pseudo effort at salary control, as he was at the forefront of most things 
that were controversial, although his public statements tried to preserve the charade.  “The reason 
why the St. Louis Browns are not being signed more rapidly is because the players have gotten 
the idea into their heads that champion players ought to draw champion salaries.  Mr. Von der 
Ahe is patiently trying to teach them the error of their way of thinking.”48  Von der Ahe himself 
put it thusly: “When anybody offers me $4,000 for one of my players he gets him.  No player in 
the country is worth $4,000 above his salary.  You hear a great deal of talk about $3,000 or 
$4,000 being offered for this and that player, but you may set it down as a fishing excursion and 
investigate no further.”49 
 In an effort to form its policy and draw up some plans regarding the salary issue, the 
Brotherhood held its first annual meeting in mid-November of 1886, just prior to major league 
baseball’s winter meeting of the Joint Rules Committee.  There was one chapter present from 
each club in the National League, represented by John Ward (New York), Mert Hackett (Kansas 
City), Sam Crane (St. Louis Maroons), Cliff Carroll (Washington), Charlie Bastian (Philadelphia 
Quakers), Arthur Irwin and Charlie Buffinton (Boston), Dan Brouthers (Detroit) and  Ned 
Hanlon (also from Detroit but delegated to represent Chicago).  They chose officers for the 
coming year, electing Ward as president, Brouthers as vice president, and Tim Keefe of New 
York as secretary and treasurer.  With monthly dues for each player set at fifty cents, they 
reported $1,000 in the Brotherhood’s treasury.  The most important thing on the agenda, 
however, was to choose a representative to attend baseball’s Joint Rules Committee meetings, 
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and to no great surprise, Ward received the nod from his brothers, along with instructions to 
recommend certain revisions to the rules of play on their behalf.50 
The winter meeting of the National League and the American Association to discuss 
changes to the rules of play was an important moment in the history of the Brotherhood.  For the 
first time ever, the players had representation when baseball’s moguls sat down to discuss 
business about the game.  Although only John Ward went on behalf of the Brotherhood, fellow 
players Cap Anson of Chicago, John Morrill of Boston, Ed Swartwood of Brooklyn, Charles 
Comiskey of the St. Louis Browns, and Harry Stovey of the Philadelphia Athletics were also 
invited, though only Ward, Anson, and Comiskey actually made it to Chicago for the meeting.  
Officially, the magnates of the game invited these men so that those who actually played could 
discuss the merits and demerits of proposed rule changes.  In any case, it was a victory for the 
players, as no player had ever gone to this conference before, and that included the 
Brotherhood.51 
 Ward’s mission on behalf of his brothers, therefore, primarily included airing their views 
on various rule proposals.  One was to simplify the responsibilities of the umpires to lessen the 
number of judgment calls they typically had to make.  Another umpire-related suggestion was 
that only team captains could discuss calls with an umpire, and then only to question the 
interpretation of a rule, not the accuracy of the umpire’s decision.  This was in order to produce a 
more orderly and fast-moving game that more fans would appreciate, rather than one bogged 
down by constant complaining and challenges to the umpire’s judgment, of which most 
spectators disapproved.  Ward also declared a desire to prohibit coaching, for the same reasons.  
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(In the 1880s, “coaching” was the term used for what later observers called heckling or trash 
talking.  It did not refer to the role of the team’s manager or captain in instructing players.)  
Ward wanted to regularize the method by which the pitcher delivered the ball to home plate to 
eliminate the chaotic variety of motions and deliveries employed by many pitchers in their 
efforts to deceive the batter, as well.  This would allow more batting, something fans liked.  
Finally, Ward and the other players wanted to have pitches hit into foul territory declared strikes, 
in part in reaction to abuse of this rule by players such as Arlie Latham.52   
Interestingly, none of Ward’s aims at the meeting had anything to do with player rights, 
the salary situation, the reserve clause, or any related issues.  Besides the fact that, technically, 
the owners only wanted to consult Ward and his fellow players on the issue of potential rule 
changes, it appears he and the rest of his brothers were still feeling their way as to how 
aggressive their organization should be in promoting their mutual cause off the field.  The list of 
proposals the players made did have a consistent theme, however, and one in line with the 
Brotherhood’s avowed intent to promote the game.  Each of the rule changes attempted to make 
the game cleaner and more orderly, less confrontational, and more pleasing to the fans by 
promoting action over delay and disputes.  Ward and the BPBP felt these changes would advance 
the interests of baseball among the patrons of the game.53  (See chapters six, nine, and ten for 
more on these important issues.) 
 Although it confined its formal actions to suggestions on refining the rules, this is not to 
say, however, that the Brotherhood sat idle all winter.  Far from it.  Instead, the players sought 
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legal advice regarding what contractual practices of baseball’s magnates were legitimate and 
which were questionable.  Although perhaps showing some premature bravado, one anonymous 
player told the Chicago Daily Tribune that the BPBP had “obtained the best legal advice in the 
country as to our rights and know that in a court of justice the league and association’s contracts 
and rules which give them the right to discharge us, reserve us, or sell us, are not worth the paper 
they are printed on.”  Despite this, “we don’t propose to make any trouble so long as members of 
the brotherhood are treated fairly. . . . There is one thing that base-ball managers must stop, and 
that is fining men because they happen to play badly. . . .  Fines must not hereafter be imposed 
on members of the brotherhood without cause; whenever they are there will be lawsuits.”54  
 In all, the organization kept a low profile for most of the year following its formation and 
statements of intent in the summer of 1886.  Participating in drawing up new rules for the game 
was a step towards greater involvement, but only a small step.  Building the membership so 
effectively was rather more significant, with 107 players in the fold representing every National 
League team by the end of the 1886 season.55  Baseball’s owners, at least in their public 
statements to the sporting press, seemed not to take much notice of, or interest in, the BPBP 
during the winter of 1886 and 1887, and as the organization did not issue any major public 
challenges on behalf of its membership during those months, perhaps the magnates hoped they 
could ignore the new organization.  In August 1887, however, the situation changed.  As the ’87 
campaign wound down, Ward and his brethren began, in the eyes of ownership, taking an 
unhealthy interest in the salary and player contract questions.
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The Winter of 1886-1887  
 
 
Going into the winter of 1886-1887, many baseball observers had one big question on 
their minds besides the usual rumors about which team might try to purchase what star player.  It 
was the salary question.  By this time, all realized that clubs had honored the salary limit of 1886 
only in the breach as far as the best players were concerned.  The question of the day, therefore, 
was whether teams would try to keep up the fiction of holding the line on salaries or would admit 
what everyone already knew and resume doing things as they had prior to 1886. 
When the Pittsburgh Alleghenys sent out contracts for the 1887 season, they made clear 
their intent to keep their costs down.  One of their sportswriters estimated the payroll for the 
upcoming season as follows: 
 
Ed Morris, pitcher - $2,500 (and probably more) 
Fred Carroll, catcher - $2,200 
Pud Galvin, pitcher - $2,300 
Sam Barkley, second base - $1,800 
Otto Schomberg, first base - $1,800 
Pop Smith, shortstop - $1,800 
Art Whitney, third base - $1,800 
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Tom Brown, outfield - $1,600 
John Coleman, outfield - $1,500 
Fred Mann, outfield - $1,500 
Bill Kuehne, utility - $1,500 
Jim Handiboe, pitcher - $1,800 
Bill Bishop, pitcher - $1,000 
Jocko Fields, outfield - $1,200 
 
The Pittsburgh correspondent estimated the team’s total outlay for the upcoming campaign at 
$30,000, give or take, which included the cost of renovating the team’s grounds at Recreation 
Park so that it could seat 10,000 spectators.  Team management lamented the fact that, “during 
the season just closed an unusually large crowd always slopped over into the fielders’ territory.” 
The renovation would remedy that situation and improve revenue simultaneously.  Although the 
club later upped their payroll, trading Schomberg for Alex McKinnon, whom they paid $2,500 in 
1887, the team was still a parsimonious operation, even by the standards of 1887.1  However, it 
did try to take up St. Louis owner Von der Ahe on his claim that anyone could purchase any 
player on his team for $4,000, targeting controversial third baseman Arlie Latham.  “If he really 
said this and means business, he can draw on the Pittsburgs for the amount any time he gets 
ready.  Phillips said yesterday that the Pittsburgs would give $4,000 for Arlie’s release any time 
between now and the opening of the championship season.”2  Von der Ahe did not bite, and 
Latham won another American Association championship with the Browns while leading the 
American Association in times at bat in 1887. 
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2 “From the Smoky City” CMB, The Sporting Life, January 19, 1887, 1. 
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 Some players still simmered with resentment over their treatment the previous winter, 
making them enthusiastic supporters of Sam Crane’s statement against salary limits (see chapter 
four).  Chicago White Stockings teammates King Kelly and Jim McCormick were among this 
group.  Team owner Spalding had fined each man $375 the previous season, mostly for excess 
drinking, and both were sore about that.  In addition, McCormick stated that his deal with the 
White Stockings promised him bonuses (to evade the official salary limit of $2,000) that would 
raise his pay from $2,000 to $3,000 (Spalding claimed $2,500) if his team won the National 
League championship, but that the team did not follow through and pay the bonuses. 
Consequently, both men threatened retirement over the winter of 1886-1887.   
Joining Kelly and McCormick in their outrage, although not in their threat of retirement, 
was veteran catcher Frank “Silver” Flint.  A major leaguer going back to the National 
Association days of 1875 when he caught for the St. Louis Red Stockings as a nineteen-year-old, 
Flint was not much of a hitter by 1886, just finishing his third consecutive campaign with an 
OPS+ below 70.  However, he had been with the club since 1879, and anyone who had taken the 
wear and tear of catching in the major leagues for that long had some professional credibility.  In 
an interview, Flint described how players such as himself, McCormick, Kelly, and others knew 
that, technically, they had violated the section of their contract promising bonus money if they 
both won the National League championship and abstained from intoxicating liquors while doing 
so.  Flint reasoned that, since the point of a clause about not drinking was there to help the team 
win the league championship, and the team had indeed won the league championship, whether or 
not players had imbibed in the course of doing so was unimportant.  “We had no idea Spalding 
would hold it out until he did so, and what makes us kick is that the club won the championship 
and the stockholders made a lot of money.”  When his interviewer asked Flint why the players 
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had not insisted on having their contracts worded with this scenario in mind, he replied, “Oh we 
didn’t ask for it, and had been in the habit of taking Spalding’s word for everything.  All I want 
now is my release and he can keep the money.”3 
President Spalding, predictably, had a different take on the situation.  He claimed that 
part of the bonus money was contingent upon the players upholding a contractual clause that 
they would abstain from intoxicating beverages during the season, and provided the Chicago 
Daily Tribune with copies of the contract to prove his case.  In the process, he thereby admitted 
to breaking the spirit, if not the letter, of the $2,000 salary limit rule, although the fact that many 
teams did so was familiar to all who read the sporting press by this time, anyway.  When asked if 
these revelations meant that the NL and AA had rescinded their salary rule, he replied that the 
rule remained in place, then announced his intent to continue evading the rule through more 
“booze contracts.”  Regarding the disgruntled players, Spalding retold the story of how his 
private Pinkerton detectives had caught certain players, McCormick, Flint, and Kelly included, 
imbibing spirits, and that this meant he was not obligated to pay.  In an effort to appear forgiving 
and magnanimous, Spalding also claimed that had the players ceased their drinking after he fined 
them the first time, he would have let the matter drop, and that this was the first time in three 
years the team had actually gone so far as to fine players.  (This was false, however, as Spalding 
had fined Flint and outfielder George Gore fifty dollars each in May of 1884 for dissipation.  He 
threatened to double the fine on their next offense and instructed team captain Anson to enforce 
                                                 
3 “Only Temperance Men” NA, Chicago Daily Tribune, December 2, 1886, 2. 
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the nightly curfew with greater diligence.)4  In fact, however, Spalding stated that about six 
players continued drinking openly, and for that reason he decided to withhold their pay bonuses.5 
Spalding then pleaded his case for why he was so earnest over penalizing his men for 
drinking.  He claimed the drinking contributed to Chicago’s unexpected defeat to the St. Louis 
Browns in the 1886 World Series, especially the second game, which the White Stockings lost 
12-0, getting just two hits and committing ten errors in the field.  Feelings against McCormick 
and his excessive drinking ran so high that when the teams traveled to St. Louis to finish the 
series, Chicago did not even allow McCormick to go.  Spalding also disparaged the burly pitcher 
by saying, “he drank about as much as all the rest of them put together.”6   
Speaking about alcohol use in general, Spalding said in December, “Now, that sort of 
thing has got to stop.  We owe it to the patrons of base-ball in this city that we have trained 
athletes on the field and we are going to have them.  Our detective’s report shows that before one 
game one of our men drank thirteen glasses of beer. . . .  Next year we will have a temperance 
club.”  Regarding the recalcitrant Mike Kelly, Spalding stated, “So far as Kelly is concerned the 
Chicago club will go on even if he does not come here; it will go on if he does; but I am free to 
say I hope he will be here.  I consider him the best ball-player in the country and will pay him 
more money than any other man in the nine.  He is a great ball-player and is popular and I like 
him; still it would be all nonsense to say he can come here and do as he pleases.”7  Spalding held 
fast to this line throughout the winter.  Although Kelly still had not signed as January wore away, 
Spalding continued to profess his admiration for Kelly’s skills, personality, drawing power, 
                                                 
4 Levine, A.G. Spalding and the Rise of Baseball, 43. 
5 “From Chicago” Remlap, The Sporting Life, November 17, 1886, 4; “Only Temperance Men” 
NA, Chicago Daily Tribune, December 2, 1886, 2. 
6 “Only Temperance Men” NA, Chicago Daily Tribune, December 2, 1886, 2 
7 Ibid.; “Pitcher Jim McCormick” NA, The Sporting News, January 22, 1887, 1. 
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ability to work with younger players, and ingenuity in devising creative ways to bend the rules.8  
Kelly played right along.  He continued to maintain that he would not don the Chicago uniform 
in 1887.  “I was perfectly satisfied with the amount of salary that I received, but my objection to 
becoming a member of the Chicago Club for 1887 was solely because I would have to play 
under Spalding, Anson & Co.  If Mr. Spalding refuses to let me go I will retire on my laurels.”9  
In another interview, Kelly tried to stand up for the players fined by Spalding, himself 
included, whom the White Stockings wanted to part ways with in the off-season of 1886-1887.  
He said that, “President Spalding and Capt. Anson have not treated me properly . . . the officials 
of the Chicago Club never fail to take advantage of any opportunity to impose a fine upon a 
player.  McCormick, Gore, Flint, myself, and several other members of the team were fined for 
no cause whatsoever.”  When queried about the Pinkertons and the proof that players were 
drinking, Kelly replied, “As for McCormick and myself, I will say that there is no truth in this 
charge. . . . McCormick pitched splendid ball at the beginning of last season, as every follower of 
the game is aware, and only fell off when the officials of the club treated him badly.”  Kelly 
finished by stating his belief that all the drama over alcohol, “was simply drummed up in order to 
lessen the salary list of the club.  If the team lost money and a scheme of this kind were resorted 
to in order to simply lessen expenses it could be overlooked, but they made plenty of money and 
have no such excuse to offer.”10 
McCormick also offered an additional reason for his desire to leave the Pale Hose: his 
wounded pride.  It seems that, for much of 1886, the team only allowed him to pitch against the 
National League’s weakest opponents.  He did not have the chance to face the stronger clubs of 
                                                 
8 “Spalding and Kelly” NA, The Sporting News, January 15, 1887, 1. 
9 “Kelly Will Not Play With the Chicago Nine” NA, Chicago Daily Tribune, February 10, 1887, 
3. 
10 “Tired Of Chicago” NA, New York Times, January 3, 1887, 8. 
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the NL, those being the Giants, Wolverines, and Quakers.  McCormick interpreted this to mean 
that his team lacked confidence in his work and did not trust him.  (This did do wonders for his 
won-lost record as a pitcher, however.  He won his first eighteen decisions of the season, on his 
way to 31 wins against just 11 losses.) This perceived lack of trust, in addition to the fines, left 
him with no desire to pitch in Chicago in 1887.11   
Some in the press supported the players in their actions against the team.  The Chicago 
Evening News agreed with those observers who felt the buying and selling of players without 
their permission was wrong, and singled out Kelly and McCormick for praise because “they are 
the only members of the Chicago nine who have had the pluck to stand out against the petty 
tyranny of the managers of the organization . . .  so that they were able to resist the Russian 
methods of the Chicago club directors and earn a living in the face of the apparently determined 
efforts of their former employers to reduce them to the level of serfs.”  The paper wondered why 
their teammates did not join them, writing, “Kelly and McCormick are, however, exceptions.  
They have been able to throw off the yoke, but it is time that the other players vindicated their 
privileges as American citizens.  The courts are open to them, and they should appeal to the law 
to protect them from the rapacity of the stockholders who interfere with their right to earn their 
living wherever they choose.”  The Evening News claimed that the people of the city backed the 
two men, as well.  “The purchase and sale of human beings inaugurated by the directors of the 
Chicago club is disgusting, and it is time that the system that permits it should be wiped out.  
This traffic has been unpleasantly commented upon by the people of Chicago, and they are 
                                                 
11 “Kelly And McCormick” NA, The Sporting News, February 12, 1887, 1. 
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prepared to applaud the action of the only two men who have dared to defy these dealers in white 
slaves.”12 
By February, however, Spalding became more confrontational when asked about the 
King.  As Kelly continued holding out, Spalding said, “if he keeps on in that spirit I’ll make him 
eat hay with his horses before he is much older.  He has been mad long enough now, and it is 
pretty near time somebody was getting mad at this end of the line. . . . If Mr. Mike Kelly does not 
sign a contract with Chicago pretty damned quick, he will have cause to regret it.  That is all.”13 
It was a bluff.  The next week, Spalding cut his losses and sold the incomparable Kelly to 
the Boston Beaneaters for $10,000.  Kelly did well out of the deal, in some respects at least.  
Although he saw none of the sale price personally, he did negotiate a new contract with Boston’s 
ownership that rewarded him with $2,000 a year for playing baseball and $3,000 per year for use 
of his photographic likeness.  The combined value, $5,000, was a nice jump over the $2,000 and 
potential no-drinking bonuses the White Stockings rewarded him with in 1886.  His teammates 
were stunned, however.  Shortstop Ned Williamson, when apprised of what had happened, 
lamented, “We were like brothers on the Chicago nine.  We traveled together in fair weather and 
foul.  When Kel went broke I went with him.  When he was flush I too had money.”  When 
asked about Chicago’s chances at a pennant without the King, Williamson was honest, or 
depressed, enough to admit, “No, it will hardly be able to do that.”14   
                                                 
12 “Kelly and McCormick Defy the Chicago Slave-Dealers” NA, Chicago Daily Tribune, April 
22, 1887, 3.  The “Russian methods” refer to the autocratic government of the Russian Empire 
under the rule of the tsars, which still had a reputation, in many ways deserved, for oppression 
even though Tsar Alexander II had ended serfdom in 1861. 
13 “From Chicago” Harry Palmer, The Sporting Life, February 16, 1887, 2.  The reference to 
eating hay with his horses was a response to the rumor that Kelly’s brother wanted him to retire 
and join him in his horse breeding enterprises. 
14 “The Only Mike Kelly” NA, The Sporting News, February 19, 1887, 1. 
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Williamson also understood the drawing power Kelly wielded.  “Why, Mike was an 
attraction, viewed in a commercial sense, who has brought thousands of dollars to the Chicago 
treasury, and Spalding will never again have a man in his team who will be to it what Mike Kelly 
has been.  He is unquestionably the most popular player on the diamond today.”15  Chicago 
sportswriter Harry Palmer agreed: “The enormous figure paid for Kel’s release is more than 
double that ever paid in the history of the games to the best of my knowledge.  Yet I believe that 
Kelly will prove himself worth several times the amount to Boston, for he is just the man to 
imbue it with the confidence and incite it to increased effort.16  Williamson also demonstrated 
how demoralizing Kelly’s loss might be to holdover players, regretting his decision to sign with 
a team that seemed determined to clear out his friends and battle-tested teammates.  “When I 
signed I supposed we would have the old nine; if I had thought that Kelly and Gore were going 
to be released my signature would never have gone on that contract.”17 
Boston’s Triumvirates had offered $5,000 for Kelly at first.  Spalding cabled back, “we 
couldn’t think of letting Kelly go at the figure you offer, but perhaps for double that amount we 
might consider it.”  The Triumvirate soon raised their figure to the stratospheric sum of $9,000.  
When Spalding stood firm and again asked for ten grand, they decided a mere $1,000 would not 
stand in the way of acquiring the defending National League batting champion and most popular 
player in the game, and decided to meet Spalding’s asking price.  Jubilation reigned in Boston at 
the electric news, and forecasts of increased patronage abounded.  “People here have been in the 
habit of going to see the Chicagos play here who never see any other games. . . . Many who have 
                                                 
15 “From St. Louis” Joe Pritchard, The Sporting Life, February 23, 1887, 4.  Pritchard, 
incidentally, had somewhat of a reputation in baseball, at least enough that when the American 
Association considered removing their active president, Wheeler Wikoff, during the 1887 
season, some people tossed his name into the ring as a possible replacement. 
16 “From Chicago” Harry Palmer, The Sporting Life, February 23, 1887, 5. 
17 “Diamond Dust” NA, Chicago Daily Tribune, March 6, 1887, 16. 
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never seen a game of professional baseball are talking about going to see the $10,000 man.  The 
interest in the game which has seemed in danger of waning has taken a boom.”  Furthermore, 
when Kelly’s old team, the White Stockings, came to town, “those Chicago games alone will 
about pay for Kelly’s release.”  The team also promised Kelly he would be the team captain, 
which did raise a little bit of a question mark, as “Honest” John Morrill had held that title, along 
with that of team manager, for several years.  A man described as having a “quiet, retiring 
temperament,”18 and respected by the team because “he does not address his companions with 
vituperative language after a game, because he is quiet, yet firm, and because his head is not 
inflated,”19 but ever the professional, Morrill pledged to work with Kelly (he retained his title of 
manager) to make the Boston nine a winner in 1887.20   
Perhaps Morrill realized that all the situation truly required was patience on his part.  By 
late August, Kelly’s ways and decisions as captain were, in the judgment of the Triumvirs, 
hurting the team, so they removed him and restored Morrill to his former dual status as team 
captain and manager.21  By that time, Kelly’s captaincy had resulted in irreparable damage, 
unfortunately, because while Kelly’s tenure lasted, Morrill could not back up his decisions as 
manager against Kelly’s will.  As one unnamed Boston player said, “How could Morrill 
discipline the nine last season when the one needing discipline the most of all was the captain 
himself.  If Morrill had fined anybody he would have had to begin with Kelly.  You see the 
predicament he was in.”22  All concerned were relieved when, prior to the 1888 season, Kelly 
                                                 
18 “The Kelly Deal” Mugwump, The Sporting Life, February 23, 1887, 1. 
19 “Notes And Comments” NA, The Sporting Life, January 11, 1888, 5. 
20 “The Kelly Deal” Mugwump, The Sporting Life, February 23, 1887, 1. 
21 “Mike Kelly Deposed” NA, The Sporting News, September 3, 1887, 1. 
22 “Notes And Comments” NA, The Sporting Life, January 11, 1888, 5. 
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renounced any ambition to serve as captain once again, ceding the post to Morrill to relieve the 
uncertainty.23 
Prodding Spalding in this surprising direction was White Stockings captain Anson.  
When Spalding first broached to Anson the possibility of releasing Kelly and selling him, the 
burly first baseman replied, “let him go.”  When the owner, surprised, asked Anson how the club 
could get along without the King, Cap replied the team could “get along without anybody who 
don’t want to stay with us.  If there is anyone else dissatisfied, let him go, too.”  To reporters, 
Anson kept up the bravado.  “The Chicago Club without Mike Kelly, is stronger than it ever was 
before. . . . Oh, well, you may howl, but I tell you we’ll be around next fall, as usual, when the 
pennant is given out.”  He later remarked, “It would be necessary for Soden to purchase the 
entire Chicago team before he could have the slightest hope of capturing the much coveted 
rag.”24   
Joining Anson, somewhat surprisingly, was Harry Palmer.  Despite the fact that he 
extolled Kelly’s virtues at the turnstiles and on the field, Palmer thought the White Stockings 
well stocked with talent and depth.  “I have said that Kel’s release will not materially weaken the 
Whites this year, and my reasons for thinking so may be found in the personnel of the team as it 
now exists.  We are far better off today in playing strength and resources than we have been for 
two years past.”25  Perhaps Palmer, usually friendly to owner Spalding in his columns, was trying 
to spin a bad situation into something less dire for the Chicago faithful, or perhaps he shared 
Spalding’s delusion that any player was replaceable.  In any case, it appears that this time he 
confused quantity with quality.  The idea that the White Stockings could continue to win 70% of 
                                                 
23 “Caught On The Fly” NA, The Sporting News, February 11, 1888, 5. 
24 “Evidently Not Stuck on Kelly” NA, The Sporting Life, February 23, 1887, 1; “Chats With 
The Ball Men” NA, The Sporting News, April 23, 1887, 5. 
25 “From Chicago” Harry Palmer, The Sporting Life, February 23, 1887, 5. 
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the time while still removing star players and replacing them with younger, unproven ones seems 
wishful thinking in retrospect.  It is also interesting that all commentators on the Kelly situation 
managed to forget his penchant for strong drink in their euphoria (or disappointment) over the 
sale. 
All, that is, except for Al Spalding.  By this point, it is clear that Spalding obsessed over 
the alcohol issue.  Personally hiring detectives to shadow his players and observe their drinking 
habits, advising other clubs to do the same, selling off players who drank, putting ironclad 
temperance oaths into player contracts, and making other personnel decisions based on perceived 
sobriety levels as much as perceived talent levels carries a tinge of fanaticism.  This reflects his 
approach to running the White Stockings and to baseball generally.  What he wanted, above all 
else, was respectability for the game.  He hoped to attract the “respectable” middle class 
professionals of the Windy City to the club’s grounds at West Side Park, and equally 
“respectable” people in other cities to parks throughout the nation.  Any perception of 
professional ballplayers as drunken riff-raff hindered him in this goal.26  He was not alone in this 
desire.  Prior to the 1887 season, Cincinnati Red Stockings owner Aaron Stern planned various 
events to go with Saturday home games in order to “cater to the best elements of society.”  These 
“gala” events included orchestral concerts and the engagement of musical celebrities.  In a 
special effort to cater to cranks on the outskirts of its rapidly growing city, the club also had a 
“Suburban Day.”  Every Saturday, games in Porkopolis started an hour early so suburban fans 
could make it home during daylight hours.27 
                                                 
26 Levine, A.G. Spalding and the Rise of Baseball, 43. 
27 “Local News” NA, The Sporting Life, February 23, 1887, 5; “From Cincinnati” Ren Mulford, 
Jr., The Sporting Life, February 16, 1887, 4.  Mulford replaced O.P. Caylor as the Cincinnati 
correspondent for The Sporting Life in February of 1887.  Caylor left to edit a new journal that 
exclusively covered baseball based in New York City.  He also left his post at the Cincinnati 
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Spalding, however, took his anti-liquor crusade to new heights for the 1887 campaign.  
The godfather of the box score, Henry Chadwick, described Spalding’s plan to enforce 
temperance: “Every spree will cost League players this season $200, and the fine will be 
enforced every time.”  Spalding himself said, “The Chicago Ball Club is bound to have its games 
played by sober men or not at all. . . . We are bound to weed out the whiskey drinkers from the 
ranks of the White Stockings, and we are impelled to this course both for the good of the men 
and the good of the game.”  Spalding continued to try to strike a high moral tone: “I may have 
peculiar and somewhat advanced ideas on this subject, but I am only anxious to elevate this great 
game of base ball and put it on a plane of respectability where we shall be proud to acknowledge 
it as our National sport.”28 
There might be a price for his campaign on behalf of morality, however, as his purge of 
players with suspect morals would probably cost the White Stockings on the field and in the 
National League standings.  But did it?  How all the off the field maneuvering played out on the 
diamond presents a complex picture.  The teams Spalding assembled in 1885 and 1886 were, and 
remain, among the best in baseball’s long history.  The ’85 club went 87-25 for a gaudy .777 
winning percentage, and while they only beat out the New York Giants by two games for the 
National League pennant that year, they topped all other teams in the league by thirty games or 
more.  The following year they fell a bit in winning percentage but still posted an exceptional 90-
34 record and won a second straight pennant.  Only one major league team has equaled this feat 
of two consecutive seasons winning more than seventy percent of their games since 1885-1886: 
                                                                                                                                                             
Commercial-Gazette in the process.  Caylor’s replacement at the Cincinnati paper was none 
other than Bancroft “Ban” Johnson.  Not only would Johnson “rather see a game of base ball 
than eat,” he was also, of course, the man who organized the American League to challenge the 
National League’s monopoly on professional baseball in 1901. 
28 “Chadwick’s Chat” Henry Chadwick, The Sporting Life, March 9, 1887, 3. 
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the great Chicago Cubs (same franchise as the White Stockings, but with a new name) teams of 
1906 and 1907.   The 1885-1886 White Stockings teams had three Hall of Fame players (Cap 
Anson, Mike Kelly, and John Clarkson) plus three others (George Gore, Jimmy Ryan, and Jim 
McCormick) who at least merit some consideration for baseball’s highest individual honor.  That 
means that nearly half of the team’s roster consisted of men of historically exceptional abilities. 
This was the roster Spalding decided to rearrange for 1887 with an eye towards finding 
players more in his image of middle class respectability.  King Kelly, with his WAR of 7.3, went 
to the Boston Beaneaters for $10,000, outfielder Abner Dalrymple (0.5 WAR) shipped out for 
Pittsburgh, and the Giants purchased outfielder George Gore and his 4.5 WAR, as well.  Pitchers 
Jim McCormick, WAR of 7.2, and Jocko Flynn, 4.8, also departed after that season, McCormick 
to Pittsburgh and Flynn to the bottle and after injuring his arm and hand.  In January of 1887 
Spalding wrote to the venerable baseball writer Henry Chadwick (he published his first book 
about baseball, Beadle’s Dime Book of Base Ball, in 1860), “you can put it down as a positive 
fact . . . that the Chicago Ball Club for 1887 will be a total abstinence crowd ready to wear red 
ribbon, blue ribbon or any other emblem that may be suggested showing their loyalty to the 
cause of temperance.”  Chadwick added, “it is a pity the New York Club does not follow 
Chicago’s example, not to mention other League clubs.”29 
Chadwick agreed that Spalding was taking the proper course.  He claimed that the only 
effective player lost by the White Stockings was Gore, (although at the time of his letter, the 
team had not yet sold Kelly) and that even his loss was not so bad, as his frequent disagreements 
                                                 
29 “Chadwick’s Chat” Henry Chadwick, The Sporting Life, January 19, 1887, 2.  As a reminder, 
WAR stands for Wins Above Replacement, the number of games the team won because of the 
player that season as compared to how many it would win with a replacement level player in that 
position.  See Appendix A for a lengthier description of WAR and why it is a useful statistical 
measure. 
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with team captain Anson negated his performance on the field.  He regarded McCormick as a 
quality pitcher when sober but worthless when not, and claimed the Scotsman had ceased to be 
of use to the team.30  “Now, Mac is worth fighting for—with a proviso, and that is, that he will 
stop ‘working the growler.’  Otherwise he is comparatively useless. . . . In the St. Louis games . . 
. he materially helped the Browns to victory.”31  As writers speculated on where McCormick 
would finally end up in 1887, they echoed Chadwick, one writing, “there is no question that Mac 
would make a valuable addition to any club if he would divorce himself from strong drink.  That 
Spalding should let him go is pretty conclusive evidence that Al has very little hope of Mac 
doing so.”32  It is interesting, however, that a player Spalding appeared to value so little still 
brought $2,000 plus young pitcher George Van Haltren to the team when Spalding finally 
released McCormick to Pittsburgh in late April, so it appears that once again, appearances were 
not what they seemed with the Chicago magnate.  Furthermore, Spalding valued McCormick 
highly enough that he did not sell him to rivals New York or Boston, fearing to strengthen either 
of those nines too much, but made sure the Scotsman went to comparatively non-threatening 
Pittsburgh instead.33 
Others agreed with Chadwick regarding Chicago’s roster facelift.  The Sporting News 
asserted that Chicago would be stronger for every departure (although again, Kelly was still a 
White Stocking and predicted to stay one at the time) because, while he was a great player, Gore 
“was an element of trouble and the best interests of the club dictated his retirement. . . . his habits 
and temperament are far from being desirable, and as the effect of his example upon younger 
players was not salutary, Chicago can spare him and New York is welcome to him.”  This writer 
                                                 
30 “Not Much” Henry Chadwick, The Sporting Life, December 15, 1886, 2. 
31 “Chadwick’s Chat” Henry Chadwick, The Sporting Life, January 12, 1887, 5. 
32 “Caught on the Fly” NA, The Sporting News, January 15, 1887, 5. 
33 “In The Field Of Sports” NA, Chicago Daily Tribune, April 21, 1887, 5. 
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also offered high praise for the newcomers replacing the departed men, especially for Marty 
Sullivan, an outfielder from the New England League with a reputation as “a fine fielder and 
heavy batter.”34  The team’s captain, Anson, predicted that trouble would find Gore in Gotham, 
stating, “Unless Gore changes his habits next season he will have more trouble than he ever had.  
The club he signed with is not noted for sobriety, and the chances are that he will not improve in 
habits or playing.”35 
Nor was Chadwick simply demonstrating a dislike for McCormick.  He offered similar 
advice to any team considering paying large sums of cash to acquire any players of questionable 
comportment:   
Who are these men for whom the sum of $5,000 each is demanded?  Are they men of 
marked integrity of character, of temperate habits, of a high degree of intelligence, and 
possessed of other exceptional qualifications as to warrant such phenomenal salaries?  
What are the facts?  [Jack] Glasscock is one of the noted Cleveland trio who broke his 
written contract with a club who had brought him up and always treated him liberally.  
[Jerry] Denny is an illiterate man of dissipated habits, and lacking in those special 
attributes which are prominent in a ‘headwork’ team player . . . is it any wonder that 
intelligent, honorable players who are in receipt of salaries less than half the amount 
asked by these puffed up players begin to kick at such an uneven distribution of financial 
favors?36 
 
As it turned out, these judgments on the merits of replacing the supposed lushers with 
more sober ballplayers were only partially correct, and Spalding’s makeover of the White 
Stockings started a downward slide from the apex of the National League to the middle of the 
pack.  While it won no more championships, the team stayed quite competitive through the 
1880s, but by the early 1890s struggled to win half its games on a yearly basis.  The decline in 
                                                 
34 “The White Stockings” NA, The Sporting News, December 18, 1886, 1. 
35 No title, NA, The Sporting Life, December 29, 1886, 4.  Anson and the other observers proved 
correct to some extent, as Gore played respectably for the Giants in 1887, but not quite to the 
form he displayed in Chicago. 
36 “Chadwick’s Chat” Henry Chadwick, The Sporting Life, February 2, 1887, 2. 
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1887 was not the fault of the team’s pitching.  For 1887, instead of McCormick and Flynn in the 
pitcher’s box, Spalding complemented John Clarkson, the team’s mainstay, with a pair of 
rookies, Mark “Fido” Baldwin, who was “a magnificent specimen of manhood, and has the 
muscle to make him a tower of strength,” and George Van Haltren, which actually turned out 
fine.  The duo combined for an entirely respectable WAR of 8.2.  While this was 3.8 below what 
Flynn and McCormick compiled in 1886, the two departed pitchers combined for just 2.6 WAR 
in 1887, as Flynn did not pitch at all.  Had these new pitchers teamed with a returning 
McCormick and Clarkson, the team’s pitching would have been deep in quality and quantity in 
1887, as Clarkson upped his WAR from an excellent 7.1 to an almost unthinkable 14.9 mark.  
Team captain Anson leaned so heavily on Clarkson that year that in August, when the team faced 
the Detroit Wolverines in a crucial three game series, Anson sent Clarkson to the pitcher’s box 
for all three games.37   
The everyday lineup was a much different story, however.  Replacing Kelly, Gore, and 
Dalrymple were another pair of rookies, Tom Daly and Marty Sullivan, plus a collection of 
undistinguished players in the outfield, of whom future evangelist Billy Sunday played most 
frequently.  These three new starters combined for 0.3 WAR, costing the team about five wins in 
1887, as the departed trio collectively posted a WAR of 5.4 even with Gore and Kelly having sub 
par seasons.  Spalding justified jettisoning his convivial veterans and making the move towards 
these young, unproven, but hopefully temperate players by saying, “nothing in the world 
demoralizes a new player so quickly and so thoroughly as to see the older members taking their 
toddy right along.  At any rate, I won’t have it.”  On the surface, it appears that without these 
superb players, the White Stockings did not recover their glory for two decades.  The team did 
                                                 
37 “The White Stocking” Petit Roche, The Sporting News, April 2, 1887, 1. 
 166
not acquire its next pennant until 1906, by which time the moralist Spalding had married his 
former mistress, recognized the illegitimate son that resulted from their liaisons, joined the Raja 
Yoga Theosophical Society, located near San Diego in Point Loma, California, and virtually 
retired from his business interests.38 
The experience of the White Stockings showed the relative risks of relying on talented 
but unsteady players on the one hand or (hopefully) predictable but less spectacular players on 
the other.  It also demonstrated the usefulness of modern statistics in evaluating teams from the 
past and providing us with a more detailed picture of why events unfolded as they did.  Spalding 
knew, just as everyone else did, that men such as Kelly were capable of better play if they would 
just let the bottle alone.  He also should have known that players as talented as Kelly, Gore, or 
McCormick did not simply materialize out of thin air, yet his quoted comments in the sports 
papers gave no indication that he did, a surprise considering the number of years Spalding had 
been around the game.  Realizing, however, that he could never turn Mike Kelly into a teetotaler, 
he had to choose to either keep trying, or let Kelly go.  He chose the latter course and sold him to 
Boston.   
Only in hindsight does the team’s decline appear inevitable, and even after accounting for 
the statistics for 1887, it is not at all clear that making personnel decisions based on player 
morality was necessarily to blame.  Consider the subsequent performances of the five key 
players the team lost after 1886.  Flynn played just one more game in the majors, hurt his hand 
                                                 
38 “Pitcher Jim McCormick” NA, The Sporting News, January 22, 1887, 1.  For more on Flynn’s 
meteoric rise to success in Chicago, and his equally meteoric disappearance from the major 
leagues, see his SABR biography at http://sabr.org/bioproj/person/dd24ba1b, accessed July 15, 
2014.  For more on Spalding’s theosophical retirement in California, see chapter seven of 
Levine, A.G. Spalding and the Rise of Baseball.  Spalding’s childhood acquaintance, mistress, 
and second wife, Elizabeth Mayer Churchill, was a devotee and personal pupil of Madame 
Blavatsky and a follower of Blavatsky’s student, the “Purple Mother” Katherine Tingley, who 
founded the Point Loma community. 
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trying to catch a ball in right field, and never appeared on a major league diamond again.  
Dalrymple played two years in Pittsburgh and one in Milwaukee after leaving Chicago, posting a 
combined WAR of 0.0 over those three campaigns.  Pittsburgh got decent value from employing 
McCormick in 1887, as noted above, but just like Flynn, 1887 was his last major league season.  
Gore lasted six more years, and was an above average player still, with 11.5 WAR to show for 
those years (1.9 average), but this is only about half as many WAR as he posted in an average 
season with Chicago in the 1880s.  King Kelly’s story is similar to Gore’s.  He toiled seven more 
years and played well for the most part, totaling 14.7 WAR for a 2.1 average season.   
What of the replacements Spalding found for these men?  Baldwin worked just two years 
in the Windy City, but his WAR of 6.0 in 1887 went a good portion of the way towards making 
up for the five departed players (combined WAR of 8.0 that year) all by himself.  Chicago’s 
other new pitcher, George Van Haltren, made up the rest of that deficit with a little to spare, so 
that even with the three new hitters contributing nearly nothing, Chicago came out ahead on this 
exchange of players.  The blame for the team’s decline, it seems, was not due to making 
personnel transactions based on morality.  The responsibility, apparently, must go elsewhere.   
Or does it?  The career trajectories of the players replacing Gore, Kelly, and friends show 
the story is still more complex.  Van Haltren went on to a fine major league career, although 
mainly as an outfielder rather than a pitcher, but spent only three seasons with the White 
Stockings.  Fido Baldwin lasted seven seasons (he also enjoyed the high life of partying and 
carousing, but after his career ended reformed his ways, got a medical license, and became a 
surgeon) but left Chicago after 1888.  Parson Sunday, like Spalding an ardent prohibitionist, 
joined the exodus to Pittsburgh after 1887 (Spalding, when letting Sunday go, stated he was “as 
honest as a Quaker,” but parted with the outfielder because “he does not stand newspaper 
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criticism well” and the team was struggling to find playing time for him39), while Sullivan joined 
Indianapolis after another mediocre season in Chicago in 1888.  Tom Daly, like Van Haltren, had 
a lengthy and respectable career, both offensively and defensively, lasting until 1903.  Teammate 
Ned Williamson credited Daly with being one of the earliest catchers to get his body in position 
to throw out base stealers before even receiving the pitch, allowing him to throw to the bases 
quicker.40  Others commented on his defensive prowess as well.  “Half his value as a catcher was 
in his wonderful throwing.  I don’t remember a back stop whose very position seemed to be so 
perfect for quick throwing to second.”41  Chicago, however, saw none of his productive years, as 
he left the fold after the 1888 season when Spalding dismissed him from the team for, yes, 
drinking. 
It seems, then, that the reason Chicago fell off was not so much the loss of the original 
quintet, only two of whom remained productive major league players after 1887, but a 
combination of three developments that followed its effort to replace those men sent packing 
after 1886.  One, those players who proved adequate replacements in 1887 did not remain 
adequate, partly because they often adopted the bad habits of those they replaced.  Most of the 
blame for this falls on Baldwin.  He was legitimately ill at times in 1888, curtailing his 
contributions that season, but Baldwin still enjoyed enough of Spalding’s confidence that he 
invited Baldwin on the world tour of 1888-1889 as a member of the Chicago team, and Baldwin 
pitched many of the games.  Fido’s bad habits were ever-present on the tour however, especially 
his love of alcohol.  The low point came when a monkey attacked Baldwin, biting him on the 
leg, after he had given the monkey pretzels and beer.  Another source claimed it was a cheese 
                                                 
39 “From Chicago” Harry Palmer, The Sporting Life, January 25, 1888, 4. 
40 “Base-Ball” NA, Chicago Daily Tribune, May 1, 1887, 6. 
41 “Hub Happenings” Mugwump, The Sporting Life, May 1, 1889, 6. 
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sandwich rather than pretzels, but at any rate, “within ten minutes after Mr. Monk had swallowed 
the malt juice he buried his teeth in Baldy’s legs and played tag all over his face at about one and 
the same instant.  Mark declared war upon the hairy son of Ceylon forthwith, but the latter was 
too keen for the ball player, and has since nimbly avoided him.”42  
Outfielder Marty Sullivan and catcher Tom Daly also went on the trip, and too often, they 
joined Baldwin at the bar.  Spalding was so infuriated by the behavior of the youthful trio (all 
were twenty-five or younger) that he released all three, along with outfielder Bob Pettit, when 
the tourists returned to the states.  The result, from the perspective of the White Stockings, was 
that by the late 1880s the team was becoming a revolving door for players as it searched for ones 
with proper moral values, even when this revolving door resulted in the team parting ways with 
quality young players who might have improved their habits and contributed to the team’s 
success for years to come.  Spalding continued to come up with some talented replacements for 
his lineup, like outfielder Hugh Duffy in 1888 and catcher Duke Farrell in 1889, both 
recommended to him by former player, Boston sportswriter, and unofficial White Stockings 
scout Tim Murnane, but by then, the pitching staff had begun wearing thin.43  (Boston’s owners, 
displeased at Murnane’s “betrayal” of his hometown nine, once decided to retaliate against his 
                                                 
42 “Tedium Relieved by Fun” Harry Palmer, The Sporting Life, March 13, 1889, 2. 
43 For more on Baldwin’s life and career, see his SABR biography at 
http://sabr.org/bioproj/person/41f65388, accessed June 15, 2014.  We should also note that 
Spalding himself did not find these new players, but employed people who we can describe as 
unofficial scouts to find them for him.  Both Marty Sullivan and Hugh Duffy, for example, 
signed with Chicago thanks to the work of Boston Globe sportswriter Tim Murnane, who 
recommended them to his friend and Spalding’s captain, Cap Anson.  In addition to being former 
teammates, Murnane and Anson both went on the 1874 European tour, and Anson simply passed 
along Murnane’s recommendations to Spalding.  For more on Murnane, see his SABR biography 
at http://sabr.org/bioproj/person/b2017f67, accessed August 22, 2014. 
 170
perfidy by making him pay for tickets to Beaneaters games rather than providing him 
complimentary tickets as was customary for hometown sportswriters.44) 
This leads to the second core reason for the team’s decline, selling the incomparable John 
Clarkson to Boston before the 1888 season.  Spalding, working from his belief that “there is no 
player so good but that his equal can be found” and “no position in life was ever filled so well 
but that a man could be found for it when occupant No. 1 had gone,” was never more wrong than 
in the case of Clarkson, who even today probably ranks among the top fifty or so pitchers in 
baseball’s history.  It is nearly impossible to replace players of this caliber overnight.  The 
pitcher, for his part, wanted out of Chicago because he felt underpaid compared to less gifted 
pitchers who made a higher salary than he did.  The result was that, as with Kelly before him, 
Spalding sold Clarkson to the Boston Beaneaters for $10,000, just prior to the 1888 season.  
Clarkson toed the rubber in Boston for five years and compiled an incredible 42.7 WAR (there 
are players in the Hall of Fame with fewer WAR for their entire careers), including an Olympian 
mark of 16.7 in 1889.45 
A final reason for the team’s decline was the Brotherhood War of 1890.  The team had a 
strong infield in the mid-1880s, with Cap Anson at first base, Fred Pfeffer at second base, Ned 
Williamson at shortstop and Tom Burns at third base.  All played at approximately the same 
level through the end of the decade, and collectively, earned the nickname of the “Stone Wall 
Infield.”  When the Players League formed in 1890, however, both Pfeffer and Williamson went 
across town and played with the Chicago Pirates.  Van Haltren joined them, along with fellow 
outfielders Hugh Duffy and Jimmy Ryan, and catcher Duke Farrell went over to the Pirates as 
                                                 
44 “Notes And Comments” NA, The Sporting Life, January 18, 1888, 5. 
45 For more on Clarkson, see his SABR biography at http://sabr.org/bioproj/person/47feb015, 
accessed June 15, 2014; “From Chicago” Harry Palmer, The Sporting Life, January 19, 1887, 4. 
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well.  Three of the team’s four primary pitchers from 1889 (future politician John Tener, Frank 
Dwyer, and Ad Gumbert) also joined various PL teams, leaving the White Stockings (known as 
the Colts by then) with Anson, Burns, pitcher Bill Hutchinson, and few others familiar to the 
cranks at West Side Park.  They finished in second place anyway in 1890, because most other 
NL teams lost just as much talent as they did, but when that talent returned to the NL in 1891, the 
Colts did not recover all their former players and the team declined once again, finishing better 
than fourth place just once in the next twelve seasons. 
Still, by 1889 Spalding and Anson thought that they finally had the right combination of 
men to lead Chicago back to the promised land of first place.  Harry Palmer described the 
Chicago nine of that year by writing, “the Chicago team as it stands is certainly a clean-cut body 
of men.  All are well-bred, well-mannered, intelligent fellows of excellent habits and even 
dispositions, and all are ball players . . . whatever demoralizing or disturbing element the team 
may have contained in the past has been eliminated.”  He concluded by writing, “The day for 
lushing, saloon-keeping and profanity among ball players has gone.”46  That might have been 
true, but decorum is not the same thing as talent, and decorum was not enough for the White 
Stockings.  They managed but 67 wins in 1889, finishing a discouraging 19 games back of the 
less sober but highly talented New York Giants. 
This close look at the fate of the fate the great White Stockings teams of the mid-1880s 
reveals several significant points, two of them especially pertinent to the story of the 
Brotherhood.  First, the teams of 1885 and 1886 were not merely great, but were historically 
great.  Yet, no team can remain at that level of success indefinitely.  Spalding’s strategy of 
removing the players with questionable behavioral traits from the 1886 team did not undermined 
                                                 
46 “Chicago Gleanings” Harry Palmer, The Sporting Life, May 8, 1889, 4. 
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that level of success.  He required a few seasons to test and find new players who lived up to his 
moral standards while playing quality baseball.  Just as the Brotherhood sought men of high 
moral caliber to burnish its public image, the same thought colored Spalding’s decisions of how 
to run his organization.   
The other motive behind the Brotherhood’s actions, as we have seen, was the issue of 
player compensation, and that also was central to Spalding’s personnel decisions.  Had he been 
willing to pay a little more money to keep John Clarkson happy, in all likelihood the White 
Stockings would have contended for, and quite possibly won, every league championship 
between 1888 and 1891, with the possible exception of 1889.  Even without the mighty 
Clarkson, the team was still strong enough to contend until its treatment of its best men caused 
the club to lose so many talented members to the Players League in 1890.  The dispersal of those 
players to other teams, rather than coming back to Chicago, was the death knell that plunged the 
franchise into a dozen years of mediocrity.47 
To finish the story of Jim McCormick, he did accept the sale to Pittsburgh and play in the 
Smoky City in 1887, although that was his last year in major league baseball.  After deciding to 
hold out for his release over the winter, it appears he stonewalled Spalding, not bothering to 
reply to Spalding’s missives about where he wanted to play.  As a result, although both the New 
York Giants and Boston Beaneaters inquired about securing McCormick’s services, he ended up 
with the Alleghenys in Pittsburgh.  True to his history of difficult salary negotiations, rumor in 
the sporting press had it that McCormick wanted $4,000 to sign with his new club, with 
                                                 
47 Among the minor themes this examination reveals is the fact that running a baseball team is no 
simple matter because there are a number of moving parts to consider, and things outside the 
control of management that team executives must estimate when making decisions.  Teams must 
also consider player morale and the effect on the fan base of making changes that include 
popular players.  In short, events that happen in real baseball situations are multi-causal, just like 
other historical events are. 
 173
Pittsburgh offering $3,000.  Pittsburgh manager Horace Phillips did not believe the situation too 
dire, however, stating that McCormick promised he would sign, and that his word was good.48  
The Chicago Daily Tribune reported his salary as $2,500, while also declaring that McCormick 
was “very fleshy, but in good condition” to go in the pitcher’s box against the fearsome Detroit 
lineup at first opportunity.  Pittsburgh management claimed that McCormick’s release from 
Chicago and salary had cost them considerably more, although some observers concluded this 
was a feint on management’s part to drum up more interest in McCormick and the club, as with 
Boston and Mike Kelly.49 
 
* * * * *  
 
 Beyond these events in Chicago, other players hoped to increase their salaries for 1887.  
Arlie Latham, the popular and charismatic third baseman of the champion Browns, wanted to 
improve his compensation by over fifty percent, asking for a $1,000 raise over the $1,900 Von 
der Ahe had paid him to lead the league in opponents infuriated in 1886.  While Von der Ahe 
offered a slight increase once the season ended, Latham’s only response was, “it ain’t enough.”  
Latham’s teammate Bob Caruthers appeared willing to relive the drama of the previous off-
season, declaring he would travel to Jerusalem rather than play for less than $4,000 in 1887.  In 
classic form, Von der Ahe’s response to Caruthers’ bravado was, “when I want Mr. Caruthers I’ll 
send for him.”  He explained his penny-pinching by describing his players as ungrateful for his 
                                                 
48 “McCormick And Van Haltren” NA, The Sporting News, April 23, 1887, 1; “McCormick 
Wants $4,000” NA, The Sporting News, April 23, 1887, 1; “Mac Wants Only $4,000” NA, The 
Sporting News, April 30, 1887, 1. 
49 “McCormick Signs with Pittsburg” NA, Chicago Daily Tribune, April 30, 1887, 3; “From 
Pittsburg” Circle, The Sporting Life, May 4, 1887, 4. 
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liberality and by asking anyone who would listen, “who were they when I took them in hand?  I 
made them what they are, or at least gave them the first opportunity to make themselves.”50 
 Parisian Bob did not back down.  Tossing out some reliable bargaining chips, he told his 
hometown paper, the Chicago Daily Tribune, “I will not play for $3,000, as Von der Ahe wants 
me to.  I am not obliged to play ball; my folks want me to quit it, my health is not as good as I 
would like, and it’s a pretty sure thing I won’t play any more. . . . I am losing weight and am not 
satisfied with my condition.”51  The claims of sickness were real enough, as Von der Ahe 
verified in a personal visit to see Caruthers at his home in the Windy City, and Caruthers said he 
would see how he felt in March and consider a contract at that time.52  The condition afflicted 
both his heart and lungs, according to the family physician, and as January melted into February, 
Caruthers was limited to a combination of bed rest and daily “electric baths” in his efforts to pull 
out of his malaise.53 
His teammate and fellow ace pitcher, Dave Foutz, was also unhappy with his 
remuneration from 1886 and vowed not to play for the same salary again.  After all, he had led 
the American Association in various statistical categories recognized as crucial at the time, 
including wins (41), winning percentage (.719), and ERA (2.11), but had also led the league in 
ERA+ at 162 while pitching 504 innings.  “I never got a cent more than the limit, $2,000, and, 
what’s more, I’m not going to play ball for another season for that kind of salary.”  Not only was 
his salary a 50% pay cut over 1885’s $3,000.  When asked how that compared to Caruthers, 
“Scissors” stated, “He got $3,500, for the season.  That’s $1,500 more than I got, and I’m blessed 
                                                 
50 “The St. Louis Browns” NA, The Sporting Life, December 15, 1886, 3. 
51 “Is It Another Bluff?” NA, The Sporting Life, January 5, 1887, 1. 
52 “From St. Louis” Pritchard, The Sporting Life, January 26, 1887, 5. 
53 “The Browns’ Pitcher” Eli, The Sporting News, January 29, 1887, 1. 
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if I am not worth as much to the club as he is.”54  Foutz later added, “I don’t want the earth, but I 
will insist on having what is right.  If Mr. Von der Ahe has another pitcher that is worth $1,000 
more than I am, I don’t want to play with the club.  However, I think things can be arranged 
satisfactorily.”55 
 When March arrived with Parisian Bob still unsigned, owner Chris Von der Ahe 
escalated the situation.  Relying on a new provision in the American Association’s constitution 
that allowed for blacklisting players who would not sign the contracts offered to them—a 
provision Von der Ahe had personally pushed through at the most recent American Association 
meeting—Von der Ahe threatened his pitcher with that punishment, should he not sign and 
report for the season by March 21.  Because he was fairly wealthy, however, Caruthers had the 
option of consulting legal counsel, which he did.  His lawyer told him to disregard the notice and 
initiate a suit in US District Court if Von der Ahe chose such extreme measures.56  It was not 
long before others decided to join the suit, should the situation go that far.  Teammates Dave 
Foutz and Arlie Latham, as well as outfielder Hub Collins, shortstop Bill White, and first 
baseman Paul Cook, all three of Louisville, announced their intent to challenge the same rule just 
one day after Caruthers.57 
 This left Von der Ahe in a conundrum.  He was bombastic and strong-willed, and used to 
getting his way, but by the end of the second week of March, only five of his fifteen men had 
reported for duty, and all of his pitchers were absent.  Many threatened to hold out for better pay, 
but he adamantly opposed paying more than he felt was right.58  Yet, his club was also supposed 
                                                 
54 “In The World Of Sports” NA, Chicago Daily Tribune, February 26, 1887, 6. 
55 “From St. Louis” Joe Pritchard, The Sporting Life, March 2, 1887, 4. 
56 “Von der Ahe’s Threat Against Caruthers” NA, Chicago Daily Tribune, March 15, 1887, 3. 
57 “Base-Ball Brevities” NA, Chicago Daily Tribune, March 16, 1887, 9. 
58 “Von der Ahe’s Predicament” NA, The Sporting Life, March 16, 1887, 1. 
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to play the Chicago White Stockings in a rematch of the World Series from the previous fall in 
just three weeks, with a decent amount of both pride and prize money on the line for the winner, 
and of course his highly competitive nature rebelled at the thought of taking on Spalding’s boys 
with anything less than his full arsenal.  More than money was at stake.  He felt his Browns 
carried the flag for the entire American Association.  Most observers had considered them the 
underdogs in the 1886 World Series because they perceived that the talent level of the 
Association was inferior to that of the League.  When the Browns triumphed over Chicago, 
however, and fairly decisively at that, the prestige of the entire Association received a boost in 
the public’s estimation.   
 All these considerations made Von der Ahe’s situation complicated indeed.  He 
threatened to blacklist all the recalcitrant players, but the threat was not very convincing, given 
the consequences.  In the meantime, Foutz, like Caruthers, sought legal counsel, with the 
Louisville contingent potentially joining the legal challenge his lawyer prepared.  Former 
Louisville manager Jim Hart summarized their situation: “Give a superior player an inferior 
salary, and what do you get? . . . Do you blame them for asking for their releases and postponing 
the signing of their contracts?  Yet these men are compelled to play for meagre salaries, because, 
if they refuse to sign, the blacklist stares them in the face.”  On the legal question, Hart offered, 
“the St. Louis pitcher reasons that the blacklist interferes with the player’s means of earning a 
living, and that the refusal to grant a release interferes with his chance to better his financial 
condition; consequently both are unlawful.”59  With his two top pitching arms, Foutz and 
Caruthers, pursuing lawsuits and threatening to quit the game for good, and with the Browns’ 
third pitcher, Nat Hudson, also rumored to sit out the season to care for his dying mother (she 
                                                 
59 “To Appeal To The Law” Jim Hart, The Sporting Life, March 16, 1887, 6. 
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died in late August that year), the defending champions were in turmoil just six weeks before the 
championship season began.60 
 Things seemed so dire for the Association champions that, at least according to some 
rumors circulating in March, other ball clubs even offered help for the Chicago series.  To 
uphold the honor of the American Association against their rivals, president Aaron Stern of 
Cincinnati offered Von der Ahe the use of any of his players, from crack pitcher Tony Mullane 
on down.  Likewise, the Metropolitans managing director, Watrous, offered to donate any player 
from his roster that the Browns needed to take on Anson’s men.  Von der Ahe appreciated that 
the Association’s other members had his back, but respectfully declined their assistance.61  It is 
doubtful the White Stockings would have allowed these men to take part in the series even if the 
offers were legitimate, but apparently Von der Ahe knew what he was doing.  Within a week, he 
had inked both Caruthers and Foutz to new contracts, making them both happy with identical 
$3,000 salaries.  Hudson, however, was not available due to his family difficulties (he pitched in 
just nine games for the Browns in 1887).  That left The Dude, Arlie Latham, still to sign, 
although observers predicted it would not be long, due to Latham’s spendthrift ways and his 
“depleted exchequer.”62  The Dude came to terms about two weeks later, his exchequer 
replenished by about $3,000, roughly what he had asked when his personal salary saga began.63 
 
* * * * * 
 
                                                 
60 No title, NA, The Sporting Life, March 19, 1887, 4; “Mrs. Hudson’s Funeral” Eli, The 
Sporting News, September 3, 1887, 1. 
61 “Around The Bases” NA, The Sporting News, March 19, 1887, 5. 
62 “Around The Bases” NA, The Sporting News, March 26, 1887, 5. 
63 “Latham Signed; Busach Released” Joe Pritchard, The Sporting Life, April 13, 1887, 1. 
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 The threat of retirement was one strategy available to players disgruntled over their 
compensation.  Players such as Jim McCormick, Fred Dunlap, and Bob Caruthers used this ploy 
in their disputes with team management prior to the 1886 season, and McCormick trotted it out 
again after the 1886 season concluded.  It was a very popular approach, although not always a 
successful one.  Charles “Lady” Baldwin of the Detroit Wolverines tried out the “retirement 
racket” in an attempt to secure a fatter paycheck for the 1887 season.64  His teammate, outfielder 
“Big Sam” Thompson, considered doing the same, once remarking he might sit out 1887 and 
spend the year “resting.”  Thompson eventually compromised with the club, however, and by 
late January both he and Baldwin were on board for the upcoming campaign.65  A good thing, 
too, as Thompson lived up to his nickname by putting up a punishing batting line of 
.372/.416/.565, for an OPS+ of 166.  He led the National League in both batting average and 
slugging percentage, not to mention at bats, hits, triples, runs batted in, and total bases. 
For other players, owning a business, or threatening to open one, was a popular technique 
to gain leverage in negotiations.  They often stated that their business, real or envisioned, offered 
enough profits that they could do without the game and retire if their clubs did not see things 
their way.  Washington’s Cliff Carroll, still angry over the heavy fine leveled on him by manager 
Scanlon in 1886, asked the club’s owners for $2,500 in 1887, saying he would sign for that 
figure or else devote his attention to the billiards parlor he recently opened in Bloomington, 
Illinois.66  He also made plans to open a restaurant across the street from Washington’s ballpark, 
the Swampdoodle Grounds, and the establishment, known as “The Boquet,” opened in March.67  
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Carroll’s defiant stance stemmed from this spat with Washington’s management, as the 
conclusion of his situation nearly produced the first grievance between baseball’s magnates and 
the BPBP.   
As reported in The Sporting News, after the 1886 season concluded, Carroll went to 
Washington’s president, Walter Hewitt, to discuss a new contract for 1887.  Carroll protested the 
fine from 1886, believing it unjustified, and Hewitt expressed his sympathy and agreement.  
Furthermore, Hewitt attempted to smooth things over with the disgruntled player by telling 
Carroll he would pay back the $100 if Carroll signed the contract.  His dignity satisfied, Carroll 
signed, but when he went to the bank to present his check and receive the $100, the bank refused 
to pay because Hewitt had ordered the bank to stop payment on the check.  Carroll immediately 
concluded, correctly, that Hewitt had hoodwinked him just to get his signature on a new deal, 
and he informed the Brotherhood of this rank injustice.  The BPBP formed a committee to 
confront Washington’s president.  Hewitt finally paid, but only after his fellow National League 
owners urged him to settle quietly.  Apparently, Hewitt’s shenanigans were so petty and unfair 
that they were out of bounds even for baseball’s capitalists.68 
Once in a while, however, a player actually did follow up on the threat of going into 
business rather than playing ball, or already was in business and doing well, thus endowing the 
claim with a veneer of plausibility.  For example, as they tried to put their team together for 
1887, the American Association’s Cleveland Blues lost out on a pitcher they coveted, Charley 
Klump.  Klump’s family objected to his playing sports for a living, and he had a comfortable 
position in the Eberleard Manufacturing Company.69  Even when so notable a baseball personage 
as Cap Anson attempted to persuade the young man to try out for his Chicago nine, he would not 
                                                 
68 “The Washington Club” NA, The Sporting News, December 31, 1886, 1. 
69 “From Cleveland” F.H. Brunell, The Sporting Life, January 12, 1887, 4. 
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budge.70  The same held true for a player the Philadelphia Athletics were after in 1888, an 
amateur pitcher named W.H. Whitaker.  Other professional teams had attempted to sign him 
previously, but because his parents objected, and he already had a solid position with the 
Pottstown Iron Works, none succeeded.  The only reason the Athletics got their man is that 
Whitaker was a relative of one of the club’s directors, although he never actually pitched in the 
major leagues that year.71 
Yet another example was shortstop Frank Fennelly of Cincinnati.  The club’s president, 
Aaron Stern, paid Fennelly a personal visit in an effort to ink the player to a contract for the 1888 
season.  To his considerable surprise, Stern discovered Fennelly was the owner of a Fall City, 
Massachusetts, grocery with “four wagons and as many clerks constantly employed.”  Realizing 
that Fennelly’s business had the potential to bring in about twice the money he planned to offer 
in salary, Stern said, “I saw at once that he was independent of base ball as a means of a 
livelihood, and, though pleased to find him so prosperous, was fearful after all that he might 
remain firm in his purpose and refuse to come to Cincinnati.”  As a result, the owner had to offer 
Fennelly $2,000 plus “a handsome bonus besides.”  He did, however, safeguard his interests a bit 
by including in the contract a clause stating that Fennelly would have to remit $500 in salary 
should he touch liquor during the playing season.72 
Better off still was Otto Schomberg of Indianapolis.  Following a fine season with the 
Hoosiers in 1887, he looked towards his life off the field (unusual for a player just twenty-two 
years old) and employment in a family business, Henry Schomberg & Co., manufacturing 
hardwood lumber and coopers’ stock in Good Harbor, Michigan.  He spent the off-season scaling 
                                                 
70 “Brunell’s Budget” F.H. Brunell, The Sporting Life, August 1, 1888, 3. 
71 “Philadelphia Pointers” NA, The Sporting Life, January 18, 1888, 2. 
72 “One of Cincinnati’s Two Grocerymen” NA, The Sporting Life, January 11, 1888, 1. 
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logs at the head of a platoon of 150 men.  While his father and brother opposed his returning to 
the diamond for 1888, Schomberg decided to play one more year.  “His physician ordered him to 
quit using tobacco and assures him that he will never again experience any trouble with his heart, 
if he leaves tobacco alone.  He proposes to follow his physician’s advice and feels confident that 
he will lead the League in batting next season.”  Schomberg did not make good on his boast 
concerning his batting prowess, stumbling to a mere .214 batting average in 1888, and did not 
appear in the major leagues again.  The heart condition was serious, as it turned out.  It seems 
that it rendered him physically incapacitated at times in 1887, making his batting record for that 
season (OPS+ of 142) all the more noteworthy.73  He tried to play with various minor league 
teams for a few more years before giving up playing ball in 1890 and attending to his lumber 
business.  He eventually incorporated the operation, putting up $15,000 in capital, and the mill 
cut about 8 million board-feet of timber at its peak, while the company (by now named 
Schomberg Hardwood Lumber Company) also operated a hotel, two stores, and a saloon in Good 
Harbor.74 
Another approach to getting a team to increase its salary offer, besides the “retirement” 
and “going into business” ploys, was to form a group and try to bargain collectively.  Hoping 
that this would work better than quarrelling with management over salaries individually, players 
on the Philadelphia Quakers, grumbling about the fact that even with the reduction of the 
maximum salary in 1886, only two team members had made even that much money, decided to 
form a “combination” to see that the same tragedy did not befall them in 1887.  Only outfielder 
Ed Andrews and shortstop Charlie Irwin got the maximum in 1886, and this seemed a tad harsh 
                                                 
73 “Notes And Comments” NA, The Sporting Life, January 18, 1888, 5. 
74 Schomberg’s SABR biography at http://sabr.org/bioproj/person/d6ce5342, accessed November 
10, 2014. 
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to the other Quakers.  Although the team finished in fourth place, its record of 71 wins against 43 
losses gave it a winning percentage of 62.3%, one of history’s greatest performances by a fourth 
place team.  As a reward for their winning ways, various players pressed management for better 
pay for 1887, and some pulled out creative reasons for their demands.  They needed all the 
creativity they could muster, as “it is a notorious fact that the Philadelphia club has had the 
cheapest salaried team in the League ever since it joined that organization.”75 
Outstanding pitcher Charlie Ferguson (ERA+ of 161, not to mention a OPS+ of 104 at 
bat) and fellow hurler Dan Casey (also coming off an excellent season with an ERA+ of 132) 
justifiably looked to get their hands on a bit more currency in the year to come, Ferguson hoping 
for a raise from his $1,800 compensation for the season just completed.  Outfielder Jim Fogarty 
wanted more than $1,600, $900 more in fact, claiming he had an offer to play in his native San 
Francisco for $1,500 plus no traveling across the country.  Charlie Bastian put in a claim for a 
raise from $1,600 and said that if he did not get it, he would retire to his liquor business.  Catcher 
Jack Clements, best known for being the last regular catcher in major league baseball to throw 
left-handed, wanted his recompense doubled, from $1,400 to $2,800, on the theory that his work 
in 1886 greatly exceeded his reward, and so doubling his salary for the current season would 
even things out for the two seasons put together.  Clements also used another familiar threat, that 
being that his well-to-do mother objected to him playing ball for a living, to prove he had 
sufficient fallback if the Quakers thought he was bluffing.76  Clements did not hold out that long, 
however, signing by mid-December for an undisclosed amount that was “not the extravagant 
figure he at first demanded, and yet is a deserved increase on this season’s stipend.”77 
                                                 
75 “The Philadelphia Club” NA, The Sporting News, March 26, 1887, 5. 
76 “The Local Clubs” NA, The Sporting Life, November 17, 1886, 4. 
77 “Philadelphia Chat” NA, The Sporting Life, December 15, 1886, 4. 
 183
 The “combination” was not the iron-wrought brotherhood the players originally hoped it 
would be.  Shortly after Clements inked his pact, Fogarty and third baseman Joe Mulvey also 
agreed to new deals.  Fogarty may have lost money in the saloon business, requiring him to take 
a sure thing rather than hold out for more but risk getting less.78  Outside of this trio, however, 
some Quakers continued agitating for more pay.  Despite the three defections mentioned here, 
Quakers management could not persuade Ferguson, Casey, Bastian, outfielder George Wood, 
reserves Ed Daily and Andy Cusick, and first baseman Sid Farrar to sign so easily.  Ferguson 
sought $3,000, but because his team was “opposed in principle to excessive salaries, and believes 
in graded increases year by year to such as are deserving,” the holdout lingered into March.79   
 When the Quakers departed for their southern exhibition tour in late March, Ferguson 
was not on the train.  Casey and Bastian were not, either.  Farrar did sign “for a substantial 
increase over last season,” but Ferguson, even after lowering his demands to $2,800, would not 
budge further when manager Harry Wright countered with $2,500 for 1887.  Ferguson coached 
the Princeton college team on the side, and claimed he was content to continue doing so, should 
the Quakers continue to hardball him.  Bastian also had a fallback option, his liquor business, 
and he stated, “I am not compelled to play ball, and I do not propose to play for the Philadelphia 
club for a thousand dollars less than I can command with some other club.”  Ferguson finally 
signed in early April, in time to enter the pitcher’s box for the exhibition series with the Quakers’ 
city rivals, the Athletics.80  (Tragically, the 1887 season was Ferguson’s last.  He died, of typhoid 
pneumonia, on April 29, 1888.  He was only twenty-five years old, and his early death ended 
what promised to be a remarkable career.  Between his pitching and hitting skills, he had already 
                                                 
78 “Local News” NA, The Sporting Life, January 5, 1887, 1. 
79 “The Local Clubs” NA, The Sporting Life, February 23, 1887, 5. 
80 “The Philadelphia Club” NA, The Sporting News, March 26, 1887, 5. 
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accumulated 32.1 WAR in a mere four years.  Ferguson had married just two years prior and had 
one child, but the child, too, died shortly after birth.  He certainly ranks amongst the best players 
that baseball history has forgotten.81)  Later, one Philadelphia writer revealed that the salaries for 
some of these holdout players were as follows: Farrar and Casey, $1,750 each, Ferguson $2,500, 
Andrews and Fogarty, $1,800, Wood $2,200, and Joe Mulvey, who had not held out, $1,600.82 
 This news from Philadelphia and other points was, however, unusual, as the winter of 
1886-1887 was a somewhat quiet one, especially compared to all the wrangling and commotion 
over the attempt at a salary limit the previous year.  The situations of a few other clubs merit a 
passing mention, however.  In addition to Philadelphia, Washington was another team that 
struggled to fill its roster for 1887.  The Nationals had a quartet of quality men hold out for more 
pay, and considering how poorly the team played in 1886, they could not really afford to go 
without the few decent players they did possess.  The four Nationals, outfielder Paul Hines, 
pitcher “Dupee” Shaw, outfielder Cliff Carroll, and catcher Barney Gilligan, realizing this, 
wanted to leverage their situation into a larger paycheck.  There was also the holdout of five 
Cincinnati players, a situation that resolved itself by early April with all the men eventually 
signing new deals.  These situations aside, however, most ball clubs had a relative relaxed 
winter, allowing them to enter the 1887 campaign with more hope for the future than acrimony 
from the past. 
 
* * * * * 
 
                                                 
81 “Pitcher Ferguson Buried” NA, New York Times, May 2, 1888, 5; “A Great Player Gone” NA, 
The Sporting Life, May 9, 1888, 3.  For more on Ferguson’s remarkable but short life, see his 
SABR biography at http://sabr.org/bioproj/person/727aabbe, accessed December 20, 2014. 
82 “In The Quaker City” NA, The Sporting News, January 7, 1888, 3. 
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 In all, there was a bit less drama in 1886-1887 than there had been the previous winter.  
In a way, however, it was not so much that the quarrels over players and salary fell off, but they 
shifted to a new phase.  The major issue of 1885-1886 had been the salary limit.  This winter, 
baseball saw an increase in the number of players holding out, demanding to play for another 
club, or both as their method of protesting their current situation.  As club managers and 
executives had to deal with more of these demands, rumors naturally started circulating that one 
club had offered another a large sum for the release of an important player who seemed 
discontent in his present location.  As with most sports rumors, most of the time there was 
nothing to the stories, but that did not stop teams or the press from believing that there might 
some truth somewhere, and that their team might be involved.  Rumors, as we know, often take 
on a life of their own.   
 A natural response, then, was for teams to increase the number of offers that they made to 
each other, hoping perhaps to secure a premium performer who might be on the market before a 
rival did.  This created its own problem, however.  As news about potential deals of this kind 
made the rounds, even players who had never complained about their situation started to worry 
that they would be involved in the next transfer.  This increased fear, in turn, gave the 
Brotherhood another issue in its program for reform.  The BPBP could urge resistance to this 
practice as a recruiting tool to build its membership, even if it already had plenty of useful tools, 
and portray teams buying and selling their players without consulting the men involved as tyrants 
building their fortunes on the backs of the aggrieved ballplayer.  The average crank, of course, 
just wanted to see his nine on the field compete and win some games, but the drama surrounding 
player sales would only build, not decline, in the years to come.  We will return to this issue after 
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a foray into some of the most salient issues that teams and players dealt with in 1880s baseball, 
and how those issues affected the relationship between players and their teams. 
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Chapter 6  
 
 
Alcohol in 1880s Baseball 
 
 
Maintaining a reputation for upright morals and honest living was very important to the 
Brotherhood.  That is because, in the eyes of many spectators, ballplayers had the reputation of 
being a rather dissolute group.  Ward and others, as we have seen, tried to bill the Brotherhood as 
useful to management because it encouraged sobriety and other good habits on the part of its 
members to keep those members in good standing.  It stands to reason, then, that understanding 
the behavior of players, management, umpires, and other individuals involved with the game in 
the late nineteenth century is important in our effort to understand the nature of 1880s baseball 
and the importance of the Brotherhood.  One of the most important behaviors, for players, 
owners, and the public alike, was drinking.  At times, alcohol rivaled money as the most 
important factor in management’s decision making, and drinking by ballplayers caused managers 
more headaches than any other daily activity during the season.  It is crucial, therefore, to 
understand the connections between alcohol and baseball in the Gilded Age. 
Significantly, the fact that excessive alcohol consumption might diminish the 
performance of players on the field was only part of the reason teams cared so much about 
drinking.  In addition, another reason was that drinking could diminish a team’s performance at 
the ticket office.  Fans wanted to see quality baseball.  Teams wanted their fans to return to the 
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grounds as frequently as possible.  More than that, the teams wanted to see certain types of fans 
return on a daily basis.  Luring the “respectable classes” to the ballpark was the paramount 
interest of most teams, especially in the National League, where tickets cost fifty cents for the 
bleachers and seventy-five for the grandstand.  The American Association had more of a 
reputation as the league for working class fans, as its teams charged but twenty-five cents for 
bleacher tickets and fifty for the grandstand.  Even in the Association, however, there was an 
incentive, a twenty-five cent incentive, to be exact, to gain the patronage of middle class 
spectators. 
If they were to successfully appeal to middle class respectability, constant drinking by 
players was intolerable to the baseball’s magnates.  Drunkenness, or other forms of loutish 
behavior such as swearing, fighting, cheating, and so forth, would alienate middle class people 
and keep them away from the grounds, and teams would lose money.  That is why teams felt that 
they must limit drinking at almost any cost.  It was also true, certainly, that fans paid to see 
winning baseball, and sober players equated to more wins, and this, combined with the bottom 
line, were the most important considerations. 
The leader of this crusade was Al Spalding, owner of the Chicago White Stockings.  In 
his annual baseball guide, he described the type of people to whom baseball teams should appeal: 
There are two classes of the patrons of professional baseball grounds which club 
Presidents and Directors have their choice in catering to for each season, and these are, 
first, the reputable class, who prefer to see the game played scientifically and by 
gentlemanly exemplars of the beauties of the game; and second, the hoodlum element, 
who revel in noisy coaching, “dirty ball playing,” kicking against the umpires, and 
exciting disputes and rows every inning. . . . But all of the clubs have not followed this 
example, the majority committing the blunder of considering only the tastes and 
requirements of the hoodlum class apparently in catering for patronage.  This is a great 
financial mistake.  Experience has shown conclusively that it pays best to cater solely for 
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the best class of patronage.  The work in doing this is so much more satisfactory for one 
thing, and it is sure to be the most remunerative.1 
 
Even a casual perusal of the sporting papers of the late 1880s reveals that issues of 
sobriety and player fitness were enormously important in this era.  The papers constantly ran 
stories about the drinking escapades of this or that player.  Clubs made personnel decisions based 
on the drinking habits of the men involved, and the discussions surrounding the trades and 
releases of players frequently mentioned drinking habits as part of the justification for the 
decision.  Without doubt, abuse (real or potential) of alcohol was one of the most important 
aspects of 1880s baseball.  It is unsurprising, therefore, that teams went to enormous lengths to 
try to curb lushing by players and keep track of other damaging behaviors, as well. 
 The issue of the ball clubs trying to keep track of player behavior, and fining players for 
breaking team rules, was a tricky business.  Often, players did do things to hurt their teams with 
their off-field behavior.  It was perfectly natural that owners and managers wanted to prevent this 
whenever possible.  They had both a competitive and financial interest in doing so.  Most 
players, recognizing this, did not kick over fines imposed for obvious and blatant misconduct.  A 
sizable gray area existed, however, between the clear incidents (showing up drunk for a game, 
going out in public with gamblers, and so forth) and the petty things that teams did simply to 
antagonize their players by keeping them in fear and taking bites out of their salaries.  As we 
have already seen, several team managers also fined their men if the players performed poorly on 
the field.  These fines, tacked on to ones for certain behaviors off the field, could add up quickly.  
Even though baseball players received pay that was quite respectable compared to the average 
                                                 
1 NA, Spalding’s Official 1889 Base Ball Guide, 56.  While the guide listed no official author, 
Spalding not wanting to share credit with any other names on the cover of his company’s 
publication, Henry Chadwick was probably the most important contributor. 
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worker, they understandably resented returning that pay to their employer for vague charges of 
misbehavior that they could not appeal. 
For instance, in 1883 a minor league club, Reading of the Inter-State Association, 
blacklisted its second baseman under the nebulous charges of “general insubordination, 
ungentlemanly conduct on the field and a refusal to obey rules.”2  Then there was the 1884 
incident where Jerry Dorgan, outfielder and captain for the Indianapolis Hoosiers of the 
American Association, incurred a $10 fine “for a tendency . . . not to take any sleep during the 24 
hours which composed one day.”3  In August of 1885, the National League’s Providence team 
took a similarly tough stance towards second baseman Jack “Moose” Farrell.  After Farrell had 
used “obscene and disgusting language addressed to the audience” the Grays suspended their 
infielder without pay.4   
Farrell got a fresh start for 1886, catching on with the Philadelphia Quakers, but it was 
not long before he wore out his welcome in the City of Brotherly Love, for the same reasons 
Providence tired of him.  The team decided to release him after only seventeen games after he 
“grossly insulted his late manager, Mr. [Harry] Wright,” to the extent that “the latter felt greatly 
annoyed at Farrell’s conduct, and seriously contemplated bringing his case to the attention of the 
league,” but Wright eventually relented after Farrell signed on with Washington, perhaps simply 
wishing to wash his hands of the troublesome infielder altogether and let the Nationals deal with 
                                                 
2 “The League” NA, The Sporting Life, June 24, 1883, 2. 
3 “From Detroit” MAT, The Sporting Life , January 13, 1886, 1. 
4 “From Providence” MCD, The Sporting Life¸ August 26, 1885, 1.  The Sporting Life also 
offered that Farrell might have been faltering on purpose in order to secure his release from the 
organization, as his batting average had declined from .305 in 1883 to .217 in 1884 and .206 in 
1885.  The paper also reported rumors that Farrell may have been guilty of dissipation.  
However, given that his batting average never again topped .225 in any of his remaining seasons, 
it seems that either loss of talent was to blame for his batting woes, or that he never righted his 
ways.  Farrell himself claimed that an attack of rheumatism was the cause of his problems.  
“News and Notes” NA, The Sporting Life, November 17, 1886, 3. 
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him.5  The Nationals actually appointed him field captain for 1887, and for a few months, he held 
onto this position, but by September, the team demoted him in favor of third baseman Jim 
Donnelly.  The reason was not poor judgment on the field but poor judgment off it.  While in 
New York, Farrell and one teammate, reserve catcher Barney Gilligan, “engaged in a slugging 
match with John L. Redeye when they were booked to play.”  Farrell then took French leave, not 
appearing for about a week, and the loss of the team’s captaincy was the predictable result.  The 
team also suspended him for the season, but later changed its mind and reinstated the Moose.6  
At the end of the 1887 campaign, Washington parted ways with Farrell, who, despite all his 
capers, still claimed that the Nationals’ management had it out for him.  “Farrell has been 
released and will leave for his home in a few days.  I understand that he claims that he was 
downed.  He did it himself, and if he could have curbed his vicious habits he would be today as 
popular as ever, for he can play ball when he will.”7 
Farrell received his last major league engagement from Baltimore for the 1888 season.  
Baltimore manager Billy Barnie seemed to have a soft spot for talented men who let their bad 
habits get the best of them.  Barnie agreed with Henry Chadwick, the great encyclopedist of 
baseball, who described Farrell as “one of the best second base players in the fraternity,” and 
brought Farrell to the Monumental City for 1888.  Chadwick laid out the reasons for Farrell’s 
downfall by stating he had, “sacrificed glorious opportunities for rising to the topmost round of 
the ladder, at the shrine of that curse of the professional fraternity—drunkenness.”  Chadwick 
also described Farrell’s engagement by the Bald Eagle of Baltimore by writing, “Barnie has 
considerately come forward and given him a chance to recover his lost credit . . . the question is, 
                                                 
5 “Diamond Dust” NA, Chicago Daily Tribune, August 4, 1886, 3. 
6 “From Washington” WUD, The Sporting Life, September 14, 1887, 1; “From The Capital” 
WUD, The Sporting Life, September 21, 1887, 1. 
7 “From The Capital” WUD, The Sporting Life, October 12, 1887, 5. 
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will he have the manliness and strength of mind to benefit by the kindly offer?”8  Farrell did not, 
and it spelled the end of his major league baseball career by age thirty-one. 
Another interesting story further demonstrates the attitude of some teams towards 
controlling player behavior.  There was one man, named Horner, who played for a team in 
Toronto, Canada.  Despite being a Canadian city, Toronto at times fielded a club in the 
International League in the 1880s, which was one of the strongest minor leagues of the day.  
Horner apparently had one of his fingers mangled while attempting to break up a bar fight.  One 
of the brawlers chewed Horner’s finger to the extent he was unable to perform on the diamond 
for about three weeks.  Horner’s Toronto club proceeded to fine him $75, reasoning he was 
under contract to play ball for them, and, by associating with disreputable types in disregard of 
the team’s warnings, he was the cause of his own misfortune and thus liable for the damages.  
Equally interesting is that The Sporting Life title its article describing the story “A Player Justly 
Punished,” signifying agreement with this method of player discipline.9 
Capricious and ill defined as some efforts to control player behavior were, this is not to 
say that such efforts to improve discipline were always bogus.  Drinking among players occurred 
with depressing frequency, and fans and sportswriters knew it.  Team management did, too, 
whether or not they conceded as much to the public or the press, and here once again, the 
invasiveness of management’s response could alienate players.  In addition, management had to 
determine if the goal should be temperance or complete prohibition.  Al Spalding opted to try the 
second option with his Chicago club in 1886, and as mentioned earlier, employed the Pinkerton 
                                                 
8 “Chadwick’s Chat” Henry Chadwick, The Sporting Life, March 28, 1888, 4.  Chadwick had, by 
this time, authored articles on baseball for no less than three encyclopedias, which were 
Chambers’ Cyclopedia, Appleton’s Cyclopedia, and Johnson’s Cyclopedia.  Some observers 
jokingly called Barnie the “Bald Eagle of Baltimore” for the reason that he was quite bald. 
9 “A Player Justly Punished” NA, The Sporting Life, October 28, 1885, 4. 
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detective agency to shadow his players at all times over a six week period.  These detectives 
discovered, for instance, that one evening Tom Burns played billiards for two hours, while Ned 
Williamson and Cap Anson (who was, it seems, almost as good at billiards as he was at baseball) 
limited themselves to eighty minutes at the billiards table the same evening.  Meanwhile Jim 
McCormick and Silver Flint left their hotel with two men, enjoyed a pair of beers at a nearby bar, 
and then returned to the team lodgings.  Spalding then fined the guilty parties (he had forced 
them to swear to lay off the drink prior to the regular season) in Kansas City.  His detectives 
rounded up information on the after-hours behavior of players on other clubs, as well.  Spalding 
clearly enjoyed the power this gave him, to the point where he recommended the entire National 
League do the same.  “I shall ask the clubs of the National League to jointly arrange with some 
detective agency to shadow throughout the League season every player of the National League; 
and submit a weekly report to President Young at Washington, embracing a statement of each 
player’s habits and of his actions from day to day.”10  
It appears some other teams liked the idea.  Louisville reportedly imitated the White 
Stockings in an effort to police the post game behavior of its nine.  Manager Jim Hart “has been 
watching the boys very carefully, and as a result there has been no dissipation to amount to 
anything. . . . Besides being under the eye of Manager James, a detective, it is reported, is 
constantly on their track, who takes note of the individual doings of each man and reports them 
in writing to President Phelps each morning.”  Although the players naturally chafed at this 
arrangement, especially those most socially inclined, the author of this piece favored the practice, 
stating, “In my opinion, and the opinion of a great portion of the public, it is the proper thing.  
Ball players are paid large salaries to play ball and they should do it well.  Spectators do not pay 
                                                 
10 “A New Scheme” Remlap, The Sporting Life, August 4, 1886, 1. 
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admission to see certain men who have been carousing all night, and play in a listless manner as 
though they took no interest whatever in what was going on.  Every club should have a detective 
in their ranks.”11  Over in Boston, the Triumvirs were listening.  They also employed detectives 
to keep track of their players throughout the 1887 and 1888 seasons.  Therefore, when some 
critics tried to blame Boston’s pedestrian performance on dissipation and carousing amongst the 
players during the evenings, they put little stock in such stories.12 
Pittsburgh also tried to enforce a no-drinking policy amongst its men for the 1889 season, 
but the players on the Smoky City nine were wise to management’s tactics by that point.  One 
unnamed player, who had not drunk at all in 1888, believed that going cold turkey had hurt his 
play, and declared he would drink in moderation in 1889, come what may.  Realizing that 
detectives could shadow him if he went out for a drink in public, “if Manager Phillips catches 
him in a saloon through the season he has no doubt but that he will be fined, but he does not 
propose to give ‘Harry’ a chance, and will keep the article bottled on his own premises and has 
no doubt but that other players will follow his example. . . . If all the players did their drinking at 
home it would be next to impossible to detect any infractions.”13   
This level of surveillance did not sit well with players, needless to say, prompting some 
to the tactics employed in Pittsburgh.  Besides the basic reaction to the invasion of their private 
lives, and the increased level of control their employers gained over them, they were grown men 
and professionals.  Even a man on good terms with ownership, such as White Stockings captain 
Cap Anson, took umbrage with being shadowed at times.  When his team, locked in a fierce 
pennant race with Detroit and New York, lost five out of six games on its August road trip to the 
                                                 
11 “On Their Trail” RWL, The Sporting News, August 9, 1886, 1. 
12 “Hub Happenings” Mugwump, The Sporting Life, June 13, 1888, 9. 
13 “No Lushing in the Pittsburg Club” NA, The Sporting News, March 30, 1889, 1. 
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East Coast in 1886, he blamed the fines administered by Spalding for disrupting the team’s 
momentum.  He did not deny what the reports of the Pinkertons revealed—only that the 
occasional glass of beer had hurt the team’s performance in any tangible way.  “It is only natural 
that such an act on the part of the club management, coming, as it did, in the nature of a complete 
surprise and then being made public, should have chagrined and displeased the men.  Their 
defeats down East, I believe, are the result of the whole affair.  Not that they have deliberately 
determined to lose games, mind you, but they are sore and are playing with a kind of dogged 
indifference.”  When the writer countered that Spalding’s primary objective was to ascertain the 
truth regarding published reports of excess drinking on the part of the players, Anson conceded 
this might be legitimate, but still held to his statement that the public nature of the discipline 
embarrassed a team of professionals, who now felt like unruly schoolchildren wearing dunce 
caps.  For his part, the writer did not believe Anson’s tale that the fines translated into lackluster 
play (perhaps for good reason, as some observers then and baseball historians now consider 
Anson a blowhard) but chalked up the defeats to a string of bad luck instead.14   
While infielder Ned Williamson declared twenty-five dollars a steep price for a mere two 
beers, claiming that this was the only time so far in the season he had let down his guard against 
the bottle, at least one White Stocking, burly pitcher Jim McCormick, went further than mere 
complaining about having Pinkertons shadow him every evening.  Just before his team boarded a 
train for their trip east in August, McCormick noticed one of the detectives in the train depot and 
decided to repay the detective for his fine by taking the money out of the man’s hide.  “The 
detective bolted, but the base ball giant was too quick, and, catching Mr. Detective by the throat, 
he proceeded to stop his wind.  Having squeezed as long as he thought safe he threw the fellow 
                                                 
14 “Remlap’s Letter” Remlap, The Sporting Life, August 11, 1886, 4.  
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from him, and, with a final thump in the eye and a pleasant ‘ta-ta’ he jumped aboard the train, 
which was already in motion.”15  Williamson later speculated, as Anson had, that Spalding’s 
fines hurt the morale of the Chicago nine at a critical time in the season.  “Big Ed Williamson 
says that together Kelly, Gore, Flint, himself and another player were fined $2,000 at the close of 
the season for drinking.  He believes that the loss of the [World] series of games to the St. Louis 
Browns was the cause of punishment inflicted by the Chicago president upon these men.”16 
Sporting papers of the day chimed in with their views regarding players with 
questionable habits.  In November of 1885, The Sporting Life reported with disgust that the 
Cincinnati Red Stockings had signed outfielder Fred Lewis and pitcher “Bollicky” Bill Taylor, 
two players known for their tendency to imbibe freely.  “These are two disturbers who were 
cleaned out from the Association last year, and should be kept out forever.  Both are good 
players when they are in condition, but it is folly to expect them to keep straight.  The National 
Agreement should make a rule for the permanent blacklisting of such men, so that clubs will not 
be tempted to take them up.”17  Some recalled the 1884 incident in which Lewis, while playing 
on the St. Louis Browns, so enraged Chris Von der Ahe that the St. Louis owner suspended him 
indefinitely for his lushing.  Furious, Lewis “grabbed a bat and started to hunt up Chris.”  The 
owner beat the player into the safety of the clubhouse by a nose, at which point he decided his 
suspension was unjustified, after all.18  After that event, whenever Von der Ahe wanted to 
discuss player drinking, he sometimes described it as “conduct . . . of the Fred Lewis order.”19   
                                                 
15 “Notes and Comments” NA, The Sporting Life, August 11, 1886, 5; “Notes and Comments” 
NA, The Sporting Life, August 25, 1886, 5. 
16 “Notes and Comments” NA, The Sporting Life, December 1, 1886, 3. 
17 “Notes and Comments” NA, The Sporting Life, January 13, 1886, 3. 
18 “Caylor’s Comment” O.P. Caylor, The Sporting Life, November 30, 1887, 2. 
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In any case, Lewis, who “has written a letter to the Cincinnati Club management in which 
he asserts that he will play ball for all he is worth next season,”20 actually had a fine season for 
the Red Stockings in 1886, sporting a .318/.365/.417 batting line in 77 games, for a robust OPS+ 
of 142.  It was his last season in the majors, however, and coming at age twenty-seven, we can 
assume his bad habits were likely to blame for his early departure, given that, when he was not 
drinking, some of the sporting papers sang his praises: “Fred Lewis . . . is probably the finest 
specimen of an athlete in the baseball profession; without a particle of superfluous flesh or fat, he 
will weigh nearly two hundred pounds. . . . He is one of the hardest workers and one of the most 
quiet men on the team.”21  Furthermore, in training sessions before the season, Lewis impressed 
observers “by the ease and grace with which he handled the 100-pound weights.  Fred says he 
will play the game of his life and his admirers know the meaning of that.”22  His effort at reform 
continued into the early weeks of the 1886 season: “Fred Lewis has made this city his friend.  He 
has begun to do what he promised he would—play the best ball of his life.  He is a great favorite 
with the patrons of the club, with the club and with the team.”23   
Sadly, Lewis did not complete the season to capitalize on his strong start.  A broken ankle 
shelved him in August, which was a true shame for both he and the Red Stockings, as Lewis was 
second in the American Association in batting average at the time.24  Following the layoff, his 
old habits returned.  “Lewis, the centre fielder, who last year was one of the heaviest batters of 
the League, has been behaving very badly.  He is drunk a great deal of the time, and is utterly 
worthless because of his convivial habits.  He will undoubtedly be sent to find another 
                                                 
20 “Notes and Comments” NA, The Sporting Life, January 13, 1886, 3. 
21 “Cincinnati’s Giants” Cincinnatus, The Sporting News, March 17, 1886, 7. 
22 “The Coming Champions” Cincinnatus, The Sporting News, March 29, 1886, 6. 
23 “Caylor’s Letter” O.P. Caylor, The Sporting Life, April 28, 1886, 1. 
24 “Caught on the Fly” NA, The Sporting News, August 9, 1886, 5. 
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engagement.”25  Some blamed his teammates.  “Many ballplayers firmly believe Fred Lewis 
would have stayed sober this season had the Cincinnati Club played better ball.  Fred, it is 
claimed, became discouraged at the club’s continued hard luck, and utter indifference with which 
some of the team played while away from home.”26   
The next season found Lewis playing for Rochester, a member of the International 
League.  He made the news late in the season for, yes, drinking, when the Flour City club docked 
him fifty dollars after an appearance in police court.27  It was his only season in Rochester 
because “the disgraceful antics of some of the players so disgusted the patrons and management 
that not a single player was reserved for next season.  They were all released.”28  Things did not 
improve for Lewis in 1888, either.  In March, he spent ten days in a Utica, New York, jail after 
assaulting an alderman in that burg.  “The latter is a saloon-keeper, and Lewis entered the saloon 
and struck the official for going back on one of his friends.”29 
Billy Taylor ended up with Baltimore by the time the championship season started, and 
got off to a good start there.  “Billy Taylor looks exceedingly well and appears to be in good 
condition. . . . He showed remarkable speed.  Barnie, he says, will never regret engaging him.”30  
Once the fur started flying, however, it was a different story, as Taylor posted a poor ERA+ of 
just 60.  Owner Billy Barnie of Baltimore tried to cover his bases with Taylor via an “ironclad 
contract” that allowed Barnie to withhold some of Taylor’s salary until the end of the month as 
                                                 
25 “Caught on the Fly” NA, The Sporting News, August 30, 1886, 5. 
26 “Caught on the Fly” NA, The Sporting News, December 4, 1886, 3. 
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29 “Notes and Comments” NA, The Sporting Life, April 4, 1888, 5. 
30 “Notes and Comments” NA, The Sporting Life, March 24, 1886, 3.  Comments on a pitcher’s 
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“security for his good behavior.”31  Barnie should have required greater security.  He released 
Taylor after just eight games started, and by August Bollicky Bill was set to join his third team 
for the season, Milwaukee, following his release from Memphis of the Southern League.32  
Taylor’s tenure in Memphis impressed no one, as the quantity of alcohol he imbibed grew to the 
point where he brought a gallon of brew to a game against Nashville.33  Before the dust settled 
on 1886, papers reported he was at Mt. Carmel, Pennsylvania, and actually doing well, because 
he had managed to lay off the fire water for a time.34   After the 1886 season, Taylor’s career 
took a similar trajectory as Lewis’s, as Taylor pitched just one more game in major league 
baseball.   
Taylor tried his best to convince someone in major league baseball to employ him in 
1887, but by this time, he had tarnished his reputation so badly no one believed his protestations 
of sobriety.  He went on an off-season exhibition tour in Cuba over the winter, and wrote to a St. 
Louis sportswriter claiming just one drink had “passed his collar button” since arriving on the 
island.  The writer replied, “The only way I can get around this story is that Bill either takes 
‘double’ drinks or he doesn’t wear such a thing as a collar button.”35  Despite the well-earned 
sarcasm, it appears Taylor was not lying.  “President Morrow, of the Southern League, saw him 
in Cuba recently, and says that he has fallen off so much that he hardly knew him.  He actually 
refused to take a drink when the handsome ‘Pooh-Bah’ of the Southern League offered to ‘set 
‘em up.’  Simmons, Scott and all the players who were in Cuba confirm this.”  Sources also 
                                                 
31 “Notes and Comments” NA, The Sporting Life, November 18, 1885, 3. 
32 “Notes and Comments” NA, The Sporting Life, August 18, 1886, 5. 
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reported his abstention from spirits had helped him drop fifty pounds.36  This led one writer to 
comment, “Billy Taylor is the metaphorical ground hog of base ball.  He comes out of his hole 
about this time in the season and remarks that he has sworn off, sees the shadow of past 
transgressions, and then crawls back again to await the sunshine of managerial touching trust and 
child-like faith.”37   
Nonetheless, Taylor finally ran out of serious chances.  He signed a deal with Charleston 
in the Southern League to start the 1887 season, and the writer describing the transaction showed 
his share of child-like faith in “Gay and Festive William”: “He has by constant exercise reduced 
himself considerably and is in the pink of condition. . . . There has been considerable newspaper 
talk about Billy’s lushing, etc., but when the time comes to play ball he will not be found 
wanting . . .”38  His performance in the Birthplace of Secession was wanting enough, however, 
and by 1888 Taylor was back north of the Mason-Dixon Line in Scranton, Pennsylvania.  It is 
unknown whether drink had anything to do with his behavior or not, but he was an accomplice 
when teammate Sam Crane eloped with a married woman there and carried off $1,400 of the 
married couple’s money at the same time.39  Nor was this the only time that Taylor mixed 
women and baseball.  One time, he was the volunteer umpire for a game featuring two touring 
teams of women.  After the game, he hopped on the omnibus with some of the women, and in the 
drunken cavorting that followed, married one of them.40   
The last we hear of Taylor is when he and another player engaged to play for Hot 
Springs, Arkansas, in 1889.  Feeling good about their chances, Hot Springs fans bet heavily on 
                                                 
36 “Notes and Comments” NA, The Sporting Life, January 12, 1887, 3; “Notes and Comments” 
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38 “Billy Taylor” Jake, The Sporting News, March 5, 1887, 1. 
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their nine with Taylor in the points, but instead of helping the team to victory over Pine Bluff, he 
sold out to Pine Bluff for $50 and skipped town.  The good people of Hot Springs were so 
incensed that they hired detectives to run Taylor to ground.  “Detectives are looking for these 
people, and if they are caught it will go hard with them.”41 
 
* * * * * 
 
The fact that a writer for The Sporting Life could provide readers with a report card on 
drinking among the various teams in 1885 shows that people around the game freely discussed 
the relationship between players and C2H5OH.  “On the general average the teams of the 
Association were pretty temperate last year as to drinking.  The Metropolitans and our own 
Athletics were about the worst,” he wrote.  Meanwhile, in Cincinnati, the “lushing tendencies 
which are growing upon the team” threatened to sabotage a promising run at the next league 
championship.42   
Along the same lines, early in the 1889 season the paper’s Columbus correspondent gave 
a similar general indictment of the American Association.  “I am told that the Columbus team is 
not alone in endeavoring to combine ball playing and lushing, and seeking to discover a winning 
combination in it, but that the Athletics are following the same tactics they used last year, and 
that even Kansas City and Louisville have players that are crooking the elbow oftener than the 
good results of base ball require.”  While the writer admitted he had no authority in the matter, 
for the good of the game he implored his hometown team to do better, writing, “I am going to 
engage my pencil, while it lasts, in calling down the members of the Columbus team in their 
                                                 
41 “Billy Taylor’s Disgraceful Conduct” JHB, The Sporting News, August 3, 1889, 1. 
42 “Intemperate Players” NA, The Sporting Life, November 18, 1885, 3. 
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damphool efforts to sink the pastime of base ball into oblivion in this town plot, and use all my 
efforts to save the Columbus directors from a heavy financial loss that certain lushing ball 
players would in a cold-blooded, heartless manner seek to impose upon them.”  Part of the 
reason this writer knew so much was that other papers reported the drinking habits of players to 
the public freely.  When his Columbus nine played Kansas City, one paper wrote, “It is a wonder 
that Kansas City plays as well as it does, for it is no secret that several of the boys are lushing 
hard.  A number of both Columbus and Kansas City players saw the sights last (Monday) night, 
and to those who were on the game was better than was expected.”43  The next week, Cincinnati 
fined one of its men, catcher Billy Earle, fifty dollars for arriving late.  “It is not known whether 
he had been indulging in the ardent, but such is the supposition, as he was out the night previous 
later than usual, and the next morning he looked very blue.”44 
The saga of two Louisville players show just how much damage lushing players could 
inflict on a franchise.  Louisville appeared to be in decent shape going into the 1886 season.  
“The members of the club are all in splendid condition . . . there are only two players of the 
club—[Tom] Ramsey and [Pete] Browning—who are addicted to the habit of strong drink, but 
Manager Hart is confident that they will be conspicuous during the coming season for steady 
behavior and quiet demeanor.”45  Manager Hart might have had second thoughts when, seeing 
Ramsey report for the southern trip of exhibition games in March, “Ramsey came in at the last 
moment.  He did not look in very good condition for playing, showing signs of dissipation.”46  
Off and on, the issues persisted as the season stretched into July and August.  During Louisville’s 
late July road trip to the East Coast, “President Phelps accompanied the boys on this trip.  Result 
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no lushing.”  Pete Browning was absent from the club by this time, however, recuperating from 
an eye injury.  “It is a hard matter for Pete Browning to drink water at the Springs.  He is not 
accustomed to it.  He had the picture of a distillery hung in his room.  It seemed to afford him 
much pleasure.”47   
The personal attention of Phelps seemed to have helped Ramsey in particular, for a time, 
anyway.  “Ramsey is pitching great ball and is taking the best care of himself.  In consequence 
he has hundreds of friends now where he had one in the spring.”48  It was not enough for 
Ramsey, however.  By late September, with the team’s chances of catching the St. Louis Browns 
for first place fading like a rain puddle in the desert sun, “Ramsey from continual carousing and 
late hours had completely broken down and had to be sent to his home in Indianapolis.  He is 
done playing for the remainder of the season.”49  Ramsey did pitch a few more games, but the 
team’s fortunes did not improve.   
Ramsey’s habits did not improve early in 1887, either; rather, he was the first man on the 
team fined by new manager John Kelly for his lack of commitment to his work.  After some 
early season games in which his “spiritless and sulky playing was manifest to everybody,” 
Ramsey stayed out boozing past three AM on a night before he was to pitch the next day.  Kelly 
put his foot down with authority.  “Today you’ve been behaving yourself like a monkey and 
you’ve got to pay for it.  You are fined the limit—fifty dollars—and every time you do this sort 
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of thing again you’ll get another fifty.”  At least Ramsey admitted the error of his ways, and 
allowed that Kelly had been right to fine him.50 
Ramsey’s history is also a good example of how, once earned, a bad reputation can be 
difficult to shed.  While fully admitting to his fondness for drink, he claimed it had not ruined his 
performance on the field or hurt the Colonels in any significant way.  Following the 1887 season, 
when Louisville again slumped late in the year, including four straight losses to the last place 
Cleveland club, and fell to fourth place in the standings, people blamed his drinking.  Ramsey 
had had enough of the criticism.  “I admit that I have been a little wrong once or twice, but I 
have always done my best when I was pitching.  I want the club to succeed, and I help it as much 
as I can. . . . I have pitched in more games and won more than all the other pitchers in the nine 
put together, and all I ask is fair and considerate treatment from the people.”  A Louisville 
sportswriter agreed, stating that while he knew Ramsey imbibed at times, “there are men in this 
and other clubs who drink more.  He is not so shrewd about it as they are, and gets caught 
oftener.”  The writer followed up this lukewarm defense of the talented pitcher by writing, 
“Ramsey is honest.  Manager Kelly can depend on him.  When the pitcher says that he will do a 
certain thing Manager Kelly can believe him, and considers his word sufficient.”51 
Browning was a different story altogether, seemingly never able to lay off the strong 
drink for long.  (In his defense, however, he suffered from acute mastoiditis, which caused him 
chronic pain and hearing loss, and this was probably part of his effort to deal with the pain.52)  
About the same time in 1886 that Ramsey’s unsavory habits returned, Browning too allowed 
liquor to tarnish his play.  “Browning has let down again in left field.  Too much dissipation is 
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said to be the cause. . . . he has gotten the idea that he can do very near as he pleases.  There is no 
doubt as to his ability to play good ball when he wants to.”53   
The writer was absolutely correct in his last statement. The incredible thing about 
Browning was that, no matter how much alcohol he might drink and how much his defense 
might suffer, his hitting remained impeccable.  His batting line for 1886 was .340/.389/.441, for 
an OPS+ of 155, and the next season he was far better, slashing .402/.464/.547 for an OPS+ of 
177 even though he reported for the 1887 season in poor condition to begin with.  As one writer 
opined, “This man’s recuperative powers are wonderful.  They must be fully equal to those of 
John L. Sullivan.  Other base ball players have dissipated as much in a given time as Pete, but I 
know of no one who has kept it up as steadily for eight regular base ball years and can yet play a 
good game.  And he is still an attraction wherever the club goes.”54  All this despite the fact that 
one day, he came to the Louisville team meal at the Lindell Hotel in St. Louis drunk to the point 
that, when the waiter asked him what he wanted to eat, Browning declared he was not very 
hungry and would just have beaver eggs for his meal.  When the uncomprehending waiter 
informed him the hotel did not offer beaver eggs, Browning took the menu to point out what he 
wanted.  His finger eventually landed on the word beverages.55   
Browning made no secret of his fondness for strong drink, either.  Before the 1887 season 
began, a writer asked him for his thoughts on the club’s new manager, “Honest” John Kelly.  
Browning replied, “he is a good one; but you can bet he won’t bulldoze me.  I am bound to have 
my allowance of rum, Kelly or no Kelly.  Jim Hart tried to stop me from taking an occasional 
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drink, but I learned him a thing or two.”  According to Browning, however, Kelly knew how to 
use demon rum as a motivating tool, as well.  “Kelly has promised each of us boys a new suit of 
clothes and a five-gallon keg of the best whiskey in Kentucky if we win the championship next 
season, so I would advise the rest of the clubs to look out for Louisville.”56  As much as 
Browning enjoyed tippling, however, there was probably no truth to the rumor that when he 
finally signed his contract for 1887, it was because saloon owners in Louisville forced him to so 
he could pay off his tabs run up over the winter.  He also knew better than to hit the bottle with 
sportswriters, as he once told a story about excusing himself from a drink with one who had 
written negative stories about his lushing several times previously, actually going so far as to 
claim he was going to walk the straight path in 1887.57   
Ever the character, before he became a major league player with Louisville, Browning 
played for a semi-professional team in the Falls City.  One season, he was not paid in cash, but 
with a contract that paid him all the ice cream and cake he wanted to eat during the playing 
season.  This cost his club something on the order of thirty dollars per month.58  Although he 
allowed drinking to tarnish his play and had more than his share of quirks, he certainly had some 
redeeming qualities as well.  One of his nicknames was “The Gladiator,” because some 
perceived him as having a combative personality, but people also knew him as “The Louisville 
Slugger,” as he was the first to contract with the company Hillerich and Bradsby to make the bats 
still known by that name today.  He also saved a young Louisville boy from death in 1884.  A 
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team of horses pulling a streetcar was bearing down on the lad when Browning ducked in and 
pulled the youth to safety.59 
Predictably, Kelly had to finesse the drinking issue with these two star players as the 
season progressed.  Both men painted the town on drinking sprees in late August and early 
September, for which Kelly fined Browning fifty dollars and suspended Ramsey indefinitely 
without pay.  Ramsey’s arm was in bad shape by that time anyway, so the team did not really 
miss him, but Browning immediately caught fire with the ash after bracing up, smacking 
nineteen hits in his next five games.  As both men appeared remorseful, however, they quickly 
returned to Kelly’s good graces.  Nineteen hits in five games probably helped Browning, too.60  
By early October, however, he was in disgrace once again.  During the season’s closing week, 
the Colonels were battling their hated rivals from Cincinnati when Browning failed to turn up for 
the first game of the series, having missed the train from St. Louis because he was too liquored 
up to get to the station on time.  Playing the next day, but still hung over badly, he managed to 
strike a double, but while taking his lead off of second base, fell asleep on the field and was 
tagged out.  No wonder that, when John Kelly set off to scour the country for new talent in the 
1887-1888 off-season, he said, “I will take only men of the very best class.  I want them sober 
and reliable, so that I can always depend on them, and I won’t have any others.”61 
The reader can imagine the baseball world’s shock, therefore, when news arrived in April 
of 1888 that the Louisville club, every single player, took the blue ribbon pledge of abstinence 
just prior to the season.  Seemingly, it took an act of God to achieve this in 1880s baseball, and 
that is exactly what the Colonels’ management produced, in the person of noted temperance 
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evangelist Francis Murphy.  He gave the players a lengthy harangue, and “the players seemed 
considerably affected by his remarks, and when he finished one and all walked up, put on the 
blue ribbon and signed the pledge.  Both Pete Browning and Ramsey put down their signature 
with good grace, and they mean to keep their word.”  Not only that, but “after Browning had 
taken the temperance pledge he went off with Manager Jim Hart and swore off before a 
magistrate.  He wanted it done officially.  Hart has great influence over him.”  (Recall Hart had 
been the Louisville manager prior to Kelly’s appointment.  Hart was in Louisville at the time 
with his current team, Milwaukee, for an exhibition series.)62 
Pete Browning’s story was not destined for a happy ending.  Nor did his team play the 
brilliant ball predicted after swearing off liquor.  In a case of cruel irony, in 1888 Louisville had 
its worst season in years, finishing seventh place with a 48-87 mark.  It was not a surprise, 
therefore, when players started weakening and backsliding on their pledge.  Browning was 
among them.  By June, on the road in Kansas City, he was so intoxicated that when it rained one 
day, he bought two fishing poles and proceeded to fish the water flowing through the gutters.  
Unsuccessful at urban fishing, he went inside the team hotel and acted so obnoxiously that hotel 
management removed him from the premises, nearly calling for his arrest so he could sober up in 
the drunk tank.  Realizing he was useless in his present state, the team left him in Kansas City 
when it moved on to Cincinnati for its next set of games.  “Since then nothing has been heard of 
him, but he is expected to telegraph for permission to join the club as soon as he gets sober.”63  
By August, things were so bad he was still at home in Louisville while the team took to the road.  
He was frequently drunk and passed his time throwing poker dice.64  He even made a September 
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trip to French Lick Springs, “an Indiana resort much patronized by people who wish to boil out,” 
but even that did not help.  “He has been back two or three days, but if reports are to be credited 
another boiling out is already necessary.”65 
Ramsey’s story likewise ended on a down note.  On June 28, the Colonels suspended him 
without pay because, like Browning, he had commenced drinking at the end of the Kansas City 
series and was in no condition to play.66  A few weeks later, he landed in jail because various 
bartenders to whom he owed money pooled their complaints and had him locked up for failing to 
pay his bills.  As Ramsey had already missed the team’s train earlier in the week, and the team 
had laid him off without pay for the transgression, the left-hander remained incarcerated for the 
time being.”67  Saddest of all, considering the amount of money Ramsey made playing baseball, 
“he was unable to give bonds and spent the night in jail.  As he was utterly penniless he was the 
next day allowed to take the insolvent debtors’ oath and was released.  His entire earthly 
possessions consisted of the clothes he wore.  None of the club officials went near him and he 
even had to borrow $5 to pay court costs.”68 
This produced a mixed reaction on the part of the Louisville faithful.  Some pointed out 
the obvious truth that Ramsey tended to lose control of himself and behave in ways detrimental 
to himself and the Colonels.  Because of his talent, the team usually gave him another chance, 
however, and so this time, he was only seeing the consequences of his actions, as he should have 
done long ago.  Others, more charitable, pointed out that Ramsey’s patronage of the saloons in 
question had made the saloonkeepers many times the amount of money Ramsey owed them 
through his magnetism and ability to draw patrons to their establishments in the first place.  
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Furthermore, what they had done was probably not legal anyway, as Kentucky state law at the 
time allowed for the arrest of debtors only if they planned to leave the state without paying their 
debts, which Ramsey clearly did not intend to do for any greater period than the length of the 
team’s next road trip.69 
The two men signed again to play with the Colonels for 1889, as new owner Mordecai 
Davidson did not learn the lessons that should have been obvious by now.  The two men had so 
much talent, however, that the temptation to keep them around was just too great.  As Davidson 
said of Browning, “if that man would keep sober he would be the greatest ball player living.  He 
has the best eye for a ball that I ever saw, and unless he is drunk on the grounds his playing is not 
affected, not even by a spree the night before.  I expect trouble with him, but I will stand no 
foolishness.”  When it came time to sign Browning for 1889, “Pete’s arm dropped to his vest 
pocket, and after much struggling he flushed out a carefully folded document, which he exhibited 
with much satisfaction to his employer.  The paper was a pledge of total abstinence good from 
date until November 1, and was duly witnessed, signed, and sworn to before a neighboring 
Justice of the Peace.”  Davidson could not help a little laugh at the “unique document” but 
nonetheless gave Browning a contract.70   
Browning at least tried to break his habit, even if he always fell short of his goal.  
Ramsey, on the other hand, did not even make it to opening day in 1889 before deciding to skip 
practice and vanish.  “He did not reappear for three days, and, although he put on a bold front at 
first, it was easily seen that he had been drinking.”71  Finally, Louisville management tired of his 
continual lushing and traded him to the St. Louis Browns during the season for one of the 
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Browns’ recalcitrant pitchers, Nat Hudson.  As sad as Ramsey’s saga is, however, it is worth 
noting that by 1889, even after several seasons of frequent binge drinking, he was still a mere 
twenty-four years old.  Many people of his age struggle with alcohol abuse.  When the alcoholic 
is a major league baseball player, however, the consequences are public, and the fall from grace 
harder, than for those operating outside the spotlight of professional sports.   
Nonetheless, the story of Ramsey and Browning demonstrates beyond any doubt just how 
detrimental drinking was in this era.  It did much to ruin Ramsey’s career, as he was out of 
baseball by age twenty-six.  Browning lasted longer, but missed so many games due to drinking 
and the resulting suspensions that despite a monstrous career batting mark of .341/.403/.467, he 
is not in the Hall of Fame simply because he did not play enough to accumulate sufficient 
statistics.  The quality of his play is certainly high enough, as his batting average is the best ever 
for a player not in the Hall, but it is hard to make much of an argument on behalf of a player so 
completely unreliable.  The fact that Louisville depended for success on two such unreliable 
players helps explain why the team was so streaky, and why it performed so poorly in 1888 and 
1889.  This, in turn, helps demonstrate why some baseball owners were so concerned about 
alcohol and why they took such stringent measures against it. 
Ramsey and Browning also illustrate the fact that, because there are never enough 
talented players to go around, even men with a weakness for drink received a number of second 
chances.  Sometimes teams saw no choice but to swallow hard, take the plunge, and hope things 
turned out for the best.  Louisville did every year, and other clubs sometimes saw no choice but 
to do the same, especially when they were as poor as the 1886 Kansas City Cowboys and had 
little to lose.  Wallowing with a record of 19 up and 52 down, on August 11, they brought Frank 
Ringo on board to catch.  “It is to be hoped that he will brace up and play good ball, inasmuch as 
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this is his home; however, Mr. McKim informs me that they will stand no lushing whatever, and 
upon his first disregard of this strict rule he will be heavily fined.”72  As it turned out, Ringo was 
not the answer that the Cowboys hoped.  Though he posted a tolerable OPS+ of 93 in limited 
action, and observers labeled him “a very active player, and the best throwing catcher we 
have,”73 the team lost nine straight after his signing, and won just eleven more games the rest of 
the season.   
The team let him go at the end of the 1886 campaign, “his greatest enemy being the sole 
reason.  Frank had done excellently until he struck St. Louis, where he forgot his former 
resolutions, and began getting drunk which caused Manager Rowe’s prompt action.”74  Like so 
many other men prone to strong drink, he spent the winter of 1886-1887 looking for a new club 
while claiming sobriety.  It did not work, as he made no further appearances in major league 
baseball, and these circumstances forced him to spend the winter as a traveling cigar salesperson 
for West & Co., operating out of Kansas City.75  He seems to have had reasonable success in this 
line of work, but apparently, it was not satisfactory to him.  In April of 1889, “after eight months 
of total abstinence he began drinking about two weeks ago and has continued it ever since.”  He 
even got married, but tragically, on April 12, 1889, Ringo killed himself.76  “Frank M. Ringo, the 
well-known ball-player, who took forty grains of morphine yesterday morning with suicidal 
intent, died at 9 o’clock this morning.”77 
 
* * * * * 
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When an interviewer asked Washington Nationals manager Mike Scanlon about his 
club’s chances prior to the 1886 campaign, Scanlon wasted no time in pointing out that “some 
people don’t understand players, but I will have one thing in favor of my team; they are all 
temperate men and do not need to be shadowed.”78  Scanlon would know; as the prosperous 
former owner of a pool hall, he had certainly seen what drinking could do to someone.79  The 
Nationals did not win many games that year, but at least lost while putting their best foot 
forward.  Things had changed by the following season, however.  The club revamped its roster 
and brought in several new players for that year, and actually won eighteen more games (they 
started from such a low level, however, that even such tremendous improvement left them with a 
46-76 record) than the year before, but at a price.  “The list of absolutely sober players on the 
Washington team is said, by local papers, to be even smaller than The Sporting Life conjectured.  
Hines, Mack and Gilmore are the only ones who can honestly claim clean skirts this season.”  
Seeing that The Sporting Life only believed the team had four teetotalers, however, the 
disagreement was not so very great.80   
The team’s observers cringed, therefore, during the 1887-1888 off-season when it 
appeared the club continued moving in the wrong direction, sobriety-wise.  The club signed Pat 
Deasley and Gid Gardner as utility players that winter, and both men arrived with a great deal of 
baggage.   
Washingtonians who take an interest in base ball and keep posted regarding the playing 
abilities of the various members of the League, do not appear to appreciate the report that 
the home management has secured Tom Deasley and Gid Gardner.  These two men are 
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said to be first-class ball players, when they are in condition, but unfortunately they have 
the reputation throughout the profession of being addicted to habits which even an oath 
before a magistrate could not, so it is said, control.  Washington can not be made an 
inebriate asylum for players of that character, after the experiences of last season.81 
 
The club did at least sign Deasley to a special contract in which Deasley agreed the team would 
withhold $1,000 of the pay due him until the end of the season.  Only if he walked the straight 
path would the club be obligated to pay him this reserved sum.82  In Gardner’s case, the team 
hoped it could count on him because he had stayed clean for the past year, according to a Boston 
sportswriter who had observed Gardner’s play.  The writer believed, “Gardner is a splendid 
second baseman or outfielder.  He is not the man that he was in Baltimore.”83  (In Baltimore, in 
1885, he had put up an OPS+ mark of 79, low but not disastrously low, but nonetheless a 
letdown based on the public’s expectations.  He had been ever worse during his brief trial with 
Indianapolis in 1887, finishing with an OPS+ of only 56.  As it turned out, Gardner played just 
three games in the major leagues in 1888, and those were his last three major league games.) 
Similarly to Scanlon’s Nationals of 1886, the 1887 New York Metropolitans were not a 
good team, but they did take strong preventative measures against boozing.  “The Mets are a 
strictly temperance team . . . all the players must understand that the first offence will be 
punished by a heavy fine, and, if this has no effect the player or players will be blacklisted, 
although judging from the present make-up of the team no such harsh measures are anticipated, 
the discordant element having been eliminated long ago.”84 
Going into detail on the morality issues with the Association’s Philadelphia Athletics of 
1885, The Sporting Life’s Philadelphia correspondent discussed the impact of potential 
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transactions by noting how the players the team might acquire would improve the overall 
sobriety level of the Athletics.  “It may be that Louisville’s brilliant young short stop, [Tom] 
McLaughlin, may be released to the Athletics.  This fine player would amply replace [Sadie] 
Houck, as he is a good short stop with none of Houck’s bad habits.”  Similarly, “it is quite likely 
that a deal will be made with Providence for [Jack] Farrell, the crack second baseman, who 
would strengthen the club in a place where it has always been weak.  This engagement would 
provide against the contingency of [Charlie] Bastian’s retirement.”  Bastian was considering 
retirement because “the latter has gone into the liquor business down town with his brother-in-
law and is doing such good business that he is reported as saying that he will not play ball next 
season.  He doesn’t care much about playing second base anyhow, and feels disgruntled over a 
couple of fines which were imposed upon him last season and were deducted from his pay.”85 
This problem stalked the Athletics consistently, it seems.  By 1888, their management 
had assembled a good team with many quality players, especially at the plate.  Indeed, the 
players were good enough that baseball prognosticators constantly picked them to dethrone the 
St. Louis Browns as American Association champion.  Between Henry Larkin at first base, Lou 
Bierbauer at second, Denny Lyons at third, and outfielders Harry Stovey and Curt Welch, the 
Athletics managed to lead the American Association in OPS, finishing ten points better than 
Association champion St. Louis and at least twenty-six points better than any other club.  Stovey 
was one of baseball’s greatest players, as contemporaries lauded his hitting, baserunning, 
defense, and gentlemanly deportment.  Yet, despite high expectations, the team finished in third 
place in 1888.  Granted, the Browns put up an excellent record, but that was little consolation to 
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the Athletic faithful.  This finish was even more disappointing as news leaked out of the lushing 
tendencies of five Athletic players, catcher Kid Baldwin prime among them.   
When the club visited Cincinnati that year, these five men, already with questionable 
reputations in Philadelphia itself, immediately made things worse.  As one Cincinnati newspaper 
reported, 
No man can drink whiskey and play base ball and make a success of both. . . . There is 
one team in the American Association that but for the bibulous inclination of its members 
would stand an elegant opportunity of winning the championship.  This team is now well 
up in the race, but would be higher did the members not worship at the shrine of Bacchus.  
It is a grand aggregation of boozers, and, during their last visit to this city the members 
had on large-sized packages of Over-the-Rhine product most of the time.  Several times 
one or two of the players came on the field ‘feeling rather happy.’  A player must be 
rather far gone when he can’t wait until after the game to get a drink.  This was the case 
with two of the members of the team in question.  While a game was in progress these 
players marched boldly up to a bar in their uniforms and tossed off two and three bowls 
of the amber.86 
 
The team’s manager in 1888, Billy Sharsig, apparently was aware of the problem, but for 
whatever reason, was loath to discipline his men.  While the problems continued when the 
Athletics reached Louisville, an event at St. Louis was probably the low point of the season, in 
terms of sobriety.  “Not satisfied with going around ‘lushing’ at night time, President Von der 
Ahe charges them with bringing a keg of beer to the grounds on July 4.”  Von der Ahe claimed, 
“I went up to where the Athletics were and saw that they had a keg of beer there.  Seeing that 
none of my men were around I came back and told Sharsig of what I saw.  Sharsig wanted me to 
have the keg removed.  I told him it was none of my business what his players did and if he 
wanted the keg emptied he should empty it himself.”  It is a testament to the talent level of the 
Athletics that, even though several players became inebriated a little early in celebrating the 
nation’s independence, Von der Ahe finished his story by remarking, “Well, my players saw 
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what was going on and they were happy, as they thought they were going to have an easy thing 
of it that afternoon.  I was never so mad in my life as I was after that game.  To think that we 
were beaten by a lot of drunken ball players riled me and I felt like selling out and quitting the 
business.”87 
The escapades of some players were enough to earn the ridicule of sportswriters.  When 
the talented outfielder George Wood went from Detroit to the Philadelphia Quakers following 
the 1885 season, despite the fine .290/.315/.428 batting line he had just put together, there was 
little wailing or gnashing of teeth among the Wolverine faithful.  “Wood is a spasmodic player.  
There is no doubt he can, when inclined, put as good an article of base ball on the market as one 
would care to see but while one day his record would glitter with great hits and fine plays, the 
next (owing to a surplus of conviviality the preceding evening) he would endeavor to bat five or 
six balls when only one left the pitchers hand.”88  It appears Wood later braced up, however, as 
in 1888, Al Spalding invited Wood to travel on his Australian tour, and given Spalding’s 
fanaticism for sobriety, it is quite unlikely he would have invited Wood if Wood’s reputation had 
not risen a notch or two. 
Sportswriters might even call out entire teams for their poor morals.  Discussing a minor 
league club located in Duluth, Minnesota, in 1887, The Sporting News told its readers how, “the 
Duluth boys are such good beer drinkers that a wealthy brewer presented Manager Anderson of 
that club with a horse, buggy and set of harness for his untiring efforts in working up trade.”89   
The story of Charlie Sweeney is a vivid example of how drink could sabotage not only 
the career of highly promising player, his entire life as well.  In 1883, the California team 
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employing him expelled him from their club for “dishonorable conduct” in a May 13 game.  
However, his next team, Providence of the National League, claimed Sweeney’s dismissal from 
the California club was a frame job, so they could get around the blacklist and secure Sweeney’s 
considerable talents.90  It did not take long for them to tire of Sweeney’s antics.  By mid-1884, 
despite an impeccable pitching effort (an ERA+ of 183 for Providence) he was with St. Louis of 
the Union Association.  When that team moved to the National League in 1885, Sweeney 
disgraced himself by sucker punching teammate Emmett Seery in the team’s clubhouse.  This 
caused the St. Louis Critic to state, “It is very doubtful if Sweeney will ever play ball in St. Louis 
again. . . . Seery is a little gentleman, while Sweeney is a whiskey-guzzling, cowardly 
nincompoop.  His cowardly treachery . . . brands Sweeney as a cur, and we sincerely trust that 
Mr. Lucas will give him his release.”91  (Seery, incidentally, burnished his standing as a 
gentleman by gaining a reputation as one of baseball’s premier chess players.92)  Lucas gave the 
pitcher one more chance in 1886, after Sweeney pledged to mend his ways.  “Charley Sweeney 
is said to have reformed.  He has not yet joined the Salvation Army, but is said to leave liquor 
severely alone, and is trying hard to get into good playing shape.  If he succeeds he will again try 
his hand in St. Louis.”93  Things did not work out, however, and Sweeney only pitched in eleven 
games.   
Sweeney pitched just one more, highly ineffective, season in the majors.  He threw his 
last pitch in major league baseball at age twenty-four.  Released by the minor league Syracuse 
Stars late in 1886, Sweeney’s career bottomed out so quickly that The Sporting Life lamented his 
fall from glory.  “Alas, what a drop for a pitcher who in ’84 was considered the finest of them 
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all.  On Tuesday last he pitched for the Constableville Club against the Lowvilles.”94  The 
Sporting News, describing Sweeney’s Syracuse performance, concurred: “Charley Sweeney . . . 
was no stronger here and has been given his release.  He pitched a slow, straight ball which the 
opposing clubs had no difficulty in hitting.”95  He finished the season with the Sacramento Altas 
in his native California.   
Although his time as a major league pitcher was essentially over after 1886, Sweeney 
was talented enough that the Cleveland Blues gave him a shot as a utility player for 1887, mainly 
manning first base and the outfield, but Sweeney never could shake his taste for liquor.  Even his 
1887 marriage to a Sacramento woman could not get him to settle down.96  When a touring team 
of major league players visited California in December of 1887, he brandished a Colt revolver at 
New York Giant first baseman Roger Connor “with true Western enthusiasm, and though 
prevented from increasing the Coroner’s troubles kept up the feud and expressed a wild desire 
for blood.”97  (While multiple sources mention this version of events, others claimed that Connor 
left to be with his ailing wife.  Perhaps both are true,98 but Connor himself denied the story, 
claiming he was merely homesick, so we should probably accept his version of the story as the 
most likely one.99)   At age thirty-two, Sweeney killed a man in a saloon, resulting in 
incarceration.  He died shortly after his release, in California, at the age of thirty-eight.100 
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On other occasions, the consequences of drinking were almost as disastrous, as in the 
case of Frank Larkin (also known as Terry Larkin), a man who pitched with several teams 
between 1876 and 1880.  Late in 1883, Larkin shot his wife, Catherine, at their home in 
Brooklyn while under the influence, because she got on his case for coming home drunk again.  
His wife’s screams attracted the attention of a passing police officer, but when the officer 
investigated, Larkin shot at him as well.  He then cut his own throat with a razor blade and lay 
down to die, but the policeman, reinforced by some fellow officers, forced his way into Larkin’s 
home and saved both from death.  After recovering at the hospital, and regretting what he had 
done to his wife, fearing that she would still die, he despaired and again unsuccessfully 
attempted suicide, this time by gashing his head against a steam register.  Bystanders restrained 
him before he completed the act, despite his plea, “for God’s sake hit me in the head and put an 
end to my suffering.”  Larkin, still battling to stay sober, played forty games as a second 
baseman for the Richmond Virginians, a team that played a partial season in the American 
Association, in 1884.  Out of the game in 1885, however, he took a job that was probably a poor 
choice, given his history with booze: bartending in Brooklyn.  Early in 1886, Larkin’s employer 
discharged him, and in his anger, Larkin went home to arm himself, then stormed back into the 
saloon with two loaded pistols and challenge his boss, James McAnany, to a duel.  Fortunately, 
however, as Larkin marched off the requisite paces, McAnany saw an opportunity and slipped 
out the back door and hailed a policeman, which resulted in Larkin’s incarceration, awaiting trial 
as he sobered up.101 
 Following this sad episode, Larkin checked himself into the Inebriates Home at Fort 
Hamilton.  It seems his love of baseball was almost as strong as his love of alcohol, leading one 
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writer to report, “during the entire six months he hasn’t touched a drop of liquor, and it is thought 
that he has now entirely conquered his weakness.  He has still many friends in Brooklyn who 
would like to see him get a position with a minor league club, in order that he may show the 
profession that he has redeemed himself.”102  Larkin even penned a short article that appeared in 
The Sporting Life in January of 1887 in an effort to repair some of the damage to his reputation.  
He claimed, “that I have reformed for good and all, no more to be the ‘most gorgeous drunk’ of 
the age,” and that his arm was right once again.  He hoped for one more chance to play, but that 
chance was not forthcoming from any major league team.103 
A similarly frightening pair of alcohol-related stories took place nearly simultaneously in 
late December of 1887.  In Mansfield, Massachusetts, right fielder Fred Grumbling “was 
assaulted with a knife by a man named Etzwiler and received three cuts, one in the head, another 
below the left shoulder-blade, and a third, a frightful gash, in the right side, from which his 
intestines protruded.  There is little hope of his recovery.”  Meanwhile, that same week in Erie, 
Pennsylvania, “John Morrison, of last season’s Hamilton team, and brother of Mike Morrison, of 
the Clevelands, got into a row in a bar-room and was so badly beaten on the head with a beer 
glass by a Brooklyn printer, named Harry Potter, that his life is despaired of.  Morrison was 
intoxicated at the time and provoked the quarrel.  His assailant is in jail.”104 
 
* * * * * 
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Unlikely as it may seem, despite the frequent mentions in the press, it is possible that 
writers underestimated the influence of demon rum in the game, as it seems nearly every team 
suffered from players drinking excessively at one point or another.  “Ball players snicker when 
the wonderful sobriety of the Chicago team last season is mentioned.  More than one League 
player is willing to swear that the champions stood up to the rack well up to July, but that after 
that many were the rackets and benders indulged in.”105  The actual record of the White 
Stockings, however, does not bear out this statement, as the club won 34 games against 11 
defeats in August, September, and October that season, including three straight losses to end the 
season after they had already clinched the League championship, and this squares well with their 
53 wins against only 14 losses to that point.  So perhaps the accusations against them were 
spurious.  (On the other hand, perhaps this charge is correct, but their opponents were equally 
inebriated, resulting in no net loss of performance on the part of the White Stockings.)  Owner 
Spalding of the White Stockings, while not exactly a disinterested party, denied the report as 
well, stating, “They went through the season without indulging in any excess, and they deserve 
to receive credit for it.  They seemed to take a great deal of pride in keeping themselves straight, 
and it would not have been good for some of the new members to have spoiled their record in 
this respect.”106   
The reader must wonder at the veracity of Spalding’s claims, however, realizing that he 
employed detectives to shadow those same players the subsequent season.  Similarly, the critics, 
unconvinced by Spalding’s bravado, did not relent in their accusations.  One offered that, 
regarding one of Chicago’s catchers, Frank “Silver” Flint, “we are sorry to make this heinous 
charge, for we knew Flint in days gone by as a high-minded gentleman . . . now, however, we are 
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informed that at Flint’s gymnasium the growler is rushed early and often.”  The writer did point 
out that Flint’s friends in St. Louis disputed these charges, but only because “they, too, knew him 
as a high-minded gentleman, and one who took his ale fresh from the keg rather than from the 
vulgar growler.”107  Even team captain Cap Anson weighed in on the matter, declaring his 
confidence in Flint’s abilities to get back in shape following an off-season in which “every time 
he happened to run across him at a sporting match or in the hotel rotunda, he appeared to be 
enjoying himself.”108 
The problem was widespread indeed, if we believe Pittsburgh Allegheny secretary A.K. 
Scandrett.  He claimed to have signed many contracts offering players between $200 and $500 
extra if they made it through the championship season without falling victim to demon rum.  He 
also claimed he had never actually paid a single cent of this bonus money to any player, ever, 
because all had failed to make good on their end of the deal.109  Likewise, when one Baltimore 
sportswriter put forth the idea of simply removing all drinking men from the game, in order to 
ensure quality play that would invite the public’s confidence, he acknowledged the idea might be 
a tad extreme because “the result would be sure, but perhaps this would be too radical to be 
practical, and so many fearful examples would have to be made that the profession would 
dwindle to small numbers.”110 
Occasionally, team managers would attempt to revamp an entire roster to clean out the 
drunkards.  In the 1885-1886 off-season, for instance, St. Louis Maroons manager Gus Schmelz 
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signed several new players to his club in an effort to shape up the morals of his nine.  One St. 
Louis writer praised Schmelz’s effort, remarking,  
Manager Schmelz’s regime is that the whiskey-heads and bums, who have brought such 
disgrace upon the club and upon the game in this city, are to be retired in favor of honest, 
hard-working, temperate and conscientious players, who will give St. Louis the best ball 
that is in them and behave themselves in a manner calculated to elevate themselves and 
their club in public estimation instead of bringing it into public disrepute, as was the case 
last season.111 
 
The New York Metropolitans considered taking a similar position before their 1887 season, as 
they almost decided to part ways with outfielder Chief Roseman.  Their management wanted a 
temperate nine, and as Roseman owned a saloon, his association with alcohol worried the 
team.112  They did end up keeping him, although given his poor performance (his OPS+ was a 
paltry 57) they probably should have kept to their original plan.  
While New York tried to sober up collectively, Baltimore, on the other hand, could not 
boast of the same achievement.  One of their writers, describing how much the club still had to 
improve to compete in 1886, mentioned, “it is hoped by the opening of the playing season some 
of the lushers can be wisely replaced by material that will invite the confidence of the public; or, 
if the worst comes to the worst, that the management will devise a system to keep them under 
control.  It must be confessed, however, that the latter phase of the question is not at all 
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promising, if past experience is to be the guide.”113  It was not to be.  Instead, the club signed 
shortstop Sadie Houck, hoping to keep him on the straight and narrow.  “Houck may be found 
with the Baltimore Club next season.  Barnie thinks he would fill the bill capably at short field, if 
he will keep straight and let up on his everlasting chinning, and that Barnie says he can make 
him do.”114  Since Houck’s other option was a yearlong suspension from his old club, the 
Athletics, for bad behavior, one might think he would embrace this opportunity wholeheartedly, 
and he had a past history of doing exactly that.  “The latter always plays well and behaves 
himself in his first season in a new town . . . Houck now has one more opportunity to redeem 
himself, and we trust he will embrace it.”115  As things turned out, however, he did anything but.  
Houck performed miserably at the plate in his 61 games in Baltimore, preventing manager 
Barnie from making good on his claim.  Houck compiled a .192/.216/.231 batting line for a puny 
OPS+ of 42, so it is unlikely that he kept straight, or even slightly crooked, for that matter, 
although to be fair, frequent minor injuries also took their toll.  He disappeared from major 
league baseball following the next season after an abbreviated stint of ten exceptionally 
ineffective games with the New York Metropolitans, who gave him a chance after he started the 
season with the Lynn club in Massachusetts.116  After failing in New York, Houck decided to go 
west as “Sadie Houck has packed his gripsack and hied himself to Kansas City, and will 
henceforth yell with the Cowboys” who by this time were a member of the Western League after 
getting the boot from the National League over the winter of 1886.117 
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No matter how many failures he had in his experiments with drinking men, the Bald 
Eagle of Baltimore, Billy Barnie, just could not resist giving second and third chances to some of 
the game’s notorious drinkers.  This drew constant laments from the team’s correspondent for 
The Sporting Life, Albert Mott.  After the disaster of 1886, “last season the team was, by 
comparison with former years, remarkably free from this, and the playing record was, as a 
consequence, much better.”  (The team improved from a dismal 48-83 mark to 77-58, a 
monstrous improvement, indeed.)  Not that all was well, as “it is not intended to assert that there 
was no drinking at all, for there was really too much of it, but it was a vast improvement over the 
steady lushing of the teams of former years.  There was not a downright lusher on the team of 
eighty-seven.”  Because of this, Mott was all the more dismayed that, “there are fears now that 
just enough boozing element will be in the team of eighty-eight to eventually demoralize some of 
the youngsters. . . .  Experience has shown that in the Baltimore Club, all the iron-clad and steel-
rivetted contracts in the world are as so much waste paper in restraining a player who has 
contracted the disease of boozing.”118   
His quote referred to manager Barnie’s decision to sign Jack Farrell for the upcoming 
championship season.  As noted earlier, the Moose had not demonstrated good behavior in his 
recent past, this being his fourth team in four years as a result.  As usual, Barnie offered him 
incentives to stay sober, in the form of a $300 salary deduction the first time he failed to toe the 
line, but Mott did not think this precaution was enough.119  The tragedy was that the club was 
beginning to regain the favor and confidence of the cranks of the Monumental City, and Mott 
feared all that would be lost if the team fell back into old habits on the field and off and resumed 
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its lackluster performances of recent campaigns.120  (Sadly, it did, posting a 57-80 record in 
1888.)  The 1888 season was even more critical in Baltimore, because that was the year the 
American Association tried fifty-cent tickets.  Mott, and many other Baltimoreans, believed that 
if the club played no better ball, and provided no improved accommodations for its patrons, it 
could not justify the hike in ticket prices, and fans would cease showing up at Oriole Park.121 
It was not Farrell, however, who got in trouble first in 1888.  That dubious distinction 
went to second baseman Billy Greenwood, who earned a suspension and heavy fine for 
excessive drinking in May.  Never a premium performer to begin with, Barnie decided the team 
could do without Greenwood after his drinking costs them games in a series against Cleveland, 
writing, “both Mr. Vonderhorst and myself talked to him, and warned him of the consequences if 
he was caught drinking again.  He paid no attention to us and when I discovered last night that he 
was spreeing, I put the fine on him and it will stick.”  The team declared Greenwood could not 
resume playing with them until June 1.122  Greenwood’s turn to the dark side was very 
disappointing to all associated with Baltimore baseball, as the previous season he had finally 
managed to shed his drinking reputation and had played some of the best baseball of his life. 
What should be clear by this point is that nearly every major league team, and those in 
the American Association above all, had problems virtually every year with some of their men 
drinking.  No team was safe from danger unless it kept up ceaseless vigilance, and even fines, 
special contracts, and suspensions were not always enough to ensure sobriety.  Players might lay 
off from booze and rehabilitate themselves for a year, only to fall back into old ways the next.  
At times, managers must have felt as if they were running in sand going uphill.  This helps 
                                                 
120 “Baltimore Bulletin” TTT, The Sporting Life, February 8, 1888, 4. 
121 “Baltimore Bulletin” TTT, The Sporting Life, February 15, 1888, 2. 
122 “The Latest News” NA, The Sporting News, May 26, 1888, 1. 
 228
explain why, eventually, they turned to the Brotherhood for help in corralling the drinking 
problem.  (See chapter fourteen.) 
 
* * * * * 
 
Although Albert Mott heaped most of his scorn on the Baltimore players for their bad 
habits, and Baltimore’s management for taking them on in the first place, he recognized 
additional factors in play.  It seemed hypocritical to Mott to tell players they must refrain from 
alcohol when the team sold it during games and used it as part of its advertising to draw 
spectators in the first place.  Yet, in the American Association, there was little chance of 
reversing this policy, considering that half the teams, St. Louis, Cincinnati, Baltimore, and (by 
1888) Kansas City, were currently or formerly owned by men who operated breweries.  “Now, of 
course, a beer man may own a club without any attempt to utilize his team as a sort of nickel-
plated faucet to draw beer, but it is not apt to be the case.”  Besides the impact on players, Mott 
described how intoxicated fans hurt the game, by scaring away the sober patrons with their 
obscenities and boorish behavior.  Furthermore, “the outrageous assault by a Baltimore crowd on 
Umpire Brennan was caused by the beer-befuddled brain of one man who rushed into the field 
and was followed by hundreds of others.  The beer riots of Cincinnati at base ball games, where 
the umpire is made the target of the heavy and deadly beer glasses, is common knowledge 
throughout the country.”123 
There seemed little chance of eliminating beer sales at games throughout the Association, 
but St. Louis actually did attempt to put a stop to the practice at Sportsman’s Park in 1888.  
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Owner Von der Ahe decided to eliminate beer sales in the grandstand that season, hoping to 
avoid the opprobrium associated with intoxicated and unruly fans.  He also attempted to make 
his grandstand more attractive to women at the same time, by creating a special section for the 
ladies where no men could enter unless accompanied by a woman.  He believed this combination 
would help bring out the “better class” of spectators for 1888.124  He did not deny the pleasure of 
the amber beverage to the denizens of the bleaching boards, however, as beer sales continued in 
that section of Sportsman’s Park.125 
Considerations involving alcohol consumption consistently figured into calculations of 
how much a player was worth in comparison to other players.  During the early months of 1887, 
for example, the New York Giants were in hot pursuit of third baseman Jerry Denny, an above 
average offensive player reputed to possess superior defensive skills.  John Ward once said of 
Denny’s defense, “I say unreservedly and without hesitation that he is the greatest infielder 
living.  He never had an equal, and I do not believe this country will ever produce another one 
like him.”126  Denny was a member of the St. Louis Maroons, a team rumored on the verge of 
disbandment.  The Giants’ management, including manager Jim Mutrie, hoped to avoid using 
their utility player, Danny Richardson, at the hot corner in 1887, as he was a little light with the 
bat.  Not all observers believed the upgrade would truly be an upgrade, however.  Graybeard 
baseball writer Henry Chadwick hoped the Giants would stick with Richardson because Denny 
“is not the equal of Richardson in qualifications which go to make up a reliable team player on 
the nine. . . . Dan is temperate, Denny is not: Dan has mental ability; ‘head work’ is not a 
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characteristic of Denny.”  He saw no reason to pursue Denny, given the cost that would entail, 
when the team already had a reliable player on hand.127   
Not all agreed, however, that players such as Denny were a liability simply because they 
liked to down a few cold ones.  His teammate in St. Louis, outfielder John “Patsy” Cahill, stood 
up for Denny as the rumor treadmill whirred into motion surrounding his possible sale to the 
Giants.  “Rumors are flying thick and fast in regard to Denny’s release to the New Yorks.  It 
would be a foolish move to sell him.  Where can the management find another man that will stop 
the hot shots that go down to third base?  I’ll tell you, his place cannot be filled.”128  Still, many 
had doubts about Denny’s overall value because of his bad habits.  He spent the winter of 1886-
1887 “in California in such a condition from continued lushing as to do himself no credit by 
performances in games out there.”129  Realizing the importance of his good name, however, 
Denny penned his own response to these attacks, stating, “My winter in California has been 
spent in hard and earnest work.  I have not lushed, but I am strictly temperate and shall remain 
so.  From constant practice I have never before been in better condition, and if health favors me 
will play the ball of my life . . .” and furthermore quoted a California paper to back his claims.130 
As in the case of Denny described here, observers feared the abuse of alcohol not only for 
the problems it could cause on the field, but also because it ruined the physical condition of men 
who imbibed too frequently.  The career of Charles “Fatty” Briody is a classic example of this.  
The journeyman (seven different teams in an eight year career) catcher, generously listed as five-
foot, eight-inches and 190 pounds in official records, was so rotund that the sporting press 
simply called him Fatty, or sometimes “the Alderman” or “Falstaff” when it needed a synonym 
                                                 
127 “Chadwick’s Chat” Henry Chadwick, The Sporting Life, January 26, 1887, 2. 
128 “From St. Louis” Pritchard, The Sporting Life, February 2, 1887, 4. 
129 “From New York” Looker On, The Sporting Life, February 9, 1887, 1. 
130 “A Missive From Denny” Jerry Denny, The Sporting Life, March 2, 1887, 1. 
 231
for fat.  He was so ponderously slow, he failed to nab a single stolen base in 56 games in 1886, at 
a time when every player was expected to be a threat to steal bases.  When Briody signed on to 
be the change catcher for Detroit in 1887, his modest contract called for him to receive an extra 
twenty-five dollars per month if he stayed pure and did not touch liquor.  Up until August, 
“Briody promised to do this and for some time kept his word, but when the club was on their 
eastern trip he fell from grace, and the information reaching President Stearns’ ears resulted in 
the extra money being withheld.”  Briody only saved his bacon, and avoided release by the club, 
by convincing them that while he had indeed imbibed, it was not in such quantity as to impair his 
play on the field.131 
As Denny’s story also shows, player drinking was an especial concern outside of the 
championship season schedule, when the games meant less to the players but ownership still 
needed a way to draw fans in the hope of clearing expenses in exhibition games.  In 1887, the 
New York Giants, with a few other players in tow such as Mike Kelly, visited New Orleans for 
some exhibition games in late October and early November.  While most of the club, including 
men such as John Ward and Tim Keefe who were important members of the Brotherhood, 
walked the straight line during their stay in the Crescent City, not all of their teammates 
maintained an honorable record in this regard.  On Monday, three players, supposedly Mike 
Kelly, Jerry Denny, and Buck Ewing, arrived at the grounds for the game in carriages 
accompanied by drunken inhabitants of the city.  After these inebriated cranks called out a 
continual stream of obscenities, New Orleans’ Secretary Kaufmann summoned the police to 
remove the boors.  In the words of New York pitcher Tim Keefe, “our last game was well 
attended by a lot of Basin Street hoodlums, and from the time the game started until its close it 
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was a constant stream of profanity that came from their quarters and intended for the New York 
players.”132  When the authorities arrived, Mike Kelly entered the stands and tried to prevent the 
arrest, and then when the next inning began and New York was supposed to take the field, 
remained in the stands drinking beer rather than take his position.  John Ward was so mortified 
he sent his new wife, Helen Dauvray Ward, back to the team hotel in a carriage.  The officials of 
the New Orleans club were equally shocked, to the extent they informed Ward and the Giants 
that there would be no more exhibition games until Ward obtained an ironclad promise from his 
men to play the games in a sober condition.133  Later accounts, while admitting that drunkenness 
was the problem, suggested that the scene was not quite so dire.  Others blamed an unspecified 
“foreign element” for all the trouble.134 
The stories concerning Mike Kelly’s drinking exploits were legion.  He was, in some 
ways, the quintessential working class boy who made good in baseball.  Spectators from the 
working class adored him, because not only was he one of them, he did not change after 
achieving baseball stardom.  He was fun, talented, generous, and charismatic, all of which helped 
make him the biggest drawing card in baseball.  He also, however, had a weakness for alcohol 
and could be headstrong.  According to some, he also tended to get depressed when his team was 
not winning.  All these traits came together in July of 1888, when Boston dropped a couple 
games to the Philadelphia Quakers and Kelly decided to hit the town and “drowned his sorrows 
in something stronger than soda water.”  He did not return to the team hotel that evening, and 
straggled in for the next game with the Quakers without his uniform.  Kelly’s actions forced 
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Boston captain John Morrill to give him a public reprimand, then borrow an extra uniform from 
Quakers manager Harry Wright for the game that day.135 
True to his nature, Kelly was embarrassed enough by the incident he decided to take 
extreme steps.  Even as manager Morrill despaired of ever getting Kelly to shape up, with 
reporters writing, “Manager Morrill has not fined him, but he frankly confesses he can do 
nothing with Kelly, who is so headstrong and willful, and has an idea he can do as he pleases.  In 
fact, he has been doing as he pleased, and this is the reason of the trouble,” Kelly decided to 
swear off booze.  “Kelly asserts that he is done with drinking, and means to play ball from here 
out.”  The odds of his keeping his pledge were long, but this brought a bit of peace to the 
Beantown nine for the time being.136  He also hinted, however, that strained relations with 
Boston were at the heart of his troubles, as he also said, “there are two things that I am certain of.  
I intend to take the pledge and not drink a drop of liquor for a year.  I have an offer to go into 
business next year and I will accept.  I have no desire to play under this management any 
longer.”137 
Cincinnati was yet another team that often made financial decisions with blood alcohol 
content levels in mind.  Before the 1887 season, Clarence “Kid” Baldwin, a catcher and utility 
player for the Red Stockings, made a bet with team owner Aaron Stern to abstain for the entire 
season.  Baldwin went before a notary and swore to lay off intoxicating liquors in exchange for a 
$100 bonus to his salary if he succeeded.  He would part with the same amount if he failed.138  It 
was a good thing he did not take the same pledge prior to 1888, however, as by June he had 
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binged in New York, earning a $100 fine and indefinite suspension from Cincinnati manager 
Gus Schmelz.139 
Schmelz and his employer in the Queen City, Aaron Stern, decided to go a similar route 
with all of their men prior to the 1889 season.  Stern inserted language into the contracts of his 
players stating that, should they falter and intoxicate themselves between the beginning of April 
and the end of October, they forfeited $500 of their salary back to the team’s management.  They 
felt impelled to this extreme step because “this year of ’88 the Cincinnati Club suffered through 
the intemperance—the notorious intemperance—of several members.”140 
 Such were the fears about players and drinking that eventually, the entire National 
League tried to insert “ironclad” contractual language prescribing heavy penalties towards men 
who drank while the season was in progress.  Before the 1887 season opened, the League 
amended its constitution to read, “Any person under contract with a League club who shall be 
guilty of drunkenness, gambling in any form, or any dishonorable or disreputable conduct, may 
be fined, or may be suspended for the remainder of the season, or for the whole of the ensuing 
season.”141  There was certainly risk in traveling this path, however.  The arbitrariness of words 
like dishonorable and disreputable left a whole host of behaviors open to interpretation.  Then 
there was the question of what to do with players, like Pete Browning, King Kelly, or Jim 
McCormick, who imbibed often but were excellent players at the same time.  Might a team look 
the other way in their cases, but suspend a lesser player to “send a message” about drinking, thus 
risking accusations of inconsistency?   
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 In Boston, the Triumvirs decided not to take the chance on appearing inconsistent.  
During the 1887 season, they, like Spalding the year before, employed a detective to shadow 
their men, and the detective noted not one or two, but nine, men from the club frequenting grog 
shops in August.  The team slapped each man, Sam Wise, Billy Nash, Charlie Radbourn, Con 
Daily, Dick Johnston, Bill Stemmyer, Tom O’Rourke, Kid Madden, and Bobby Wheelock, with 
twenty-five dollar fines for “frequenting disreputable places” and their “infringement of 
discipline by drinking.”  This certainly caused dissention in the ranks.  Some of the men, such as 
veteran Sam Wise, admitted they deserved their penalties, but found it rather rough that team 
management came down so hard on youngsters like Billy Nash, who ended up paying $6.25 in 
fines for each of his four beers.142  The fines, and the poor morale that resulted from them, may 
well have caused Boston to falter in the National League standings.  They day after the fines 
came down, the team mauled Pittsburgh by the remarkable score of 28-14, giving it a record of 
49-40 for the season.  From that point forward, however, the Beaneaters won just twelve times 
against twenty defeats, turning a moderately promising season into an unremarkable fifth place 
showing in the National League. 
 It is a wonder the same detective did not report second baseman Jack Burdock among the 
delinquent nine, for “Black Jack” certainly could imbibe with the best.  He had been in major 
league baseball since his 1872 campaign with the Brooklyn Atlantics, but by 1887, he was 
merely a part-time player on the Beantown nine.  A man “not especially brilliant when he is 
sober,” on New Year’s Eve 1887, Burdock, who friends said, “has been drinking hard all 
winter,” barged in to a stationary store in Brooklyn near the Washington Park baseball grounds 
where the Brooklyn club played.  He tried to arrest “Tillie Brown, a pretty girl of 17,” claiming 
                                                 
142 “From The Hub” Mugwump, The Sporting Life, September 7, 1887, 5; “Radbourne 
Suspended” NA, The Sporting News, September 10, 1887, 1. 
 236
that he had a warrant for her arrest, and that the young woman had to go with him to New York 
City.  Brown, understandably alarmed and terrified, nonetheless kept her composure long enough 
to ask Burdock to show his warrant and badge, and when he could not do so, said she needed to 
find her hat and gloves before she could go, and asked Burdock to help her find them.  As soon 
as his back was turned, Brown eluded abduction by sprinting out of the store and straight to her 
sister’s house, and in short order the Brooklyn police issued a warrant for Burdock’s arrest on 
two counts, impersonating an officer and assault.143   
Despite this, the Boston club signed him for another campaign in 1888 while waiting for 
the courts to hear the case, hoping to squeeze a bit more value out of the veteran infielder, 
although Burdock’s contract was a modest one, offering $1,000 up front and another $1,000 at 
the season’s end pending his good behavior over the summer.144  Burdock did not come through, 
however, posting one of the most dismal seasons ever by a player who played semi-regularly or 
better.  Between Boston and Brooklyn that year, he managed to bat .142 in 325 at-bats, for a 
rock-bottom OPS+ of 11.  It was his last season in the major leagues, save for three games in 
1891.  About the only thing to go right for Black Jack that year was that a judge acquitted him of 
the charge of assaulting Miss Brown in September when Brown failed to appear in court.  
According to the New York Times, “the court advised Burdock to stop drinking and play ball.”145  
He failed to do so, however.  By June, he was absent without leave from the Beaneaters.  “He 
says he went as Boston Club delegate to the Brotherhood meeting.  President John Ward says he 
didn’t, and the other Boston players know nothing about it. . . . He has not been in condition to 
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play ball, and now it is all over. . . . He may not be officially released this minute, but he will be 
free to go wherever he wishes within twenty-four hours.”146   
Strangely, Brooklyn picked him up soon afterwards and installed him as their regular 
second baseman.  His offensive performance for the Bridegrooms was less than worthless, as his 
.122 batting average in 259 at-bats in the City of Churches contributed heavily to the dismal 
overall offensive performance just mentioned.  The team would have been vastly better off by 
keeping Bill McClellan at second base.  McClellan was by no means a strong player, but at least 
managed an OPS+ of 80.  Brooklyn’s Charles Byrne decided to take a flyer on Burdock, 
however, reasoning that with a wife and five children in Brooklyn, Burdock would brace up and 
play decent ball, but it did not happen that way.  At least it was a cheap flyer, as Burdock 
allowed Byrne to name the terms of the contract in return for one last opportunity.147  On the 
field, the consequence was that Burdock’s WAR of -2.0 went almost half way to costing 
Brooklyn the pennant in ’88.  Had the club strengthened itself at second base instead of 
weakening itself with Burdock, they would have taken the St. Louis Browns all the way to the 
season’s final days, rather than needing ten straight wins to close the year just to finish 6.5 games 
back.  Burdock did avoid booze while in Brooklyn, to his credit, with manager Bill McGunnigle 
stating, “‘Burdie’ played poor ball at times, but he never drank a drop from the time he came to 
us until he was released,”148 but his performance was so dismal the Bridegrooms let him go at the 
end of the campaign.149 
 
* * * * * 
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 What to do about drinking, then, when players did it so often, but fines built up ill will 
and lengthy suspensions deprived the club of a useful player for an extended period?  One 
Baltimore writer had an answer, even if his knowledge of the nature of human behavior was 
rather weak.  “The best policy for managers to adopt to ‘compel players to abstain from the 
improper use of liquors’ is not to employ hard-drinking men.  All other plans fail in the end, not 
only in base ball, but in everything else.  Lushing is a disease from which few recover, even 
among the most intelligent classes.”150 
 Another option was to locate your team in a town or state that was dry, although this was 
not under the control of any major league teams.  Minor league clubs might use this to their 
advantage, however, as the Portland, Maine, club did when signing Lew “Buttercup” Dickerson 
for 1887.  Dickerson was a decent enough major league player when sober (career OPS+ of 121), 
but was not sober nearly often enough.  Portland, therefore, thought it might land a useful player 
by bringing Dickerson to a town where his vice was not available to him.  “There is some chance 
of keeping Lew straight in the Maine prohibition city, as he can only work his liquor through 
prescriptions.”151  Their plan seems to have worked, as Dickerson rehabilitated himself in the 
eyes of some observers.  “What’s the matter with Lew Dickerson being given another chance 
with some League or Association club next season?  He has evidently remained perfectly straight 
all season and has played a splendid second base for Portland, and splendid second basemen are 
not to be found on every bush.”152  One Philadelphia writer agreed, stating, “Drink has always 
been his failing, but he is said not to have touched a drop for a year and a half and his 
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reformation appears to be permanent.  In view of the great scarcity of competent second 
basemen, the Phillies might go further and fair worse.”153  Philadelphia did not bite, however, 
and Dickerson found no other takers, either, never again donning a major league uniform.   
Despite his boosters, he signed with London, Ontario, of the International League for the 
1888 season, playing shortstop there.154  He even began the year as team captain, as a testament 
to his skills and the depth of his commitment to a healthier lifestyle.  Sad to report, his old habits 
caught up with him while playing north of the border.  In early June, he, along with former major 
leaguer Larry Corcoran and future major leaguer Tom Kinslow, went on a drinking spree at the 
Clarence House in London that was so extreme it left Corcoran temporarily paralyzed.  
Dickerson had to pay a fifty-dollar fine, London fined Corcoran and suspended him without pay, 
and the club threatened all the men with dismissal from the team and the blacklist should the 
event repeat itself.155  By the winter of 1888-1889, all talk of him returning to major league 
baseball died down, one writer dismissing such a possibility by writing, “Lew Dickerson is in 
town.  Dick isn’t in the condition he was last winter.  He is pretty fat.”156  Things got worse 
during the 1889 season, alcohol abuse again being the main reason.  He spent some time in jail 
for abusing his wife while drunk, and when he got out, he skipped town and deserted the team, 
for which the London club suspended him indefinitely.157 
 Another man who swore off intoxicating liquor for the sake of trying to save his career 
was William “Peak-A-Boo” Veach.  His prodigious penchant for alcohol was so well known that 
once, when a story circulated that other members of his team had quaffed as many beers as he 
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had, a writer refuted such nonsense by observing, “any one acquainted with Veach knows he can 
drink enough to drown himself in, and to say that others of the nine drank as much is folly.  It 
has been the bane of his life.”158  Although he played in just a handful of major league games in 
the 1880s, this man seemed on intimate terms with many of the leading drunkards previously 
introduced in this chapter.  In an 1887 letter to The Sporting News, he described how he was a 
drinking pal of Billy Taylor, having last seen him in Savannah, and then detailed a bender with 
Lew Dickerson, Charley Sweeney, and Bill Harbridge in Syracuse back in 1886 in which “we 
drank so much beer in one saloon that the bar tender sat down and cried like a child.”  By the 
end, Veach “kept the bell boy running for bromide of potassium for Harbridge” (medical 
knowledge of the time considered potassium bromide a useful sedative) while Sweeney “laid 
perfectly stiff and the only signs of life he gave was that every once in a while he would roll his 
eyes and say: ‘Dear mamma.’”  By late 1887, however, Veach had sworn off liquor, which was 
such a radical departure from his previous habits that some suggested he change his nickname 
from “Peak-A-Boo” to “Prohibitionist.”159  Still, when he moved from Des Moines, Iowa, and 
signed to play in St. Paul, Minnesota for the 1888 season, St. Paul management hedged their 
bets, offering him a $600 bonus come October should he stay true to his pledge throughout the 
season.160  Apparently unable to believe that a man could reform so thoroughly, stories circulated 
immediately that Veach had gone back on his pledge, so he once again denied them in print.  In 
May he wrote, “I am sure it will be satisfaction to know that I have kept my word.”161 
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 This story involving Veach is important because, in their effort to elevate the moral 
stature of the game and its players, team executives and the sporting press went out of their way 
to play up stories that suggested moral reform.  They were only too happy to print statements 
such as those offered by men like Veach and Lefty Marr, a utility player who became a regular 
performer with the Columbus Solons in 1889.  “When I first started out as a professional ball 
player, I thought I could not play ball without I had two or three big drinks of booze.  I used to 
think it gave me courage.  I have only found out lately that it was a great detriment.  I did not 
drink a drop all of last season, and I hit the ball better than I ever did.”162  Part of the problem for 
baseball, however, was that stories of successful reform were rare, while stories of lushing 
inebriates were common. 
 While the media did all in its power to play up stories of moral reform, hoping to raise 
the stature of baseball in the eyes of the public, unfortunately, sometimes their shining heroes of 
one day became the goats of the next.  Veach, for instance, did not keep his word permanently.  
Playing in California in 1889, “When the Sacramentos lose he drowns his sorrow in the flowing 
bowl.  When they win, he celebrates the victory by getting hilariously full.  He did the later last 
night, and that is why it reads on the record book this morning: ‘Veach—drunk—fined $20 and 
suspended without pay.’”163 
 
* * * * * 
 
 This foray into the drinking habits of 1880s baseball players does show that, without 
doubt, team management had reason to worry about the morals and behavior of their players.  
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The financial stakes for the teams were high.  Especially in the National League, were the 
minimum ticket price was fifty cents, teams hoped to attract wealthier and supposedly 
respectable patrons to their grounds as the core of their fan base.  Such people, however, were 
not likely to come in the first place, and certainly not likely to return, if they saw a group of 
drunken men staggering around the diamond.  If teams wanted to encourage these types of 
people to patronize their games, they had to have men who met the expectations for 
comportment of middle class Americans. 
 Part of the problem, however, was that it was difficult to differentiate fines and 
disciplinary measures that players truly deserved from those simply meant to keep players fearful 
for their position and drain their wages.  Because everything was arbitrary, with few appeals 
other than the legal system, where the yawning chasm between the player’s resources and 
ownership’s resources led to the same disadvantages as in the business world generally, efforts at 
player discipline often resulted in increasing bitterness between players and management.  The 
constitution of the American Association did state that “under no circumstances shall the board 
of directors of the Association remit any fine thus imposed, unless said fine is in excess of $10,” 
a clause meant to control unruly players but to discourage excessive fines.164  However, given 
that the board of directors consisted of team owners, this was hardly a failsafe protection from 
the players’ point of view.  The result of this was, frequently, an adversarial relationship between 
management and labor, which made contract features such as the reserve clause even more 
galling, because players had no way out of this bad situation save pleading for release in the hope 
that another club might prove willing to offer them the chance to play. 
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 Still, it is difficult not to feel some sympathy for team management on this issue.  A 
player such as Mike Kelly might drink constantly, but if that player was talented enough to help 
the team win despite the drinking, what could a team do?  The choice was sell or release the 
player, or put up with the drinking and take the bad along with the good.  In baseball, where the 
demand for top talent always exceeds the supply, it was exceptionally risky to let a good 
ballplayer go, unless the team had a sure thing as a replacement, and rarely was that the case at a 
time when teams considered fourteen men a full roster. 
 As a result, teams continued to cast about for solutions.  One solution that the National 
League attempted was to use the Brotherhood to help enforce temperance.  That choice did not 
turn out badly.  The League also tried the Brush Classification Plan, however, which graded 
players while considering personal habits as part of the rating system.  This choice did not turn 





Physical Fitness and Training 
 
 
In addition to alcohol, physical training and the condition of the players throughout the 
season was also crucial to success in Gilded Age baseball.  As with alcohol, the reason for this 
was primarily financial.  The prevailing belief among almost all observers of the game was that 
fans came to the grounds to see action.  They wanted to see batters hit the ball, the fielders chase 
it, and baserunners on the move.  Fans disliked games with long waits for batters to swing, little 
action for the fielders, timid baserunning, or lackadaisical effort by the men in the field.  This is 
not to say that all games had to be high scoring in order to please the cranks.  On the contrary, 
newspapers often reported low scoring games as among the best of the year.  Although fans 
wanted their team to win of course, the level of scoring was not the critical consideration—the 
amount of action that fans witnessed was what people cared about most.  When commentators 
stated that fans wanted “heavy batting,” they did not necessarily mean fans wanted a continual 
parade of long hits; instead, they meant that fans wanted to see lots of contact with the ball and 
movement on the field. 
As a result, whenever the legislators of the game tinkered with the rules, they did so 
hoping to create more action.  Strikeouts, although considered among the most important stats 
for a pitcher to accumulate today, were not very popular to fans or managers in the 1880s.  This 
was partly because commentators favored “headwork” from pitchers with a scientific approach 
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to their craft, but also because when the batter struck out, nothing happened in the field.  The 
same was true of baserunners who were not a threat to do anything after reaching base.  They put 
no pressure on the defense, and thus created no excitement for spectators.   
The result of all this was that teams put a high value on men who could create excitement 
in the field.  That is what fans paid to see, and so that is what teams tried to give them.  Players 
with great speed were always in demand; in fact, sometimes, wealthy supporters of the teams 
offered prizes to the men who stole the most bases during a season.  The same was true of those 
with great defensive range who could track down balls in the field and prevent hits.  When 
newspapers described the attributes of a player, they generally discussed the man’s batting skill, 
defensive ability, and baserunning reputation, without indicating that they regarded any of these 
categories as more important than the others.  Not just for men who played the field, either.  
Observers even rated pitchers in these areas of skill.  Sometimes, managers declared their intent 
to have a “baserunning team,” indicating that many believed emphasizing swift men on the base 
paths was a legitimate strategy to achieve victory. 
Because of these beliefs, the level of physical fitness of the nine was always an important 
consideration for managers and owners.  Players must stay in good shape, or be “in the pink of 
condition,” in order to perform up to the expectations of the spectators.  Men who were “ice 
wagons” might cost their clubs money if the cranks believed they were paying for inferior 
baseball played by out of shape athletes.  As a result, teams did many things to encourage their 
men to be in top condition, because ticket receipts depended on it.  As with alcohol, a well-
conditioned nine would win more games, and that helped draw fans, but the real fear was that 
fans would refuse to come to the park to see players that could not keep up with the opposition 
athletically. 
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As a result, even before opening day, teams took action and expended money to get their 
nine ready to play ball.  Players did a variety of things in the off-season, some more conducive to 
successful ball playing than others.  Most returned to their home cities for the winter.  Others 
would participate in exhibition tours through the southern states, California, or even more exotic 
locales such as Cuba, where warmer winter weather allowed them to continue playing and stay in 
shape for the next season.  Come March, some teams would embark for southerly climes as a 
group, such as the Chicago White Stockings, who made an annual pilgrimage to Hot Springs, 
Arkansas in the late 1880s to work into shape.   
When March came around each year, and it was time for players to gather for training 
purposes, sportswriters followed the preparatory habits of their home club as best they could.  As 
Chicago Daily Tribune and The Sporting Life reporter Harry Palmer stated about the 1886 White 
Stockings, “Several of them, notably [Silver] Flint, [Ned] Williamson, [Tom] Burns, and [Abner] 
Dalrymple will have to drop a few pounds before they can get around the bases in their old-time 
form, but the majority are all solid bone and muscle and ready to play the best ball of their lives.”  
Palmer went on to supply his readers with a before-and-after table of player weights.  Displaying 
progress that would make good TV advertising for a modern diet plan, Ned Williamson, Jim 
McCormick, and Cap Anson dropped an average of eight pounds in just two weeks of training, 
while George Gore and King Kelly sloughed off five each.  However, Palmer did not stop there.  
His readers also learned the exact physical measurements of each White Stocking.  Captain 
Anson, for instance, sported a 41.75-inch chest, 14.75-inch biceps, 14.75-inch forearms, 26-inch 
thighs, 16.75-inch calves, and stood six-foot-two.  Ace pitcher John Clarkson, in comparison, 
measured a scrawny 37.25, 13, 12.75, 23, 14.25, and five-foot-nine, respectively.1 
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 Regarding the health and conditioning of the White Stockings, shortstop Ned Williamson 
reported that the players ran between three and eight miles daily, with the result that “all of the 
big fellows are rapidly reducing, and the ‘lightweights’ are gaining in flesh.”  Demonstrating the 
marginal knowledge of most people regarding medicine in the 1880s, Williamson also praised 
the waters at nearby Sulphur Springs.  “The curative properties of the waters here are really 
wonderful, as demonstrated in several cases of rheumatism.  Last Wednesday a big fellow 
weighing close upon 200 pounds arrived here, and was apparently so lame that he could hardly 
walk with the aid of crutches, and Saturday he won a hundred-yard race from Anson.”2   
Also reflecting marginal medical knowledge, patent medicines, unfortunately, figured in 
the training regimens of some players.  Ed Swartwood, primarily an outfielder who played in the 
American Association in the 1880s, praised the benefits of cascara sagrada (a laxative obtained 
from tree bark) as an all-purpose weight loss drug.  “This remedy is easy and sure, and if Bill 
Taylor and Hardie Henderson took a dose every day for three weeks then they could truthfully 
say to all the world: ‘I’m in great favor.’  It beats walking all hollow, for all you have to do is to 
take a few doses daily and sit down and watch the fat evaporate.”3  Nor was this dependence on 
quack medicine new to baseball in the 1880s.  When umpire “Honest” John Kelly was still a 
player, with the Manchester, New Hampshire club in 1878, towards the end of the season he 
suffered from “malaria of a malignant type” and so after the season he departed for a health 
resort in the South.  His admirers in the Granite State saw him off with a fur-lined overcoat and 
seven bottles of Swift’s Secondary Syrup on his way to a hot springs.4 
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Williamson certainly numbered among the “big fellows” attempting to reduce his store of 
reserve adipose at Hot Springs in 1886.  In earlier years, his athletic abilities had been first-class.  
In 1882, when the White Stockings held contests for the top baserunning speed and distance 
throwing among their players, Williamson won both, circling the bases in 14.75 seconds and 
heaving the ball 396 feet.5  Things had changed a bit by 1886, however.  Having a less-than-
svelte official playing height and weight of 5’11”, 215 pounds, by the end of the 1886 season 
Williamson tipped the scale at a rotund 227.  For 1887, then, he tried a preemptive approach to 
getting in shape.  Stopping in at White Stockings headquarters before embarking for the Natural 
State, he astounded all present with his chiseled physique.  As Harry Palmer, with liberal use of 
stereotyping, put it, “when he left here last fall he was almost Falstaffian in appearance, with a 
paunch like an alderman, a face like a Dutch brewer, and a heavy, swinging gait like any other 
than that of an athlete.”  By early March, however, Williamson was eager to show off his 
makeover.  After he “swelled his biceps and stuck out one iron-muscled leg for examination,” 
Palmer pronounced the new, 197-pound shortstop “one of the biggest, squarest, whitest men that 
ever picked a ball off the diamond.”6   
The extra physical preparation certainly helped Williamson.  His slash line improved 
from .216/.339/.335 to .267/.377/.437, his OPS+ rose from 95 to 114, and he hit more doubles, 
triples, and home runs than he had in 1886 despite a similar number of at bats.  Most tellingly, 
perhaps, his total of stolen bases rose from 13 to 45.  Besides his new training regimen, observers 
also credited his refusal of strong drink for the improvement.  “Ned Williamson hasn’t touched a 
                                                 
5 “Chadwick’s Chat” Henry Chadwick, The Sporting Life, February 6, 1889, 3. 
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drop all this season and has become an enthusiastic advocate and supporter of Spalding’s 
temperance theory. . . . Ned has also made many new and firm friends of a better class than he 
ever had in the old days, when he thought of nothing but having a good time.”7 
With Williamson now in prime condition, someone else training at Hot Springs (joining 
the White Stockings were a handful of players employed by other clubs) had to take the ribbing 
for his resemblance to a Chaucerian friar.  That man turned out to be Bill Phillips, Brooklyn’s 
first baseman.  “The proud title of alderman should be transferred from him [Williamson] to Old 
Bill Phillips.  Bill’s companions have nick-named him Budweiser, which is not exactly to his 
liking.”8 
 Not to be outdone, the Boston Beaneaters followed the same procedure of letting their 
fans know the size and conditioning of various members of their nine in 1886.  “[Jack] Burdock 
is the most evenly and best developed man of the team . . . [Bill] Stemmyer is the tallest man . . . 
and the heaviest . . . he has also the greatest lung capacity, 340 cubic inches, and the largest hip.  
[Sam] Wise has the largest calf . . . the youngest player is [Billy] Nash, and the lightest is [Tom] 
Poorman, 135 pounds.”9  They could not compare physically to the club the Detroit Wolverines 
fielded that year, however.  “The Detroits are the biggest set of men ever gathered into one team, 
Manning being the only medium-sized man in the team.  In Brouthers, White, Thompson and 
Twitchell the team has giants, while Rowe, Richardson, Hanlon, and Bennett are very large, 
heavy men. . . . Wherever they go the Detroits evoke praise for their fine physical appearance.”10   
To provide perspective on what constituted a large man in the Gilded Age, according to 
their officially listed playing heights and weights, Dan Brouthers stood 6’ 2”, 207 pounds, and 
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Sam Thompson the same.  Deacon White was 5’11”, 175, although being 38 years old by this 
time, he may well have been heavier than the official tally, one writer stating about him, “Jim 
White may be getting old, but if he is as frisky on the ball field, as he is at the table he improves 
with age,”11 and Twitchell measured 6’, 185.  Jack Rowe was 5’8”, 170 pounds, Hardy 
Richardson 5’ 9”, 170, equal to Ned Hanlon, and Charlie Bennett was 5’11”, 180.  Jim Manning, 
the “medium” man, stood 5’7” and weighed 157 pounds.  For comparison, the tallest player in 
the American Association was “Long” John Reilly who, like Brouthers and Thompson, stood 
6’2”. 
 Going a step further, and possibly a step too far, Detroit’s cranks even knew the hat and 
waist sizes of their nine for 1887.  For example, catcher Charlie Bennett wore a 7.125-inch cap, 
with a waist of thirty-five inches.  True to his nickname, “Big” Sam Thompson required a 7.25-
inch hat and a 36.5-inch belt; not to be outdone, “Big” Dan Brouthers needed a 7.25-inch cap and 
sported a waistline of thirty-eight inches, the greatest girth on the team.  In comparison, twenty-
year-old pitcher Pete Conway was a mere twig, featuring a 32.75-inch waist.12  
 When the Baltimore Orioles reported for training in 1887, they looked to take after their 
National League brethren from the City of the Straits and find large, strapping men of impressive 
physical stature.  Success crowned their efforts, as “all the members of the Baltimore team are 
remarkably-built men, and not a man measures less than thirty-seven inches across the chest.”  
The measurements of Baltimore’s nine went from young Phenomenal Smith’s thirty-eight inches 
to the Redwood-like 42.75-inch trunk of the aptly named James “Jumbo” Davis.13  Davis had a 
reported playing height and weight of 5’11”, 195 pounds, which made him a large man indeed in 
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1887.  Jumbo, “our friend of the large pedal extremities,” also earned a reputation for a 
reluctance to slide into bases, and during practice for the 1887 season he belly-flopped into one 
slide such that he “drove the canvas so far into the soil that you couldn’t see it with a 
telescope.”14   
That same year, the Cleveland Plain Dealer gave its nine the rather lukewarm 
endorsement that the Blues had more uniformity in size than any other team in the American 
Association.  However, it did remember to give a little praise to the players’ conditioning, saying 
that they were “a pretty stalwart and muscular lot of men” who were, as every team that has ever 
existed has been in April, about to play some of the best ball of their lives.15  For 1888, the team 
showed improvement in this regard, as some of its new blood were large players.  “Nine of them 
. . . are above the ordinary size, and . . . four are giants.”  The men who opened the season with 
the team averaged 67 inches in height and weighed an average of 171 pounds.16 
 Similarly, Louisville looked to beef up its nine for 1887 and find men in the prime of 
their careers to do battle with the American Association that year.  Of the sixteen men in the 
organization in mid-April, none were older than twenty-nine, and all but four were twenty-six or 
younger.  While they boasted no 200-pounders such as Dan Brouthers or Sam Thompson, the 
club did have an average weight of 167 pounds, earning the remark that, “this is not a Jumbo 
team, but it is by no means a lightweight aggregation of players.”17 
 
* * * * * 
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 It was important to differentiate, however, between mere size or weight, on the one hand, 
as compared to finding men in the pink of condition, as sportswriters phrased it in the Gilded 
Age.  As the stories regarding Williamson, Davis, and others show, being big was only useful if 
it produced on-field benefits and corresponded to performance.  Mere fat, on the other hand, 
drew scorn from commentators.  Things got so bad for the Brooklyn Grays in September of 
1887, the players took heat for carrying too much reserve adipose tissue and the sporting press 
began referring to them as “ice wagons.”  “The prodigal son has returned to Brooklyn, but he 
will not chew juicy steaks cut from the traditional fatted calf.  In fact the Brooklyn Club is not 
killing fatted calves for its players at present.  It will plane down some of the extra and flabby 
tissue on its players first.  People around Gotham think that the Brooklyn Club would play better 
ball if the men were not so fat.”18 
This focus on overweight players and conditioning was especially important to observers, 
given the value that 1880s baseball’s conventional wisdom placed on speed, fielding range, and 
baserunning skill.  The New York sportswriter describing the Brooklyn players’ lack of fitness 
spoke for many, therefore, when he wrote, “it seems a pity that such a ball town as Brooklyn 
undisputedly is should have such a slow-moving team.  Moly Hoses, how slow they are.”19  A 
prime offender was reserve outfielder Ernie Burch.  Described as “one of the largest men in the 
profession,” one teammate in Brooklyn described the flabby left fielder by saying, “see that man 
sitting over there watching the clock?  Well, that man is none other than Burch, our left fielder.  
He will sit in that chair until dinner-time and he will keep one eye on the clock the whole time.  
                                                 
18 “New York Mention” George Stackhouse, The Sporting Life, September 21, 1887, 1. 
19 Ibid. 
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He may get up and move around a little, but the chances are that he will not.  He is lazy and the 
biggest feeder on the team.”20 
While Burch stood, officially, five-foot ten and weighed 190 pounds, larger still was an 
outfielder who played in New York named Mike Slattery.  Truly a large man during the late 
nineteenth century, his official playing measurements were six-foot two and 210 pounds.  Like 
Burch, however, New York sportswriters were not convinced his eating habits always served 
him well.  “I hear that since Esterbrook ceased to be a Giant Slattery has taken his place as the 
champion feeder of the team.  The New York players have frequently remarked that Slattery is 
nearly always left at the plate when the rest of the team leave the dining room.  In this city where 
Slattery is well known his entrance into a restaurant generally creates a stampede among the 
waiters.”21 
Players who were not just thin, but truly skinny, also earned notice for this fact, although 
without the excessively negative connotations that went with being overweight.  Dave Foutz, 
nicknamed “Scissors,” was one such player.  The nickname itself referenced his appearance 
when pitching the ball, and one writer referred to him as “his slivership,” but despite his scrawny 
appearance, he was successful as both a hitter and a pitcher up until age started to take its toll in 
his mid-thirties.22   
 The fascination with player fitness and size helped contribute to one of the early spoofs in 
baseball history.  Early in the 1887 season, Al Spalding’s Chicago club struggled to field a 
healthy pitching staff outside of leading hurler John Clarkson, who pitched over 46% of the 
teams’ innings that season.  On May 15, the Milwaukee Sentinel ran a special dispatch 
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describing Chicago’s acquisition of a new pitcher from China who stood six-foot-seven-inches.  
“This collection of bones, muscle, and gristle was none other than Tsang Wong Foo, an athletic 
coolie from the village of Kwachu, in the province of Kiangtsu, and he is now a skilled baseball 
pitcher.”  The dispatch described how Tsang Wong Foo became a baseball prodigy: 
A Chinese professor, after some research, discovered that the art of curving a ball in the 
air was known during the time of Confucius, and that it was merely a primitive form of 
the art which had been causing tops to travel up hill in China for the last 1,600 years.  
Aided by these discoveries the professor at once put twenty men into practice at curving 
the ball according to the regulations of the National Baseball League.  The men soon 
attained wonderful proficiency.  After three months of steady practice Tsang Wong Foo 
was picked out as the best of the lot and at once placed on the market and shipped to 
Chicago.23 
 
Not only could Tsang Wong Foo curve a ball around posts to strike a nail into an oak 
plank, he could do so almost as effectively with his left arm as with his right.  Furthermore, he 
once pitched fourteen consecutive hours without resting.  In the States, Tsang Wong Foo would 
pitch under the name Mike Murphy, according to the article.  Unsurprisingly, no one named 
Mike Murphy, or Tsang Wong Foo, for that matter, appeared on a major league diamond in 
1887, but this faked account does demonstrate the connection many baseball observers made 
between physical stature, proper training, and athletic prowess.24 
 Spoofs aside, in the 1880s teams and players tried to find ways to prepare physically for 
the coming season.  Some traveled to the South, to Cuba, or to California to work their way into 
form.  Others participated in private workout sessions in their home cities.  They called their 
training haunts gymnasiums, most of which were indoor, an obvious advantage for players 
wintering in cities such as Chicago or Boston.  The practice of renting a gymnasium for practice 
was already an old one by the mid-1880s.  According to a memorandum in the possession of 
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Harry Wright, a member of the legendary Cincinnati Red Stockings team of 1869 (not a direct 
predecessor of the Cincinnati team of the same name in the American Association, however) but 
field manager of the Philadelphia Phillies by the mid-1880s, the ’69 Red Stockings spent $71.73 
on gymnasium training.25   
 It was never too early to start training, either.  Half a dozen of the Pittsburgh Alleghenys, 
namely Pud Galvin, Sam Barkley, George “Doggie” Miller, Charles “Pop” Smith, Bill Bishop, 
and Bill Kuehne, entered the gymnasium to begin training for 1887 in early January.26  
(Incidentally, this shows that some players, between training and exhibition tours, really did 
make a year-round profession out of baseball, contradicting those who wanted to slash their 
salaries because they only “worked” six or seven months of the year.)  Many players considered 
some gymnasium practice especially important in preparation for the 1887 season.  That was the 
year that baseball’s rules makers finally did away with the rule allowing the batter to call for a 
high or low pitch from the pitcher.  Now, the pitcher could deliver the ball for a strike anywhere 
between the knees and armpits of the batter.  Some hitters, used to calling for either a high or low 
pitch, spent hours in practice to make sure they could adapt to the change in regulations. 
 Similar to the way that all major league baseball teams hold spring training today, in the 
1880s entire clubs would enter the gymnasium together to get their work in before the season 
began.  In 1887, St. Louis Browns players had to arrive in town by March 10 so the players could 
trim down to their fighting weight, although some, such as outfielder Curt Welch, were early 
birds.  He had been playing hand ball at Sportsman’s Park since January.27  Likewise, the 
Washington Nationals got their marching orders to arrive during the first two weeks of March 
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1887, where the entire club took part in daily exercise.28  Brooklyn owner Charles Byrnes 
wanted his men in training by mid-March in 1887, stating that they would do their work under 
the careful eye of an experienced training specialist, Jack McMasters.29   
This idea of hiring experts to train the nine seems a popular one.  Pittsburgh, in their 1887 
gymnasium work, considered engaging a well-known local sprinter named George Smith to 
work with its players on their baserunning form.30  Likewise, when the Cleveland Blues entered 
their gymnasium preparatory to the 1887 season, “the men will all be here by March 20, and will 
at once be put into the Cleveland Athletic Club gymnasium on Frankfort street.  There under the 
eye of [manager] James A. himself, and the hand of Dick Collier and Bob Bell, the gymnasium 
instructors, the men will go through a daily course of work suited to their positions, baths, and 
rubbing.”31 
Baseball’s premier player-mascot(see chapter eighteen), Hugh Nicol, who “although 
small in stature, is a veritable Hercules in strength,” was devoted to conditioning himself and 
others.  Once, he supposedly threw a 315-pound man in a wrestling match in late 1886 (he 
reported a playing weight of all of 145 pounds, so the reader can believe the tale or not) while 
serving as a “professor” at a gymnasium in Rockford, Illinois.  He accepted a challenge from 
Cincinnati’s “Kid” Baldwin for a wrestling match that same off season (a good match, as 
Baldwin had a reported playing weight of 147 pounds), and went into training with a noted 
wrestler known as “Strangler” Lewis in order to prepare himself properly.32  “I am in first-class 
health, and feel like a race horse; I tip the beam at exactly 155 pounds, and am as stout as a bull . 
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. .”33  The much-anticipated bout never took place, however.  It seems Baldwin backed out at the 
last moment, although he did spend time training with a pair of African Americans noted for 
their grappling prowess.  Sadly, however, when The Sporting Life gave its report of their training 
methods, the paper chose to depict the speech of the black men involved with the broken English 
typical in portrayals of black people at the time.  This was a noted contrast to its renditions of the 
speech of white immigrants, whose words, however accented in fact, normally appeared in 
perfect English in the paper’s columns.34  (Baldwin was another great character of 1880s 
baseball, as was often true of players who earned the sobriquet “Kid.”  The police arrested him 
once, along with fellow ballplayer Buck Ewing and 103 other spectators, for attending an illegal 
cockfight.  His indiscretion cost him a $27 fine.35  There was also the episode in November of 
1887 where, after some excess tippling in a Cincinnati saloon on Vine Street, he sustained a 
bloody nose when punched in the face by a fighter from that city.  Baldwin invited the boxer “to 
the outside” where they duked it out in the streets.  Baldwin got the best of the man, according to 
reports.36) 
Shortstop Bill Gleason, who played in St. Louis, Philadelphia, and Louisville in the 
second half of the 1880s, was another devotee to fitness and the gymnasium.  So much so, that 
he constructed his own workout room at his home in St. Louis.  “He walks and runs about fifteen 
miles every day, and he puts in the rest of his spare time handling Indian clubs, dumb-bells and 
other gymnasium apparatus.  Bill has a little gymnasium of his own.”37 
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Similar to gymnasium training was engaging in hand ball.  By 1888, many baseball 
observers started to believe this was the very best way to prepare during the off-season.  Cap 
Anson in Chicago played frequently.  Brooklyn’s management was so convinced of hand ball’s 
virtues that during March and April of 1888, they engaged the court at the Brooklyn Hand Ball 
Club in the mornings to limber up their nine.  Not only that, they also paid for “the services of 
champion Phil Casey to train the players in hand ball each morning while field practice is not 
available and on rainy days in the early spring months.  [Pitcher Adonis] Terry has been training 
this way for some weeks already, and he has gained the greatest advantage in it.”38 
Another option, besides entering a gymnasium in the northern states to prepare for the 
season at had, was a tour of the South, playing exhibition matches in that region.  The White 
Stockings, as already noted, liked Hot Springs, Arkansas, as their training ground.  The Detroit 
Wolverines went further south in 1887, staying at the Hotel Lanier in Macon, Georgia, starting 
on March 8.  The plan was to train there on the local grounds for ten days, play some practice 
games with the Macon semi-pro team, then play exhibition games at Mobile, New Orleans, 
Savannah, Charleston, Birmingham, Decatur, Alabama, Memphis, Nashville, and Louisville, 
ending the tour in the Falls City on April 15.  From there, manager Watkins first considered 
taking his men further west, to Topeka and St. Josephs, before returning home to begin their 
championship schedule in the National League, but instead decided more games against northern 
competition would be a better idea.  Therefore, he scheduled some additional games with La 
Crosse to open their new grounds, Wisconsin, Minneapolis and St. Paul, and finally Milwaukee, 
a trip of nearly two months covering about 4,000 miles.39  When the tour got underway, the 
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Wolverines pummeled most of their opponents from the Sun Belt.  For one game with Savannah, 
no one bothered to keep a box score, as everyone considered the outcome a foregone conclusion 
before play even began.  The Wolverines played twenty-three games on the tour and won all of 
them, most of them easily, although the Memphis club lost by a single tally on two occasions.40 
Not all clubs thought this a good idea, however.  That same spring, Pittsburgh eschewed a 
Southern tour because “there is no money in it,” instead deciding to tough out the colder April 
weather in the Smoky City and play a series of games against Syracuse, Buffalo, Toronto, and 
Utica, with Binghamton possibly replacing Utica should that be necessary.  Pittsburgh manager 
Horace Phillips believed fourteen games against these clubs would give his nine plenty of time to 
shake off whatever rust had accumulated over the winter.41  Pittsburgh’s ownership, recognizing 
the need for something to help its team in the early months of the year, however, considered the 
idea of constructing a state of the art gymnasium on its grounds at Recreation Park.  “A 
handsome building will be erected at Recreation Park, in which there will be a complete 
gymnasium outfit, together with bowling alleys, tennis courts, etc.  A cinder path for spring 
runners and cyclists will be provided.”42   
Some could not decide if touring the southland was the right decision or not, as they 
recognized both the value and drawbacks of preseason travel.  Jack Kerins of Louisville, when 
asked in 1888 if a southern trip worked to the team’s advantage, confessed that he was not sure.  
“We never make any money by them.  In fact we usually lose a little, but I suppose they serve a 
good purpose in taking the kinks out of the boys’ muscles, and forcing them to overcome the 
stiffness of their winter rest.  But still this exercise is sometimes injurious, as it may be too early 
                                                 
40 “The Southern Trip Over” MAT, The Sporting Life, April 20, 1887, 5. 
41 “From the Smoky City” CMB, The Sporting Life, January 19, 1887, 1. 
42 “Notes and Comments” NA, The Sporting Life, January 26, 1887, 3. 
 260
and too severe.  There have been many cases in which a man has been injured for an entire 
season by it.”43 
Even if taking an exhibition tour did not pay, however, financially speaking it was better 
than traveling to some Southern locale to work into shape.  In 1887, the Chicago White 
Stockings debated whether they should repeat their 1886 trip to Hot Springs, Arkansas.  The 
team’s captain, Cap Anson, preferred the idea.  Based on prior experience, Anson believed that 
playing a heavy slate of exhibition games ran the risk of getting players banged up and injured 
before the championship season even began, thus handicapping the White Stockings 
unnecessarily.  Team owner Spalding, on the other hand, tended to favor a tour of games.  The 
team might not profit from these games financially, but the players got live practice and the club 
made some money for its time and effort.  A trip to Hot Springs or some other training ground 
offered no remuneration to the club at all, and Spalding figured that losing a little money was 
better than losing a lot of money.44  In 1887, at least, Anson’s views prevailed, and the White 
Stockings traveled south to Hot Springs just as they had the previous year. 
As Anson correctly realized, besides the monetary considerations, playing too many 
exhibition games risked injury to important members of his nine before the season even began.  
John Morrill, player and captain for the Boston Beaneaters, had exactly this in mind when he 
decided against a tour of the Sun Belt in 1887.  When the team returned from their 1886 series of 
exhibitions, second baseman Jack Burdock had a bad leg, third baseman Billy Nash a sprained 
ankle, utility player Sam Wise an injured arm, pitcher Charlie Buffinton a bad arm, and utility 
player Ezra Sutton contracted malaria.  Morrill also said that in future travels, he would lean 
more on the new players and give the older, more established players more time off.  His 
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preferred method of preparation was the gymnasium, and he blamed the injuries of ’86 on too 
little time working out before taking the field.45  The Philadelphia Athletics of the American 
Association felt the same way.  They, too, entered the gymnasium known as the Elite Rink in 
March of 1887 in order that they would have “no lame arms, sore shoulders or other defects in 
the players.”46 
 
* * * * * 
 
Although probably a good practice, all things considered, not all players liked 
gymnasium work, and this could lead to discord in the ranks, or further rancor between players 
and management, even before the championship season began.  When discussing the prospects 
of entering the gymnasium for training in mid-March for 1887, John Morrill noted that 
workhorse pitcher Charlie Radbourn wanted nothing to do with such things as preparatory 
training.  “He don’t think much of it, and don’t care to begin work until he can get out on the 
diamond.”  Morrill was not overly distressed in Radbourn’s case, however, noting, “He looks as 
though he could step in to-morrow and pitch through a game without the slightest inconvenience.  
Fishing, hunting and quiet living have done good work for the great twirler this winter.”47  
Similarly indisposed towards gymnasium practice was the “Gladiator,” Pete Browning.  “Old 
Pete’s no sucker; he wasn’t raised in Morehead, and he hain’t goin’ up against any of them dod-
gasted pulleys or put on any of them damn sweaters until he’s got to.  When the sun shines on 
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both sides of the fence Pete, old boy, will be there, teaching all the guys how to line ‘em out.”48  
In order to help reduce player hostility towards a training regimen, Manager Gus Schmelz, in 
Cincinnati’s employ by 1887, tried to set a personal example of proper training for his men in 
order to reduce the animosity of reporting for duty in mid-March.  “This will mean real 
gymnasium work for them, as their manager is ‘stuck’ on that sort of preparatory training, and 
works as hard himself as if he were preparing for the diamond himself instead of merely 
coaching.”49 
For every Radbourn, however, there was a player like Ed Morris.  Morris, in fact, went to 
extreme lengths to ready himself for the 1888 season.  After a disappointing 1887 campaign, in 
which his performance dropped off considerably as rule changes regarding the delivery of 
pitches, plus sore arm troubles, hurt his work in the box, he vowed to get in shape to redeem 
himself.  In a move about as extreme as a ballplayer could undertake in the Gilded Age, he swore 
off spirituous liquors and joined the local Young Men’s Christian Association (YMCA).  “He 
has not, however, become religious, his object in joining the association being to get the use of 
its gymnasium.”50  While “the rumor that Ed has joined the temperance army is a little 
premature” Morris said “he will take the pledge on New Year’s Day, however, and he means to 
keep it.”51  Morris, true to his word, did so.52  He also commenced an outdoor fitness program.  
“Morris is taking long walks daily to reduce his weight, with great success.  His clothes are 
already too big for him.  He has dropped 14 pounds since he started.”53 
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A few rebel managers disdained the gymnasium, however.  Philadelphia Quakers leader 
Harry Wright was one.  He preferred a tour of exhibition games, and had little interest in the 
gymnasium except as a last resort.  “It is not the present intention to put the Phillies to 
gymnasium practice.  ‘Give me ten day’s practice in the field,’ says Mr. Wright, ‘and the other 
teams can have their month’s practice in a gymnasium.  In my opinion one day on the field is 
nearly as good as one week in a gymnasium.”54  He got his way in 1887, as his club embarked on 
a southern trip, beginning in Charleston on March 26.55  Wright’s top player, Harry Stovey, 
agreed with his manager.  “A couple of days in the field will do more for a player than a month 
in a gymnasium or rink.”56   
A team had to be careful on the schedule and timing of its southern tour, however, 
according to Wright.  He declined to head to the Sun Belt before the 1888 season because while 
“he has not lost faith in the beneficial effect of the Southern climate and knows of no better 
means of getting into condition,” he feared to return to Philadelphia too early and leave too many 
days between his time spent in the South and the opening of the season.  This was because “the 
transition from the warm South to the North at a time when the latter has not yet entirely shaken 
off its winter garb, is hazardous and calculated not only to immediately undo all the work 
accomplished by again stiffening up the men, but it is apt to render them more than ordinarily 
liable to colds and inflammations.”57   
Perhaps, as northerners moving into the southern climate, they were more vulnerable to 
malaria as well.  The Mason-Dixon Line is the approximate boundary north of which mosquitoes 
carrying the Plasmodium vivex form of malaria cannot survive due to insufficient temperatures.  
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While doctors knew what malaria was, and how to treat it (quinine from the bark of the cinchona 
tree) by this time, they did not learn that mosquitoes were the infection vector until somewhat 
later.58  One baseball veteran observed that “there is a good deal more danger of sickness coming 
upon a player who has been South and returned than there is to the one who remains North and 
goes into such preliminary practice in his native climate.”59  For 1888, then, Wright and his men 
instead headed for Cape May, New Jersey, where “he routs every man of them out at six o’clock, 
and they give each other salt water baths with water just brought in from the cold surf.  Vigorous 
rubbing with rough towels follows and at half-past six the squads start off for a thirty minute 
brisk walk over the beach to the Government life station.”60  They did all this work under the 
watchful eye of Trainer Taylor, with the result that “the men are gradually reducing” their winter 
stores of flesh.61 
Yet another option was to play exhibition games with other major league baseball teams, 
especially if they were located nearby.  Each year, the Philadelphia Quakers squared off with the 
Philadelphia Athletics for local supremacy.  The two St. Louis teams, the Browns and Maroons, 
did the same as long as the Maroons lasted.  New York City featured both the Giants and 
Metropolitans until 1887, plus Brooklyn just a short distance away, giving several possibilities 
for preseason tune ups.   
Physical training of some kind was especially important for older players hoping to hold 
time at bay for one more year and stay in the game.  Ezra Sutton was one such player.  Born in 
Seneca Falls, New York, just one year after the famed Seneca Falls Convention for women’s 
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rights in 1848, by 1887 Sutton was a grizzled veteran looking to convince onlookers he still 
belonged on the diamond.  His hitting talent was still clear, but during the 1886 season, his 
defensive range came under fire from newspaper observers in Boston.  (He might have countered 
that the club tried to play him in the outfield part of the time, where he had played all of eight 
games in his career up to that point.)  He tried to reassure the doubters in the winter of 1886-
1887 by sending frequent letters to friends in the Boston press describing his advanced state of 
fitness achieved through working at his sawmill in Palmyrs, New York.62  Tim Murnane reported 
that, when the Boston club went into gymnasium, Sutton was the hardest worker present, and 
that “he looks just as young today” as when he first broke into baseball with the Cleveland and 
Middletown, Connecticut clubs in the early 1870s.63  Murnane would know, as he was also a 
member of the Middletown Mansfields, posting a .360 batting average as the team’s first 
baseman in 1872. 
Any kind of training might help.  Many types are familiar to readers today.  Walking, 
lifting dumbbells, playing hand ball, and other gymnasium exercises were nothing special to 
players in 1880s baseball.  Physical labor for wages worked, too, as Ezra Sutton demonstrated.  
There were novel approaches, however, that would probably not pass muster in modern baseball 
training circles.  Washington Nationals pitcher Frank “Shadow” Gilmore took things to an 
extreme in his efforts to enhance his physique and improving his hitting for the 1888 season.  In 
his attempt to bulk up, “he realizes that he can strengthen and harden those muscles brought into 
play while batting by the judicious use of Indian war clubs for a brief period daily, without 
reducing or impairing his ability as a pitcher.”64 (Essentially, an Indian war club was a club with 
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a ball-shaped end to add weight, similar to swinging a bat but with the weight of the object 
distributed more unevenly.)  Perhaps he figured that, with a career batting average of .049 
entering 1888, things could only get better, but incredibly, his club-swinging routine actually 
hurt his performance at bat, as he got just one hit in forty-one tries in 1888, for a .024 batting 
mark.  He left major league baseball after that season, boasting a career batting average of .043 
in 163 trips to the plate. 
Rather than swinging Indian war clubs, some baseball observers tried to apply science, or 
what passed for science in the 1880s, to training techniques.  The premier manual of training and 
injury treatment in 1880s baseball was by Dr. Alexander Leuf, titled Hygiene for Base Ball 
Players: Being a Brief Consideration of the Body as a Mechanism; the Art and Science of Curve 
Pitching; a Discussion of the Causes and Treatment of the Disabilities of Players; With a Few 
Practical Hints to Club Managers.  This book, published in 1888, contained descriptions and 
diagrams of all manner of motions and training techniques associated with the game.  The author 
was no quack.  Leuf was an M.D., was the director of physical education at the University of 
Pennsylvania and Swarthmore College at the time he published his book, was an honorary 
member and the ex-secretary of the Brooklyn Pathological Society, and had worked at St. Mary’s 
hospital in Brooklyn.  In addition, some sporting papers quoted him and his research in their 
columns, so people in baseball recognized his name and put stock in his views on training. 
Leuf advised treating the arms of pitchers in various ways.  Liniments were inappropriate 
for treating sore muscles because “In the first place, they are utterly useless, as any number of 
impartial and disgusted sufferers can testify.”  Likewise, players should avoid rubbings, 
massages, or any other passive motion activity to treat soreness, because these served no 
beneficial purpose, either.  Leuf advised elevating the arm, believing that the excess blood 
 267
producing the pressure on the muscle would recede due to gravity, thus relieving the soreness.  
The player might alternate this with immersion in hot water.65 
More severe pains called for more severe measures.  “In severer cases, where there is an 
excess of inflammatory products, the best remedy is mild galvanism.”  This meant treatment with 
electricity.  “Mild galvanism is very gratifying and should be done in the evening, so that the 
nutritive changes induced by the passage of the current shall act undisturbed till the next 
morning.”  It was important that only experts performed this procedure, however.  “It is well, 
however, to bear in mind that very great harm can be done with electricity if not judiciously 
employed.  This can only be done by skilled physicians. No ball player or advertising 
‘electrician’ can do any good for they can never be certain as to the kind of electricity to be used, 
its quantity and intensity, as well as the duration of its application.”  This last warning was 
necessary because, apparently, some players actually did carry their own batteries with them for 
treatment while traveling to road games.66 
For general muscle injuries, hot water was, by far, the best treatment in Leuf’s eyes.  A 
player might combine hot water with plaster bandages and continue to play.  Again, mild 
galvanism could help as well.  Leuf recognized the ballplayers tended to heal from soreness and 
mild injuries more quickly than the population at large, and credited this to better nutrition, 
which may well have been true.  These treatments only worked for muscles, of course.  Broken 
bones and issues that were more serious could only heal with time.67 
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Leuf’s book also offered advice on how to train and avoid injury in the first place.  He 
advised constant muscular exercise throughout the playing season, the equivalent of what we 
would call weightlifting.  Doctor Leuf also realized that not all baseball activities used the same 
muscle groups, and so recommended different training regimens depending on the position 
played.  He put great stock in exercise machinery, especially one manufactured by the company 
of the same man who owned the Philadelphia Quakers, Al Reach.  This machine, featuring 
weights manipulated via pulleys and a handle for the player to grip, was a simplified version of 
today’s Universal Gym or Bowflex type of apparatus.  Reach’s machine cost ten dollars and 
came with an illustrated pamphlet demonstrating thirty-one different exercises.  Leuf’s book 
illustrated the various exercise movements as well, and mentioned what muscles each helped to 
exercise, sometimes including how performing a certain exercise would aid the ballplayer.  
There was an even an attachment for the machine where the player could hook up a bat and 
practice swinging against mild resistance.68 
In addition to the Reach exercise machine, Leuf advocated a few more activities.  He 
favored flexibility and endurance over power, cautioning readers that exercise should be slow, 
and that it was best to stop before great fatigue set in.  He approved of training with Indian war 
clubs but cautioned that they should be light and swung slowly.  Work with dumbbells was 
acceptable, but again, Doctor Leuf advised light weights for exercises where the elbow remained 
stiff.  Besides weights, Leuf agreed with those who preached hand ball as the premier form of 
exercise.  “This will reduce the amount of fat to a minimum within two or three weeks, besides 
hardening the muscles and getting one fully past the period of soreness and stiffness.69 
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The book closed with general advice on other aspects of staying in top form during the 
season, some quite sensible, others more dubious.  When addressing the question of whether the 
gymnasium or outside practice was preferable, Leuf wrote, “Gymnasium work in the winter has 
its use, but proper base ball practice is far better and makes the former not only unnecessary but 
undesirable.”  He also advised, for example, practicing twice a day even on game days, although 
only for thirty minutes for pitchers and catchers, while eating at precisely 7 AM for breakfast and 
12 noon for lunch.  The book discouraged play in cool temperatures, due to the greater risk of 
injury.  It concluded with sections on how to achieve proper digestion (players should not eat 
before active work, must chew food carefully, and should not eat fried or greasy foods), get 
adequate amounts of sleep, and the importance of abstaining from alcohol and smoking.70 
 
* * * * * 
 
While physical training was a popular preparation for the season, there were other, less 
scientific, things that players did to try to stay in condition.  The players most likely to sustain 
serious injury in 1880s baseball were the pitchers and catchers, which is part of the reason why 
they often received higher pay than other players, due to the greater risks associated with their 
positions.  Throwing a baseball at high velocity is a very stressful thing for the arm’s muscles.  
The history of the game in the 1880s and beyond is strewn with pitchers who performed 
admirably for a few seasons, but then suffered serious arm injuries of one kind or another and 
had to leave major league baseball due to those injuries reducing their effectiveness.  This was 
especially true in the late 1880s, when a typical team featured three main pitchers, with maybe a 
                                                 
70 Ibid., 95-121. 
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fourth or fifth man on the team that pitched once in a while (they were usually referred to as 
“change pitchers”), and pitchers generally pitched the entire game, no matter how many innings 
it might last or pitches they might throw.  Pitchers who developed sore arms tried any number of 
things to cure their ailments and get back into condition to enter the pitcher’s box. 
One of the most popular “cures” for a sore pitching arm was a brief shock of electricity.  
Several pitchers employed this tactic.  As Pittsburgh pitcher Ed Morris said in 1887, “my arm is 
in good shape again . . . I think electricity did it much good.  The doctor gave me a dose that 
knocked me off a chair.  He said a woman could stand two cells and he gave me forty-two.”71  In 
1887, former pitcher Fred Goldsmith tried a much more extreme remedy to get his arm back in 
condition.  Having last pitched in the majors in 1884, out of desperation he submitted to the 
Moxa treatment, which meant, “He has had the muscles of his arm blistered with a hot iron, 
similar to the treatment used on the strained tendons of race-horses.”72  It did not work, at least 
not to the point where any major league teams were willing to sign him.  Still not willing to face 
the inevitable, by 1888 Goldsmith was in Hot Springs, Arkansas, hoping the supposed curative 
properties of the local waters would do the trick for him.  As the Chicago White Stockings also 
trained at the springs, he hoped to impress Chicago’s Captain Anson and get a shot at a contract 
that way, however unlikely that seemed on a White Stockings club that had already signed about 
twenty men that winter.  The waters did not help, sadly, any more than the hot iron did, and he 
never again pitched in major league baseball.73  He stayed in the game, however, serving as a 
                                                 
71 “Pittsburg Pointers” Circle, The Sporting Life, September 21, 1887, 4. 
72 “Notes and Comments” NA, The Sporting Life, April 27, 1887, 11. 
73 “Notes And Comments” NA, The Sporting Life, February 22, 1888, 5; “Detroit Dotlets” MAT, 
The Sporting Life, March 14, 1888, 2. 
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substitute umpire in the American Association in 1888 and a regular umpire the next year until 
losing his position for his role in the Brooklyn-St. Louis fiasco described in chapter seventeen.74 
Louisville thought it had a better answer for sore arms than electricity or hot irons.  In 
1887, the club employed Professor William Patterson, noted for his knowledge of magnetic 
healing.  “He has treated the arms of Hecker, Chamberlain and Ramsey with great success, and 
restored each to good condition when the aspects were very discouraging.”  He had so much luck 
(one hesitates to use words such as skill or success) treating the Louisville pitching staff that the 
team considered employing him on a full time basis to keep its nine in good condition for 1888.75 
With all these risks to pitchers, it made sense that those hurlers with a reputation for 
durability were in high demand.  In November of 1887, the Cleveland Blues signed a new 
pitcher, Edward “Jersey” Bakley, away from the Rochester club.  The Sporting News described 
the transaction by noting that Bakley “has plenty of speed and skill, and never has a sore arm.”76  
The description was apt, at least for 1888, as Bakley started 61 games for the Blues that season 
and logged 532 innings in the pitcher’s box. 
Catchers were also at great risk in 1880s baseball.  The practice of wearing a glove to 
catch pitches caught on slowly throughout the decade, but even with a glove, the catcher’s hands 
were only a stray pitch or foul tip away from jammed or broken fingers.  Without much other 
protective gear, foul balls often hit various parts of the catcher’s body, as well, with all the 
bumps, bruises, and broken bones one would expect on seeing the human body struck by a solid 
object traveling eighty or more miles per hour.  Catchers, like umpires, were starting to wear 
masks for their protection, but these were rather primitive in design and only partially fulfilled 
                                                 
74 “Goldsmith a Substitute Umpire” NA, The Sporting News, July 28, 1888, 1. 
75 “From The Falls City” XX, The Sporting Life, September 7, 1887, 4. 
76 “Cleveland Signs Bakley” NA, The Sporting News, November 19, 1887, 1. 
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their purpose of protecting the face.  To cite just a few of many examples regarding the marginal 
effectiveness of these devices, in 1887 a foul tip struck Louisville catcher Lave Cross and 
“glanced his mask and peeled off a portion of the scalp.  The wound bled freely, but Cross 
pluckily finished the game.”  Part of the reason Cross was in the game in the first place is that 
Louisville manager John Kelly had another of the club’s backstops, John Kerins, guarding first 
base because the team needed his bat but Kerins’s hand was too tender to catch pitches.77  
Similarly, that same year the New York Metropolitans struggled to keep a full compliment of 
catchers healthy.  “Catchers [Bill] Holbert and [Andy] Sommers are disabled, and [Jim] Donahue 
is the only catcher left.  Either Rooney Sweeney or Tom Deasley will be pressed into service.”78  
This shows that having three catchers on hand was an absolute minimum, with four preferred.  
Like New York, in 1889 the Kansas City Cowboys found themselves in similar straits.  “Jimmy 
Donohue is all out of shape just now, and is unable to catch.  Reynolds’ hands, too, are sore, and 
Gunson is not in the best of trim.  Consequently Hoover is compelled to do most of the back 
stopping.”79 
Like pitchers, some catchers earned a reputation for durability, and along with a catcher’s 
ability to handle pitchers, durability, even more than hitting talent, tended to make or break the 
catcher’s reputation with the press.  Take Doc Bushong, for instance.  He had a reputation for 
catching regularly and being especially durable.  In 1888, he played in just 69 of Brooklyn’s 140 
games, but that was still good enough to place second in the American Association for games 
caught that season.  In 1885 and 1886, he led the Association in games caught both seasons, 
                                                 
77 “From The Falls City” XX, The Sporting Life, September 7, 1887, 4. 
78 “The New York Clubs” NA, The Sporting Life, September 14, 1887, 1. 
79 “Less Exultant” Freeman, The Sporting Life, May 22, 1889, 1. 
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catching in 191 of St. Louis’s 251 games in those two years.  In fact, in 1886 Bushong became 
the first catcher to catch 100 games in a championship season, going behind the bat 106 times.   
Because of these risks, men who could take the abuse were always in demand.  Hoping to 
find a dependable man to spell Charlie Bennett as catcher in 1888, the Detroit Wolverines signed 
Cal Broughton, in large part because of his constitution.  “He is just the man that is wanted to 
catch Conway, who is the hardest of all the Detroit pitchers to handle.  Broughton is a man that 
can stand any amount of punishment, and the chances are that he will have an opportunity to 
make a martyr of himself.”80  This is why newspapers often made a big deal of things when a 
catcher caught several games in a row, while they rarely did so for other players.  It was hard to 
stay healthy for long when going behind the bat, and so any streak that exceeded ten games or so 
merited mention for being exceptional. 
Other things could ruin a player’s physical condition, besides injuries sustained on the 
field.  Off-field incidents occurred with distressing frequency, as well.  Fights brought on by 
excessive alcohol consumption were foremost among these, as already noted.  Accidents 
happened, too, such as when one player had his hand pecked while preening one of his trained 
fighting birds.  One other issue, barely hinted at in the press, given the straight-laced public 
morals of the Gilded Age, was the visitation of prostitutes and the resultant risk of venereal 
disease.  Baseball players were, as a group, certainly in the high-risk category for this behavior.  
Although no one mentioned this vice by name in baseball chronicles, professional ballplayers 
were in the prime of life, sometimes married but often not, frequently on the road for long 
stretches away from their families or friends, often intoxicated, and almost completely immersed 
                                                 
80 “The World’s Champions” Dan, The Sporting News, December 10, 1887, 5. 
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in an environment valuing “manly” traits such as physical and sexual prowess, with the resultant 
peer pressure to conform to group expectations.   
Once again, we must thank sportswriter O.P. Caylor for having the nerve to bring up this 
topic in print.  While never quite using words such as prostitute explicitly, and certainly not 
naming any specific players guilty of this behavior, he did discuss the issue in an 1887 column 
for The Sporting Life.  He wrote, “It is an evil which cannot be discussed in public prints as it 
deserves.  I refer to disease which players so often contract and which, if it does not wholly 
destroy them as ball players, unfits them in their profession for months.”  He continued, “Many 
notable cases of this kind could be cited; and dozens of cases of ‘malaria,’ ‘sprains’ and 
‘Charley-horses’ so-called have been nothing else but a shrewd invention or pretension to hide 
from the management the diseased condition of the player who has found himself in a physical 
form which wholly unfits him for doing his duty to the club and earning his salary.”  It was 
Caylor’s belief that, “This evil is a more general one than is commonly imagined, and though it 
has broken up some of the best and most important players in the various clubs, it is confined 
almost entirely to the lower strata of the profession” who “seek the dangerous society of the class 
of people from whom these evils are contracted, and who are found after night on the prominent 
streets of large cities looking for victims among such men whose desires it does not take much in 
the way of physical temptation to excite.”  He ended with the apologetically worded statement, 
“It is the most destructive form of intemperance with which the profession has to deal, and I may 
therefore be excused if my pen has dealt with it too plainly” but also suggested that each club 
“have at its call the services of a reputable physician to whom every member of the team shall be 
sent for examination.  So soon as any of these cases of malaria, sprains or Charley-horse begin to 
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develop; and from the day that such player becomes unfit to fully do his professional duty by 
reason of the disease named he should have his salary shut off.”81   
The Methuselah of baseball writers, Henry Chadwick, sustained Caylor on this matter.  
He stated, in regards to players maintaining their condition over the course of a season, “over-
eating is bad, excessive drinking is worse, but the worst of all is the dissipation of the habitués of 
brothels.  Many of the serious sicknesses of players last season was due to this latter cause.  
Caylor has done a good thing in calling attention to it.  As manager of two teams he knows 
whereof he speaks.”82  Later, Chadwick repeated this belief, although regrettably, he did not 
provide many precise details.  “The saloon and the brothel are the evils of the base ball world at 
the present day; and we see it practically exemplified in the failure of noted players to play up to 
the standard they are capable of were they to avoid these gross evils.”83  As Chadwick also edited 
Al Spalding’s yearly baseball guides, it was no surprise when the 1889 guide stated, “The two 
great obstacles in the way of the success of the majority of professional ball players are wine and 
women.  The saloon and the brothel are the evils of the baseball world at the present day.”84 
A few other stories corroborate Caylor and Chadwick.  For example, just prior to the 
1888 season, one of the Cincinnati Red Stockings, catcher John O’Connor, got himself into 
trouble on this score.  “John O’Connor, one of Cincinnati’s catchers, was arrested the other day 
and fined $15 and costs for drunkenness.  A disreputable woman caused his arrest.”85  Likewise, 
when the Philadelphia Athletics saw several members of their nine drinking heavily in 1888, 
                                                 
81 “Caylor’s Comment” O.P. Caylor, The Sporting Life, November 9, 1887, 5. 
82 “Chadwick’s Chat” Henry Chadwick, The Sporting Life, December 7, 1887, 5. 
83 “Chadwick’s Chat” Henry Chadwick, The Sporting Life, November 14, 1888, 3. 
84 NA, Spalding’s Official 1889 Base Ball Guide, 58. 
85 “Notes And Comments” NA, The Sporting Life, February 22, 1888, 5. 
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some of the men “kept late hours and still others consorted with women to such an extent that 
they became too enervated to even stop a thrown ball on the bound.”86   
Pittsburgh manager Horace Phillips explained part of the reason why so few of such cases 
came to light in the sporting press.  Team managers often shielded their players from the 
unwanted attention, because if word got out regarding the company some players kept, the 
damaged to the team’s, and baseball’s, reputation would be immense.  The “respectable” fans 
each club wanted to court would hardly attend games if they thought the men they were watching 
play were all drunkards, gamblers, and associates of loose women.  The only reason Phillips 
revealed even this much was he was angry with one player he had shielded from such unwanted 
attention in the past when that player ungratefully pressed Phillips for more money in salary 
negotiations.  “There is one man whom I have protected in many a scrape and kept it away from 
the newspapers, and in reward he abuses me.  Why, I found him in the grand stand in New York 
with a well-known woman whom he had represented to be his sister, and the boys know there are 
dozens of other scrapes in which matters have been kept quiet through my efforts.”87 
Usually, teams succeeded in keeping the sexual habits of their players out of the news for 
the reasons described by Phillips, but not always.  Just before the 1889 season opened, two 
Columbus players, pitcher “Wild” Bill Widner and outfielder Ed Daily, decided to examine the 
nightlife in Baltimore.  “Columbus is already on another voyage of discovery.  Widner and Daily 
made a scientific investigation that occupied all of Tuesday night.  In the morning, at the urgent 
request of Manager Buckenberger, they contributed fifty dollars each to the club coffers.”  At 
first, observers surmised that the men must have been guilty of a drinking spree, as 
Buckenberger had promulgated a strict code of conduct for his team that called for a fifty-dollar 
                                                 
86 “Philadelphia Pointers” NA, The Sporting Life, September 5, 1888, 6. 
87 “Pittsburg Pencilings” Circle, The Sporting Life, November 21, 1888, 3. 
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fine for the first drinking infraction.  Buckenberger decided to clear his players on the drinking 
charge, but in the process, had to own up to what the men had actually done.  “Buck says but for 
this one indiscretion the boys are all behaving themselves as well as he could desire, and he 
wants it distinctly understood that Daily and Widner are not drinking, but in this case were a 
little too susceptible to female charms, and he thought it prudent to check it for once and all 
time.”88   
Buckenberger soon had his hands full with drinking players as well, with pitcher John 
Weyhing earning a suspension for lushing during the first week of the season.  According to one 
of the sportswriters following the team, he should have known better than to attempt to hide his 
infraction.  “Columbus has had so many drinking bum ball players on her salary list in the past 
years it is too late in the base ball day for any player to think now that we don’t know a lush 
when we see one.”89 
 
* * * * * 
 
 Baseball teams of the Gilded Age were surprisingly modern in that they placed great 
value on physical training and athleticism.  The techniques used in achieving this status might 
not be what a twenty-first century athletic trainer would choose, but the goal was the same.  
Teams wanted men at a high level of physical ability and preparedness before beginning each 
season, and took significant measures to help their players reach this goal. 
                                                 
88 “Baltimore Bulletin” TTT, The Sporting Life, April 24, 1889, 5.  I was unable to discover 
whether Widner’s nickname comes from his behavior off the field or his control of the ball while 
pitching, but given that his career walk rate was a rather reasonable 2.4 per nine innings, I am 
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89 “Columbus Chatter” F.W. Arnold, The Sporting Life, May 1, 1889, 5. 
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 The key difference, as we have seen, is in the thinking of why this was necessary.  In the 
present day, where many players train year round, have nutritionists, lift weights consistently, 
take steroids and other drugs, and so forth, the goal is to keep these finely tuned athletes on the 
field.  A team needs its star players on the field in order to win, and teams that win draw fans.  
Muscular players with home run power are also good drawing cards, and baseball’s powers that 
be tend to adjust rules to keep the home runs flying and the scoreboards lit up, as anyone who 
watched the game in the 1990s and 2000s remembers well.  If all this fails, they simply instruct 
the companies that manufacture their baseballs to wind the ball tighter so it will fly further, or 
move the fences of their ballparks a few feet closer to home plate.  The game today is not a game 
of motion.  Pitchers and their pitching coaches now prize the ability to strike out batters, while 
the better hitting coaches laud their players for their patience in taking pitches and working the 
pitcher for walks if they can.  Batters put the ball in play for the fielders to handle less frequently 
in the 2010s than they ever have before.  Some, Adam Dunn for instance, do so only about half 
the time they come to bat. 
 Neither of these things, either pitchers attempting to pile up strikeouts or batters trying to 
draw walks by waiting out the pitcher, were popular in 1880s baseball.  Writers often referred to 
batters who did take a lot of pitches as waiters.  Observers did not exactly look down on the 
strategy, but for most players, taking pitches was more a means to an end, that of getting a good 
pitch the player thought he could hit hard.  In the same vein, when the owners discussed rule 
changes each year, the goal was to see more hitting and more action.  This required athletic men 
who both hit the ball hard when at bat and could chase and field it proficiently when on defense, 
and hopefully run the bases with vigor as well.  Fans wanted to see action, and action helped 
draw the fans to the park.  In order for a team to draw well, having players meeting all these 
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specifications was almost a requirement.  Thus, teams spent much money and energy looking for 
the best ways to keep their players in prime condition throughout the year, and did so in order to 
keep their finances in prime condition throughout the year. 
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Chapter 8  
 
 
Umpires and Gilded Age Baseball 
 
 
One thing has never changed in baseball and probably never will: the running battle 
between players and umpires over calls made on the field.  In 1886, one of the National League’s 
new teams, the Kansas City Cowboys, reportedly posted a sign at their home park reading, 
“Please do not shoot the umpire.  He’s doing the best he can.”1  Second baseman Johnny Evers, 
of the famed Tinker to Evers to Chance trio, once said, “my favorite umpire is a dead one.”2  
Players of the 1880s frequently behaved as if they agreed.  Prior to the 1877 season, the leagues 
did not hire their own umpires; the home team provided them, with the provision that the visitors 
agreed with the choice.  Unsurprisingly, the visitors and the public alike tended to lack faith in 
the integrity of this arrangement.  Beginning in 1877, therefore, leagues began to hire their own 
men for the job.3   
Because each league supplied its umpires and paid their salaries, they sought to 
economize whenever possible.  As a result, there was only one umpire on the field at the time, 
                                                 
1 “Threetees’ Meditations” TTT, The Sporting Life, August 11, 1886, 1; “Caught on the Fly” NA, 
The Sporting News, August 23, 1886, 5.  This appears to be a play on the sign “Please don’t 
shoot the piano player, he’s doing the best he can” reported by Oscar Wilde on a tour of the 
West. 
2 Quote taken from http://research.sabr.org/journals/johnny-evers, accessed May 20, 2014.  
Evers, known as “the Crab,” was infamous for his combative personality.  Former umpire Bill 
Klem described him by saying “His tongue knew neither fear nor control when he was crossed, 
and he thought everybody within eye or ear range was crossing him.”  Klem’s quote from same 
website. 
3 Thorn, Baseball in the Garden of Eden, 165. 
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rather than the four typical of major league baseball today.  The Players League in 1890 was the 
first league employing two umpires for the same game on a regular basis, although the 1887 
World Series between the Detroit Wolverines and St. Louis Browns also tried the two-umpire 
experiment.  Even though most observers considered the innovation a successful one, neither the 
National League nor the American Association followed up and employed two men for their 
regular season contests as late as 1889.  Regardless of who appointed the umpire, however, 
players’ opinions of umpires did not improve markedly.  They simply shifted the justifications 
for their anger from the umpire’s favoring the home team to his disliking their own club.   
The decision to use just one umpire also meant that umpire had a devilishly hard time 
seeing everything happening on the field all at once.  Calling balls and strikes, rushing to bases 
to make calls on tag plays, and trying to judge if outfielders had caught the ball on the fly or on 
one bounce were all challenging when just one person had to make every call.  Those are just the 
obvious problems.  In addition, in the 1880s umpires had to watch baserunners and make sure 
they actually touched bases rather than cutting the corner.  They had to watch the fielders, too, to 
make sure the same ball hit into the outfield was the one the fielder threw back to the infielders 
during the play, rather than one the fielder had hidden somewhere convenient.  Umpires also had 
to keep the game moving, never an easy job when players spent so much time arguing and 
questioning even routine calls.  This was especially problematic when it was late in the day, one 
team was ahead, and that team initiated stalling tactics so the umpire would call the game 
because of darkness and award them a victory.  With so many potential things to keep track of, 
being an umpire was extraordinarily difficult. 
While it is true that players and umpires have always had their disagreements, it seems 
these disagreements were more heated, violent, and disruptive to the game in the 1880s than they 
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have been at nearly any time since then.  Both major leagues, not to mention the sportswriters 
who wrote about the games in the newspapers, considered the umpire issue one of the most 
important albatrosses cursing baseball.  Writers constantly mentioned the performance of the 
umpire, occasionally complimentary but usually derogatorily, in recent games their team had 
played.    The primary reason for this concern about umpiring was not what the reader might 
think, however.  It is true that observers wanted officials who were as accurate as possible, to 
make sure the players decided each game rather than the umpire, but that was not the main 
reason the issue was so important.  Instead, it was about bringing in more money.  With good 
reason, team executives believed that poor umpiring led to raucous, obnoxious, and occasionally 
violent crowds.  Spectator violence, in turn, turned off the middle class patrons with money that 
teams wanted to attract to their grounds on a consistent basis.  Therefore, the game required 
quality umpires who would “give satisfaction” and keep the game under control, so the crowd 
stayed under control and the “better class” of spectators attended with greater frequency.   
Rather than being unusual, rows with umpires, or potential rows, happened several times 
each season in major league games and numberless times in minor league ones.  Every team 
wanted to avoid situations such as that in Cleveland in mid-August 1889.  When umpire Phil 
Powers made a controversial call regarding a Cleveland baserunner not touching a base, the 
home crowd exploded in anger.  “A dozen jumped into the field and started in the direction of 
Powers.  Three policemen with drawn clubs and all the members of the Cleveland ball team 
hastened forward and by sharp talk and some force drove the indignant spectators back.”  While 
they accomplished this, however, “the field in the meantime was filling up, and 500 men were 
yelling their opinion of the umpire in chorus, and a hundred of them were shaking their fists and 
brandishing their canes at him.  For ten minutes it seemed that a riot was certain, but Powers 
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finally called the game and returned to a room under the grand stand.”4  Furthermore, the 
members of the crowd thirsting for Powers’ blood were not simply drunken hoodlums.  
“Prominent among them were several leading businessmen, whose gray hairs and gentlemanly 
appearance were strangely out of place in such surroundings.”5 
With such incidents occurring with frightening regularity, one Columbus writer described 
the important role of a good umpire by writing, “This fact does more to advance the game and 
bring out the best class of patrons than good ball playing does, for there is a large class of people 
who will not go to a ball game in this city, and I presume it is so in other places, simply because 
the howling hoodlum element is so disgustingly offensive when an objectionable umpire is in 
charge.”6  A Cleveland scribe echoed this opinion after the above-mentioned incident with 
Powers, writing, “Patrons of the better class are becoming disgusted and will not go to a game on 
account of the uniform discrimination against the home team.  The wretched work of the present 
League staff has cost the Cleveland Club hundreds if not thousands of dollars in the past month 
or six weeks.”7 
Nearly every week, it seems, a major or minor league umpire was either in a fracas or 
narrowly avoiding one.  The problem was, most likely, far worse than it appears, because there 
were sundry leagues around the country, and the sporting press could not cover all of them, but 
just between the major and leading minor leagues, it seems as if umpires were not safe anywhere.  
During an 1886 game in the International League, for instance,  
                                                 
4 “The Latest News” NA, The Sporting News, August 17, 1889, 1. 
5 “Cleveland Cullings” Commodore, The Sporting Life, August 21, 1889, 5.  F.H. Brunell, the 
former Cleveland correspondent for The Sporting Life, had recently moved to Chicago to be head 
editor of the sports department there. 
6 “Cheerful Columbus” F.W. Arnold, The Sporting Life, August 14, 1889, 5. 
7 “Cleveland Cullings” Commodore, The Sporting Life, August 21, 1889, 5. 
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Tuesday last, Umpire West displayed such bad judgment that not only the Rochester 
nine, but over 2,000 people kicked badly.  About every person one would meet would say 
‘West is drunk’ or “West is crooked.’ Horner, pitcher of the Rochesters, lost his head, as 
West was bound to give him the worst of it, and after the game struck West, but did not 
get a chance to follow it up . . . West . . . was told he could never umpire again in this 
city.  He certainly deserved all he received from Horner, but the latter should have 
selected a more secluded spot to have punished him.8 
 
This shows that the press often helped incite rage against baseball’s officials.  Nor did the 
conditions under which the game took place always make much difference.  Another incident 
from 1886 is a case in point.  That year, St. Louis Maroons manager Gus Schmelz opined, “we 
have been outbatting and outplaying the Browns, but have lost the majority of the games for the 
reason that they have been given nearly all the close decisions and had all the best of the 
umpiring.”  The games that drew Schmelz’s public ire were not even regular contests, but 
exhibition ones.9  Teams amplified their disgust when championship season games were on the 
line.  In 1886, in the midst of a heated pennant race between themselves, Chicago, and New 
York, a Detroit Wolverines sportswriter blamed a mediocre eastern road trip on poor officiating.  
“The narrow margin by which most of the games were lost shows that the Detroits were playing 
ball, and doubtless but for cross-eyed umpiring the results would have been reversed.”10 
Players disputed umpires’ decisions verbally, of course, but also physically at times.  
Baiting umpires, known as “kicking” or “bulldozing,” knew few limits.  The fact that, 
sometimes, team owners would pay fines on behalf of their abusive players surely encouraged 
the practice.   
In the St. Louis–Louisville game of April 21 [St. Louis captain Charlie] Comiskey tried 
his usual bull-dozing tactics on the new umpire, Ben Young.  He opened with a tirade of 
abuse and was promptly fined $25.  That wasn’t enough for Comiskey, and he kept the 
thing up until his fines amounted to $75, which either he or Von der Ahe will have to 
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pay, as Umpire Young is determined to enforce payment owing to Comiskey’s 
inexpressible blackguardism and insolence.11 
 
Apparently, Von der Ahe did sometimes pay fines for his men.  “Mr. Von der Ahe informs us 
that he only paid those fines imposed by the American Association under protest, and it is so 
recorded.  He proposes at the close of the season to test the matter in court.”12  This same St. 
Louis team also refused to continue a game on July 31, 1886, in protest of an umpire.  To a man, 
they sat on the bench and refused to play.  Only the intervention of Von der Ahe got them back 
into position in time to avoid a forfeit.13 
 Players in Wilkesbarre, Pennsylvania, were similarly indisposed to take part in a game in 
August of 1886, this time because they could not agree on who would officiate.  The visitors 
from Williamsport wanted one man, while the hosts from Wilkesbarre insisted on another.  
Rather than play the game, players on both sides decided to go home, rather than submit to the 
choice of the opposition.  The Wilkesbarre club was so hot, it considered withdrawing from its 
league over the fiasco, though in time cooler heads prevailed, the teams worked out their 
differences, and took the field the next day.14 
The various leagues tried to uphold the authority of their umpires at times.  The Southern 
League, coming off an 1885 season in which umpire abuse was constant and vicious, gave their 
officials greater authority to deal with troublemakers in 1886.  “Umpires have been so far much 
better treated by Southern League audiences than was the case last season. . . . They have most 
rigid orders as to kicking, and as there is a proper way to settle differences of opinion they are 
                                                 
11 “News Notes” NA, The Sporting Life, April 28, 1886, 4.   
12 “Notes and Comment” NA, The Sporting Life, August 18, 1886, 5. 
13 “Caught on the Fly” NA, The Sporting News, August 9, 1886, 5. 
14 “Notes and Comments NA, The Sporting Life, August 18, 1886, 5; “Harmony Once More” 
NA, The Sporting Life,  August 18, 1886, 1. 
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instructed to fine, and fine heavily, every kicker.”15  One Southern League umpire not getting 
better treatment was the seemingly misnamed Umpire Merrett, who continued to “give the most 
genuine and merited dissatisfaction.  He is the most densely ignorant and pitiable weak umpire 
that has ever visited Nashville.  He does not give either club the best or worst of his decisions, 
but makes both alike, and the audience as well, very tired.  Whenever he makes a decision, the 
players feel like sitting down for a while, just because they are so faint.”16 
 
* * * * * 
 
Although most press coverage of umpires was negative, observers showed a measure of 
sympathy towards some men who had earned an upright and honorable reputation.  They might 
occasionally even sympathize with a man who normally performed well but made the occasional, 
unavoidable mistake.  In an 1886 game, umpire Charles “Chick” Fulmer called out Charlie 
Bastian on a pitch that appeared wide of the plate.   
 
Bastian deliberately leaned over, drew a line a foot wide of the plate, measured the 
distance on his bat and then walked to the players bench, showing the rest of the team 
how far in his opinion the third strike had been wide of the plate.  From the reporters’ 
stand the third strike did look rather dizzy, but Fulmer’s judgment on balls and strikes is 
so superior to the work of other umpires seen there this season that his few mistakes 
should be overlooked.17 
 
Those umps who were confident enough to take the constant abuse, and even give some 
back, might earn the grudging admiration of the press, at least temporarily.  “Umpire [Ben] 
Young has impressed me very favorably.  One of his highest recommendations is that he sits 
                                                 
15 “Notes and Comments” NA, The Sporting Life, April 28, 1886, 5. 
16 “Caught on the Fly” NA, The Sporting News, August 8, 1886, 5. 
17 Ibid. 
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very promptly on the kickers.”18  One St. Louis correspondent described umpire John 
McQuade’s work in early 1887 by writing, “McQuade shows no improvement in his umpiring 
over last year, as that would be an impossibility.  Mac is a good one, and he has a large number 
of admirers in St. Louis.”  Others disagreed, of course.  After McQuade had a tough game in 
Brooklyn early in 1887, a New York sportswriter stated that “some of his decisions were awful” 
and that “I wish the rotund gentleman [Pritchard] from Missouri could have been present, he 
might have changed his mind.”  A few days later, the writer’s view of McQuade sank further, as 
he wrote, “McQuade again distinguished himself by his ridiculous decisions.  I can’t understand 
how people can call him a good umpire.  He is not considered so here.”19   Later that year in 
Cincinnati, McQuade gave a decision contrary to the wishes of the Cincinnati crowd by calling 
Hugh Nicol out on an attempted steal of home plate.  The crowd threw beer glasses at him and 
McQuade eventually required the protection of the Porkopolis police force.  Among the 
consequences of this fiasco was that Cincinnati made the humane, although less lucrative, 
decision not to sell beer at their grounds for a while.20   
Like Pritchard, Henry Chadwick allowed the occasional bit of praise to grace his writing, 
as he enjoyed the work of former pitcher Lon Knight when Knight worked a game in Brooklyn 
in 1887, saying, “the best umpiring I have seen for sometime past has been that of Lon Knight at 
the games at Washington Park.  More impartial decisions I have never seen rendered.”  This was 
high praise indeed, considering Chadwick had seen umpires at work going all the way back to 
                                                 
18 “Caylor’s Letter” O.P. Caylor, The Sporting Life, April 28, 1886, 1. 
19 “From St. Louis” Joe Pritchard, The Sporting Life, April 20, 1887, 4; “From New York” 
Regular, The Sporting Life, April 27, 1887, 6. 
20 “Little Nick’s Great Slide” NA, The Sporting News, August 27, 1887, 1; “From Cincinnati” 
Ren Mulford, Jr., The Sporting Life, August 31, 1887, 3. 
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the Knickerbocker club’s games in 1845.21  Chadwick, to his credit, was one of the baseball 
commentators who rarely criticized the work of baseball’s officials, often admonishing his 
contemporaries when they tried to blame umpiring for poor play by their hometown team. 
A select few even garnered near-universal admiration for their abilities, such as Bob 
Ferguson.  A player in the 1870s and 1880s, Ferguson could boast of many baseball innovations.  
He may have been the game’s first switch-hitter, although it seems he did not switch sides of the 
plate depending on the pitcher, but based on how he felt or what the situation dictated.  A 
manager as well as a player, Ferguson pioneered a defensive strategy increasingly in vogue 
among modern major league teams—that of shifting his infield and outfield to counter hitters 
with a tendency to pull the ball.  Because of his defensive prowess as a player, Ferguson also 
owns one of baseball’s greatest nicknames: “Death to Flying Things.”  He had been around the 
game for so long that by the 1880s, one paper referred to him as “the Methuselah of the diamond 
field.”22 
Interestingly, Ferguson’s career as an umpire almost ended before it began, due to his 
combination of honesty and an exceptional temper.  In 1873, while playing for the Brooklyn 
Atlantics, he also served as a substitute umpire.  During one game, he accused an opposing 
player of dishonest play, believing the player, Civil War veteran Nat Hicks, was conspiring with 
gamblers to throw the game.  Gambling was an all too frequent plague on baseball in the 1870s, 
and Hicks’ team, the New York Mutuals, was notorious for crooked play even given the 
standards of those years.  When Hicks called Ferguson a liar, Ferguson snatched up a bat and 
                                                 
21 “Chadwick’s Chat” Henry Chadwick, The Sporting Life, April 20, 1887, 5. 
22 Information and quotes regarding Ferguson are from his SABR biography page, 
http://sabr.org/bioproj/person/df8e7d29, accessed May 20, 2014, except the quote calling him 
Methuselah, which comes from “Arranging the League Games” NA, New York Times, March 8, 
1885, 2.  Methuselah was a biblical figure who lived to 969 years of age. 
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broke Hick’s arm.  As fans stormed the field to take revenge, police escorted Ferguson away 
from the mob.  He apologized afterwards, and said he was through with umpiring.23 
In later years he later reconsidered, however, umpired all of the 1885 season, and became 
one of the game’s best.  “Umpire Ferguson had a number of close calls to make in yesterday’s 
game.  Some of them were unfavorable to the home team, but nevertheless they were just.”24  
Likewise, by 1886, the Louisville Courier-Journal referred to him by writing, “perhaps the 
greatest and most successful umpire that ever regularly serves was Ferguson . . . he is a man of 
iron nerve, strictly honest, and cold and unsociable as an iceberg.  He avoided players, who 
always held him in fear.”25  The Sporting Life reported that, upon making his 1886 debut as 
umpire for the Brooklyn-New York match up on April 24, “the new Association umpire, Mr. 
Ferguson, made his first appearance, which, to all, was a genuine surprise, not a soul having been 
informed of the quick work done by Wyckoff and Byrne in securing his services.  He was 
cheered when he appeared, and gave excellent satisfaction.”26  Even Chris Von der Ahe in St. 
Louis, a man always on the lookout for, and in his own mind often finding, conspiracies against 
his beloved Browns, once said of Ferguson, “Ferguson gave us a square deal all around.  He 
appears to want to do the square thing always regardless of the opinion of the home crowd.”27 
Ferguson did not stay on the field all season in 1886, however, only a brief part of it.  The 
New York Mets tabbed “Death to Flying Things” as their new field manager after they relieved 
Jim Gifford of his duties a mere seventeen games into the 1886 season, and Ferguson stayed at 
                                                 
23 Ferguson’s SABR biography.  Nat Hicks later opened a “sporting house” in Hoboken, New 
Jersey, featuring “six billiard tables, four bowling alleys, a first-class racquet court, with rotary 
fans, electric lights, and all the other modern improvements.” “Notes and Comments” NA, The 
Sporting Life, August 25, 1886, 5. 
24 “Notes of the Game” NA, New York Times, August 29, 1885, 3. 
25 Ferguson’s SABR biography, accessed May 20, 2014.   
26 “The Brooklyns Beat the Mets” NA, The Sporting Life, April 28, 1886, 1. 
27 “The Boss President” NA, The Sporting News, June 9, 1888, 1. 
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this post until he was relieved in turn when the Metropolitans stumbled to just six wins in their 
first thirty games in 1887.  While largely unsuccessful as a manager, he did not lose his touch for 
umpiring in the interim, as one Baltimore writer wrote in 1887, “although it is almost impossible 
to make a comparison in percentage of correct decisions in umpiring, yet certainly Bob Ferguson 
appears to reach the highest limit.”28 
He was a man of extreme honesty and bravery, which no doubt served him well in 1880s 
baseball.  Another story relates how Ferguson once single-handedly prevented gamblers from 
stealing a game.  According to O.P. Caylor, “It was a game he was anxious to win, and the team 
had the game well in hand, when some of the players began to dump, with the evident intention 
of losing the game.  Ferguson saw it and knew what was coming.”  Grabbing a bat and striding 
over to the box where the gamblers sat betting he said “Say, you blankety sons of Adam, you’re 
the fellows who have bought up my men and have paid them to rob people for you.  I want to say 
right here that I can whip the entire gang of you if you’ll come down here one or two at a time, 
and I’d be very much obliged if you’d give me a chance at the lot of you.”  Finding no takers, “in 
a minute or two Bob bowed low to them, and, turning around, had his nine resume the game. . . . 
the players who had begun the dump had been intense auditors of what their captain said to the 
‘Gold Board,’ and the consequence was the dumping stopped and Ferguson won the game.”29 
For those lacking Ferguson’s stature, however, violence against umpires, or the threat of 
it, regrettably was quite common.  The first week of the 1886 season was not even finished 
before The Sporting Life reported, “Already there is trouble about umpiring.  [Billy] Carlin came 
near being mobbed in Baltimore; Ben Young had a little trouble in St. Louis; Denny Mack has 
not given satisfaction and the Athletic and Metropolitan clubs have sent a protest against him to 
                                                 
28 “From Baltimore” TTT, The Sporting Life, September 21, 1887, 4. 
29 “Caylor’s Comment” O.P. Caylor, The Sporting Life, May 30, 1888, 4. 
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Secretary [Wheeler] Wikoff.”  Young’s trouble was not just with St. Louis, either.  On the 
season’s opening day, the Cincinnati club played a game that Young umpired under protest 
because of his decisions regarding when to use a new ball for play.30  Carlin, meanwhile, rather 
than continue to risk the wrath of the mob, left baseball for a career in local politics, a career 
“more congenial and remunerative than umpiring,” although by 1887 he had only advanced as 
far as night superintendent of the city delivery division of the Philadelphia post office.31  In May 
1886, cranks in Washington threatened the umpire, named Wilson, in their game with a mobbing 
because of his uncharitable decisions.  The local writer for The Sporting Life bemoaned the 
conduct of the home crowd for both moral and financial reasons.  “It does not become a public 
who lay claim to peace and decency to behave in such a manner and it has a tendency to keep the 
better element away from the games.”32   
Later that year, in the Northwest League, a burly lumberjack felled an ump named Timlin 
with a blow to the head after a game.  “The cowardly brute then seized a bat and would have 
struck Timlin with it but for the timely interference of the crowd.  When arrested he excused 
himself by saying that one of Timlin’s rulings during the game was unfair.”33  Things were even 
dicier in Charleston in August.  There, the cranks threatened to kill umpire Edward Hengle after 
                                                 
30 “Notes and Comments” NA, The Sporting Life, April 28, 1886, 5.  As to the story over 
Young’s reluctance to use a new ball for play, this is not as trivial a matter as it may seem.  
Standard practice was to use two balls in a game.  If one became unusable then umpires 
substituted another ball, but not before.  As a result, the two balls in play quickly became dirty 
from rolling through dirt and grass after players struck them, or stained by tobacco or licorice 
juice that players spat on the ball, and rendered very difficult to see for the hitters in myriad other 
ways.  Therefore, Young’s failure to introduce a new ball that was still white and easy to see 
worked to the detriment of the hitting team, which in this case was Cincinnati.  There were a few 
situations where an umpire was supposed to remove a ball from play, such as if it became 
misshapen. 
31 “Notes and Comments” NA, The Sporting Life, September 14, 1887, 6; “Philadelphia News” 
NA, The Sporting Life, October 12, 1887, 2. 
32 “From the Capital” WUD, The Sporting Life, May 18, 1886, 3. 
33 “Notes and Comments” NA, The Sporting Life, August 4, 1886, 5. 
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a controversial decision at the end of the game resulted in the defeat of the home nine.  Only the 
pleading of Charleston’s president saved Hengle from a grisly fate.34  Showing, perhaps, better 
instinct for self-preservation than for calling balls and strikes, Hengle said he would resign and 
go home immediately afterwards.  He did leave the Southern League, but before the year was 
out, he resurfaced in the International League, where it seems people were more appreciative of 
his efforts.35  In fact, prior to the 1887 season, he had offers to officiate for the Western League, 
the Northwestern League, and the International League, to go along with his application for work 
in the National League.  He ended up on the staff of the Western League.36  Whether or not his 
work at the Brthplace of Secession was as bad as the incident at Charleston might indicate, 
however, Hengle was not the worst that Southern League spectators witnessed in 1886.  That 
title belonged to the aforementioned Merritt (spellings of his last name varied), and observers 
feared for his safety should he end up working games between the two of the league’s top 
contenders, Savannah and Atlanta.  “Merritt, now at Memphis, is conspicuous for incompetency, 
though probably meaning well.  One of those brick-proof refuges for umpires will be needed in 
Atlanta if that official fails to play into Atlanta’s hands during the Savannah series.”37 
Umpires in Atlanta that year never knew what to expect, although expecting the worst 
was probably the best bet.  On August 21, yet another umpire, named McQuaid, had issues there.  
McQuaid was supposed to work the game between Atlanta and Savannah, but did not appear on 
the grounds as scheduled.  “He claimed that a lot of toughs and hoodlums had called on him at 
his hotel and threatened to kill him if he officiated.  Not caring to be killed he wisely remained 
                                                 
34 “Caught on the Fly” NA, The Sporting News, August 16, 1886, 5. 
35 “George Washington Bradley” PDQ, The Sporting News, September 6, 1886, 1. 
36 “Notes and Comments” NA, The Sporting Life, February 2, 1886, 3; “Umpires Appointed” 
E.E. Murphy, The Sporting Life, March 2, 1887, 1. 
37 “Southern Irregularities” Arm, The Sporting Life, August 18, 1886, 1. 
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away from the grounds.”  Was the threat real?  Some evidence suggests not, as observers noted 
that McQuaid stayed at the same hotel, the Kimball House, as the Savannah club, causing 
speculation that Savannah had asked McQuaid to lay low for the afternoon, hoping to have one 
of their own men installed as a substitute against the stronger Atlanta nine.38  The Southern 
League’s ex-secretary believed the charges might have validity, however, pointing out that many 
teams complained about their treatment in Atlanta.39  The larger point is, however, that things for 
umpires were bad enough that such a claim on McQuaid’s part carried weight and people took it 
seriously. 
Indeed, in the entire troubled history of the Southern League in the 1880s, there was but a 
single umpire in whom the entire league had confidence.  That man was Tim Hurst, who 
matriculated below the Mason-Dixon Line in 1889 and, somehow, managed to please everyone 
despite his Yankee pedigree.  “He came unheralded from Pennsylvania, and gave such 
satisfaction that every city in the League clamored for his services whenever it was possible to 
obtain them.  This is an unusual state of affairs.  It is the first time we have ever known an 
umpire to give entire satisfaction.”  This led one paper to remark, “Mr. Hurst must be a wonder 
to evoke such commendation.  Indeed, the man that could give universal satisfaction in the South 
is a phenomenon.  His work in the West will be closely watched, and if he sustains his Southern 
reputation he will sooner or later be called to a higher field.”40 
 
* * * * * 
 
                                                 
38 “Gay Times in Atlanta” NA, The Sporting News, August 30, 1886. 
39 “The Southern League” NA The Sporting News, September 20, 1886, 1. 
40 “A Wonder” NA, The Sporting Life, July 24, 1889, 1.  Hurst was moving to the Western 
Association because the Southern League had just disbanded for the remainder of 1889. 
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While major league baseball might have been a man’s game, occasionally female cranks 
could get just as worked up over umpiring as anyone else.  “A lady in the grand stand at 
Recreation Park last Tuesday was so carried away by Umpire Skinner’s poor work, which bore 
rather heavily against the home club, that she expressed a desire to scratch the hapless Skinner’s 
eyes out.  Happily for Skinner she was not in a position to carry out her wish, which was 
evidently sincere.”41   
This woman’s reaction seems unusual, however, as most female attendees had a 
pacifying influence on other cranks.  Although “it generally takes a woman some time to master 
the mysteries of the sport,” Brooklyn owner Charles Byrne decided to admit ladies to the 
ballpark at no cost starting in 1885.  “The good effects of the move were at once noticed, and he 
has been wise enough to keep up the practice ever since.  The spectators are now more respectful 
and careful about the style of language they use in addressing the players and umpire.”  Although 
some of the rougher cranks might not like seeing more women at the ballpark, “if other managers 
would but follow in Brooklyn’s footsteps and admit the fairer sex to their grounds, it would not 
only have a good effect on the game generally, but it would increase the attendance and enlarge 
the dividends of the club at the end of the season.”42   
Byrne did decide to start charging admission for women in 1888, after the American 
Association decided on its hybrid plan whereby the home team had to split some of its gate 
revenue with the visiting nine.  He ended up charging half price to female spectators, but 
believed this reduced price was well worth it, because “the patronage of ladies invariably 
increases the attendance of men.  ‘Stag’ gatherings, at ball matches or elsewhere, are miserably 
dull affairs in comparison to assemblages graced by the presence of the fair sex; and it is in every 
                                                 
41 “The Local Season” NA, The Sporting Life, August 18, 1886, 4. 
42 ”Jim Mutrie Laughs” NA, The Sporting News, December 11, 1886,1. 
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way to the interest of the professional organizations to do all in their power to have crowds of 
ladies at the ball matches.”43  Louisville decided it must do the same as Brooklyn and begin 
charging women for admission, and for the same reasons, although it made cranks in the Falls 
City unhappy.  ‘This announcement has caused much dissatisfaction here.  The presence of the 
ladies has always done a great deal for the game, and it is doubtful whether the new rule will be 
of financial benefit to the game.”44 
The Cleveland Blues, once admitted to the American Association in 1887, also tried to 
lure women to their grounds in an effort to boost their reputation and bottom line.  Unlike Byrne, 
however, they did not admit women for free, but rather charged them the general admission price 
for a seat in the grandstand, thus allowing the women of the Forest City to enjoy games at a 
discount.45  Chris Von der Ahe’s St. Louis team declared every Tuesday, Thursday, and Saturday 
to be “Ladies Day” for 1887, and like Brooklyn and Cleveland, one reason was to improve 
baseball’s name among the “better class” in the Mound City.  For the first such day of the year, 
the Boss President gave out souvenirs to all women in attendance, a satin embroidered portrait of 
the team tied to a terra-cotta folder by a silk cord.46   
Indianapolis also tried the reduced ticket price approach for 1888, as team president John 
Brush offered season tickets at a cost of twenty-five dollars for men but just sixteen dollars for 
women.  As in Brooklyn and St. Louis, Brush hoped that more women spectators would both 
improve the game’s image and his bottom line.  “President Brush is in favor of doing everything 
possible to increase the attendance of the ladies, and feels that while the ticket is very cheap it 
                                                 
43 “Chadwick’s Chat” Henry Chadwick, The Sporting Life, March 7, 1888, 3. 
44 “Louisville Laconics” JA, The Sporting Life, April 4, 1888, 3. 
45 “From Cleveland” F.H. Brunell, The Sporting Life, March 3, 1887, 2. 
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will pay in the end.  It is the better class of people who support base ball in Indianapolis, and the 
long-headed president seems to think that where the ladies go the men will be sure to follow.”47  
In addition, “to the presence of the ladies can be attributed the excellent behavior of the audience 
in attendance at all games here.  The ladies of Indianapolis recognize in the National game an 
amusement that furnishes an opportunity to get the benefit of the fresh air and is at the same time 
highly entertaining.”48  Brush’s stratagem did produce some results, as the team sold more than 
300 season tickets with this approach.49 
 
* * * * * 
 
Based on some of the stories of how spectators and players treated umpires, it is a small 
wonder anyone ever took the job in the first place.  Consider the case of a former major league 
played named Joe Ellick, who worked the game between the Philadelphia Quakers and Detroit 
Wolverines on July 31, 1886.  The previous day, when overseeing the Washington-Detroit game, 
fans of the Nationals nearly mobbed Ellick for supposedly favoring the Wolverines in his 
decisions.  Cranks in Washington brought bells with them to the ballpark, and rang them 
whenever umpires ruled against them or the visitors began kicking, and July 30 was a loud day at 
Washington’s Swampdoodle Grounds.50  He must have been leery of working another game 
featuring Detroit the next day in the first place, and cannot have been reassured when several 
thousand cranks arrived at the Philadelphia grounds at Recreation Park out for blood.  The game 
“ended in the most disgraceful scene that has ever happened in this city.”  The cranks verbally 
                                                 
47 “Indianapolis News” A.G. Ovens, The Sporting Life, February 29, 1888, 2. 
48 “The Hoosier Team” Lew Rup, The Sporting News, March 3, 1888, 1. 
49 “Base-Ball Notes” NA, Chicago Daily Tribune, March 7, 1888, 3. 
50 “Frightened to Death” SAM, The Sporting News, August 9, 1886, 1. 
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abused Ellick from the first pitch onward, constantly reminding him of his performance the prior 
day.  “The open seat crowd got at him early, and this seemed to rattle him, which only increased 
the wrath of the spectators, and also affected the players of both sides, who began kicking at his 
decisions.”  As the game drew towards its close, trouble loomed.  “Just before the last man of the 
Phillies had gone out the crowd at left field closed suddenly in on the players and when the side 
was retired and the game closed a rush was made for the umpire.”  Although possibly 
exaggerated, the Philadelphia correspondent claimed that three or four thousand people stormed 
the field while just three policemen tried to defend Ellick.  “The three officers and several 
employees of the grounds did the very best they could to protect Ellick; the officers presenting 
their pistols and using their clubs in the liveliest manner . . . the officers had their helmets 
mashed, players were hit, but Ellick was finally gotten into the coach without a scratch.”51  The 
man could not catch a break wherever he went, as fans in Boston treated him roughly in August 
after a loss to Kansas City.  “They had an able ally in Umpire Ellick.”  When New York lost a 
game against Kansas City, they likewise laid the blame at Ellick’s door.52      
What is especially ironic about Joe Ellick’s Washington experience is that the National 
League hired him for its umpiring staff just the week before.  He was one of a trio of men 
(Charles “Chick” Fulmer and W.S. Wyckoff being the others) appointed by league president 
Nick Young to replace umpires John Connelly, Wesley Curry, and John Egan (sometimes 
referred to as Eagan) for their lackluster performance to that point in the season.  The League 
announced its dismissal of Connelly for neglecting his duties and attempting to umpire while 
                                                 
51 “On Saturday” NA, The Sporting Life, August 4, 1886, 1.  The Philadelphia team’s official 
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inebriated, Egan for general incompetence, and Foley had already submitted a resignation, which 
President Young now accepted.   
The change has not, however, brought about cessation from trouble, as Fulmer alone has 
escaped condemnation.  Ellick has had considerable trouble and narrowly escaped 
mobbing in Washington, which, along with Kansas City, is becoming the worst city in 
the country for umpires; attributable, no doubt, to the managerial indifference or 
incapacity to maintain order during the game, and to the fact that open betting is allowed 
in the ground, a matter to which the attention of the League will be called.53 
 
 
Fulmer arrived ready for action, literally.  “Umpire Fulmer carries a revolver concealed 
upon his person when umpiring a contest.  In every city he obtains a permit to carry the same for 
self protection, from the proper authorities.  So the hoodlums that infest the different grounds 
should give the constable plenty of room.”54  Nor was Fulmer the only umpire to arm himself for 
protection.  In 1889, during a Tri-State League game in Wheeling, West Virginia, an umpire 
named Bartlett feared a mobbing after working a game in a way unsatisfactory to the crowd.  In 
self-defense, he drew a billy club he had concealed for just this occasion.  Ironically, after 
drawing his weapon, he was the one arrested, on the technicality that no one had actually 
threatened him yet.55 
Besides packing a weapon, umpires who were good with their fists might also gain a bit 
of extra respect from potential kickers and bulldozers, as Bob Ferguson proved.  Jack Kerins was 
another such umpire.  A former catcher with Louisville, by 1889 Kerins had retired from play 
and become an umpire.  One paper wrote about him, “Umpire Jack Kerins is the possessor of 
                                                 
53 Ibid. 
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considerable pugilistic ability and, like Ex-Umpire Billy McLean, isn’t troubled with ‘very hard’ 
protests from kicking players.”56 
Ellick, meanwhile, soon realized that umpiring was not his true calling.  “Joe Ellick says 
he is satisfied he was not cut out for an umpire, and will resign as soon as he returns to the west.  
Good for Joe.”57  Another former player, Grace Pearce, took Ellick’s place on the umpiring 
carousel.  The result was that in his first week, “It is said that Chicago and Kansas City have 
already protested against the new umpire, Grace Pearce.”58  Ellick accepted the offer to manage 
Kansas City’s entry in the Western League for 1887, considerably lengthening his life 
expectancy thereby.  His reputation stayed with him, however, as the announcement of his new 
position included a reminder that in his days as an umpire, “his satisfaction rendered was not of a 
universal nature.”  Still, the Cowboy City’s sportswriters believed he would do much better 
running a team than running a game, stating “a better man could not have been secured” and “it 
is expected his services will meet with approval in his new undertaking.”59  Interestingly, when 
his Kansas City Western League team disbanded after the 1888 season, Ellick caught the fever 
again and returned to umpiring.  Commentators did not approve, however, one writing after an 
exhibition series, “Joe Ellick umpired the games, and rubbed it in on the home boys.  Ellick is an 
awful nice fellow, but he is too much afraid of favoring the home team.”60  Regardless, the 
American Association made Ellick its substitute umpire for games in Kansas City in 1889.61 
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As for Grace Pearce, his problems in Kansas City stemmed from bad blood left over from 
a previous encounter with Cowboys manager Dave Rowe.  Once, Pearce worked an exhibition 
game in New Orleans in which, according to Rowe at least,  he had conspicuously refused to call 
any strikes in the final inning of the game, allowing Rowe’s opponents to win by virtue of 
scoring runs via the base on balls.  Rowe, who both played and managed, wasted no time in 
reminding Pearce about New Orleans in his first time at bat, and unpleasant words followed.62  
Surprisingly, Pearce ended up umpiring the deciding game of the 1886 World Series between the 
St. Louis Browns and Chicago White Stockings, although, being a League umpire, working a 
game in an Association city proved very risky for him.  A fellow umpire who was present at the 
game, John McQuaid of the American Association, remarked,  
Grace Pierce, who umpired the last Chicago game, was pulling hard for the White 
Stockings to win, but he wouldn’t have dared to make any rank decisions against the 
Browns, though.  He discovered that fact when he made a bluff as if to give the game to 
the Chicagos . . . the big crowd that circled around him nearly scared the life out of him.  
He thought they were going to mob him sure.  He walked over to where I was sitting on 
the bench beside Mr. Von der Ahe, and I noticed that he was trembling like a leaf.  As 
quickly as possible after he saw the crowd coming down on him he disposed of his white 
cap and snatched my hat from off my head, and then tried to lose himself in the crowd.  
They all had him spotted, though, and, I really believe, had he given the game to the 
Chicagos he would never have gotten out of the grounds alive.63 
 
Wyckoff did not end up on the NL’s staff of arbiters after all, allowing Egan to continue 
for one more week, until replaced by former catcher Phillip “Grandmother” Powers.  (Players 
earned a nickname such as “grandmother” if they gained too strong a reputation for refusing 
strong drink and counseling others to do the same.)  Wyckoff continued his work in the Eastern 
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McQuaid’s given name was John, but his nickname was Jack. 
 301
League for the time being, but engaged to work for the League in 1887.64  He never did appear 
on the field that year, however, as he understandably left umpiring for, presumably, a safer 
position as a traveling agent for a dry goods business in New York City.65  Egan’s dismissal was 
not lamented by observers.  A Boston writer described how Egan called a game between Boston 
and St. Louis a tie, despite the fact it was early in the evening with many hours of daylight 
remaining, just because the Maroons manager, Gus Schmelz, managed to convince him his club 
would miss their train should the game continue.  “When you find a man who either don’t know 
the rules, or else has not the backbone to enforce them, he has missed his calling if he attempts to 
umpire ball games.  Now that is just the case with our friend. . . . There was never a more honest 
umpire than John Egan, but honesty is not everything in umpiring a ball game.”66   
It appears Powers was an upgrade.  Even in Kansas City, known as the worst city in the 
National League for riding umpires in 1886, he received favorable comment from the press.  
“Phil Powers commands more respect from the players than any umpire who has visited this city.  
His decisions are not questioned by either audience or players.  It was amusing to watch Dunlap 
yesterday.  When he had a kick to make he would tell Captain Hanlon.”  When a player as 
notorious for his kicking as Fred Dunlap refused to fight the Powers, it was a sure sign of an 
umpire in charge of the game.67   
These efforts earned the Grandmother another appointment to the NL’s umpiring staff for 
1887, although with the caveat that he would not work any games in Detroit due to complaints 
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from that quarter.  Upon learning of his appointment, cranks in the Wolverine City “were cast 
down with woe . . . it would be some relief if he does not officiate at the Detroit grounds.”68  
Powers appears to have given satisfaction at least most of the time in 1887, as he earned a rare 
compliment for his work in a key Detroit-Chicago series in the Windy City during August.  
“Neither side kicked and that was the best criterion of his skill.”69  Players in the Smoky City of 
Pittsburgh disagreed, however.  After his work in a home series with the White Stockings, 
players of the Pittsburgh nine accosted Powers in the dressing room after the game (umpires 
typically changed back into their street clothes in the clubhouse of the home team), Sam Barkley 
stating, “Powers, I had thought that you were an honest man and a gentleman, but I regret to say 
I have been mistaken.  You are a ----- thief and rascal.  You know that you have robbed us of 
today’s game, and you ----- villain that you are, you made us win Friday’s game twice before 
you would let us have it.”  While the players at least allowed Powers a chance to respond and 
state his case, they were not pleased with his remarks.  Team captain Abner Dalrymple even 
stopped by the home office of The Sporting News to remark, “Powers has roasted us so palpably 
during the last three games, that no other team but ourselves would have stood it.  I am not 
kicking as a means of excuse for our defeat.  Our play on Saturday speaks for itself.  All I 
complain of is that Powers is biased in favor of Chicago, because he wants to see that team 
defeat Detroit.”70   
Small wonder, then, that after the 1887 season ended, Powers resigned from the National 
League’s staff and decided to accept a safer and less stressful engagement as the manager of the 
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London, Ontario club in the International Association.71  Even though National League president 
Nick Young tried to tempt Powers back onto the League’s staff with a healthy raise, Powers 
declined, citing that London was his wife’s home, that she was often ill, and that he had barely 
seen her during the summer months for the past decade.  He also, it appears, harbored thoughts 
of getting back into the game as a player, having last played in 1885.  While it was true that he 
was thirty-three years old at the time, making such a plan seem feasible, given that his career 
OPS+ was a dreadful 38, this seems rather unlikely, but hope sprang eternal in Powers’ mind 
nonetheless.  He stated he intended to catch for the London team he was going to manage, telling 
an interviewer, “Well, I guess I shall be one of the team’s regular catchers.  I’ll jump in there and 
make a record for myself.  Who knows but that I may be catching for a League club the 
following year?”72 
Even the fourth member of the NL’s umpiring staff, John Gaffney, got into trouble in 
New York when Giants captain John Ward accused him of leaning to Detroit’s side.  “For a time 
it looked as if the umpire would be roughly handled, but better judgment prevailed and Mr. 
Gaffney left the field unmolested.”  Gaffney demanded an apology from Ward, did not receive 
one, and then refused to officiate the following day, necessitating a substitute.73  “Umpire 
Gaffney officiated here yesterday and we have no reason to rejoice at his presence in the 
Metropolis. . . . Gaffney declined to act this afternoon, he complaining of the comments of the 
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press and certain remarks from an outsider, but we fail to see in this any valid excuse for his 
failure to respect his contract with the League.”74 
 While Ward, and Cap Anson, too, heaped scorn on Gaffney’s work, other sources were 
more charitable, and in time, observers generally concluded Gaffney the best umpire in baseball, 
even the superior of Bob Ferguson.  In 1886, The Sporting Life’s Philadelphia correspondent 
praised Gaffney by writing, “Gaffney’s umpiring here last week was the finest seen at Recreation 
Park this season.  His judgment of balls and strikes is almost infallible, and leaves no room for 
questioning.  If he umpired anything like as well elsewhere as he did here we cannot for the life 
of us see what Anson and Ward found to kick about.”75  The writer surely knew the answer to his 
own question, however, as Anson kicked about anything and everything, and the whole baseball 
world knew it.  (This helped earn him one of his less flattering nicknames, “the Baby.”)  
Speaking of Anson, one reporter wrote, “This man is a terror to umpires; continually finding 
fault, and rattling a referee if possible. . . . Anson is the cause of the dismissal of more umpires 
than any other person in baseball.”76  Another writer described his bulldozing talents, stating that 
Anson was “of beefy proportions, red-faced, a high-pitched, harsh, grating voice and the bearing 
of a slave-driver, if anyone could terrorize an umpire he is the man. . . . Unlike the kicker, he 
does not growl at a decision and then subside, but sets his teeth and hangs on until the umpire 
yells enough and then lets go.”77 
For many observers, however, Gaffney remained among baseball’s best.  One secret to 
his success was his tremendous energy.  “His base decisions were splendid and the games that he 
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had to umpire were nearly all hard ones.  He takes more interest in a game than any man that 
ever umpired, and he covers more ground than any man in the country.  After a game is finished, 
Gaffney is the weariest man on the field, for the reason that he has done the hardest work.”78 
Given the fact that Gaffney was one of the National League’s few arbiters to hold some 
measure of the public’s confidence, league officials must have been dismayed when he stepped 
down from his position in late August to assume the job of managing the Washington Nationals 
after Mike Scanlon’s resignation.  Whatever his reasons, it seems safe to say that his stress level 
declined drastically, even when one observer quipped, “Gaffney will manage the Washington 
Club from this date on.  If he could umpire the club’s contests he would have a winning team 
sure.”79   
Unlike today, having men switch from umpire to employee of a ball club was not unusual 
in 1886.  In October of 1886, it happened again when “Honest” John Kelly, a former journeyman 
player, moved from American Association umpire to manager of the Louisville Colonels, taking 
the place of Jim Hart in the Falls City.80  Hart did not hold a grudge against Kelly, and in fact, 
hoped the club would prosper under his guidance.  He warned Kelly that, if not, the job of 
Louisville manager would be like “umpiring an endless game, which would decide the 
championship of the world, with two teams composed wholly of Ansons and Comiskeys, with 
the score tied and the mob howling for his blood, as this is the hardest losing city in the 
Association circuit.”81  
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Despite all these difficulties for his fellow arbiters and himself, John Connelly tried to 
come back for more after his dismissal in 1886.  Although the NL had discharged him for 
questionable judgment linked to excessive tippling, he tried for reappointment in 1887, claiming 
to be in excellent condition, dry as a bone, and that he would “do his level best to deserve 
confidence.”82  The National League did not approve his application, but to its misfortune, the 
Central League did in 1888, at least for a time.  “Grace Pearce manages to catch on each year.  
He has been appointed a Central League umpire.  Umpire Connelly has been suspended.”83 
 The American Association had trouble with its umpires as well.  In August of 1886, 
Brooklyn owner Byrne had to call for extra protection for umpire George “Foghorn” Bradley 
after a game, believing the crowd intended violence.84  Bradley’s fellow Association official, 
Mike Walsh, even drew ire from the press for being too deliberate with his calls.  “The games 
Mike Walsh umpires are generally longer than those presided over by other Association umpires, 
because he is a trifle slow and allows too much kicking and bulldozing which consumes time.”85  
Furthermore, “Mike Walsh’s lazy call of ‘low ball’ or ‘strike one’ can hardly be heard in the 
reporters’ stand, while his decisions on plays at first and second are far from being correct.”86 
 Part of the Association’s problem, at least according to one of its umpires, Lon Knight, 
was that the Association did not stand by its men, which is why he had quit by mid-1887.   
When you try to do right in the League they stand by you, but the harder you try to be 
square in the Association the worse they treat you.  Why it’s terrible.  That man Von der 
Ahe is a terror.  He wants you to give his team everything, and then if you don’t, off goes 
your head.  You can’t do anything with his players.  He tells them to do certain things 
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which he knows are not right.  You fine his men for doing them and what good does it 
do?  He pays the fines and has you discharged besides. . . . An umpire cannot command 
the respect of the players in the Association.  If he tries to keep the players within decent 
bounds by fining them they run to their manager.  He decides the umpire is rotten and 
goes to work to have him removed.87 
 
 Clearly, 1886 was a very tough year for umpires.  For 1887, therefore, both leagues 
decided to ease the burden on their officials.  Both the League and the Association agreed that no 
one could question an umpire’s decision save the captain of each team, and that no one could 
leave their proper position on the field to address the umpire unless he requested them to do so.  
Each violation of the news rules equaled a prompt ten dollar fine.  Even as The Sporting Life 
reported this hopeful item, however, the paper was not sure the plan would work.  It ended the 
essay describing the new regulations with the statement, “snatch it while you may, boys, as in 
time you will all undoubtedly strike up against new and unforeseen snags.”88   
Also describing the treatment of officials in 1886, Cleveland writer F.H. Brunell was 
probably near the mark when he wrote, “If the treatment of the umpires of 1886 is to be repeated 
the National game will be in danger.  And every newspaper writer who does not aid in stemming 
such a tide will be a sorry knave.”89  The other voice crying out in the wilderness on this issue 
was fatherly Henry Chadwick, who seconded Brunell in print, writing, “now if the base ball 
reporters will only stop the press abuse of umpires, we shall see the best umpiring done this 
season ever witnessed on the diamond field. . . . What more disgraceful sight can be seen on a 
sporting field than that of witnessing an umpire escorted off the field under the guard of a posse 
of police to protect one man against the assault of a crowd of cowardly bullies?”90 
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 Alas, like so many New Year’s resolutions, this movement by a few sportswriters to ease 
the kicking against umpires did not catch on for the press in general.  Regardless of how players 
behaved on the field, umpires could not fine sportswriters for penning unkind words, and the 
torrent of abuse from writers did not abate noticeably.  This affected the game on the field, as it 
simply encouraged more whining, complaining, and arguing.  This, in turn, made teams fearful 
that well situated patrons would stop coming to games. 
 Despite the attempt at reform, the vitriol hurled at umpires on the field did not improve as 
much as league officials hoped in 1887.  Consider the case of Herm Doescher.  A former player, 
Doescher found himself on the blacklist and out of major league baseball following the 1882 
season.  He was no longer playing by 1887, but by then had managed to return to the game and 
make a fair name for himself as an umpire.  The National League brought him onto its umpiring 
staff in 1887, after all the problems it experienced in 1886, hoping that it had secured a good 
man.  Doescher did not last even one season.  In August he retired from umpiring, justifying his 
decision with words that were all too familiar.  “I’m sick and disgusted with the whole business, 
and the more I see of it the more I hate it.  Everywhere I go there’s an eternal kick, kick, kick.  I 
can’t stand it much longer and I won’t. . . .  There isn’t a man living who can umpire a game 
without being hooted and hissed.  That is going to drive decent men out of the business.”91  
(Doescher reconsidered his decision to quit, however, and umpired in the American Association 
in 1888, as we will see.) 
 Writer O.P. Caylor, in New York by 1887 in the Metropolitans organization, lamented 
that despite the best intentions of baseball’s rule makers the preceding winter, things were no 
better in 1887.  “Something must be done.  The recent joint committee on rules hugged 
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themselves with the idea that they had delivered the suffering umpire from his thraldom, even as 
the Children of Israel were delivered from some place by somebody.”  Rather than liberating 
umpires, however, things were as unsafe and violent as ever, partly because no rules could 
control fan or newspaper behavior.  When the Metropolitans played a game in Baltimore where 
umpire Ted Sullivan did not give satisfaction as far as the men from the Monumental City were 
concerned, “the Baltimore papers took up the war-whoop, and one of them in an inflammatory 
editorial indirectly tried to incite the spectators to riot.”  Consequently, “Sullivan appeared on the 
grounds Wednesday thoroughly scared and asked me to excuse him.  What else could I do?  I 
knew it was almost his life if he went out and gave any Metropolitan player a base on balls or a 
close decision.  The Baltimore team and the Baltimore crowd had it in for him.”92  The same 
week, some in the Detroit press questioned Sullivan as well, saying he had stolen a game from 
their Wolverines and awarded it to Boston with his poor decisions.93  Following those 
difficulties, the New York press got on his case, too, claiming that his miserable work cost the 
home nine a game against Boston on August 16, and as the paper claimed Sullivan’s 
performance was “again disgraceful” we may conclude this was not the first time Gothamites 
questioned his capacity.94 
 Caylor continued to make his case for better treatment of umpires throughout 1887, 
advocating a raise in pay.  He later wrote, “A poor umpire can drive more money away from a 
club’s treasury than three poor players.  But because a good umpire wants $2,000 to risk his life 
and expose himself to ribald abuse for six months he is passed by and some miserable excuse is 
paid $1,200 to break up teams and incite riot every time he tries to sort out the balls and strikes.”  
                                                 
92 “The Umpire Question” O.P. Caylor, The Sporting Life, August 17, 1887, 4. 
93 “From Detroit” MAT, The Sporting Life, August 17, 1887, 4. 
94 “More Than Two To One” NA, New York Times, August 17, 1887, 2. 
 310
As an example of this, he advised baseball’s leaders to “pay umpires a living salary and get men 
who know how to do it.  If John Kelly had been financially encouraged he would have been 
umpiring this season instead of chasing Ramsey and Browning away from the dangerous 
localities of red lights.”95  
Another umpire-related mistake that the American Association made, in retrospect, was 
that in 1887 it paid each umpire a different salary, thus causing some jealousy between the men 
involved but more anger towards the Association for playing favorites when everyone potentially 
risked life and limb each day on the job.  “This season there has been a lot of quiet kicking over 
the inequality of salaries.  Bauer and Curry only get the limit, $1,000, while Ferguson gets 
$1,200 and McQuade $1,400.”96 
Lon Knight was not the only person to see his work and efforts to control the game 
undermined.  Players sometimes got rough with umpires, as an umpire named Lynch discovered 
while working an 1887 game in the New England League, but if the home fans supported the 
player, it was very difficult for the umpire to maintain control of events.  In Lynch’s case, while 
working the Manchester-Lowell game on September 7, Manchester captain John Troy disputed 
one of Lynch’s decisions and cursed him, drawing a ten-dollar fine.  Troy then threatened to 
apply his fist to Lynch’s nose, and the umpire mulcted the player ten dollars more.  Not one for 
idle threats, apparently, “Troy advanced and hit the umpire in the face under the left eye, hard 
enough to raise a bruise.”  Lynch responded by upping the fine twenty-five dollars further before 
leaving the grounds and refusing to continue.  Troy emerged from the incident financially 
unscathed, however, as “what the Manchester public thought of Troy’s act was shown when the 
hat was passed around and enough money chipped in to pay Troy’s fine.”  Furthermore, “his club 
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failed to take any notice whatever of his disgraceful act.”  Following this incident, Lynch 
declared he had had enough and quit.  “In Mr. Lynch the League not only loses its best umpire, 
but one of the best in the country.  Outrageous conduct towards umpires has been frequent 
enough in that League, but this is the first time that an umpire has been struck.”97  (Amazingly, 
Lynch declined to press any charges against Troy, claiming he did not want to take away Troy’s 
means of earning a living, even while Troy’s actions persuaded him to give up his own.98) 
A similar incident took place during the 1888 exhibition season in New Orleans.  There, 
Kid Baldwin of Cincinnati Red Stockings decided the rulings of umpire Tony Suck were not as 
impartial as the Red Stockings deserved, and so the catcher struck Suck in the face.99  (It would 
be easy to poke fun at the aptness of the umpire’s name in this case, but Suck’s surname does 
describe his playing career well enough.  It lasted two major league seasons, with all but seven of 
his career at bats coming in Union Association, which was not really a major league anyway, and 
even competing against such diminished competition, he chalked up a career OPS+ of 24.)  
Baldwin’s actions also drew a rebuke from Henry Chadwick, who lamented that up until that 
point, the Cincinnati players had been exemplars of gentlemanly conduct in Chadwick’s eyes.100 
 There were a few times when baseball’s officials fought back against all the kicking and 
other shenanigans.  “E.F. Youngs, of Genesee, N.Y., has been sued for $5,000.  He struck a 
spectator for making disparaging remarks about his umpiring.”101  While striking cranks might 
not have been wise, using the law on your behalf might work.  It is a wonder that more umpires 
did not imitate one man, named Ullery, who had Sandusky, Ohio, centerfielder Strothers 
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incarcerated after Strothers struck him in the face during an August 30, 1887 game.  After Ullery 
fined him five dollars, Strothers became enraged and smacked Ullery, for which he saw his fine 
quintupled to twenty-five dollars, plus the inside of a jail cell for assault and battery.102  One of 
the best stories about protecting umpires comes to us from Red Bank, New Jersey, where umpire 
Thomas Arrowsmith apparently was not giving satisfaction to the home nine on September 19, 
1887.  When the crowd “tried to put him off the field,” Arrowsmith’s father, who was at the 
grounds, sprang into action to protect his son.  “Arrowsmith’s father, fearing violence, drew a 
pistol and threatened to shoot anyone who attempted to harm his son.  The crowd quickly 
dispersed when Mr. Arrowsmith drew his pistol, and the game was declared off.”103 
 
* * * * * 
 
 One of the most interesting things about all the controversies with umpires is that because 
the sporting papers made so many of them public, and those around the game discussed these 
issues openly, the public knew on whom to focus their ire.  Any literate person could find out 
which arbiters were in public disgrace just from reading a sports newspaper.  The Sporting Life 
frequently printed which umps were hired, and which fired, on a weekly basis.  In its August 18, 
1886 edition, for example, it announced that the Pennsylvania State Association appointed H.M. 
McClure, of Sunbury, Pennsylvania, E.E. Wolfe, of Lewisburg, Pennsylvania, and H.H. Hess of 
Lock Haven, Pennsylvania, while severing ties with W.S. Dean of Lancaster.  Meanwhile, the 
International League suspended W.L. Crofut and appointed C.H. Cushman in his stead.  
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Furthermore, these announcements were front-page news, not buried on page six amidst the 
Binghamton-Utica box scores and news concerning cycling, cricket, and billiards.104  Likewise, 
before the season opened in 1889, the paper even published the schedules of when each umpire 
would be in which city all season long, just as it published schedules for each team, so every 
reader of the paper knew when each man would appear in their city.105 
 Certain teams, players, and cities gained a reputation for exceptionally abusive treatment.  
For the National League’s 1886 season, observers generally agreed that cranks in Kansas City 
went beyond the call of duty in their obnoxious and vile behavior.  National League president 
Nick Young said, “I sent an umpire to Kansas City, which is the worst city in the country for ill-
treating umpires.  He umpired a game, and the people received him so that he telegraphed me his 
resignation that night.”106  To illustrate how bad things were, consider a story told by New York 
Giants manager Jim Mutrie about one game his nine played in that town.  In a tie game, a Kansas 
City batter, second baseman Al “Cod” Myers, launched a deep drive down the right field line.  
Mutrie, standing on the foul line at the time, saw the ball go clearly foul, at least ten feet, in his 
estimation.  The umpire agreed, but the Kansas City cranks did not.  Mutrie tuned to talk to a trio 
of men declaring the ball fair, and when he pointed out that it was not, one man “made a 
dextrous movement with his hand to his hip pocket and drew forth a regular ‘bulldog,’ laid it 
across his knee with the muzzle pointing directly at me and with a stentorian voice asked, ‘What 
was it?’  I looked at him for about one second and answered with all the affability at my 
command, ‘I guess I was mistaken, that surely was a fair ball.’”  Mutrie then went even further to 
smooth things over with the angry, pistol-packing crank by continuing, “I can’t understand why 
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the League doesn’t engage competent umpires so that every club gets its just dues.”  Only a 
hearty handshake from the crank allowed the manager to breathe a sigh of relief.107  The Kansas 
City press, of course, denied that any such event occurred, but the fact that the city’s reputation 
made such a tale believable enough to print in the first place is a good indication of how tough a 
place it was to umpire.108   
 Observers and sportswriters certainly discussed how baseball should protect their arbiters 
from the excessive abuse and violence.  Some thought better pay, which would secure higher 
quality men for the position, was the answer.  Each umpire earned $1,000 for his work in 1886, 
and in 1887, the National League paid the same amount.  This money was on top of traveling 
expenses, of course, which the League also paid.  For 1888, the League did up the pay level to 
$1,500 in an effort to find “a superior class of men” who could “command the respect of players 
and public.”  Considering that even a minor league circuit such as the Western League was 
paying its men $1,000 per season by 1888, it was probably time to improve the remuneration.109  
One Baltimorean wrote, “The best of umpires will receive some abuse, and in consideration of 
this, as well as to induce the best service and place it above temptation, liberal salaries should be 
paid.  These salaries have been altogether too small and entirely out of proportion to the services 
rendered.  It should be great enough to hold to the service such men as Kelly and Ferguson.”  
The same writer went on, “the service is considered by base ball men one of the most important 
to the game . . . and yet the poorest old stick of an ignorant outfielder outranks in salary this 
important officer.  Is it a wonder his authority is so often questioned by his ignorant, lushing 
subordinate?  Good umpires will pay for themselves at the gate, forty times over.”  Finally, 
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“make the salary for good, temperate, intelligent umpires, at least $2,000 and don’t have any 
other at any price.”110  One Detroit writer took his Baltimore associate a step further, writing of 
the National League, “If it expects to secure the services of such men as Gaffney, Daniels, 
Ferguson and others, it should make the salary $2,500.  Get four of the best men in the country, 
pay them enough to make them perfectly independent and let them take hold of their work 
without fear or favor, and with the understanding that they are not to be removed except for 
drunkenness or crookedness.”111   
One major league did indeed do so for 1888, but it was the American Association, as that 
body swooped in to net prized umpires Herm Doesher and Gaffney at a cost of $2,500 each.112  
Not only did the Association offer these prime umpires generous salaries, it also agreed that it 
would only remove the men for certain causes, which had to be stated in writing, and that the 
men had the opportunity to testify in their own defense should such an event occur.  The purpose 
here, clearly, was to prevent certain team officials and managers from criticizing an umpire and 
demanding his release out of sheer spite for a few unpopular decisions.113 
 Interestingly, when the Association corralled the best umpire talent for 1888, this put 
pressure on the League.  Not only did the public believe that the League’s staff of umpires was 
inferior, but prospective League umpires were no longer willing to work for the relative peanuts 
that the NL had offered its men in the past.  Feeling themselves on a par, status-wise, with the 
Association’s staff of umpires, $1,500 did not look as enticing to possible National League 
arbiters as it had in the past.114  Two men that the NL targeted for its staff, Billy Furlong and 
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Wesley Curry, declined the League’s offer of $1,500 plus expenses.  Curry made a counteroffer 
back to Nick Young, but Young declined, fearing the increased expense.115 
 It did not take long for the National League to begin feeling the heat.  By the end of the 
first week of the season, observers challenged its men for perceived incompetence.   
The League staff is composed of some very poor material, and it becomes more apparent 
every day that League patrons are going to have a monkey and parrot time this season.  
At Indianapolis fisticuffs are indulged in, and the spectacle is presented of a man who 
should know and do better urging the fighters on. . . . But in Pittsburg the most pitiable 
and contemptible spectacle of all was witnessed, where the crouching, cringing, skulking, 
slinking Decker tried to umpire. . . . It is said that Decker is a relative of Nick Young.  
That may account for his appointment.  But it is certainly no excuse for his retention.  Get 
somebody in his place who is at least suspected of sincerity.116 
 
Decker denied any relation to Young, (although later correspondence between the two men 
revealed that they were friends) but to complete the story, the fisticuffs in Indianapolis resulted 
from an incident where Paul Hines attempted to obscure the view of Chicago’s reserve catcher 
Del Darling and prevent him from catching a throw at home plate.  “Darling made two attempts 
to push Hines away, and failing in that, struck him a smart blow on the back.  That Hines stood 
there with the intention of balking Darling, I have Hines’ own word.”  Shortly afterwards, 
Chicago baserunner Marty Sullivan intentionally collided with Hoosier first baseman Dude 
Esterbrook as Sullivan attempted to round first base and head towards second.  (Despite his 
dandified nickname, Esterbrook appears to have been no stranger to the rough and tumble.  
Described as a “husky duck,” he once “wiped the floor” with umpire John Kelly after a game in 
which Kelly fined him twice.117) The men went down, got back up, and then the Dude struck 
Sullivan three times in the gut.  As Sullivan was already out, his fly ball caught by the Hoosier 
outfield, there was really no reason for him to be in such a position.  This physical play resulted 
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in a general brawl between the two nines, with Chicago’s captain Anson the instigator. In an 
effort to return the favor the next day, Esterbrook slid into, and past, second base to break up a 
double play.  He collided with Chicago second baseman Fred Pfeffer “and knocked him four or 
five feet from the bag.”118   
 Others, especially in Detroit, agreed that Decker was incompetent, but one took a novel 
tack and tried to profit from his lack of skill.  Horace Watkins, the Detroit manager, believed 
Decker favored the home nine consistently.  Therefore, he wired to National League president 
Nick Young, “for heaven’s sake send this man to Detroit.  I will guarantee that we won’t lose a 
game.”119 
 Indianapolis joined in the criticism of the National League’s quartet.  One Hoosier 
sportswriter believed League umpire John Valentine was a decent umpire, but “Lynch, who 
followed Valentine, is rather to be pitied than censured.  He is simply awful.  That he is honest, 
however, is very clear, and that he is wholly incompetent is a fact to be deplored.”  Later, he 
wrote, “Mr. Lynch is one of the worst I ever saw.  Lynch is one of those fellows who, when they 
make a rank bad decision, always try to even up by making a worse one against the other side.”  
Lynch’s problem was not partiality, therefore.  “Lynch did not beat Indianapolis out of a game so 
far as I can remember . . . his work was simply that of a man who didn’t understand his 
business.”  Decker was another matter.  While “he is not a fool and is a very pleasant gentleman 
personally . . . that he is regarded as thoroughly dishonest by a large percentage of the people 
who saw his work here cannot be disputed.”  Decker reinforced this feeling when, “in the 
opening Boston game he made the worst decision against the home team that has been seen in 
Indianapolis in ten years, and at once aroused the old suspicion that he was crooked.”  Thus, the 
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writer concluded, “President Young made a serious mistake in allowing all of the best umpires to 
leave the League for no other reason than that they were high-priced.”120 
 By June, the continual complaints against Decker forced Young to remove him from the 
National League’s staff.  The League was actually lucky in this regard, as it replaced Decker 
with “Honest” John Kelly.  Although he began the year as the manager in Louisville, the team 
had started very badly (a 10-29 record as of June 7) and was now under new management, so 
Kelly decided to resign and return to his old trade of umpire.  National League observers 
nationwide rejoiced at the upgrade.121  In Washington, “John Kelly’s umpiring has been the best 
seen here this season.  His decisions are not questioned, and there is the absence of ‘that kicking’ 
which always mars the beauty of the game.  Kelly received a rousing send off from the lovers of 
base ball when he made his initial appearance on the field, and his success as the finest and best 
umpire was noted by the spectators from the start.”122  Kelly actually worked an entire week in 
the same locale without incurring any wrath in the nation’s capital, a truly rare feat.  “Kelly 
continued to umpire the games last week as only he can, and the result is perfectly plain.  Every 
body is satisfied.  ‘We want Kelly to umpire again when the boys get back home’ has been 
frequently heard.”123 
 Closing the circle and returning to the Association’s staff in 1888, things did not turn out 
quite as rosy as the Association’s moguls intended.  That Gaffney was the top umpire in the 
circuit, no one seemed to doubt.  Most continued to express their entire confidence in his work.  
McQuaid, for the most part, escaped comment in the press, also a good sign.  A few clubs 
complained about Ferguson’s work at times.  His reputation for honesty remained impregnable, 
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but there were complaints about his decisions on the bases, which some blamed on advancing 
age.  The weakest link in the quartet was clearly Herm Doescher.  Several teams complained of 
his work, especially Cincinnati, accusing him of harboring a spirit of revenge towards those who 
criticized him.  This, combined with his liberality in assessing fines, made him the Association’s 
most unpopular and heavily criticized arbiter of 1888.  This led one sportswriter to state, “I am 
glad for the sake of base ball that he is scheduled away from Cincinnati the balance of the 
season, for with the passions of the ‘cranks’ warmed against him he might be numbered with the 
victims who have been mobbed by the hot-heads in years gone by.”124 
 Later in 1888, some in St. Louis accused Doescher of a much more serious offense than 
simply handing out fines for trifling reasons.  A story circulated that he had tried to share the 
signs of the Cincinnati club with the Philadelphia Athletics, in order to help the Athletics 
overtake the St. Louis Browns for the American Association championship.  Cincinnati manager 
Gus Schmelz, although he believed Doescher had nothing to do with the scheme, did admit to 
receiving an anonymous telegram from Philadelphia warning him that something was afoot, and 
that his team should change its signs for the series.125  It turned out, however, that the story was 
simply another example of Chris Von der Ahe in St. Louis envisioning all possible schemes to 
thwart his beloved Browns from a fourth consecutive Association pennant, and nothing more. 
 The Association decided to reduce the salaries of its men after 1888, on the theory that 
while the overall umpiring performance had given adequate satisfaction, the Association could 
get equal satisfaction at a lower price.  The National League’s decision to employ men of inferior 
reputation actually helped in this regard, because while the work of the League’s men had not 
always been up to par, the games had gone on all the same, and now the Association believed it 
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could get umpiring that was good enough without paying each man $1,000 more for the 
privilege.126  This caused much wailing and gnashing of teeth on the part of the Association’s 
supporters, one opining, “In no previous season had the Association so little trouble 
comparatively as last season. . . . The idea of lowering the salary of an umpire . . . is as big a 
blunder as any committed in base ball legislation for some years past, and the Association will 
realize the fact before the close of the season of 1889.”127 
 
* * * * * 
 
Other baseball observers advocated different measures to protect umpires, besides 
increasing their pay in order to attract better ones.  Some writers thought more police protection 
at the grounds, including giving the police greater authority to remove unruly spectators, was a 
positive step, along with the related notion of barring all kicking from team captains and players, 
backed by a system of fines for violations of the rule.128  One team actually tried this tack, and 
reported success.  In 1889, Kansas City’s President Speas instructed his men not to kick over the 
decisions of the umpires under any circumstances.  As a result, “Ferguson has had an easier time 
than he has ever had before. . . . It does seem that an umpire would try to do better work if he 
knew that his decision was going to be unprotested.”129  While many did endorse the idea of 
more protection for umpires and less kicking by players, no other teams joined the Cowboys in 
their reform movement, however, and as a result, within about two months president Speas 
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allowed his men to resume acting like petulant children, and the idea of allowing umpires to 
officiate unhindered by controversy died stillborn. 
Some wanted to go beyond the protection offered by police, as  
experience in Baltimore has proved that a good barbed-wire fence surrounding the stands 
and cutting off spectators entirely from the field is better. . . . not a single disturbance has 
occurred since it was placed there, though it happened often before and gave Baltimore a 
very undesirable name.  When a rowdy, carried away by excitement, attempts to climb a 
barbed-wire fence to punch the head of the umpire, he suddenly thinks better of it and has 
all he can do to rub the scratches on his anatomy.130   
 
Although greater police protection was a good idea in theory, it was not always so in fact.  
Looking to more police protection was a questionable strategy at times because the police 
themselves were questionable at times.  In the late nineteenth century, police were not typically 
well-trained professionals.  It is more accurate to think of them as men who were willing to get a 
little bit rough in their efforts to enforce the law.  In addition, like many workers of this era, their 
recompense was not always sufficient to meet their daily needs, and so, sometimes, they would 
strike for better working conditions, leaving teams with no extra protection.  This was a problem 
in Cincinnati in 1887, and so the Red Stockings decided “all the police at the ball park will be 
signed on regular contracts.  Last year they struck too often and this new departure will prevent 
any such trouble.”131   
The inverse of this situation, the unwillingness of some clubs to pay for any police to 
keep order at games, also caused problems.  Early in the 1889 season, umpire Charley Daniels 
did not give satisfaction as far as Louisville patrons were concerned.  More than one thousand of 
them rushed the field after one decision, forcing Daniels to retreat into his dressing room while 
things calmed down.  Things took quite some time to calm down, however, because “the police 
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service at the park this year is very poor, owing to Manager Davidson’s economical policy.”132  
(For more on Mordecai Davidson and his mismanagement of Louisville in 1888 and 1889, see 
chapter seventeen.) 
Another idea, actually implemented by the Players League when it began play in 1890, 
was to place a second umpire on the field, so that the umpire at home plate could call balls and 
strikes and be responsible for making decisions on plays at third base, and the other could watch 
the action on the right side of the diamond and make the calls at first and second base.133  
Baseball tried this experiment, known at the time as the double umpire system, for the 1887 
Detroit-St. Louis World Series, and all observers seemed to agree the experiment was a success.  
Many clamored for someone to try the double umpire system for 1888, and Cleveland writer 
F.H. Brunell advised the National League to do so that year, especially after it lost out to the 
American Association for the best umpiring talent.  As Brunell wrote, “outgeneraled in my hunt 
for umpirical talent I’d hire eight of the next best men and give the double system a good fair 
trial.  It is the system of the future and a season’s trial will knock out the old way of doing 
things.”134  The League did not do so, apparently decided that hiring a second set of officials, 
which would have cost each club somewhere in the neighborhood of $600, was not worth having 
its games umpired more accurately. 
In the meantime, in the absence of a second umpire John Gaffney did some innovating.  
He tried a new technique in his placement on the field.  Standard practice was for the umpire to 
stand behind the batter and catcher, as the home plate umpire still does in baseball today.  In 
1888, however, Gaffney began umpiring games by standing behind the pitcher when men were 
                                                 
132 “Disgruntled Louisville” NA, The Sporting News, April 27, 1889, 2. 
133 “An Umpire Suggestion” Marc, The Sporting Life, November 17, 1886, 1. 
134 “Needless Interference” F.H.Brunell, The Sporting Life, December 7, 1887, 4. 
 323
on base.  This allowed him to judge balls and strikes with accuracy, yet still be near enough to 
the bases when tag plays took place against base runners that he could render an accurate 
decision.  Observers contended this led to a significant reduction in kicking by players and 
spectators alike.135  Many baseball people found this innovation such a capital improvement over 
the standard practice that, at once, the Association circulated a paper amongst its club presidents 
asking for their views on using the experimental system as part of league policy.  Even team 
executives who had criticized certain umpires harshly in the past thought it would help.  “Messrs. 
Byrne, Barnie, Williams, and Von der Ahe unite in pronouncing it the best system of umpiring 
ever devised, and superior even to the two-umpire system—which received such a satisfactory 
trial in the last world’s championship series—in that the expense is less, there is no divided 
authority and the results are equally good.”  Equally miraculously, “the players also pronounce it 
excellent.”136  National League president Nick Young was impressed enough that he directed one 
of his own officials, John Valentine, to try the plan in the National League, and if that proved a 
success, he would instruct all League umpires to use the “Gaffney system.”137 
By 1889, however, this practice waned.  Some, such as John Rogers in Philadelphia, 
criticized it because, when standing behind the pitcher, the umpire had a difficult time judging 
whether a ball hit down the third or first base line was fair or foul.  As a result, National League 
president Young ordered Gaffney and his brethren back behind home plate at all times, once 
again making an accurate call on tag plays at bases little better than a coin flip.  This, of course, 
led to a new chorus of voices calling for the double umpire system.138 
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Gaffney also called for a second innovation in an effort to improve the lot of his brethren.  
Umpires had long had the power to fine players, but as mentioned previously, this threat did not 
carry much force because team management often paid the fines of its players.  Gaffney 
reasoned, therefore, that if umpires were the recipients of the fines, rather than the league, any 
problems with kicking that umpires might have would go away very quickly.  “Here’s the way 
some of the gentlemanly players will argue: ‘Well, I’ll not open my head to that sucker and let 
him fine me a tenner.’  If such a rule were made the players would cease ‘kicking,’ if for no other 
reason than to prevent the umpire profiting by any act of theirs.”  When a listener queried 
Gaffney on whether this might lead to a situation of umpiring for personal profit, he replied, “In 
the four years that I have been umpiring my fines amount to $165, $100 of which I put on Anson 
for using vile epithets.  Let them adopt that rule on Monday, and in one month a ball game will 
be as orderly as a prayer meeting.”139 
Neither the League nor the Association adopted Gaffney’s plan for 1889, but they did 
change one rule in an effort to reduce kicking and keep the games moving.  Players guilty of 
verbal abuse of the umpire, or engaging in other acts of excessive kicking, now faced ejection 
from the game.140  Not only would this hurt the team’s chances to win, as its starting players 
tended to be the best players, but given that most clubs had but one or two substitutes besides 
pitchers and catchers at any given time, losing a man might force a club to play men in 
unaccustomed positions, greatly compromising its defense.  The one other reform in this line that 
the National League attempted in 1889 was to use the double umpire idea, but for only one game 
each day.  Whichever series of games president Nick Young believed was most important, he 
dispatched a second man to officiate in that location for the duration of the series.  This was both 
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helpful, as one game out of four each day had better officiating, but also harmful, as the six other 
teams not sharing in the bounty were left wondering why they were considered inferior.141 
 Other suggestions ranged from the practical to the comedic.  One writer wondered, “How 
would the cooper, Graham, who went through Niagara whirlpool in a barrel, do for an umpire, to 
be permanently located at Washington.  True, he may know nothing about base ball, but then he 
has lots of nerve, which requisite so many umpires seem to be lacking.”142 
 Perhaps intrigued by the idea that bravery and fortitude mattered more for umpires than 
an intimate knowledge of the rules of the game, Louisville tried a variant of this idea for a 
November 1886 exhibition game in California at the Alameda Grounds.  They tabbed the 
heavyweight champion of the world, John L. Sullivan, to preside that day.  Technically, Sullivan 
did not umpire the game, as the throng of cranks, reported at 18,000 strong, mobbed the field just 
to get a look at the celebrated pugilist.  Arrayed against this vast multitude and trying to keep 
order was “the entire police force of Alameda, consisting of as many as seven men and a short, 
but stout chief” who “worked sedulously to scatter the mob, but in vain.”  The Louisville club 
did eventually play ball against the local nine, but only after Sullivan departed the scene.143   
The heavyweight champion apparently harbored visions of baseball glory, however, later 
opposing the Louisville team as a pitcher for its California opponents, but “his pitching was not 
very effective and he gave way to Raymond in the third inning.  Sullivan’s delivery is extremely 
slow, and curves are apparently unknown to the pugilistic champion.”  The champ then switched 
to third base, where his defensive skills earned similar comparisons to his pitching, but he did 
manage a hit off of Louisville (on loan for the exhibitions from St. Louis) pitcher Dave 
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“Scissors” Foutz.  Sullivan, despite a gait described as “lumbering,” then stole second and third 
base, eventually coming around to score one of two runs for the “Sullivan Nine” on the day.144 
 The Sporting News once joked, “An American base ball player was in Belfast when the 
recent riot broke out.  When he saw clubs flourishing and heard pistols popping he began to grow 
homesick.  When the excitement subsided he asked a stranger if the umpire had escaped.”145  The 
paper also deadpanned that “Tweedle’s patent umpire trap will be in use next season.  It consists 
of a trap-door, down which the umpire can at any moment disappear, and by an underground 
passage get away from the mob that thirsts for his gore.”146  Not stopping there, “the Czar of 
Russia gets a bigger salary than a base ball umpire, but his life is not in such imminent 
danger.”147  (Recall that Tsar Alexander II was assassinated just five years prior, in 1881.)  In 
addition, “life insurance companies now rate the base ball umpire in the ‘extremely hazardous’ 
class, along with men who work in dynamite factories” and “a scrupulous umpire in Oneida 
fined himself seventy-five cents for a wrong decision.  He should kick and curse himself, to 
make himself feel perfectly natural.”148   
 The most exotic idea of all, but sadly, also the most racist idea of all, came courtesy of Al 
Spalding’s tour of the world in 1888-1889.  (See chapter fifteen.)  When one paper learned the 
tour would stop in Australia, it stereotyped the native Australians, turning them into Zulus for the 
amusement of the paper’s readers, then writing, “a black-and-tan umpire clad in fearlessness and 
a bath towel, with his shield and assegai instead of the usual mask and cane, would lend a sort of 
éclat to the game. . . . Then, too, it would be more realistic and probably more effective if the 
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umpire, when Buck Ewing would kick about a called ball, were to transfix him with an assegai 
instead of the usual $25 fine.”149 
 Recognizing that efforts to improve the lot of the umpires were, by and large, failing, The 
Sporting News printed a sympathetic mock dialog between a gun store owner and a young man 
set on a career in umpiring. 
Man: “I’ll take two of those largest revolvers you showed me yesterday. . . .  and just throw in 
three boxes of cartridges.” 
Clerk: “Anything else?” 
Man: “Yes, I want a long knife with a broad hilt.” 
Clerk: “Anything else?” 
Man: “Keep hand grenades?” 
Clerk: “Yes; how many do you want?” 
Man: “Half a gross of the largest size.” 
Clerk: “What else?” 
Man: “A lined breast-plate, if you have it, and you might toss in a small hand-axe.” 
Clerk: “Must be going to hurt somebody, eh?” 
Man: “Not necessarily.  And while you are about it just wrap up a repeating rifle with a gross of 
explosive bullets.” 
Clerk: “Going after O’Brien?” 
Man: “No, no.  Got any torpedoes?” 
Clerk: “Don’t keep ‘em.  What are you going to do with all this truck?” 
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Man: “I’ve just hired out as umpire in Baltimore and I want to prepare myself for some close 
games.”150 
 
* * * * * 
 
 The apparently sincere comments of men like Brunell and Chadwick aside, it was a bit 
hypocritical for the sporting papers to talk about protecting umpires, as they certainly contributed 
to the problem.  By describing the performance of the umpires on a weekly basis, and printing 
the names of those men whose work the writers found lacking, they only encouraged the cranks 
in their abuse.  The fact that sportswriters often justified the unruly behavior of players and fans, 
or made excuses for it in their columns, did little to curb that behavior.  It is probably naïve to 
expect that the players would refrain from the occasional episode of kicking, given that most 
were fierce competitors playing a competitive sport, but there was no need for the sporting press 
to encourage the fans to emulate the players.  Presumably, it made good copy for the papers, but 
to denounce violence on the one hand, and do things that tolerated, or even encouraged, violence 
on the other, seems a Janus-like strategy on their part. 
 Some commentators were brave enough to point out this hypocrisy.  A piece written for 
The Sporting Life in 1886 called out other columnists for their contributions to the problem while 
also offering some practical solutions.  The writer offered that writers frequently blamed umpires 
for a loss, and were loath to forgive them their mistakes while being much more magnanimous 
towards players when they erred.  This eroded public confidence in baseball’s officials while 
giving more ammunition to the kickers on each team.  The writer’s advice to his brethren was 
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“gentlemen, if you expect to get the best service you must choose competent and honest men, 
and then treat them as though you had confidence that they were competent and honest, and it 
remains with you more than anyone else whether the umpiring system shall be made more 
successful and satisfactory than at present.”  Even though the author put other writers at the top 
of his enemies list, he echoed former umpire Lon Knight by writing that team managers also 
deserved some heat for not standing up for umpires and making too many official complaints to 
the league office, which could result in an umpire’s dismissal.  Finally, the author recommended 
less turnover in the umpiring staff of each league, as less turnover allowed the players and 
umpires more time to become accustomed to each other and would reduce the misunderstandings 
that occasionally resulted from unfamiliarity.151 
 Even though umpires realized the power of the press to make or break their reputation, 
there was very little they could do about it.  As an International League umpire, Ben Young, put 
it, “his rise and fall, his ups and downs, depend not so much on his own individual work as on 
the favor or disfavor of the press.  No matter how much the crowd may howl on day of games, 
let the newspapers say ‘he’s all right’ and the grievances of yesterday become the graces of to-
day.”  A few team managers of baser morality even used this to try to win more home games.  
One, Charles Cushman, who managed Toronto in the International Association, got caught red-
handed in this practice in 1888.  An umpire, by mere chance, intercepted a letter Cushman wrote 
to the Toronto Mail.  “The Toronto papers, instead of roasting the umpire, gave [Jerry] Sullivan a 
fair show by complimenting him.  This so enraged Cushman that he instanter wrote a letter to the 
editor of the Toronto Mail imploring him to roast Sullivan and all umpires that refused to favor 
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Toronto.  If this were done, said Cushman, the umpires will weaken and the pennant will fly in 
Toronto again.”152 
 Unbelievably, Cushman was not the worst manager in the International Association, 
according to Young.  That distinction belonged to Buffalo’s manager, John Chapman.  Young 
wrote,  
He caused my release in order to give Jack Remsen a livelihood.  It was supposed that 
Remsen would prove himself grateful by favoring Chapman and Buffalo.  To Remsen’s 
credit it must be said he did nothing of the kind, but did the best he knew how.  The 
second and last day of Jack’s career the crowd in Bisontown imagined that Remsen was 
doing them up.  It was evident to me, who was sitting in the grand stand, that the crowd 
meant business, and that Remsen needed protection after the game.  What then was my 
surprise at the conclusion of the game to see Chapman walk up to Remsen white as a 
sheet, and instead of offering him his arm for protection, began gesticulating in a wild 
manner and denounced him most severely for his umpiring.  The crowd needed not to 
look for a leader. . . . Chapman now turns Remsen over to the mob, while he himself 
sneaks toward the dressing room.  Remsen was struck with bottles and cushions rather 
freely and would have been struck with fists but for the police that arrived in time to save 
his life.153 
 
 A Buffalo associate of Chapman later wrote to The Sporting Life to refute Young’s story, 
although interestingly, he never denied the events concerning Remsen (whose umpiring career 
was rather short, as by the next season he was managing the Mansfield, Ohio, ball club).  Rather, 
the author sought to impugn Young’s umpiring abilities, even going so far as to suggest Young 
was once an inmate in a Cleveland insane asylum.154  Whatever the truth of the matter, this story 
demonstrates that umpires, whether major league or minor league, always seemed to be in some 
kind of danger, and dealt with enough hostility that people could easily believe a story such as 
that put forth by Young. 
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 The case of much-maligned Ted Sullivan was another case in point.  Regardless of his 
abilities to officiate a baseball game, it is hard not to feel a little sympathy for the man.  When he 
signed on to work games in the American Association midway through 1887, he arrived with a 
fine reputation based on his work in the International League.  Unfortunately, he started his 
major league umpiring career in Baltimore, which in 1887 had “attained unenviable notoriety for 
its treatment of even the best umpires.”  Furthermore, when he came to town to work games in 
the Monumental City, the Orioles were on a losing streak, so it was even easier than usual for the 
frustrated fans and players to scapegoat him for their continued woes.  The Baltimore press raked 
him over the coals, and he became rattled, making the problem worse.  When cranks at his next 
stop, New York, read the bad press given him in Baltimore and found that he was working the 
next set of games involving the Metropolitans, they became prejudiced against his work before 
he even set foot on the field, expecting the worst with every call and eager to jump down 
Sullivan’s throat over the first close call that did not go their way.  Unsurprisingly, this treatment 
rattled Sullivan once again, and he could not umpire consistently.  Fans in Philadelphia acted the 
same way, with the same results there.  “Sullivan couldn’t please no matter how hard he tried 
and the Philadelphia crowds settled him; he quit.”155 
 There was another man named Sullivan who umpired in the National League that same 
year, the recently mentioned Jerry Sullivan, and he must have empathized with his namesake, 
because his story was almost the same.  After getting some ribbing from the Detroit press, he 
traveled east to work games in Boston.  When the home nine went down to defeat one Monday 
in August, the crowd was ready to lay the blame on Sullivan.  “All through the game he had been 
hooted at and guyed, and at the conclusion he would have been roughly handled but for the 
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interference of [Mike] Kelly, who, with the assistance of a policeman, escorted him to the 
dressing-room.  As it was, a number of stones were thrown by small boys, one of which struck 
Sullivan in the head.”156   
The Boston press believed the attack justified, however, as one wrote that Sullivan “is 
playing tenth man on Jim Mutrie’s nine just at present.  He was with us only a few days, thank 
fortune, when his grip was checked for other fields, on which he will show what he don’t know 
about base ball umpiring.”  While the writer, of course, did not “excuse the acts of rowdyism in 
the least,” he then immediately excused the rowdyism by writing, “no one who saw the game 
will deny it, that this weak-backed Mr. Sullivan was the cause of all the disturbance and wholly 
to blame by being simply a puppet in the hands of Buck Ewing. . . . How could it be otherwise 
than exasperating for an immense home gathering to see the captain of a visiting team pull the 
strings which worked the umpire.”157  Perhaps Sullivan should have modeled himself after 
American Association umpire Wesley Curry, who in one game that year fined Cincinnati 
shortstop Frank Fennelly nine times, to the tune of twenty-five dollars per offense.  This gave 
rise to the story that Fennelly was intoxicated for the game, as clearly, only someone of reduced 
mental capacity would continue arguing under the circumstances.158 
 The old man of the game, Henry Chadwick, pointed out additional problems with the 
press blaming umpires for nearly every loss by the home nine.  He agreed that “one cannot pick 
up a daily paper containing Associated Press dispatches of games played out of town without 
reading that this or that club lost the game by the wretched umpiring of So-and-so” but he 
believed the best remedy was for umpires to sit on the kickers promptly and fine them liberally.  
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Chadwick also believed, however, that one reason the press treated umpires with such 
remorseless criticism was that they frequently bet on games and lost, and needed to take out their 
frustrations for psychological reasons and get back at someone for costing them money.  “As it is 
now, with the latitude allowed to kicking and with press criticism of umpires, generally written 
by scribes who bet on the games they write about, satisfactory work by umpires is out of the 
question.”159  This practice of writers betting on games may not have been an isolated one, 
either.  “In Topeka and other Western League cities base ball reporters have fallen into the 
reprehensible habit of betting on the ball games which they are called upon to report.  Is a correct 
and impartial report possible under such circumstances?”160 
 Hypocrisy or not, one reason, in addition to simple common decency, that observers 
wanted better protection for umpires was the fear of losing the few quality arbiters they had.  
Chick Fulmer, considered one of the best of the lot in the National League after his midseason 
appointment in 1886, considered giving up his position within half a season of joining the 
umpiring ranks, claiming he was tired of the abuse.161  Fulmer made this statement despite a 
reputation for fairness that decreased complaining from the contestants.  “Charlie Fulmer, of the 
old Athletics, officiated as umpire and gave general satisfaction; he possesses one very good 
quality in being firm in his decisions. . . . The games were well conducted and without any 
kicking of any kind from either side.”162  Rather than take the abuse any longer, Fulmer went 
into public service instead, gaining election as a magistrate for the city of Philadelphia in 1887.  
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This new position tripled his salary, to $3,000 per year (for a five-year term) plus 
“perquisites.”163 
 Additionally, but usually in vain, some papers tried to point out how difficult a job 
umpires had.  The New York Times tried to remind its readers that “the umpire has to perform 
functions incomparably more incessant and important than in any other popular pastime . . . but 
accusations against him of partiality or deliberate violations of the rules are probably unjust in 
nine cases out of ten, the real difficulty being that of seeing with precision all that is going on.”  
In addition, the Times pointed out that seeing plays at second base that required a tag of the 
runner, especially when players on first base attempted to steal second base, was immensely 
difficult.  Finally, the paper acknowledged the rough play and poor sportsmanship that existed in 
the game, and how umpires tended to take the brunt of the bad sportsmanship and complaining 
no matter what else they did right.  “The umpire’s difficulties are further increased by the 
prevailing doctrine that all tricks are fair in baseball, as in war, and that a game that cannot be 
won squarely may be won by hook or crook. . . . Hoodwinking and bulldozing the umpire thus 
becomes a part of the game.”164 
 Furthermore, imagine the dismay of baseball officials and observers when the rare 
umpire they actually liked lost his position.  Such was the case with “Honest” John Valentine, 
who worked American Association games in 1886 to the general satisfaction of most observers.  
When the Association did not retain him for 1887, many papers and writers wondered why.  
Even Chris Von der Ahe, the mercurial owner who never shied away from controversy with 
anyone who did not support his beloved St. Louis Browns, expressed his surprise.  “I have liked 
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his umpiring all along and last season it was remarkably good. . . . I tell you good umpires are 
hard to get and no changes ought to be made as long as the staff gives satisfaction.”165  Evidently 
agreeing with Von der Ahe’s assessment, the National League decided to swoop in and nab 
Valentine for their staff for 1888.   
Valentine had a narrow escape in Philadelphia in August that year after some 
controversial calls aided in the defeat of the home nine in a game with the Boston Beaneaters, as 
“a crowd of men and boys waited on Broad street for Valentine to leave the ground, but they 
missed him.”166  The New York Times speculated he was trying to redeem himself in the next 
series, when the New York Giants came to town, because his work did not give satisfaction then, 
either.  “The crowd in an instant saw that he was treating New York unfairly, and when he 
presented Philadelphia with the runs he was roundly hissed.  It is a rare thing for a Philadelphia 
crowd to hiss an umpire for favoring the home club, but today was an exception to the rule.”167  
This demonstrates that even a good man was at risk if he found himself in the wrong city on the 
wrong day. 
 Valentine was certainly a tough customer.  Any umpire had to be, but in 1887, he proved 
his ability to go beyond the call of duty, as he umpired several games after breaking his arm.  
Finally, however, he succumbed to the pain and asked for leave to recuperate.  The National 
League literally heaped insult on top of injury at this point as, true to the expectations about 
workplace safety in Gilded Age America, the League refused to compensate him for his time 
missed while injured on the job, claiming its constitution made no provision for such situations.  
Even though Valentine was hurt through no fault of his own, an errant pitch doing the deed, he 
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had to get by without compensation during the down time, as baseball law considered this risk 
part of his job.  Some of the sporting press actually sympathized with an umpire for once when it 
got wind of Valentine’s plight.168  The League finally gave in and allowed him eighteen days pay 
for the time he was out with injury, but not until its meeting in November of that year.169 
 There was, believe it or not, one bright spot for baseball’s arbiters beginning in 1887, as 
the idea of wearing a mask for protection started to gain traction.  Umpire Doescher summed up 
the prevailing viewpoint when he stated, “I am wearing a mask for the first time, and I don’t like 
it, because it is hard for me to see all the points, though, of course, it is a protection.  I have had 
my face all battered up this season already, and only a couple of weeks ago had to have stitches 
put in my neck where I was hit with a ball, so I thought it was about time for me to adopt some 
protection.”170  This idea caught on, although there were limits to just how far a man would go.  
Prior to the 1889 season, a Western League umpire named Sandy McDermott decided to don a 
set of protective gear that the sporting papers described as “a suit of armor.”  It consisted of a 
chest protector and facemask with steel ribs covered over with stout bull’s hide, along with shin 
guards made from the same material.  While this sounds suspiciously similar to the modern attire 
of the home plate umpire, it was a little before its time and did not catch on immediately.171 
 
* * * * * 
 
 What, exactly, did umpires do to anger fans and players so much?  Of course, any game 
where too many close decisions went against the home nine invited the crowd’s anger.  This has 
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always been true of any sporting match that requires split-second calls on the part of its arbiters.  
There were also, however, enough actual examples of favoritism that it brought disrepute on the 
honesty and ability of all members of the profession.  A few examples will suffice to show why 
teams, players, and spectators alike felt so much outrage at times. 
 In 1885, Boston engaged in a cross-league exhibition match with the Brooklyn Grays 
following the end of the championship season.  All seemed on the up-and-up until the last inning.  
Brooklyn led 5-4 as the ninth inning opened.  The umpire, Mr. West, decided the game should 
proceed.  Boston opened with a hit, suffered an out, but their next batter tripled to tie the game.  
At this point, only two minutes into the ninth inning, West decided to call the game because of 
darkness.  This caused the score to revert to what it had been at the conclusion of the last 
completed inning, giving Brooklyn a 5-4 victory.  Even the home Brooklyn cranks, “whose 
better judgment was not obscured by partisanship,” kicked over the clearly partial decision.  That 
same day, Brooklyn’s neighbors from New York, the Metropolitans, crossed the Hudson River 
into New Jersey for an exhibition game with Newark, where “they suffered the same fate that has 
befallen so many clubs visiting that city.  Umpire Ketcham took sides with the home team early 
in the game, and amused himself by calling men out at first when the ball happened to arrive 
some seconds after the runner.”172 
 Apparently, fans did not always appreciate such sleight of hand, even when it benefited 
the home side.  Just three days after Brooklyn’s heist of the game from Boston, the New York 
Giants took the field in Washington for an exhibition match with the Nationals.  The game began 
with a substitute umpire, named Stearns, who only called the game because the Giants refused to 
take the field with umpire Holland on hand, feeling he had wronged them grievously the day 
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before.  The Nationals led 2-1 as the seventh inning opened.  A combination of hits by the Giants 
and errors by Washington resulted in New York plating four runs in the top of the seventh.  “At 
this point the Nationals bulldozed the umpire and compelled him to call the game back to the end 
of the sixth inning, which threw out the 4 runs made in the first half of the seventh and gave the 
Giants a defeat instead of a victory.  The spectators hissed the local players and warmly 
applauded the New Yorks as they left the field.”  The cranks in the nation’s capital did not 
appreciate the display of cowardice, as “such a petty trick in order to escape a defeat was 
severely commented upon by the patrons of the game in this city.”173 
 Another mistake an umpire might make, besides calling games too early or too late 
because of weather or darkness, was to allow players to do things in plain sight that clearly stood 
outside the rules.  For instance, in an 1886 Jersey City-Newark game, umpire Charley Daniels 
allowed Newark player Tom Burns to block the paths of two Jersey City baserunners attempting 
to score on a ninth inning hit.  Because of Burns, the ball beat the men to home, and the umpire 
declared them out, allowing Newark to triumph by a single tally.  Following this case of 
excessive leniency towards the visitors, “an excited crowd made a rush for Daniels, and would 
have mauled him but for the interference of the police.  The crowd was so determined to get at 
him that the police found it necessary to draw their revolvers to keep them at bay.”  Furthermore, 
“after the game Daniels went under police protection to a near saloon, where he remained until 
his pursuers had withdrawn.  The car in which the Newarks started for home was attacked, and 
Burns is said to have been struck.”174 
 Similarly, there were incidents not covered by the rules where the umpire had to make a 
decision, but of course, this invited criticism that he had exceeded his authority, even though 
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there was no other option and the playing rules of both major leagues granted him the latitude to 
make such decisions.  This appears to have been the case in a Tri-State League game in Canton 
on May 3, 1888, when umpire Sandy McDermott failed to declare a baserunner named O’Neil 
out, even though he had jumped on one of the fielders and spiked him badly.  As a result, cranks 
in Canton “became infuriated and went for the unfortunate umpire, but he was gotten inside the 
club house before the mob could lay its hands on him.”175  Other observers pointed out that 
Sharpe, the catcher, had been standing on home plate to try and block O’Neil from crossing and 
scoring a run.  McDermott ruled that the runner had a right to the base, and thus was safe.176  The 
situation was so bad that The Sporting Life printed a missive from McDermott to describe the 
incident.  To all the talk that he had stolen the game from Canton, McDermott replied that the 
home nine had lost by two after allowing five runs to score via fielding and baserunning errors.  
Furthermore, “every umpire has trouble in your city.  How can it be otherwise?  You allow open 
betting on your ground.”  Club officials of Canton even forced McDermott to undergo an eye 
examination.  “The good doctor—Morrow by name—informed the man who would have me 
blind, that my ‘lamps’ were all O.K.  Then you accused me of being intoxicated.  I am pleased to 
say you are mistaken again, I don’t drink.”177 
 Sometimes, there was nothing to blame but bad judgment.  This might be embarrassing if 
the poor judgment imperiled the chances of the visiting nine, but if the umpire was unlucky 
enough to aggravate the home side with his mistakes, anything could happen.  Consider the 
plight of former pitcher George Bradley, who officiated in the Brooklyn-Cincinnati game of July 
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11, 1886.  After he called a Brooklyn runner safe on a close play at first, allowing the visitors to 
plate a pair of possibly undeserved runs in the sixth inning, 
the wildest confusion ensued.  Yells and hisses were hurled at the umpire, and ruffians 
threw beer glasses at Bradley.  Several thousand people jumped from the stands into the 
field to mob Bradley.  The excitement was still further increased by Frank Bell, formerly 
catcher of the Brooklyns, who became involved in a fight in the pavilion with a fellow 
named Clark, brother of Bob Clark, the present catcher of the Brooklyns.  The fight was 
waxing hot, when Bob Clark, in full uniform, jumped into the pavilion, bat in hand, to 
assist his brother, who was being whipped.  Then followed a pitched battle of the friends 
of the contestants.  Bell’s friends rushed to his rescue, and the followers of Clark took a 
hand in the melee, which lasted fully 15 minutes, during which the police seemed utterly 
powerless.  That part of the crowd not engaged in the fight went for Bradley with beer 
glasses, but he was hustled off the field in time to save his life. 
 
Amazingly, that was not the end of the story.  “The Brooklyn players, fearing trouble, stood 
ready, bats in hand, to protect themselves.  The police by this time had rallied and restored quiet.  
Bradley, under protection of the authorities, umpired the rest of the game.  So far as can be 
ascertained, no one was mortally hurt in the fight, although several were injured.”178 
 While some umpires, regrettably, were the target of beer glasses hurled at them by fans, 
the beer glasses they lifted with their own arms could also be problematic.  Observers sometimes 
pointed this out to excuse the poor treatment.  In retrospect, it is easy to see why an umpire might 
choose to drown his sorrows in the bottle, given the stress his job entailed.  However, this did not 
help him perform his job any better the next day, thus perpetuating the cycle of abuse followed 
by drinking followed by more abuse.  Even a relatively good man like John Kelly sometimes fell 
into this trap.  During his time in Detroit in September of 1888, “Umpire John Kelly has been on 
an extended spree here, and night after night has been seen on the streets in a beastly state of 
intoxication.  His umpiring in consequences has been outrageously poor.  Yesterday, as the result 
of a tear the night previous, he was unable to appear at the grounds and umpire, John Ward 
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taking his place.”  Kelly, not yet finished with his escapades in the City of the Straits, “in 
company with a Detroit tough, went out on a painting expedition last night, assaulted a woman, 
and is now in the Police Station on a charge of assault and battery, preferred by the woman in 
question.”179  Kelly tried to clear his name, blaming sickness rather than intoxication for his 
failure to show, and pointing out that the courts dropped the charges against him for assault for 
lack of evidence.  His explanation did not convince many in the baseball world, however given 
all the other evidence he could not explain away.180 
 The same month, another man on the National League’s staff stood accused of the same 
indiscretion.  “Mr. Valentine is stupid and unfit to act as umpire in his present condition.  He has 
reached the point where he is unable to keep accurate count of balls and strikes.”  The accuser, 
A.G. Ovens of Indianapolis, was careful to point out he did not accuse Valentine of favoritism, 
just poor work due to alcohol.  “I am not finding fault with him because of anything he has done 
against the Indianapolis team any more than for what he has done against the visitors.  He has 
been impartially bad and the crowds have grown tired and disgusted with his miserable work.  It 
is the impression here that his habits are not good and that he stops too often between his hotel 
and the ball grounds.”  Ovens also believed a third man on the NL’s roster of officials, Charley 
Daniels, did the same.  “His work here has been better than Valentine’s, but that does not mean 
that he is a good umpire.  He has many of the latter’s faults, and they come from the same source 
in my opinion. . . . In to-day’s game he made some awful decisions and the bleacher element 
raised a great row, repeatedly calling him a ‘lusher’ and demanding his withdrawal on that 
account.”  If Ovens was correct, that meant that three-quarters of the National League’s regular 
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umpires were consistently intoxicated during the heat of the 1888 pennant race.181  League 
president Nick Young tacitly admitted there was a problem once the season concluded.  “I regret 
to say that this has been the trouble with some men this year who would otherwise be first-class 
in the position.  It is a matter of great regret to me, and I hope to steer clear of the trouble next 
year.”182 
 Another practice of some umpires, which earned the scorn of many cranks, was what 
observers called “evening.”  As the name implies, this meant that if an official gave a poor 
decision on a play, and realized it, he would then attempt to even things out by calling the next 
play in favor of the other club, no matter how obviously wrong the decision.  This infuriated 
people because, in addition to a poorly called game, by this practice the umpire essentially 
admitted he had made a mistake on the previous decision.  All these things provided the kickers 
with fresh ammunition to use in questioning the umpire’s judgment.  Most preferred that, even if 
a mistake occurred, the umpire would continue to call the rest of the game as even-handedly as 
he was capable. 
 Finally, there was the fact that some umpires unabashedly favored the home team.  This 
was always a risk when the regularly scheduled umpire could not appear due to injury, illness, 
intoxication, delays in transportation, and the like.  Such cases required producing a substitute, of 
course, and as there was not always time to find a man with good qualifications, local umpires 
sometimes got the nod regardless of their merit.  This always raised doubts regarding whether the 
visiting team would receive a square deal or not.  This system showed its worst features when 
Philadelphia traveled to Boston in June of 1889.  A local man, Charles Weeden, got the call 
when George Barnum could not go.  “He knew what was expected of him, and from the first 
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game to the last gave the Phillies an unmerciful deal in most brazen fashion.”  When 
Philadelphia captain Arthur Irwin questioned his interpretation of a rule, as the rules allowed 
captains to do, Weeden responded, “I don’t have to know; I’ll umpire as I like.”  Weeden 
momentarily weakened in his resolve to steal games from the Quakers when, after another poor 
call at second base, even the home crowd hissed him for incompetence, but when one of the 
Boston Triumvirs, Conant, yelled out “Good decision, good decision!” Weeden continued 
playing the role of benefactor towards the home nine.183 
 Bad judgment, on the field and off, certainly occurred, but it is amazing that baseball’s 
decision makers took so long to decide to place another umpire on the field (the desire to save 
the pittance of an umpire’s salary was the primary obstacle to this reform), because there were 
some situations where one man could not possibly be correct all the time, no matter how good 
and impartial.  Probably the most notorious of these situations was when a baserunner attempted 
to steal second base.  The umpire, stationed behind home plate to call balls and strikes, had to 
make an instantaneous decision on a tag play at second base, which was more than 100 feet 
away, and where the bodies of players, dust from the sliding baserunner, or even the pitcher’s 
body might easily obscure his vision of the play and cause him to give the wrong decision.  This 
was one situation where players kicked mercilessly, claiming the umpire had wronged them, 
which he often did, whether it was intentional or not.  Umpires admitted this was their toughest 
play.  Ted Sullivan stated in 1887, “that most of the umpire’s troubles came from decisions at 
second base, which, in most cases, are as he claims—guess work.”184 
 This is why veteran baseball observers, led by the most veteran of them all, Henry 
Chadwick, called long and loud for a second man to watch plays in the outfield and on the bases.  
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As Chadwick wrote, “I don’t care how able or experienced an umpire may be, he cannot attend 
to the double duty of judging balls and strikes, and of running down the field to judge questions 
of outs on the bases that two men—each in his own position—can achieve.”  Chadwick even 
brushed off the extra cost of having a second man on the field, stating, “the only one point that 
can be brought to bear against it being the extra expense it involves, and this should be a matter 
of secondary consideration; for, in comparison with the pecuniary losses likely to be involved in 
the continuance of the rows and disturbances incident to umpires’ decisions, with the consequent 
loss of patronage, the extra expense . . . is merely nominal.”185 
 Major league baseball teams actually did put a second man on the field at times during 
the 1888 season, but it was not exactly what proponents of the double umpire system had in 
mind.  That season, whenever the regularly scheduled umpire was unable to appear and officiate 
the game, as a replacement, league policy was for each team to have one player from its roster 
not playing that day perform as umpire, one at home plate and the other in the field.  In 
retrospect, it is almost impossible to imagine why baseball’s leading men could possibly 
conceive this would be a good idea.  The potential conflicts of interest were so numerous they 
require no elaboration here.  Yet, that is what the game’s leaders decided to do, rather than stand 
the expense of hiring regular men as substitute officials.  Predictably, this inspired vigorous 
protests from all involved, including, of course, vigorous protests from some of the men who 
approved this idea in the first place.  Just one example of the folly of this arrangement comes 
from Kansas City, where “we have had even a more exciting time than we had in the Baltimore 
series. . . . Of course that nonsensical double umpire system was the occasion of the row, and 
once again the visiting club was to blame.”  The schedule called for a double-header, and in the 
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first game of the two, pitcher Adonis Terry of Brooklyn umpired balls and strikes.  “In the first 
game Terry umpired and Kansas City won by the score of 5 to 1.  Terry did well and Kansas City 
was pleased.  In the second game Terry, for some occult reason, was not permitted to umpire, but 
Darby O’Brien was put in.  Captain Barkley did not know O’Brien, but took McGunnigle’s word 
for his honesty.”  From that point, trouble began because, “well, Darby was not honest by a long 
shot.  He robbed Kansas City of a game fairly won.”  The next day, therefore, when a 
controversial call took place late in the game and Brooklyn protested, “there was a great big able 
bodied row, in which the crowd joined.”  The whole matter ended up involving several severe 
fines for bad behavior, and a hearing by baseball’s Board of Arbitration in order to iron 
everything out.186 
 It is a wonder that cranks or players did not actually kill a major league umpire, as hard 
as they tried sometimes.  They were almost responsible for one minor league fatality, however.  
On September 6, 1889, in Darlington, South Carolina, fans and players attacked umpire William 
Marshall when the game did not go in their favor, and one of them, shortstop Leon Dorgan 
(sometimes spelled Dargan), reportedly killed Marshall.  After one call, which the press regarded 
as accurate, the Darlington team threatened violence, “and during the excitement young Dorgan, 
Darlington’s shortstop, rushed up with a heavy bat in his hand and with a mighty blow on the 
side of the head felled Umpire Marshall to the ground like a log.  Pistols, knives and bats were 
drawn, and a general riot seemed imminent.”  The assailant was seventeen years old, and he was 
also the son of a Congressman.187  While initial reports stated Marshall died from the blow, 
fortunately, the blow was not fatal, and he slowly recovered.188 
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In addition, there were at least two umpires killed in the line of duty, but not by players or 
fans.  Instead, the ball itself was responsible.  In one case, a foul tip struck Samuel Hainbrook, a 
merchant from Kincaid, Kansas, in the neck, and he died instantly on August 31, 1888.189  The 
other case was the death of Steve Hagan, who umpired many western games in Kansas City.  
The official cause of Hagan’s death was blood poisoning, exacerbated by being stuck in the leg 
by a swift pitch that broke a bone that did not heal properly.  Hagan appears to have been the rare 
umpire whom both fans and players liked.  His skill in making calls was not his best trait; rather, 
it was his honesty and friendly nature.  “I don’t think he ever left the field with hard feelings 
against him, and I have never heard anyone charge him with doing wrong intentionally,” 
remarked one Kansas City sportswriter.190 
 There were cases in which the reverse happened, and umpires killed unruly cranks and 
players.  In 1889, there was a delay in a minor league game in Sunbright, Tennessee, when a fan 
came on the field and threw rocks at the umpire, W.R. Staples.  Staples, instead of taking the 
abuse, drew a knife and stabbed his attacker, Davidson Hill, who also happened to be his cousin.  
Hill died instantly.191  There was also the incident in Owensboro, near Louisville, where umpire 
Ben Bates got into a row with an argumentative player, Frank Morris.  During the fracas, he 
drew a pocketknife and stabbed Morris, killing him.  The amazing thing was, according to the 
newspaper account, “Bates is but sixteen years old.”192 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
knowledge, Marshall was the first umpire killed on the field to that point in baseball history.  
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* * * * * 
 
 By now, it is clear that monetary considerations made finding quality umpires an 
important matter.   There is, however, another important point about umpires to remember.  The 
treatment of umpires, in all likelihood, influenced the results on the field.  If this chapter proves 
anything, it is that umpires who ruled too frequently against the home nine were either brave, 
foolish, incorruptible, spoiling for a fight, or some combination of these all at once.  Unless the 
man enjoyed the sterling reputation of a Bob Ferguson or John Gaffney, the risk to life and limb 
was considerable.  Whenever in doubt, many umpires must have chosen to favor the home side 
simply out of their sense of self-preservation.  One contemporary recognized this fact, writing, 
“to induce the best men to serve, the umpire must receive positive protection from bodily harm.  
Even if poverty compels him to serve, he cannot take his life in his hand and at the same time 
exercise the requisite good judgment to make himself and the game a success.”193   
It is impossible to prove definitively, of course, but the results on the field support this 
conclusion.  In the 1880s, the home team won 58.3% of their games, the second best decade ever 
for home teams, trailing only, unsurprisingly, the 1890s, when the hosts triumphed in 60.3% of 
the contests.  There are other reasons the 1890s were a golden age for home clubs, such as the 
practice, appearing in American Association in 1887 and the National League 1892 and 
becoming more prevalent as the 1890s progressed, of teams with weak home attendance giving 
up home games to play more road games because the visitor’s share of the gate on the road was 
more money than their home share would have been from a poorly attended home game.  (This 
practice remains a central feature of college football in the present day, incidentally.)  In 1890s 
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baseball, however, the result was that poor teams played more road games, where they were 
more likely to lose in the first place, driving up the winning percentage of the usually better to 
begin with home teams.  To take an extreme example, in the 1880s, Louisville was 261-195 at 
home, for a solid .572 winning percentage, but a dismal 171-315 in road games, equating to a 
.352 winning percentage.194 
 It is not hard to fathom some other reasons why home teams had the edge in the 1880s.  
Many teams put their players up in third-class accommodations while traveling in order to save 
cash.  Another method teams used to save a few shekels while away from home was simply 
leaving some reserve players behind in order to avoid paying for their room and board on the 
road, thus playing its road games with a depleted roster.  The St. Louis Browns were the masters 
of this maneuver, largely because two of their pitchers, Bob Caruthers and Dave Foutz, were also 
versatile players and outstanding hitters who could play right field on the days they did not pitch, 
so the team could get by with fewer men because of their diverse talents.  Other clubs, however, 
without such useful players, often played at a disadvantage when playing road games without 
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their full complement of ballplayers.  Being away from home for an extended period also takes 
its toll, especially on people not fond of traveling in the first place, and when teams hit the road 
in the 1880s, it was often two weeks or more before they returned home.  In addition, each 
ballpark has its own quirks and subtleties, of which the home side is more adept at taking 
advantage.   
These things, however, with the possible exception of team travel arrangements and 
lodgings, have always been true, yet in the 1880s and 1890s home teams won more often, by far, 
than in any other decade.  Although there is no way to prove the hypothesis that treatment of 
umpires favored the home team in any mathematical way, of course, it seems safe to assume that 
the treatment of umpires contributed to this phenomenon of dominance by the home teams of the 
1880s and 1890s.   
 We even have a few tantalizing hints that baseball’s umpires did favor the home side on 
purpose.  As mentioned earlier, Ted Sullivan’s time as a National League umpire in 1887 did not 
go well.  He could not seem to please anyone, anywhere, and writers in many cities reported on 
his inconsistency and incompetence.  Late in August, with the air thick with rumors about his 
resignation from the National League’s staff of umpires, he said league president Nick Young 
had told him (and thus, presumably, other umpires as well) he was supposed to favor the home 
side when in doubt about a call.  “Yet Sullivan was blamed for obeying orders.  His instructions 
were that where a decision is so close that it can be given either way to give it to the home club, 
and this he did in all cases.  He said he was disgusted with the whole business.”195  Later 
testimony confirms this, according to Washington sportswriter Bob Larner, who often spoke with 
Young and had access to him consistently for interviews and official statements.  “Mr. Young, in 
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discussing the objectionable decisions with Umpire Kelly, advised him that in all cases where a 
reasonable doubt existed to give the home club the benefit of the doubt.”196  Another National 
League umpire, George Barnum, told the press that Young gave him the same instructions.  It 
seems safe to conclude, therefore, that at least in the National League, the home team really did 
get the benefit of the doubt.197 
 Former manager O.P. Caylor admitted to this tacit understanding between major league 
baseball and its umpires as well.  In 1887, he described the umpiring in games involving his club, 
the American Association’s New York Metropolitans, on one road trip thusly: “No, we were not 
robbed by the umpire.  The team got, as a general thing, fair treatment in that respect all the way 
through.  Bauer umpired nine of the games and McQuade three, and umpired well.  They may 
have leaned a little toward the home club, but I always not only expect that, but am a warm 
advocate of the system.  Both Bauer and McQuade umpired splendid ball.”198 
 
* * * * * 
 
 It is clear that in the 1880s, umpires were very important to the overall success of 
baseball, and very visible in terms of their treatment in the press.  Fans and sportswriters knew 
the identities and reputations of each man, and commented freely upon their merits or lack 
thereof.  Newspapers held discussions of the problems facing umpires almost continually, and 
everyone involved in the game sought ways to improve the officiating of baseball games.  This is 
a major difference between Gilded Age baseball and baseball today.  With the exception of a few 
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high profile unsatisfactory umpiring performances, such as that of Eric Gregg in the 1997 
National League Championship Series, umpires in recent decades almost never garner the 
attention that their nineteenth century predecessors did.   
Partly this is because there are so many more of them today, while in the 1880s there 
were just eight for all of major league baseball.  These eight men operated under a media 
microscope of the same magnitude as players did, their performances scrutinized just as 
minutely.  This was because their performance meant a great deal for each club financially.  
Poorly officiated games, whether actual or imagined, caused bad behavior from players and 
spectators alike.  This might sour middle class patrons on the game, and hurt teams at the 
turnstiles.  The search for good men to serve as umpires was akin to the search for star players.  
There never seemed to be enough to satisfy the demand.  It is strange, therefore, that in the late 
1880s ownership never embraced the obvious solution to its problems, finding a second umpire 
to work each game.  The same owners engaged in an unceasing search to find ways to gain 
greater control over their players, but did not even attempt something that offered no controversy 





Gambling and Dishonest Play 
 
 
With only one umpire on the field to police the game, there were sundry opportunities for 
cheating, and the temptations to come out ahead on the scoreboard often overruled the better 
angels of the players’ natures.  This was a problem, certainly, but it was just one of the issues 
regarding honesty in Gilded Age baseball.  In 1885, most people still remembered the dark days 
when the honesty of the games themselves was questionable.  Betting on games by players and 
throwing games to gamblers had become part of the game as soon as baseball players became 
professionals who played for money.  While this practice was on the decline by the mid 1880s, 
the memory of what had happened so often in the 1870s haunted baseball like a specter, just 
waiting to reveal itself and spoil the game as its popularity soared.   
As a result, while baseball observers certainly noticed the prevalence of cheating on the 
field, and commented accordingly, it was cheating off the field that worried people the most.  
Any game that looked suspicious might result in charges of throwing the game, or hippodroming, 
as people called it in the 1880s.  The worst thing for baseball, players and owners both, was that 
the charges did not even have to be true in order to damage people’s faith in the game.  The fact 
that such charges had a foundation in the past was enough that accusations of throwing games in 
the mid-1880s drew strenuous denials from team executives and players alike.  With attendance 
growing and baseball’s popularity on the rise, one major scandal might undo everything.  
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Everyone with a stake in the honesty of the game was motivated to make sure such a scandal 
never occurred.   
Part of the problem, however, was that even though gambling and betting by players 
declined in frequency, and any connections with gambling and throwing games meant a 
permanent place on the blacklist, those who surrounded the players faced no such prohibitions on 
their behavior.  As we have already seen, sportswriters bet on games, as did spectators.  Some 
clubs allowed open betting on their grounds, and others allowed saloons to connect telegraph 
wires to the ballpark to transmit scores to patrons.  These people might well gamble on the 
outcome of the games, and teams had no control over such behavior.  As a result, the gambling 
issues hovered like a dark cloud just on the edge of sight, ready to cast a shadow on the game 
should baseball’s guardians let down their defenses even for a moment. 
Cheating by players might have paled in importance to insuring the honesty of games, but 
cheating or bending the rules happened nonetheless, and it took many forms.  “Bolicky Bill” 
Taylor, besides enjoying the bottle, also enjoyed pulling a fast one whenever the situation was 
promising.  “Few will forget Billie Taylor’s trick of standing outside the coach lines and having 
the ball thrown to him on the claim that it was ripped, allowing it to pass and the man on third to 
come home.  Taylor is the first man who was also known to score a run without going nearer 
than 20 feet of the base.  He cuts across the field whenever the opportunity is offered.”1  That 
was not the only Billy Taylor story, either.  There was also a game where Taylor went towards 
second base, where there was going to be a close tag play.  Taylor ran into the second baseman, 
Joe Quest, and wrestled with him a moment, causing Quest to muff the ball.  Before anyone 
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could notice, Taylor grabbed the ball and secreted it in his pocket, then proceeded to run all the 
way home and score while the rest of the players searched for the ball.2 
Many others copied Taylor in his unsportsmanlike feat of cutting corners on the bases.  
Mike Kelly did so frequently, but the practice was common enough by 1887 that National 
League president Nick Young actually told umpires to watch for the occurrence in his written 
instructions to them for that season.  Young’s same missive also called for umpires’ alertness 
regarding two other common tricks.  One was when, on a ground ball to an infielder, the pitcher 
would cross the first base line and disrupt the runner on his way to first in the name of backing 
up first base.  The other was the sleight of hand practiced by catchers whereby they would catch 
a pitch that was off the plate but almost imperceptibly move their glove back over the plate while 
catching the ball, making a ball appear to be a strike.  This practice, known today as framing the 
pitch, allowed catchers, players, and fans to call the umpire’s judgment into question, and Young 
wanted his arbiters to keep their attention on the location of the pitch and avoid getting taken in 
by this subterfuge.3 
Other forms of distracting the opposition occurred frequently.  One trick was the practice 
of a player on the batting team yelling confusing instructions to the outfielders as they attempted 
to catch a fly ball that was about halfway between them.  With both men concentrating on 
tracking the ball, and usually having to worry about not stumbling over ruts and potholes in the 
outfield as well, they sometimes had to depend on verbal signals from their teammates on who 
should take the ball.  The offensive team might yell some signals of their own, hoping to confuse 
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the defenders enough that the ball would fall in for a hit.  Baltimore Orioles pitcher Matt Kilroy 
got himself ejected from a game for precisely this practice in early August of 1889.4 
Outfielders had their ways of striking back, however.  No one was more devious in this 
regard than Hugh Nicol.  Besides being the luckiest man in baseball (see chapter eighteen), he 
was among the craftiest.  When he played right field for the St. Louis Browns, he perfected a 
trick later copied by such men as Jim O’Rourke of the New York Giants and many others.  
Sportsman’s Park in St. Louis had benches with seats in the outfield, rather than an outfield 
fence, during Nicol’s tenure in the Mound City.  
Hugh would report for duty every morning, and before he left the park for his dinner he 
would place a couple, and sometimes three balls under the right field seats, and he knew 
just where to find them, too, when necessity demanded it.  When a batsman of an 
opposing nine knocked the ball under the right field seats Hugh would go over the inside 
fence in a twinkle, grasp the hidden ball, and before the runner could reach second, 
‘Robbie’ would be waiting on the line, ball in hand, to retire him.  Of course Captain 
Comiskey was not on to the scheme, and he has often purchased Nicol a good cigar after 
the game on account of his quick movements in returning the ball to the diamond.5 
 
 
In the heat of the 1886 pennant race between his New York team, Detroit, and Chicago, 
someone asked New York captain John Ward which team was more difficult to defeat.  His 
answer reveals much about dishonest and rough play. 
Chicago, of course.  All you have to do to beat Detroit is to play better ball than they do.  
To down the Chicagos, however, you have not only to play good ball, which is hard to do 
when playing with them, as they are continually attracting your attention by their tricks, 
but you must also watch them or they won’t go near second or third base.  Besides this, 
they rattle the umpire and the opposing nine by their ‘bulldozing’ tactics.6 
 
Similarly, after Mike Kelly left Chicago to play in Boston in 1887, an interviewer asked him 
what was the strongest point of the Chicago nine.  While admitting the team still had a terrific 
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infield, which deserved much of the credit for the team’s success, Kelly also said, “the Chicagos 
can beat any nine in the country at cunning and maneuvers.”7  Indeed, it was difficult to find 
anyone is 1880s baseball who believed Chicago was not the best in this regard.  “Old-time 
players will tell you that Chicago has generally played a rough-and-tumble game for years; in 
fact, has won the championship on it frequently.  Many umpires will permit the Chicago Club to 
do it.”8 
 The American Association’s answer to the Chicago White Stockings was the St. Louis 
Browns.  Equally infamous for their rough and dishonest play, the Browns’ tactics mirrored the 
attitude of their captain, first baseman Charlie Comiskey.  “I go on a field to win a game by any 
hook or crook.  It is the game we are after, not reputations as society dudes.”  Comiskey did not 
always like fighting or brawling, but believed in bending the rules as far as they would stretch, 
then bending them a little more.9  The unholy trinity of Comiskey and teammates Bill Gleason 
and Arlie Latham was the inspiration for baseball installing a box on the field for coaches.  
Recall that in the 1880s “coaching” was not usually about instructing your own men, but about 
rattling the opposition.  Baseball decide to put down chalk lines to limit where coaches could 
stand because 
Comiskey and Bill Gleason used to plant themselves on each side of the visiting catcher 
and comment on his breeding, personal habits, skill as a receiver, or rather lack of it, until 
the unlucky backstop was unable to tell whether one or a dozen balls were coming his 
way . . . so for the sake of not increasing the population of the insane asylums or 
encouraging justifiable homicide, the coach’s box was invented.  This helped out the 
catcher, but the pitcher and other players on the opposing team were still at the mercy of 
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Comiskey, and I know of no man who had a sharper tongue, who was in command of 
more biting sarcasm, or who was quicker at repartee.10 
 
 Even if observers acknowledged the White Stockings and Browns as masters of 
manipulation, trickery, and bulldozing, John Ward’s own New York team had a few tricks up its 
collective sleeves, too.  In an exhibition game with the Washington Nationals in 1885 (why use 
trickery in an exhibition game that does not count in the standings?  It at least suggests that there 
was money at stake due to possible betting by some players.), the left fielder for the Giants, Jim 
O’Rourke, came under suspicion for trying to introduce an unofficial ball into play.  In the first 
inning of the game, with New York in the field, Washington’s players (the home team was 
responsible for supplying the ball) detected a ball in play that was not the official ball they had 
presented.  Soon players discovered the O’Rourke had concealed a ball in his shirt.  He would 
not produce the ball or leave the field, however, and his manager, Jim Mutrie, backed his 
outfielder when O’Rourke claimed the ball was his personal property.  Washington’s manager 
Mike Scanlon refused to continue the game unless O’Rourke produced the ball, so New York 
packed up their equipment to leave the grounds.  Only the introduction of a new, standard ball 
allowed play to continue, while commentators speculated whether this chicanery might be 
responsible for New York’s strong offensive showing from the day before.11   
Another example of creative play and bending the rules to New York’s advantage 
occurred early in the championship season of 1885, when the Giants faced off with the Chicago 
White Stockings.  These two teams, easily the best in the National League that season, were in 
the eighth inning of a tie game when New York’s catcher, Buck Ewing, batting with two strikes, 
intentionally swung at a wild pitch from Chicago’s John Clarkson.  Baseball’s rules state the 
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batter can attempt to reach first base on a strikeout if the catcher does not catch the pitch cleanly.  
The defense must throw him out at first base to complete the out if this happens.  Knowing this, 
Ewing took his chances that the ball would escape from Chicago’s catcher, Sy Sutcliffe, and 
swung and missed the ball on purpose.  It did elude Sutcliffe, Ewing reached base, and later 
came around to score the winning run of the game.  While legal, Ewing’s play clearly perverted 
the intent of the original rule, and not all baseball observers considered such actions honorable.12 
 No one had more tricks and subtleties than Mike Kelly did.  New York Giants manager 
Jim Mutrie told the story of how, in one game at the Polo Grounds in New York, Kelly was on 
second base for Chicago when Cap Anson drove the ball into right field for a hit.  As Kelly 
rounded third (whether he actually touched third was debated) Giants right fielder Mike Dorgan 
uncorked a wild throw to the plate.  The ball sailed up the third base line and through a gate that 
led under the grandstand, which happened to be open.  As Giants catcher Tom Deasley and 
pitcher Tim Keefe raced under the stands to retrieve the errant throw, Kelly raced over and shut 
the gate, standing in front of it to prevent the ball from coming back onto the field.  Anson, 
meanwhile, circled the bases and scored a run for the White Stockings.13  Philadelphia Quakers 
outfielder Jim Fogarty also got credit for performing this manner of interference against 
Indianapolis in 1888.14   
Kelly also had his own version of hiding an extra ball in the outfield.  When the batter hit 
a home run over the fence at Boston’s South End Grounds, if it barely cleared the wall, he would 
suddenly scramble after the imaginary ball that had “caromed of the top of the wall,” grab a ball 
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secreted in his uniform, and fire that ball to teammates to halt the progress of the baserunners.15  
Another of his tactics to defend against the home run while playing the outfield was, if it was late 
in the game and difficult to see clearly because it was getting dark, he would fake a catch of a 
home run that traveled over the fence, then extract his extra ball from his uniform and return it to 
the infield.16 
 Kelly also perfected a defensive technique as catcher to impede baserunners.  One of 
baseball’s oldest plays used to pressure the defense comes when the offense has men on first and 
third base.  The man on first attempts to steal second, and when the catcher throws the ball to 
second to prevent the stolen base, the man on third breaks for home plate.  Kelly’s strategy for 
disrupting this play was, after throwing down to second, to toss his catcher’s mask into the 
baserunner’s path about four feet from home plate.  Unable to slide for the risk of injury, the 
baserunner attempting to score from third base had to arrive at home plate standing up after 
avoiding the mask, leaving Kelly with a split-second of extra time to apply a tag against the 
runner.  A few other catchers learned to copy this trick.  Eventually, baserunners responded by 
stomping on Kelly’s mask at non-critical times, such as when he tossed it away to chase a foul 
pop up, to smash it and make him finish the game without one.17 
 Tactics of questionably legality might or might not succeed, depending on the mood of 
the umpire.  For instance, consider the 1885 game between the New York Metropolitans and 
their cross-borough rivals in Brooklyn.  It was an overcast September day, and in the fourth 
inning New York led 4-0 when scattered raindrops started to fall.  A game is official if stopped 
by weather after five innings or more.  At first, Brooklyn’s players complained to umpire John 
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Connelly that the field was unplayable and the game could not continue, thus hoping to avoid a 
probable defeat.  When Connelly was unmoved by their entreaties, the Brooklyn players 
immediately employed various delaying tactics to slow the game and force a cancellation as 
more rain fell.  The key to their filibustering was pitcher Henry Porter, whose “conduct made 
him the recipient of loud, long, and continued hissing.  He wiped the ball with sawdust every 
time before he delivered it, saying, ‘it’s wet,’ and several times would drop it on the wet grass 
for the purpose of getting it wet again.”  It was all for naught, however, as Connelly would not 
cancel the game, despite some heavy rainfall, until after the seventh inning, when it was truly 
pouring.18 
 Cincinnati performed another variation of this maneuver in a July 1888 game against 
Brooklyn.  Brooklyn led 2-0 in the fifth inning when the skies darkened, raindrops began to fall, 
and the Red Stockings began stalling to get the game rained out before five innings were 
completed.  Lee Viau was pitching for Cincinnati when the mischief began.  He retired the first 
two men of the inning, then threw a pitch to the backstop, because it took more time to retrieve 
that way.  Then the Red Stockings, realizing this was not nearly slow enough to achieve their 
objective, pulled out all the stops.   
He pitched the ball and it again went into the grand stand, Baldwin again got it and this 
time threw it away out to Corkhill at center field.  Corkhill gazed at the ball and stood 
like a lump on a log for a few moments.  Fennelly then walked lazily out into the field, 
picked the ball up and threw it over Reilly’s head.  Reilly made a great splurge for the 
ball, got it and fired it away over Carpenter’s head.  As Carpenter picked up the ball 
threw it in to Viau, the rain came down in torrents. 
 
It worked, in a way, as umpire John McQuaid had to call off the game at that point.  Before 
doing so, however, he fined Reilly, Carpenter, Viau, and Baldwin twenty-five dollars each for 
their shenanigans.  Outraged, Brooklyn’s owner, Byrne, accosted Cincinnati owner Stern and 
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told him, “Now I do not propose to submit to any further robbery.  I insist, even though it cost 
me my share of the gate receipts, that you at least protect your patrons in giving them back their 
money or rain checks, since that you robbed them of the opportunity of seeing a game of ball.”  
Stern chose rain checks, and Cincinnati picked up an expensive no decision.19 
Pittsburgh employed a more subtle variation of this trick when faced with some rain 
before a late May game with Indianapolis in 1888, in an effort to circumvent the judgment of the 
umpire altogether.  At the time, the home club determined if its grounds were fit to play ball 
before the game started; only after the action commenced did the umpire gain this authority.  
Pittsburgh, realizing this, and also realizing that they did not have many cranks on hand for the 
game, but still had to pay the visitors from Indianapolis a $150 guarantee no matter how many 
spectators braved mother nature’s surliness, decided to take preemptive action and cancel the 
game.  This outraged Indianapolis, as they claimed the grounds were quite playable given a bit of 
sawdust and sand, and when the sun came out during the afternoon and dried up the grounds, 
they vowed revenge on the men from the Smoky City.20 
This was not the only time that Pittsburgh management was guilty of shenanigans of this 
type.  Just a few days later, in fact, they pulled the same trick on the New York Giants, but with 
an even more infuriating financial sleight of hand.  Pittsburgh executive Horace Phillips declared 
the game was off at about 1:30 in the afternoon, but failed to notify New York manager Jim 
Mutrie of the fact.  Mutrie, therefore, brought his men to the grounds at Recreation Park as 
planned, paying eight dollars for the transportation of his players.  Upon arrival, he found there 
would be no game that day, and then paid for transport once again to return his team to their 
lodgings.  The only entity to profit from the fiasco was the omnibus company.  The president of 
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this company was none other than Nimick, the same man who also was president of the 
Pittsburgh baseball club.21   
The Giants returned the favor shortly afterwards when Pittsburgh was supposed to play at 
New York’s Polo Grounds in early June.  Rain had fallen at the Pittsburgh hotel, the Rossmore, 
most of the day.  At 2:30, Phillips telegraphed to the Polo Grounds for instructions of whether to 
bring his nine to the grounds for the game or not.  Mutrie did not answer, and Pittsburgh only 
received a response when New York owner John Day sent one at 3:55.  As the game was 
supposed to begin at 4:00, and the Alleghenys could not reach the ballpark within five minutes, 
the umpire declared New York the winner by forfeit.22 
 Teams could also try to manipulate the home environment, giving them an unfair 
advantage.  Besides the individual ground rules that were unique to many ballparks in the days 
before permanent outfield fences were common, there were other tactics teams employed to get a 
leg up on the competition.  The Philadelphia Athletics, for instance, painted their grandstand 
white for the 1887 season, believing, “the idea that it will injure the players’ eyes and affect their 
play is fallacious.  Of course it will affect the men a little at first, but the home team will soon get 
used to it and as for the visiting players, if they should happen to be affected it will rather inure 
to the benefit of the home team.  See?”23  In another case, the Athletics tried to prepare for a 
series with the St. Louis Browns in 1886, and believed that the aggressive baserunning tactics of 
the Browns gave the visitors a decided advantage.  The Athletics responded by spreading loose 
gravel around second and third base, hoping that the threat of injury from the rocks might deter 
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any base stealing.  The stratagy failed, however, as the Browns located brooms and swept the 
gravel away before the game began.24 
 Because there was just one umpire to watch the game, anything went on the base paths 
when that umpire was watching another part of the action.  Interfering with baserunners was a 
very common trick.  Besides pitchers interfering with a runner on his way to first, if the ball 
entered the outfield and the umpire’s gaze was focused on the action there, infielders would slow 
down baserunners as they attempted to advance by grabbing belts, tugging shirts, tripping, even 
punching, shoulder blocking, and tackling.  The St. Louis Browns, following the example set by 
their first baseman and captain, Charles Comiskey, were famous for these tactics of rough play.  
Just one example out of many occurred in an August 1887 game with Cincinnati.  When speedy 
runner Hugh Nicol had a chance to advance a base on a wild throw, Browns shortstop Jack 
Gleason tackled him to the ground and did his best to apply a chokehold and prevent “Little 
Nick” from advancing at a key point in the game.  Although Nicol did deliver a sharp kick to the 
shins of Gleason in return, he did not advance a base or score a run, and “this garroter’s trick 
robbed Cincinnati of a chance to win.”25 
 It was possible to go too far, however.  In May of 1888, Indianapolis was playing 
Chicago when one of the Hoosiers, third baseman Jerry Denny, dove back to second base to 
avoid a tag by White Stockings second baseman Fred Pfeffer.  He arrived safely, and when 
Pfeffer dropped the throw, Denny proceeded to grab the ball and hurl it into the outfield, 
advancing himself to third base in the process.  When the Chicago outfield returned the ball to 
third baseman Ned Williamson and he applied a tag to Denny, the umpire declared that Denny 
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was out.  Incredibly, Denny tried to protest the call, but eventually retired to the bench.26  
Although this did not work for Denny, it did for former Louisville outfielder Monk Cline.  
Playing for Memphis in the Southern League, he snatched the ball away from a fielder and flung 
it into the outfield in order to advance a base, just as Denny had done, but in this case, umpire 
Edward Hengle did not call him out.27 
 A few players pioneered another trick relying on the standard practice of having two 
baseballs for play at a time.  As the game went along, these two balls became darker in color, 
softer, and scuffed as batters hit them and they passed through the dirt and grass in the course of 
play.  The further the ball’s condition eroded from its original state, the better for the pitcher, as 
balls that were less white, softer, and scuffed were harder for batters to see, hit for distance, or hit 
at all.  As a result, in 1888 two International League pitchers, Bob Barr and Pete Wood, tried a 
new tactic to make sure they got to pitch a well-used ball.  When umpires finally decided to 
throw out an old ball and introduce a new one, they of course preferred the other remaining ball 
to the brand new one.  To make sure they were pitching with the older ball, their first pitch with 
the new ball would “accidentally” fly over the batters’ heads and either into or entirely over the 
grandstand.  Others began to imitate them, until International League executives instructed their 
umpires to fine pitchers $25 whenever this took place.28 
 
* * * * * 
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As mentioned already, baseball’s leaders maintained constant vigilance against gambling 
and throwing games.  It does seem that this problem was on the decline by the late 1880s, at least 
when it came to throwing games.  Players who bet on their own team to win were still an issue, 
and there were some other problems, certainly, but it appears teams played more games on the 
level by the later 1880s than they had previously.  When queried about the influence of gambling 
on the national pastime in 1886, National League president Nick Young stated, “From a 
thorough acquaintance with the clubs, that never in the history of base ball has the game been so 
pure as to-day.”29  Former New York Metropolitans manager George Williams was even more 
positive about the honesty of the national pastime.  “As now conducted it is the most innocent 
and honest outdoor sport we have. . . . It is honest and clean, and that constitutes its greatest 
charm to me, as it does to the thousands who spend their money at the gates to support it.”30  The 
New York Times echoed president Young that same year when it opined, “so far as we recall, no 
umpire, club, or individual player of either of the two leading associations has been known to sell 
or ‘throw’ a game during the past season, and while that honorable record lasts professional 
baseball will hold its great and well-merited popularity.”31 
 Things were not completely pure, however, largely because some teams allowed open 
gambling at their grounds.  The entire Southern League did so in 1886 and 1887, which probably 
did a great deal to contribute to the unmerciful abuse suffered by Southern League umpires.  The 
Washington Nationals openly allowed gambling at the Swampdoodle Grounds in 1886.  Prior to 
a game in October, Washington Nationals manager “Honest” John Gaffney received several 
warnings that betters had placed unusually large wagers on Kansas City, and that he should 
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change his battery (pitcher and catcher) for the game as a precaution.  Gaffney also sensed that 
strange things were afoot, and purposefully gave out misinformation to thwart the nefarious plot.  
“Never as long as I am manager will I allow the nine to be used as the tool of sharps and the 
latter will have to work some scheme less transparent than the one they tried at St. Louis” was 
Gaffney’s official statement regarding the matter.  The fact that Gaffney portrayed himself as an 
old hand at dealing with such matters surely holds significance.  The Sporting News elaborated 
on the scheme, stating, “That there was a scheme to sell that game . . . there is no longer any 
doubt.  The Kansas Citys were not only backed heavily in St. Louis, but a large amount of 
money was placed on them in pool rooms at Chicago, Pittsburg and Kansas City.  It is estimated 
that about $60,000 changed hands on the result.”32 
 Because baseball’s officials realized that this problem could do major damage to the 
game’s reputation, if there was even the slightest hint that gamblers were influencing the 
outcome, as the years passed they continued their efforts to clamp down on any connections with 
the gambling element.  Realizing the harm betting had done to the Southern League, where many 
teams were on the brink of dissolution during this era, the officers of the Birmingham team 
persuaded the Board of Aldermen of the Magic City to ban all types of betting on baseball games 
before the 1888 campaign got underway.  The Board also banned Sunday baseball at the same 
meeting.33  Other Southern League cities wisely followed suit, according to the editor of the 
Spirit of the South.  In an effort to convince Henry Chadwick that the failings of the Southern 
League in 1889 were due to poor management rather than gambling, he wrote Chadwick a letter 
stating, “Pool rooms may do a good business on the game in other leagues in the South, but they 
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do not in connection with the Southern League; at least they have not for the past three years.”  
The editor admitted that some cities, New Orleans and Memphis, for instance, had pool rooms, 
but only for betting on racing rather than baseball.  Other than those two, “Mobile, Chattanooga, 
and Atlanta have no pool rooms.  The Birmingham room was broken up by the city . . . and I 
don’t believe there is a pool room in Charleston.”34 
 Additionally, when gamblers in the horseracing world set up a Bookmakers’ Alliance in 
1887, New York Giants owner John Day was emphatic that this group should never become 
affiliated with the national game in any way.  Day recalled the problems and black clouds 
surrounding the New York Mutuals and their gambling propensities in the 1870s all too well.  
“There will be no gambling in base ball as long as I have anything to do with the game.  Those 
gentlemen are not wanted in base ball and will not be tolerated.  When open betting is allowed 
on base ball games, good-bye to our National game.  The managers will not soon forget the 
trouble and blow to base ball caused by such practices a few years ago, and they will not fall into 
error again.”35 
 We can imagine Day’s anger and concern, therefore, when, prior to a game in May of 
1888 against Boston, an incident surfaced involving his own captain, Buck Ewing.  Prior to the 
game stalwart outfielder George Gore took up his position in left field.  Ewing, however, called 
Gore back to the bench and replaced him with Mike Slattery, an unproven twenty-one year old 
player in his first full major league season.  Some observers reported that Ewing did so under 
instructions from the “brokers’ box” at the Polo Grounds.  Ewing flatly denied the charge, stating 
it had been his plan to play Slattery all along but that he had not communicated the change to 
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Gore in time.36  Ewing’s manager, Jim Mutrie, also upheld his catcher and captain.  Not all 
observers bought the explanation, however, including New York sportswriter George 
Stackhouse.  He wrote, “There were nearly 7,000 people at the grounds on that day, and it will be 
a difficult matter to make the majority of them change their mind about that little incident, even 
if Captain Buck pens the denial himself.  It may have been entirely unintentional as Buck says, 
but it did not look that way.”  As evidence, Stackhouse cited, “the score card had Gore in left 
field in clear black type. . . .  When the game was to start Ewing looked out at left field, made a 
motion with his hand, and Slattery came in and sat down on the players bench.  Just as Umpire 
Daniels called play, that genius in the broker’s box made that famous yell, and Gore was called 
in and Slattery was sent out to take his place.”37 
 Gambling, and attempts to fix games, was not limited to the major leagues by any means.  
Minor league umpire Felix McIver revealed how an Eau Claire businessman had attempted to 
bribe him in order to fix a game between the Eau Claire nine and the Oshkosh team in October of 
1886.  McIver revealed that the man, Rooney, who owned an Eau Claire livery stable, offered 
both himself and Oshkosh pitcher Krock $100 to go easy on the local nine.  Neither proved 
obliging, and McIver decided to make the matter public after the Eau Claire cranks accused him 
of favoring Oshkosh during the game.38 
 Usually, gambling took place through the pool halls and related establishments that 
marred the cityscape of almost every burg in the United States.  The Wheeling, West Virginia 
correspondent for The Sporting Life described their pernicious effects on baseball in that city.  
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“The first of these is the decreased attendance and consequent financial loss to the clubs.  
Hundreds of these gamblers congregate in the pool rooms instead of going to the games, and 
watch with eagerness the result of their speculations.”  This paled in importance, however, 
beside, “the second, and more deplorable evil, is the mob spirit manifested by such persons when 
they do attend ball exhibitions in which they are pecuniarily interested.  All close decisions must 
go their way or the umpire’s head must suffer the penalty.”  The writer believed that the city 
authorities should take action against such establishments, but they proved negligent in this 
responsibility.  “The only explanation of their slowness in the matter is that some of them 
indulge in the ‘sport’ frequently themselves.”39 
 Major league teams agreed with this assessment.  In St. Louis, team president Von der 
Ahe attempted to make a move against the Western Union Telegraph Company’s practice of 
wiring scores to local drinking establishments after each inning of the game.  Von der Ahe 
believed this hurt his attendance at the gate, as many people would go drink at saloons rather 
than pay a quarter to come to Sportsman’s Park.  It also drew younger men to saloons before 
their time, in the eyes of the mothers of these young men, at least, and some of these mothers 
deluged Von der Ahe with remonstrances against having scores readily available in drinking 
establishments.  Western Union did have the contract to send out wires from Sportsman’s Park, 
but the St. Louis president hoped the company would eschew this practice of sending scores to 
saloons, because that was of minimal value compared to how often sportswriters used its service.  
Therefore, Von der Ahe hoped he could leverage the potential loss of the larger profits to get the 
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company to abandon the lesser one.  In the end, however, his attempts went nowhere, and the 
transmission of scores to saloons continued unabated.40 
 Things were much worse in the Texas League in 1888, where the gambling element 
gained a stranglehold on the league’s officials.  The League’s president, F.W. Turner of Austin, 
had to resign his office after investigations revealed his financial interests in an Austin pool 
room.  Another team official, Robert Purdy, a director of the Dallas team, also owned a pool 
room in Dallas.  As a result, “in the later series with Dallas at this place [Fort Worth] an umpire 
(substitute) was sent here from Dallas, and his decisions were so biased and so evident that the 
admirers of the Dallas team, who came along to witness the game, freely admitted that the 
umpire won the game for them.”  Not only that, “we have an affidavit setting forth that this 
umpire (Creeland by name) admitted he was paid to throw the game, and it is now before Acting 
President Adair as evidence in support of our protest against the game.”41 
 Players as well as umpires in Texas were under the control of the men of vice.  The same 
Fort Worth writer offered “I have letters before me from our manager dated at Houston, May 26, 
in which he states that Fudger and Rodgers, a battery for Fort Worth, undoubtedly threw the 
game to Houston played that day, and were assisted by O’Connor, a fielder.”  This manager also 
claimed to have uncovered hard evidence of a gambling connection.42 
 Trying to prevent such sordid occurrences, some minor league teams attempted to 
enforce clean play by putting clauses mandating exactly that into the constitution of their 
franchise.  The Nashville Athletic Club, of the Southern League, stated that, “all games of cards, 
games of chance, wagers of every description, profane or vulgar language, and the use of 
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alcoholic or malt liquors on the club’s premises are strictly prohibited.”43  They promulgated 
these rules before the 1887 season, possibly because they believed the rumors emanating from 
Macon about the team of that city dropping games intentionally in 1886.  “Several persons in 
Macon interested in base ball have volunteered the information that the team they have had was a 
bad one and sold games straight along.”44 
 Gamblers bet on exhibition games, just as they did championship season ones.  In the 
winter of 1886-1887, the Louisville club, along with a few other players including pitcher Dave 
Foutz of the champion St. Louis Browns, was playing a series of exhibition games in California.  
Near the end of their tour of the Golden State, they suffered a 10-4 loss at the hands of a picked 
nine of California players.  Seeing that Louisville had won every other game of the tour but one, 
charges of hippodroming flew immediately.  Betting patterns before the game leaned severely 
towards the picked team, while on the field, the Louisville tourists certainly played as if their 
hearts were not in the game.  Pitcher Dave Foutz, featuring a delivery that “would not have 
puzzled an amateur,” allowed fourteen hits without recording a single strikeout, and his fielders 
erred nine teams to aid the opposition.  The play of Louisville was so lackluster that “any person 
who ever participated in a game of ball could detect the presence of fraud.”  The Louisville 
outfielders played too shallow, allowing the ball to travel over their heads, while the infielders 
either threw poorly to first or “handled the ball as if it were a sphere of fire,” resulting in several 
mistakes.  Fans in California lost no time in declaring the game a hippodrome.45 
 Louisville’s manager for the tour, Jim Hart, would have none of this nonsense.  He noted 
that the picked nine featured many quality major league players, while some of his had already 
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departed for home (Joe Werrick to get married, Monk Cline because of the tragic death of his 
child) or were ill.  He also claimed that he looked into the matter “most religiously” and detected 
no foul play on the part of his club.46  Of course, it behooved him to declare that everything was 
on the level, given the serious penalties and loss of public confidence that accompanied getting 
caught gambling on games.  Still, given the relative strengths of the nines, not to mention the 
uncertainty that means even the better baseball team cannot win every game, circumstances seem 
to lean towards manager Hart’s take on the story.  The fact that the same picked nine defeated 
what was left of the Louisville tourists again a week later added credibility to the belief that they 
really were capable of defeating the men from the Falls City.  The Louisville players who toured 
California, and those from other teams who joined them, such as utility player Fred Carroll, 
outfielder Jim Fogarty, outfielder Tom Brown, and second baseman Reddy Mack, also denied 
the charge of hippodroming.  They claimed that the original accusation of dishonesty came from 
a man who was angry with manager Jim Hart after Hart denied the man and friends free passes to 
attend a game.47 
 Still, because of gambling’s history in the game, some people wondered whenever 
something unexpected happened on the field.  Early in 1889, for instance, defending American 
Association champion St. Louis went down to defeat against Kansas City, a team that finished 
last in the Association the prior season, three times in four games.  Some could not believe the 
mighty Browns would play so poorly unless something illicit was afoot.  It took a lengthy 
interview with “Honest” John Gaffney, back to umpiring by this time, to convince people that 
the games were indeed on the up and up.  (The Browns’ players denied the charge too, of course, 
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laying the blame on hard luck, good play by the Cowboys, and of course, home team umpiring 
by Gaffney.)  In fact, the 1889 Cowboys truly were an upgrade over their 1888 predecessor, as 
the team went on to win twelve more games than it had the previous season.  They now had 
future Hall of Famer Billy Hamilton full time in their outfield, and they had found a new 
shortstop as well, Herman Long, who went on to a lengthy and successful career, drawing rave 
reviews for his defensive wizardry from the moment observers first saw him.48   
 Rumors of gambling in St. Louis in 1889 refused to abate, however.  They resurfaced 
again in July and surrounded two prominent Browns, third baseman Arlie Latham and pitcher 
Silver King.  Both played lackluster ball during the first half of that month, and eventually, some 
St. Louis newspapers began charging the duo with throwing games.  Second baseman Yank 
Robinson also drew a bit of suspicion with his sub par play.  All involved denied the charges, of 
course, as did writers associated with the Browns.  St. Louis sportswriter Joe Pritchard blamed 
King’s performance on a sore arm that needed some rest (he was on his way to pitching 458 
innings that season, despite the fact he was suspended for a while in September and October, so 
the claim was plausible) while Latham and Robinson had been ill.  Pritchard admitted that 
players certainly gambled, writing, “Ball players gamble a great deal, and some of them have bet 
on their own club winning—this I am positive of—but I have never known any one of them to 
bet against their own team, as this would certainly give ground for rumors that crookedness was 
going on.”  His strongest evidence that the accused were clean was to write, “I have known for 
some time past several of the Browns’ men were being watched pretty closely by detectives, and 
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I am positive that the men with ‘eagle eyes’ have discovered nothing that would throw even a 
shadow on any of the gentlemen who now compose the St. Louis team.”49 
 By August, however, Pritchard was no longer so sure, at least regarding Latham.  The 
Browns suspended their third baseman indefinitely that month, at the insistence of team captain 
Charlie Comiskey, who spoke on behalf of several other Browns as well.  The reason for the 
suspension was “Latham’s failure to play the game that he was capable of playing, and he was 
also charged with associating with men who are interested in pool rooms and others who are 
known to bet heavily on ball games.”  Pritchard was not yet ready to accuse The Freshest Man 
On Earth of throwing games and being in the pay of gamblers, but he did write, “I don’t claim 
that Latham is crooked, but the fact of his associating with men who bet all the way from $500 to 
$3000 on a single game and place their money for the Browns to lose—so ‘tis said—and then for 
Latham to go into the games and play like a wooden man, looks very much like there was a 
screw loose somewhere.”50 
 Latham tried his best to clear his name, but in the process of doing so, admitted to some 
rather suspicious activities.  He acknowledged keeping unsavory company, including some late 
evenings with one Boston gambler, but denied ever betting against his team or that he was in any 
way connected with gambling establishments.  The Browns did finally reinstate him, on his 
promise that he would not associate himself again with the shady companions that got him into 
hot water in the first place.51  The reinstatement did not last for long.  By late September, the 
team’s Board of Directors fined him $200 and suspended him for the rest of the season; Silver 
King got the same treatment although with half the fine.  Once again, the directors believed the 
                                                 
49 “Joe Pritchard Sifts the Story” Joe Pritchard, The Sporting Life, July 24, 1889, 5. 
50 “St. Louis’ Sensation” Joe Pritchard, The Sporting Life, August 21, 1889, 6. 
51 “The Browns Coacher” NA, The Sporting News, August 24, 1889, 1. 
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men were losing games on purpose.  With the Browns in a monumental pennant race with the 
Brooklyn Bridegrooms, it is unlikely the team would take such an extreme measure unless 
something really was afoot between Latham, King, and the representatives of St. Louis gambling 
interests.52 
 The most probable punishment for legitimate cases of hippodroming was the blacklist.  A 
handful of players and one umpire, former New York Mutual Dick Higham, were on the 
permanent blacklist by the later 1880s.  While some in the game had sympathy for players who 
engaged in contractual shenanigans, there was little sympathy anywhere for those who were 
crooked.  The ancient seer of baseball, Henry Chadwick, thought that crooked play was one of 
the only legitimate reasons to use the blacklist.  “To tell the truth, I don’t approve of blacklisting 
except for very dishonorable conduct.  Drive ‘crooks’ out of the fraternity forever.  Let no mercy 
be shown the Devlins, Cravers, Nichols, Highams et al, of the crooked class.  Blacklist out-and-
out contract-breakers and persistent, irresponsible drunkards, but let a lesser penalty be inflicted 
for more venial offences.”53 
 Gambling on the games themselves was not the only form of gambling that worried 
baseball observers.  The players might gamble in other situations, even if not betting on baseball 
games.  Baseball observers lamented this vice for many reasons.  As long as baseball players, as 
a profession, held a reputation for being dissolute patrons of bars, brothels, racetracks, and faro 
banks, there was always the risk this would harm public confidence in the game.  It also tended 
to bankrupt players whose salaries should never have seen them in such financial jeopardy.  This 
resulted in players frequently asking their clubs for advance money to see them through to the 
                                                 
52 “Shaking Up the Browns” NA, Chicago Daily Tribune, September 26, 1889, 3. 
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the expulsion of Devlin, Nichols, and Craver from organized baseball, see Seymour, Baseball, 
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beginning of the season, to the never-ending dismay of team executives.  Finally, the mere 
knowledge that baseball players participated in gambling of any kind fueled fears that they might 
get involved in gambling on baseball games themselves, with the serious risk to public 
confidence that any hippodroming scandal might entail. 
Given these fears, it is not hard to understate the consternation of baseball observers 
when newspapers began reporting that one player, pitcher Ed Morris of Pittsburgh, was running a 
gambling establishment in his Smoky City saloon in 1889.  Morris and his partner, utility player 
Bill Kuehne, pled innocent to the charge.  “Morris denies very emphatically that any gambling 
took place in the house within his knowledge.  He admits that the boys occasionally played for 
cigars and soft drinks in that little back room, but nothing more.”54  Things did not look good for 
the left-hander, however, as “his claim is smiled at by the police and others who have looked into 
the matter.”  True to form for Gilded Age baseball, however, when the Pittsburgh club learned 
one of its prized performers was in legal jeopardy, “in the event of a true bill by the grand jury 
every effort will be made to stave the case off until fall, so that the club will not lose the services 
of the men.”55 
Everyone in the game breathed a collective sigh of relief when an official hearing cleared 
the players of wrongdoing.  Suspicion lingered, however, and the brief accounts describing the 
situation leave the modern reader wondering if team officials perhaps pulled some strings with 
the local authorities to make sure their men were in the clear.  One Pittsburgh sportswriter 
described their brief hearing by writing, “they were discharged from custody at their hearing last 
night on a charge of keeping a gambling house.  The witnesses did not show up.  As they were 
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policemen, the circumstance is very odd. . . . The result of the hearing was a surprise, but when it 
is known what influence was at work one will not wonder much longer.  The boys are in luck.”56 
 Still, even taking all these events into account, by the late 1880s, things were better than 
formerly when it came to the honesty of the game.  Hardy Richardson recalled the days when 
betting on games by players was legal, so long as you bet on your own team.  The problems with 
this practice were many, but foremost was the possibility for lucre if many players did bet on 
their own club but one man sold out and went the other way on the sly.  Richardson described 
one such event that he witnessed in person. 
The first game I ever saw sold was at Philadelphia. . . . The pitcher of one of the 
contesting teams had bet a good deal of money that his team would win.  The short stop 
of the club had made exactly opposite financial calculations.  The game hadn’t proceeded 
very far when the pitcher became aware that the short stop was working against him.  He 
accordingly sent in slow ‘raise’ balls in order that the batters would hit them up in the air 
away from the short stop.  He succeeded, and when the opposing team went to bat in the 
last half of the ninth the betting pitcher’s team was two runs ahead.  The short stop was 
desperate.  With two men out, the next three batters got to first and the bases were full.  
Now if the pitcher could only get a fly knocked up.  The next hitter sent a grounder 
straight at the short stop, who fielded it and threw it forty feet over first and out of the 
grounds.  Four runs came in.57 
 
With such events still fresh in the memories of current players, taking all possible precautions 
against gambling was important. 
 The scheme could always work the other way, however.  Mike McGeary, a mediocre 
player who nonetheless managed to play for twelve seasons in major league baseball, had a 
lucrative scheme he perfected.  O.P. Caylor described how it worked: 
Mike McGeary at that time was a notable player, but every once in a while when Mike’s 
nine was playing, he would not be well, would have a Charley-horse or something of the 
kind, and would lay off.  On such occasions Mike invariably got up on the stands back of 
the Gold Board, and that stand had no roof over it.  Consequently Mike carried a very 
peculiar yellow umbrella or sun shade.  It was amusing and instructive to notice how 
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often Mike raised his yellow parasol, and just as often lowered it.  Indeed, he seemed to 
go through a regular drill with it, and his fellow players down in the field could always 
know where their captain was by the shade of his peculiar umbrella.  ‘By gosh, it’s hot,’ 
Mike would say and up went his umbrella.  Strange to say a few bad errors would 
invariably follow, and a number of runs would result to his club.  Then Captain Mike 
would move over into another part of the stand where some one was offering a heavy bet 
that his club would not score a run in the next inning.  A man following close to Mike 
would take the bet.  In order to wipe the perspiration from his brow the yellow umbrella 
had to be lowered and while this work was being done, his men out on the field would 
become possessed, and fairly knock the ball out of the enclosure.  That old yellow 
umbrella was worth more to McGeary in those days than any old pair of shoes or gloves 
in these days of the $2,000 limit rule.58 
 
Like Caylor and Richardson, anyone who had been around the game long enough had a 
gambling story of one kind or another, and as a result, they knew just how much damage any 
further scandals might cause.  These individuals worked strenuously to ferret out even the 
slightest hint of crookedness.  Nick Young, who umpired National League games before moving 
to the League’s front office and eventually becoming its president, remembered well the dark 
days of 1876.  Speaking in 1889, he said, 
For thirteen years base ball has been as square as a die.  Since 1876 there has not been 
one well authenticated case of crooked ball playing even on the part of a single member 
of a League team.  In 1876 there was an epidemic of crooked work, and as a natural result 
the national game was nearly swamped.  I umpired a game on one occasion which I 
remember with great distinctness.  To my positive knowledge the members of both teams 
had been paid to lose the game and I doubt if your imagination could conjure up such a 
contest as that was.  I am very happy to say, however, that of all the players against 
whom the slightest charge was ever made or upon whom the faintest suspicion rested of 
crooked ball playing there is hardly one actively playing to-day.”59 
 
 
* * * * * 
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 Honest play, and especially honest competition, fit squarely in the mold of what 
influenced the behavior of teams in the Gilded Age.  The honesty of the game, even more 
directly than alcohol use or player fitness, had an enormous impact of the financial health of 
baseball.  If fans ever became convinced that players were not playing the games on the level, 
the consequences would be disastrous.  All the goodwill and growth in patronage achieved over 
the course of the 1880s might disappear in an instant.  The middle class patrons all teams hoped 
to draw to their grounds would not stand such a scandal, and even the denizens of the bleaching 
boards would thin out and the working classes might spend their scarce entertainment dollars 
elsewhere.   
 This is why ensuring the integrity of the game seemed to matter so much more than 
ensuring the integrity of the rules themselves.  Players like Mike Kelly or Billy Taylor might do 
underhanded things at time, but they did them in the spirit of winning the games.  It is probably 
fair to say that the prevailing social values of the Gilded Age did not look on such tactics as 
deadly sins.  Many might even see them as a baseball equivalent of the entrepreneurial spirit that 
Americans professed to admire so greatly.  Even if players employed tactics that were not strictly 
“honest,” both sides had an equal opportunity to do them, and players did them in the open, 
relatively speaking.  In this respect, the transgressions of the rules in the 1880s are somewhat like 
the steroids scandal of the 1990s and 2000s in baseball.  Players on every team were involved, 
but as the scandal involved individual performances, rather than the integrity of the outcome of 
the games, the blowback was modest. 
 This was not so with gambling and hippodroming.  No one wants to play, or watch, a 
game where the deck is stacked or the dice are loaded.  Similarly, spectators enjoy competitive 
sports, in part, because the demands of the competition inspire the performers to a high level of 
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excellence, and because there is uncertainty over the outcome.  That is part of what makes the 
games entertaining for observers, the chance of seeing something truly spectacular or 
memorable, and knowing that your favorite team has at least a chance to win on any given day.  
Baseball offers many such chances, which helps explain why it remains a mainstay of American 
culture after nearly 150 years of professional play.   
In the 1880s, baseball’s leaders wanted to put the game on a sound financial footing.  In 
order to do so, they had to have the confidence of the public.  In order to have the confidence of 
the public, one piece of the equation was to have honest games.  Even though baseball was closer 
to this goal than ever before, the legacy of the past still loomed in the collective consciousnesses 
of players and front office members of each team.  This fueled the fanatical efforts of the teams 
to root out gambling and dishonesty from the game, a goal that might encourage them to turn to 





Violence and Baseball  
 
 
On and off the field, Gilded Age baseball could be quite rough.  In his Historical 
Baseball Abstract, no less an observer than Bill James ranked on-field violence as the second 
worst problem in the game during the 1880s, right below the introduction of segregation and 
above such things as arguments with management, frequent player movement, and alcoholism.  
By the 1890s, on-field violence rated first in James’ eyes, surpassing even racial segregation as 
baseball’s greatest sin.1  It is possible that James underrated the issue of drinking, as we have 
seen, but no doubt, violent behavior was a discredit to many players, and something that both 
team management and the Brotherhood tried to counteract in the eyes of the public. 
At times, there was a lot of counteracting to do.  As Cleveland sportswriter F.H. Brunell 
put it, baseball needed “to squelch the idea held by the general public that a ball player is a 
tough, unfit for decent society, a creature of people of sporting tastes to be tolerated in his public 
capacity because of his peculiar talents, but not fit for society other than his own and his 
immediate admirers.”  He saw hope, however, and believed the Brotherhood might play an 
important role in elevating the moral stature of the game.  “There has been a moral growth 
among the ball players of the last six years . . . the Brotherhood can help it, and the Brotherhood 
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should, and should also extend its arms as far as possible.  This will be an influence that the 
public cannot resist—that of merit.”2 
Violence took many forms and happened at all levels of the game.  Sometimes, players 
got rough in their efforts to hold back the opposition, considering physical play to be part of the 
game.  St. Louis Browns center fielder Curt Welch was one such player.  In the fifth inning of a 
game on June 9, 1887, an opponent, Philadelphia Athletics pitcher Gus “Cannonball” Weyhing, 
struck the ball and scampered towards second base for a double.  Welch ran all the way to 
second base from his position in center field, and upon arriving at the infield, “struck Weyhing 
with his clinched fist in order to prevent the latter from making second.”  The American 
Association fined him forty-five dollars for this and various other offenses perpetrated that day.3  
Other Browns played just as dirty.  Second baseman William “Yank” Robinson had a habit of 
punching baserunners in the gut as they rounded second base to deprive them of their wind, as 
long as something else on the field distracted the umpire’s eyes.4  Curt Welch was also among 
the group of ball players with a habit of leaning over home plate to let pitches hit him while at 
bat.  The goal, of course, was a free trip to first base, despite the fact that the rules state a batter 
should try to evade a pitched ball rather than let the ball hit him on purpose.  (Statistics 
corroborate Welch’s reputation.  He led the American Association in times hit by the pitch in 
three separate seasons.  As Joe Pritchard put it, “he would stop any kind of a ball with his ribs in 
order to gain the initial bag.”5)  The umpire had the power to deny the batter a free base in this 
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instance, but because this was a judgment call, it only encouraged more kicking by either the 
batter or pitcher, depending on which way the umpire called the play.6 
 Probably contributing to Welch’s ungentlemanly style was his fondness for liquor, as 
according to contemporaries, he could drink almost any amount and not miss a beat while 
playing, either at bat or in the field.  As one writer put it,  
He stands unrivaled as an outfielder.  He makes plays that other outfielders cannot touch 
with such little effort that the plays lose half of their effect as they look to be easy.  What 
makes his great work all the more remarkable is the fact that he does not take care of 
himself.  It is a fact that Welch very frequently comes on the ball field almost stupid from 
his excess in liquor, with a load on that would put most men to bed.  In spite of his 
drunkenness he will make almost impossible catches, hit the ball hard and run bases in 
grand style.  He is the only ball player who can drink and play good ball.7   
 
Nor was Welch especially picky about when he imbibed.  “Welch nearly threw away his career 
in his rookie year at Toledo by swilling beer whenever there was a break in action—an argument 
with an umpire or a conference in the pitcher’ box—from a stash he hid behind a loose board in 
the outfield fence at the Blue Stockings park.”8 
 The roughhouse tactics employed by Welch and Robinson were, by many accounts, 
typical of the entire St. Louis Browns organization, as noted in the previous chapter.  There was 
another episode, this one in 1885, where they had the bases loaded in a close game.  On a ground 
ball to the shortstop, Browns baserunner Bill Gleason collided with the catcher at home plate and 
knocked him to the ground.  He continued wrestling with the catcher, Jack O’Brien, until both 
other baserunners and the batter had circled the bases and scored.  As the incident took place at 
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the Browns’ home grounds of Sportsman’s Park, “the umpire would have declared all hands out, 
but that he valued his life too highly.”9 
 Although he did not become a full time major league player until joining the Browns in 
1888, Tommy McCarthy was already a full time thug in the eyes of many contemporaries.  As a 
result, he had no trouble fitting in with his new mates in the Mound City.  Early in that season, 
he and John Reilly of Cincinnati earned reputations for continually spiking fielders as they slid 
into bases, in the hope of distracting them from catching the ball or applying a tag.  (It is 
interesting to see Reilly accused of this tactic, considering that in the off-season, he would walk 
alone in the woods and make artistic sketches of woodland scenes, but competition can bring out 
both the best and worst in people.10)  When attempting to spike someone, as the runner slides 
into a base, he raises one foot and kicks at the fielder with his spiked shoe, usually striking for 
the shin.  While this violent practice helped in the short run, it was dangerous if done repeatedly, 
as there were ways for fielders to strike back.  As one explained, “If McCarthy, Reilly, or any 
other dirty ball player ever spikes me intentionally, I will signal my catcher to throw the ball high 
to me the very next time that player starts to come my way, and if I don’t jump high into the air 
and bring my spikes down squarely on him and spike him so badly that he won’t play a month 
after that my name ain’t -----.”11 
 Welch did not learn his lesson from his healthy fine for his assault on Weyhing.  Just six 
days later, in Baltimore, he did a similar thing to Orioles player Bill Greenwood, only this time 
Welch was the baserunner.  The “game between the Orioles and the Browns was truncated by a 
crowd riot after Welch smashed into Baltimore second baseman Bill Greenwood on a steal 
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attempt.  Barnie and Oyster Burns . . . both rushed onto the field in streetclothes to assail Welch 
and several spectators exhorted a policeman to arrest the Browns star for assault.”  The police 
did arrest Welch, and the Browns had to pay $200 to bail him out of jail to play the next day.  
This time, it is just possible that Welch went too far, even for the Browns.  A short time later Tip 
O’Neill, one of the largest men on the team, lost control of his bat during a swing while Welch 
was in the on-deck circle.  The bat flew towards Welch and struck him in the face.  This may 
have been a message from his teammates that enough was enough.12 
Although he was the aggrieved party in St. Louis in 1887, Weyhing did not necessarily 
mind the rough and tumble.  Just two months later, he was involved in another ruckus.  He drove 
the ball into the outfield at the home grounds of the New York Metropolitans on Staten Island, 
whereupon he reached third base.  The umpire ordered him back to second, claiming that the 
ground rules for the park dictated a double for any ball hit in that location.  Weyhing refused to 
retreat, “the players and umpire were soon mixed up in an excited mass,” and eventually umpire 
Sullivan awarded the game to New York by forfeit when he could not restore order.13  In spite of 
his willingness to risk injury in physical confrontations, Weyhing had a long career in major 
league baseball and, true to the reputation the stories above seem to give him, he is easily the all-
time leader among pitchers in batters hit by the pitch.  He plunked 277 men in his career, far 
outdistancing the second place pitcher, Chick Fraser, whose career lasted from 1896-1909.  In 
his first two seasons of pitching alone, Weyhing hit 79 men with pitches, almost one for every 
ten innings pitched. 
Violence occurred off the field as well, and players in the minor leagues were every bit as 
likely to take part as their major league brethren were.  One example comes from San Francisco.  
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The city was not a major league city in the 1880s, of course, but minor league baseball was hot 
in the Bay Area, with fully six minor league teams operating there at various points in time.  
With a population of 234,000 by 1880, San Francisco already ranked ninth in the United States 
in total population, and was the center of West Coast baseball in the nineteenth century.  In 1886, 
two highly regarded California League pitchers squared off in a boxing match to settle a long-
standing grudge between the two.  They arranged a bare-knuckles match, complete with 
timekeeper, seconds, and a referee.  The opponents, Mike Finn and Charles Gagus, went three 
rounds (“Both young men were tolerably scienced in boxing, and exhibited large and iron-like 
muscles.”) before, just prior to the conclusion of round three, Gagus stunned his opponent with a 
blow to the chin.  Gagus won the fight, but not before “the visages of both men were greatly 
disfigured” from the intensity of the contest.14  It seems Gagus was no stranger to the rougher 
side of things in Golden State.  In the winter of 1886-1887, when Louisville toured in California, 
and he frequently acted as their guide.  “Clever Charlie Gagus knows every person in ‘Frisco, 
and they all know and like him.  He has acted as a guide to our boys on a good many sightseeing 
night and day trips since we have been here.  Gag knows when there is any fun to be had of all 
description, from seeing a Chinaman hanged to attending a hoodlum ball.”15 
In Pennsylvania in August 1886, a man named Christian Loper clubbed an opponent’s 
pitcher, Elmer Foster, over the head with his bat during a game, to the point where observers 
feared for Foster’s life.  The source of their quarrel was a cigar.16  Another example of on-field 
violence occurred during an exhibition match between the New York Metropolitans and Newark 
just prior to the 1886 season.  Two players, Tom Foster for the Metropolitans and Tom “Oyster” 
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Burns (not the same man who played third base for the Chicago White Stockings that same year, 
and who had no shellfish-based nickname) for Newark, engaged in fisticuffs following a raft of 
verbal abuse directed from Burns towards Foster.  The dispute arose over the umpiring 
performance of former major league player Dave Pierson, whom both teams accused of 
inconsistency in his interpretation of the rules.  At one point, Pierson called a balk on Newark 
pitcher John “Phenomenal” Smith, and when Burns protested and Foster stood up for Pierson’s 
call, Burns became infuriated and struck the second baseman.  “This was the signal for the crowd 
to take part in the row.  Men and boys left their seats, and in an instant all was confusion. . . . 
While the trouble was at its height, one man rushed out on the field with a revolver in his hand.  
Some of his friends interfered, and before he could do any damage he was disarmed.”17  
Eventually, law enforcement restored order, herding the 300-400 brawling spectators off the 
grounds.  Needless to say, New York field manager Jim Gifford pulled his club off the field, and 
shortly thereafter American Association Chairman Byrne instructed Association teams to boycott 
all further games with Newark as long as Burns remained a member of the club.18   
Some defended the Newark infielder, however, with The Sporting Life offering “the 
Washington papers generally sympathize with Burns, and rejoice at the thrashing he gave Foster, 
of the Mets, who is described as a good player but quarrelsome.”  Burns asked Newark for his 
release as a penalty for his volatile behavior, but the team rejected his request.  He ended up on 
the blacklist instead, although he later cleared his name.  That same week, some New York fans 
attempted to avenge their man, Foster, by assaulting Burns on the streets.  Burns required a 
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police escort to a safe house for protection.19  Although best known as an outfielder, by 1887 he 
was playing shortstop for Billy Barnie in Baltimore, where he produced several solid seasons as 
a hitter (he sported a lifetime OPS+ of 135 and a WAR of 26.3) but never quite shook his 
temper.  At least he admitted he had a problem.  “Tom admits having the hottest kind of a temper 
which is easily ruffled, but claims that no serious troubles need ever be apprehended on that 
score if he is properly dealt with.  What he asks, he says, are respectful demands and he will 
readily comply with them.”20 
Tony Mullane, despite his reputation as a dandy, was not averse to brawling when he felt 
so inclined.  We have already seen the bad blood that existed between Mullane and second 
baseman Sam Barkley, who once threw his bat at the pitcher during an exhibition game.  
Mullane, while pitching for Cincinnati, also got into fisticuffs with Cleveland utility player Bob 
Gilks after an exhibition game in 1889.  During the game, Gilks accused Mullane of trying to hit 
him with pitches intentionally, knowing that Mullane had a reputation for trying to intimidate 
batters who could hit his curveball, and they exchanged words.  After the game, Mullane entered 
Cleveland’s dressing room, stating he wanted to explain himself to his opponent.  Gilks, not 
feeling conciliatory, grabbed a bat and feinted at Mullane, whereupon the Porkopolitan grappled 
Gilks and tossed him to the floor, landing several blows before teammates and police separated 
the two.21 
Managers and other club officials, although supposedly above such rowdyism, sometimes 
were not.  In an 1887 exhibition game against Des Moines, Mobile manager Kelly entered the 
stands to do battle with a spectator applauding the Des Moines nine too vigorously.  “A row 
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followed and the result was that a meeting was called that night at which Manager Kelly was 
suspended.”  In addition to a fine, as further disciplinary action, Mobile cautioned Kelly, “under 
no provocation whatever, should he give way to his temper, under penalty of dismissal.”22 
Managers might also brawl with members of their own nine.  That is what nearly 
happened in Kansas City in 1888, when manager Dave Rowe got into the face of right fielder 
Jim McTammany after the outfielder had allowed a ball to get past him in that day’s game.  
Rowe threatened his own player, according to witnesses, telling McTammany, “if it had not been 
that so many people were in the grand stand this afternoon, I would have left my place, gone out 
into the field to you and smashed your jaw, for allowing that grounder to pass you.”  Taken 
aback, McTammany protested that his effort was up to par and he was trying his best.  His 
manager replied, “no, you ain’t.  You are playing lazy ball, and if you let any more ground hits 
get away from you, I repeat, I’ll smash your face.”  Unable to take any more, McTammany 
challenged his manager to make good on his threat on the spot, promising to pay him back with 
interest for any damage sustained.  The men did not come to blows, but the intensity of the 
exchange was quite common in baseball in this era.23 
Whether money is the root of all evil or not, it was sometimes the root of conflicts in 
baseball.  There was an unsightly row between the manager of the St. Paul club, Barnes, and the 
treasurer of the Omaha club, McCormick, in May of 1888.  Barnes became angry at perceived 
insults in his efforts to collect the visitors’ share of the gate for his team, and when McCormick 
attempted to attack him, Barnes “knocked him silly and was giving him a good pounding when 
several men who were in an adjoining room to see that the Omaha man was not whipped, rushed 
upon Barnes and commenced to kick and abuse him in a terrible manner.”  According to 
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witnesses, these men might have killed Barnes, if not for the timely intervention of future Hall of 
Fame manager Frank Selee, who was the Omaha manager at that time.24  Writers from Omaha, 
predictably, portrayed the incident in a somewhat different light.  While admitting that Barnes 
was a large man who probably would get the better of McCormick, the Omaha correspondent for 
The Sporting News wrote, “Barnes knocked nobody down, did not ever hit anybody.  He simply 
got bounced for being too fresh, and then went off and cried about it.”25 
When the Baltimore Orioles traveled to Brooklyn to open the 1889 season, the Orioles 
displayed both new uniforms and a surly disposition.  One of their catchers, a journeyman named 
Pop Tate, collared Brooklyn’s Darby O’Brien when O’Brien threatened to escape a rundown 
between third and home.  Tate dragged O’Brien to the ground, whereupon third baseman Billy 
Shindle tagged him.  The umpire declared O’Brien out, the Brooklyn crowd erupted in protest, 
and the two clubs exchanged threats.26  The disturbance caused by the hundreds of fans storming 
the field in protest was so great, the Bridegrooms took the extreme measure of installing a barbed 
wire fence to separate players and spectators at Ridgewood Park.27 
Rough tactics were, on occasion, so blatant that one wonders why players even tried 
them.  For instance, there was the May 1889 series in which Indianapolis faced Cleveland, and 
the actions of the Hoosiers ran the gamut from dumb to imbecile.  In one game, the umpire ruled 
Hoosier third baseman Jerry Denny out for baserunner interference.  Twice.  Meanwhile, catcher 
Con Daily took up the Mike Kelly practice of tossing his catcher’s mask down along the third 
base line, so that runners heading home could not slide without injuring themselves.  To top 
things off, in another game, Daly hit a weak ground ball to the infield with a runner at second 
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base.  In an effort to reach base, rather than dropping his bat at home plate, he carried it with him 
down the first base line, finally throwing it at Cleveland first baseman Jay Faatz just as Faatz was 
about to receive the throw at first base.  The umpire let Daly off easy for this violent act, calling 
him out and mulcting him a paltry ten dollars.  It seems only fair that the same game ended when 
Cleveland fooled a Hoosier baserunner, Jumbo Shoeneck, with the hidden ball trick, which is 
literally the oldest trick in baseball and works roughly once per decade.28 
 Sadly, in 1885 a dark incident brought home the risks of all the rough play that the game 
featured in the 1880s.  The Southern League’s Atlanta team had a first baseman named Louis 
Henke.  Much bad blood existed between Henke’s team and Nashville, and in the August 14 
game between the two nines, both sides did everything possible to thwart the efforts of the 
opponents.  In that fateful game, Henke drove a ball into the outfield, and ran towards first base 
with the intent of heading to second.  Before he could, however, the Nashville first baseman cut 
off his path to the base and “assumed a position to meet him, and standing with bent knee, Henke 
ran against him with tremendous force.  He rose, staggered, and fell.”  Louis Henke died from 
internal injuries at 5:30 PM the next day.29 
 Nor was this the only baseball fatality due to rough play on the field.  In 1888, The 
Sporting Life wrote, “spikings are of common occurrence, far more than the public has any idea 
of, and it is really a matter of wonder that fatalities are not more frequent.  Any and every player 
who suffers from the spikes is liable to meet the fate of the Newark second baseman Simmons, 
as the danger of blood poisoning is always present, contingent upon the injured man’s physical 
condition or improper treatment of the wound.”  Because of the death of Simmons, considered 
among the most promising players in the Central League, the paper advocated the interesting 
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innovation of allowing baserunners to overrun all bases without fear of the fielder putting them 
out, rather than just first base, putting an end to the need for sliding altogether except for close 
plays at home plate.  It concluded, “it is bad enough to have many valuable players crippled each 
season without in addition sacrificing their lives to the Moloch of base sliding.”30 
 
* * * * *  
 
 Some players, by virtue of their kicking and willingness to run their mouths too freely, 
made plenty of enemies.  Foremost among such players was “The Freshest Man on Earth,” Arlie 
Latham of the St. Louis Browns.  While people also called Latham “The Dude” for his colorful 
personality and flashy wardrobe, the “fresh” part of his nickname reflected his tendency to speak 
too provocatively towards opponents.  “Latham’s coaching methods and his free tongue may be 
nuts for spectators, but they make him lots of enemies in the profession.  The boys have to be 
careful about scrapping during the playing season, but there is no law against it after the season 
closes.  For this period Latham has no less than twenty fights to settle, five of which are with 
[second baseman Yank] Robinson, of his own team.”31  Following the 1886 World Series with 
the Chicago White Stockings, the major Chicago papers lambasted Latham and his jumbled 
utterings.  The Times remarked that Latham “made an antiquated idiot out of himself in a vain 
attempt to rattle the veteran players of the Chicago team,” while the Daily Inter Ocean deplored 
“the disgusting mouthings of the clown Latham.  There was a universal sentiment of disgust 
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expressed by the crowd that left the ball park at the close of the game at this hoodlum’s obscene 
talk on the ball field.”  Finally, the Daily Tribune stated that one contest was  
chiefly remarkable for the coaching of Latham, a sawed-off Brown, with a voice that 
would put to shame the most ambitious fog-siren on the lakes.  His incessant howling, a 
meaningless jumble of catch phrases, was funny for about fifteen minutes.  Then it grew 
tiresome, and before the fourth inning he was universally conceded to be the worst 
nuisance ever inflicted upon a Chicago audience.32 
 
Latham’s energy and wit was such that, along with another of baseball’s most charismatic 
performers, Mike Kelly, he sometimes performed on stage during the winter months to 
supplement his income and keep himself occupied.33  He admitted to having no experience at all, 
and furthermore, to having no idea what he was doing, telling an interviewer, “I just simply 
accepted the proposition that was made to me last summer and went in on my gall. . . . You see I 
don’t exactly know my part yet.  In fact I haven’t any part.  I just come on and say what I please.  
It’s generally different every time.  A part was written for me but I didn’t have time to study 
it.”34  (Interestingly, Emmett Seery tried his hand at being a thespian as well, which seems a 
strange choice for a man with somewhat of an intellectual reputation for his ability as a chess 
player.35  Seery, however, did sing the part of the Assessor in the play “Chimes of Normandy” 
during the winter of 1888-1889.36) 
Besides being one of the great mouths in the game of the 1880s, Latham also had one of 
the sharper brains.  In 1886, a sportswriter mentioned him as the originator of a subtle tactic for 
reaching base.  Latham’s technique was to foul away pitches intentionally in order to make the 
pitcher work harder and eventually throw enough balls that Latham could walk to first.  That 
                                                 
32 “Latham’s Coaching” NA, The Sporting Life, November 3, 1886, 5. 
33 “Louisville Laconics” JA, The Sporting Life, November 21, 1888, 4. 
34 “Cincinnati Chaff” FKW, The Sporting News, November 24, 1888, 4. 
35 “Seery Turns Actor” NA, The Sporting News, November 24, 1888, 1. 
36 “Notes And Comments” NA, The Sporting Life, December 5, 1888, 2. 
 394
way, he could avoid the risk of the defense putting him out and reach base safely.  Some 
observers deplored this maneuver as an unmanly bending of the rules, but others approved of 
Latham’s ingenuity and creativity.37  He also developed a less controversial strategy for securing 
hits in which he would move his bat into position to bunt the ball, thus causing the infielders to 
charge in to defend the bunt.  At the last moment, however, Latham would pull the bat back and 
slap at the pitch, swinging with his wrists, in an effort to drop the ball just over the heads of the 
onrushing fielders and score a hit in that manner.38 
As the story of Burns and Foster demonstrates, players sometimes instigated fights with 
each other.  They instigated the occasional fight with fans as well.  In an 1886 exhibition game in 
St. Louis, Maroons pitcher Al Bauer nearly made a heckling fan into a landscaping tool.  “Bauer, 
of the Maroons, is perhaps the most muscular ball-player in the profession.  During one of the 
recent games at Sportsman’s Park, someone in the crowd where Bauer was standing made an 
insulting remark about the Maroons, and Bauer almost made a hole in the fence with him.”39   
It seems like this penchant for aggressiveness would have served Bauer well when he 
ended his mediocre pitching career (“because his exertions caused his arm to lose its cunning”40) 
and became an American Association umpire before the 1887 season, considering all the abuse 
that baseball’s officials took from players and cranks, but it appears he was just as mediocre an 
umpire as he was a pitcher, at least initially.  Just two weeks into the 1887 season, Bauer had 
already made enemies of St. Louis owner Von der Ahe and Louisville’s Zack Phelps, who 
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alleged they had “suffered as the result of his work against them in all games in which he has 
officiated thus far,” and these men tried to engineer Bauer’s dismissal because “he was so 
deficient in the necessary qualifications of a fair and correct interpretation of the rules as to make 
it a hardship and a wrong to compel clubs to play under him.”41  A Louisville sportswriter at one 
of the games agreed that Bauer’s work had not given satisfaction, but that his lack of judgment 
showed no favoritism and that players for St. Louis, especially first baseman Charlie Comiskey 
and second baseman Yank Robinson, had kicked so badly as to delay the game with their 
whining over Bauer’s decisions.  Robinson also had the nerve to cut twenty feet in front of third 
base while trying to score on one hit, and this almost produced a fight with Louisville catcher 
John Kerins when Bauer failed to notice the subterfuge.42  Bauer resigned from the American 
Association’s umpiring staff on May 6.43  Following his failure in the Association, he signed on 
in the Ohio League that same year and improved his work to the point that the desperate 
Association gave him another chance in August when Ted Sullivan threw in the towel in disgust 
over his treatment.44   
Apparently, Bauer spent his time in the Ohio League productively, as “Al Bauer made his 
reappearance as an American Association umpire here yesterday and there wasn’t a chirp of 
dissatisfaction from either audience or players.  The game was quickly played—it required one 
hour and eighteen minutes to finish it—and was the shortest on the home grounds this year.”  
Even though each team put “four or five players on the coach line at once” in order to whine 
about favoritism and poor calls, “it was a game in which the coacher had little to do,” and Bauer 
sailed through the game “without hearing a word of protest from either side.”  Cincinnati 
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manager Gus Schmelz even went so far as to say, “his work to-day has not been excelled this 
season!”45  Bauer continued to excel in the environment of the minor leagues.  Working the Tri-
State League in 1888, one Columbus writer praised his performance by writing, “he is one of the 
fairest and best posted umpires in the business.  He is not a home umpire.  He plays no favorites, 
and any club that wins a game over which he presides does so upon the merits of their 
superiority.  He is absolutely fearless, and will not be bulldozed.  Sober and reliable, a gentleman 
at all times.”46 
Another example of player violence against fans came in 1888 when St. Louis outfielder 
Tommy McCarthy tried to peg a Cincinnati fan with the ball during a game.  The batter, Kid 
Baldwin, hit the ball into the outfield crowd and while McCarthy was retrieving the ball, one of 
the spectators began taunting him.  Rather than return the ball to the infield to halt Baldwin’s 
progress, McCarthy attempted to bean the fan instead.  He missed, and Baldwin circled the bases 
before anyone could retrieve the ball.  This behavior constituted a pattern on McCarthy’s part, as 
earlier that year he had attempted to do the same to umpire Bob Ferguson when Ferguson’s call 
did not go his way.47 
While McCarthy and Ferguson did not escalate their disagreement any further, one of the 
worst cases of fighting between a player and umpire at the major league level took place at the 
end of the 1889 campaign.  In a game between Cleveland and Boston, Beaneaters captain Mike 
Kelly arrived at the ground intoxicated, forcing manager Jim Hart to relegate the star player to 
the bench for the day.  After an unexceptional call went against his men, Kelly rushed the field to 
give the umpire, McQuaid, a piece of his mind.  Just as Kelly drew back his arm to strike a blow, 
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teammates Charlie Bennett and John Clarkson tried to restrain him.  While Kelly was pushing 
them away, McQuaid had just enough time to call for police protection, so that when Kelly made 
another rush at him, the officers took the King by the throat and escorted him from the grounds.48 
Kansas City Cowboys catcher Charlie Hoover got himself into hot water for reasons 
similar to McCarthy late in the 1889 season.  When some members of the home crowd started 
giving him grief in an October 3 game, Hoover let a pitch get to the backstop on purpose.  
Instead of retrieving the ball, however, “the catcher pulled off his gloves, threw down his chest 
protector and climbed over into the seats.  He had blood in his eye and was looking for the man 
who had presumed to guy him.  The individual who did the yelling was just at this time the 
quietest man on the grounds.”  Mortified at such behavior, Cowboy management removed 
Hoover from the game after the inning concluded (rules prevented mid-inning substitutions at the 
time, except for cases of injury) and decided to suspend him for the remainder of the season.  
After being relieved of duty, Hoover left the bench to drink away his frustration in a nearby 
saloon.49 
 Even seemingly benign events could lead to trouble, if the mix of personalities involved 
was too volatile.  At one point in 1886, players attempted to organize a benefit for former major 
league player Curry Foley, as described in chapter four.  However, two of the men responsible 
for selling tickets to the benefit, recently retired player Lew Brown and Pat Sheeham, got into a 
row when Sheeham accused Brown of trying to embezzle tickets to the benefit.50   
Brown had a knack for getting into hot water, so the accusation might have been 
legitimate.  By the end of the 1886 season, his name was on baseball’s blacklist, because his 
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team in 1886, Norwich of the New York Central League, advanced him some money as part of 
his contract, but Brown never showed up to play.51  Perhaps it was karma catching up to him, but 
by 1889, Brown was dead.  He broke his kneecap in a wrestling match and died from 
complications from the injury after a doctor amputated his leg and pneumonia set in.52  One 
source reported he broke his kneecap not from wrestling itself, but when the owner of the 
drinking establishment he worked for struck him with a gas pipe for a refusal to stop wrestling.53  
Whatever the truth, Brown’s problems, like those of so many Gilded Age ballplayers, stemmed 
from his long and intimate association with liquor.  Several writers remarked on his abilities and 
friendly disposition when in proper form and free of demon rum, and most appeared saddened at 
his death.  “If Brownie had let booze alone no catcher would have compared with him.  His 
backstopping was marvelous.  All deliveries were the same to him.  He handled them all with 
equal ease.  A more good hearted, white souled fellow never lived.  Peace unto his ashes.”54 
 Because of baseball’s competitive nature, it is no surprise that teammates squared off at 
times.  In Pittsburgh, first baseman Otto Shomberg (or Schomberg) got into a row with catcher 
Fred Carroll when Schomberg started rumors that Carroll had it out for him.  When the rumors 
got back to Carroll, he went hunting for the first baseman.  “He found him and accused him of 
carrying tales.  This Shomberg denied, and Carroll after applying some language more forcible 
than polite, hit him.  Shomberg immediately retaliated and witnesses say was getting the best of 
the bout when separated by friends.”  Later, the two men shook hands and smoothed over their 
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differences, though not before the club fined Carroll fifty dollars for his violent outburst.55  The 
team traded Schomberg after the 1886 season, so the situation with Carroll could not escalate any 
further.  
 Another example emerged in Boston in 1888.  There, outfielder Joe Hornung and 
shortstop Sam Wise made each other’s enemies list when Wise initiated several fictitious stories 
in an effort to discredit the team’s left fielder.   It appears Wise even paid a visit to Hornung’s 
home in an effort to injure his marriage and anger his wife, but the woman chased Wise from her 
home with a carving knife.56 
 The language used by players towards other players, fans, and umpires was violent, as 
well.  Although the Baltimore Orioles teams of the National League in the 1890s would gain the 
greatest renowned for this, and took the practice to extremes, they had predecessors from whom 
they drew inspiration.  Cap Anson’s Chicago teams of the 1880s perfected the art of kicking, and 
as mentioned earlier, Charlie Comiskey in St. Louis was no slouch when it came to bulldozing 
opponents and umpires.  Some owners liked this, because they believed that fans liked it and 
would pay to see it. 
Eventually, however, the frequency and intensity of the profanity became so great that 
baseball’s powers that be decided they must tone things down for the sake of the ears of female 
spectators if nothing else.  Things were bad in the 1880s, certainly, and by the 1890s, National 
League owners feared it was hurting attendance by keeping respectable women away from the 
park.  This fear grew so great that in 1898 the owners distributed (by hand, as the language 
involved would invite federal prosecution for indecency) a memorandum to all clubs titled, 
“Special Instructions to Players.”  This memo, proposed by Cincinnati owner John Brush, 
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indicated that the National League, when investigating incidents of unseemly behavior by 
players, received nearly one hundred credible reports (from umpires, club managers, and other 
team officials) of abusive language directed from players towards other players and umpires.  
When league officials learned that players were trying to intimidate others by calling them “cunt-
lapping dogs” or informing their opponents that they had “fucked your mother, your sister, your 
wife,” they decided that they must enforce a minimum standard of behavior lest potential patrons 
desert the national pastime.  The memo concluded, “Whether it be the language quoted above, or 
some other indecent and infamous invention of depravity, the League is pledged to remove it 
from the ball field . . . any indecent word, sentence, or expression, unfit for print or the human 
ear . . . will be dealt with without fear or favor when the fact is established by conclusive 
proof.”57  Owner Brush even proposed a rule that any player speaking to other players or the 
umpires with such heinous disregard for public decency must appear before a three-man tribunal, 
with lifetime banishment from major league baseball the penalty for a guilty verdict.58 
 The Southern League attempted stronger measures against some of its most unrepentant 
sinners in 1886.  Shortstop Marr Phillips, who had played in the majors the prior season with 
both Detroit and Pittsburgh, nearly had to plead his case to Atlanta’s authorities.  “Marr Phillips, 
Charleston’s short stop, was arrested at Atlanta last week for profanity upon the ball field and 
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hauled before the chief of police.  At the request of the Atlanta Club directors he was discharged 
and thus saved an appearance in the police court.”59  Curt Welch was another player known for 
his profanity.  “Welch?  There is one thing certain and that is The Sporting Life would not 
publish the talk he indulged in out in center field last Friday, and if he ever sent it to you by mail, 
he would be liable to indictment by a United States Grand Jury for violating the postal laws.”60 
 Fans often showed manners as poor as the players’.  A sarcastic article written for The 
Sporting Life in 1886 gives readers an idea of the ungentlemanly behavior of some spectators.  
“When there is a high wind smoke cigars with broken wrappers.  Those next to you will have 
their interest in the game greatly increased if their eyes are filled with tobacco ashes.”  In 
addition, the writer advised, “the managers are always pleased to have their attention called to 
the weak points of the nine.  It isn’t to be supposed that the gentlemen who have thousands of 
dollars at risk would notice defects in the players as soon as the spectator.”  Finally:  
Don’t be so credulous as to believe the umpire is selected because of his knowledge of 
the game.  There was never known a base ball audience that couldn’t tell a pitched ball 
better than he.  One reason for this is because the umpire stands too near the home plate 
and almost in a direct line with the batsman and pitcher.  It is reasonable to suppose that 
the spectators opposite the second and third bases are far more competent to detect 
pitchers’ errors than a person in the position described.61 
   
O.P. Caylor also noticed that spectators, no matter where they were sitting, always 
believed they knew better than the umpire did.  He sarcastically suggested, therefore, that the 
umpire call the game from a similarly distant point.  “Maybe a balloon anchored several hundred 
feet above the diamond would be a handy place for him.  Then he would be out of reach of beer 
glasses, and if he made a mistake he could cut the cables and sail away out of danger, thus doing 
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away with a strong police escort.”62  Detroit’s president in 1886, Marsh, poked fun at such 
behavior, too.  “I’ve got an idea.  I am going to have some cards printed.  On one set I will have 
the reasons why our club did not win the last game; on another, the condition of all our pitchers, 
and on another, the reasons why Brouthers doesn’t knock the cover off the ball every time he 
comes to bat. . . . It will give me a rest, and perhaps I can recuperate before the scheme wears 
out.”63 
 
* * * * * 
 
 Despite the occasional distasteful episode on the field, the greatest threat that violence 
posed to the game, from the Brotherhood’s perspective certainly, but from the viewpoint of the 
owners as well, was the damage to baseball’s reputation.  Every time someone did something 
violent, and the press found out about it and published the story, there was the risk people would 
consider all the players guilty by association.  This could also hurt management; if the public 
believed that baseball nines were simply a collection of uncouth hooligans, people might well 
stay away from the park and spend their money elsewhere.  In February of 1888, for instance, 
old-time player Dickie Flowers, who had once performed for the Troy Haymakers and 
Philadelphia Athletics back in the National Association days, entered a Philadelphia barroom and 
engaged in a “playful struggle” with the barkeep, Peter Whalen.  He ended up stabbing Whalen 
in his abdomen, and Whalen died four days later.  While a coroner’s jury found Flowers innocent 
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of murder, ruling the death accidental, incidents such as this certainly did not improve the 
reputation of ball players among the sporting pubic.64 
 Likewise when, that same month, a young player with the Cincinnati Reds, John 
O’Connor, and a few of his friends decided to have some fun and ended up behind bars.  In an 
episode that helped earn him his sobriquet of “Rowdy Jack,” O’Connor and his comrades 
“wanted to scare a couple of damsels by impersonating police officers and arresting them, and 
while the boys were playing the joke on the thoroughly scared dusky females they were arrested 
and locked up for impersonating police officers.”65 
This was small potatoes compared to the brawling nature of Jules Piyol, who played third 
base for the New Orleans Pelicans of the Southern League.  Demonstrating yet again that alcohol 
was a ballplayer’s worst enemy, in late March of 1888, news came out that a policeman had 
killed him during a fight in a Crescent City saloon.  The rumors proved unfounded, however, 
leading one paper to remark, “Jules Piyol . . . is not dead after all.  He’ll live to drink more 
whiskey and thump more policemen.”66  Whiskey likewise led to the incarceration of Andy 
Cummins, who got one year in a Kentucky pen for stealing chickens in 1888.  “A few years ago 
Cummins was one of the best all-round base ball players in the country—a hard hitter, sure 
fielder and a splendid sprinter.  Harry Wright once offered him $3,000 a year to play ball and 
keep sober, but his love for the ardent was too much.  He has been arrested several times in the 
past few years for stealing, but always got off with a workhouse sentence.”67 
Ed Beatin, a pitcher with the Detroit Wolverines, also gave his associates reason to fear 
for their reputations.  In April of 1888, Beatin attempted to seduce Miss Annie Merkel, of 
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66 “Notes And Comments” NA, The Sporting Life, April 4, 1888, 5. 
67 “Notes And Comments” NA, The Sporting Life, December 5, 1888, 2. 
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Trexlertown, Pennsylvania, and Miss Merkel retaliated by pressing charges against him.  Merkel 
worked at the Eagle Hotel in Allentown, where Beatin had stayed for a time.  It took until August 
for the law to catch up with Beatin, but once it did, he spent two days in jail before settling the 
case and paying $400 in damages.68 
When it came to trouble involving young women, worse by far was the case of John 
Glenn.  Like Flowers, Glenn entered major league baseball in the National Association in 1871, 
lasting long enough to play two National League seasons with the Chicago White Stockings in 
1876-1877.  In the 1880s, Glenn spent time in New York’s state prison for assaulting women, 
including his own niece.  He was out of prison by 1887, but apparently, he had not reformed his 
ways.  In that year he shot, but missed, at a carriage driver while drunk.  Then, in November of 
1888, he assaulted another person, a nine year old girl.  “When he was taken to the police court a 
mob made an attempt to lynch him.  The police endeavored to protect him, and in the scuffle that 
ensued Glenn was accidentally shot in the head by a policeman.”  He did not die on the spot, but 
the police moved him to his brother’s house for an attempt at recuperation.  “If Glenn survives he 
will most assuredly be lynched. . . . Had he not been shot yesterday the mob would have 
succeeded in getting him away from the policemen and would have hanged him to the nearest 
lamp-post.”  Mob action turned out to be unnecessary, however, as Glenn died from the gunshot 
two days later, on November 10.69  Few missed him, it seems.  “Glenn, who was addicted to 
drink, is one of the very few professionals who have disgraced themselves by criminal conduct.  
At Sandy Hill, where he resided of late years, not an expression of sympathy for the dead man 
could be heard.  The police officer who accidentally shot him was conceded to be blameless.”70 
                                                 
68 “Notes And Comments” NA, The Sporting Life, September 12, 1888, 2. 
69 “In Deep Disgrace” NA, The Sporting Life, November 14, 1888, 1. 
70 “Glenn’s Record” NA, The Sporting Life, November 28, 1888, 6. 
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With so much on the line in terms of public reputation, teams went to varying lengths to 
keep their men out of trouble.  The precautions teams took against alcohol were many.  When 
Columbus regained major league status and joined the American Association for 1889, its 
management even drew up a code of conduct for the players.   
 
1 – Players are expected to be gentlemen at all times. 
2 – While in Columbus report at grounds daily, except Sunday, at 10 AM and 2 PM, unless 
excused by captain or manager. 
3 – Retire at 11:30 PM. 
4 – No drinking of intoxicants will be allowed at any time. 
5 – Players are cautioned against associating with harlots and gamblers. 
6 – Avoid pool rooms and saloons. 
7 – While in the field the captain has charge of the team, and his authority is not to be questioned 
at any time. 
8 – No finding fault with another player’s work will be allowed.  If you have any grievance go to 
the manager. 
9 – Players are expected to keep themselves in proper moral and physical condition. 
 
Any breach of these rules resulted in a $10 fine, except for the no-drinking clause, which carried 
a $50 fine for the first offence and a $100 penalty plus suspension for the second.71   
As with some of the attempts to prevent drinking described in chapter six, it is not that 
any of these rules were poor in the abstract.  The problem lay in the fact that the definitions of so 
                                                 
71 “Columbus Chatter” F.W. Arnold, The Sporting Life, April 3, 1889, 3. 
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many of the behaviors they purported to control were ill defined.  This left them open to abuse 
by team officials hoping to recoup some of their outlay for salaries by fining their players for 
trivialities.  There was also the fact that grown men may well resent having their employer try to 
control who they associated with and when those associations took place.  Yet, the teams had to 
do something, if they did not want to see their fan base melt away in disgust over the actions of 
some players. 
This is where the Brotherhood’s efforts to improve the conduct of its members might 
prove useful.  As John Ward stated many times, the BPBP considered that the interests of the 
players and the team owners were almost identical, and on the issue of general behavior by 
players, they were.  If fans grew disgusted over the actions of players and stayed away from the 
ballpark, teams would make less money, and they would then be unable to pay their players as 
much.  Furthermore, if the BPBP wanted to raise salaries for all of its members, making sure that 
those members behaved themselves would give them a stronger hand in negotiations.  It meant 
that management would have one less issue with which to disparage them in public and in salary 
negotiations.  That is part of the reason why the Brotherhood did not accept every National 
League player into its ranks.  It turned away a few men for their moral shortcomings, for exactly 
the reasons described here.   
In the end, the issue of violence in baseball is important for the same reasons that alcohol 
abuse, umpire abuse, gambling, dishonesty, and physical fitness were important.  All of these 
were about improving baseball’s image and presenting spectators with a better product for their 
entertainment half-dollar.  Negative incidents involving any of these vices threatened to dampen 
public enthusiasm for a sport growing in popularity and profitability.  No one connected to the 
game wanted to see those things injured or disrupted, especially the owners who had invested 
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sizable sums in baseball.  This fact next raises the question of the fortunes of the owners and the 





Team Finances in the 1880s  
 
 
As the clubs of the National League and American Association moved to institute their 
salary cap for the 1886 season in an effort to hold down player salaries, and then contemplated 
what they should do in response to the players forming their brotherhood, it seems worthwhile to 
ask: were the teams in financial straits to begin with?  Was it necessary to check player salaries 
in order to keep the franchises afloat, or was this simply another way to squeeze the players and 
take tighter control of labor?  Leaving aside, for the moment, the point about proportionality, and 
whether or not men who made millions of dollars in business should care if their baseball team 
made or lost a few thousand dollars in a season, there remains the question of how much money 
the teams actually made or lost.   
Without access to the account books of each franchise, it is impossible to know the 
precise figures.  Nor can we always take the public claims of owners at face value.  In some 
cases, especially during the Brotherhood War of 1890, the need to foster an image of stability 
and profitability colored the public pronouncements of the teams.  Not only was each team 
competing for fan support and favorable press coverage; each major league was competing with 
the other for a reputation as the superior organization.  True, the two major leagues were not in 
open warfare after 1883, but if the numerous and frequent rumors (that occasionally panned out, 
too) of franchise moves in the sporting papers of the 1880s are any indication, each league 
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incessantly tried to get the jump on its rival organization.  In some cases, examining 
circumstantial evidence may be the best we can do in estimating the financial conditions of the 
teams, but there are some solid figures to work with as well.  In any case, we must give the 
figures we do have a careful examination to see what they tell us.   
The city of Cleveland fielded a major league team for most of the 1880s, taking a break 
only when they left the National League after the 1884 season in protest over poor treatment 
from the League.  They returned in the American Association in 1887, taking Pittsburgh’s place, 
headed by Frank Robison, who made his wealth in street railroads, as president.  In order to gain 
readmission to the major leagues, their ownership group proudly pointed to the financial success 
the team enjoyed in its League days as part of their efforts to persuade the Association to take 
them on.  The owners revealed that their club operated in the black even before joining the 
National League.  In 1878, when they were the Forest City team in a league known as the League 
Alliance, they turned a profit.  After joining the National League in 1879, they finished sixth in 
the championship race (out of eight, and at 27-55, they were a very long way from fifth) but 
made money regardless.  Despite never finishing better than third place in their six years in the 
National League, the team made money each year, except for small losses in 1881 and 1884, 
with the profits reaching as high as $20,000 for the 1883 season.  By the time Cleveland entered 
the American Association in 1887, the club believed its prospects brighter still.  Their new 
grounds (known, confusingly, by the same name as their old grounds, both being called National 
League Park), “as level as a billiard table,” seated 5,000 spectators and was more centrally 
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located than the old grounds, being four blocks closer to the Public Square and accessed by three 
street car lines.1 
Other team executives used the same tactic of pointing out past profits in order to justify 
current actions.  O.P. Caylor, manager of the Cincinnati Red Stockings in 1885 and 1886, 
provided his readers in The Sporting Life with some financial information in his effort to prove 
how the National Agreement between the two major leagues served to boost franchise values far 
beyond what they had been before the National Agreement existed.  He claimed that the Red 
Stockings, who entered the American Association in its inaugural 1882 season, made $12,500 in 
their first year.  They continued pulling in the cash the next two seasons, profiting about $10,000 
in each campaign, before losing $7,000-8,000 in 1885 when the team had greater than usual 
expenses in an effort to sign new players.  In the just-concluded 1886 season, the team resumed 
operating in the black (how far went unspecified) but Caylor did claim receipts for the season in 
excess of $55,000.  This was slightly down from 1883, when the Red Stockings had between 
$65,000 and $70,000 in receipts, but near 1884’s total of $60,000.2 
The story of Chris Von der Ahe reads along the same lines as that from Cleveland.  The 
St. Louis entrepreneur started out as the owner of a grocery store, and then added ownership of a 
saloon, butcher shop, and food store to his portfolio.  In 1880, he joined a group that wanted to 
renovate Grand Avenue Park in St. Louis and fit it for baseball purposes.  By 1881, St. Louis had 
a team playing on the grounds, and although it was not a major league club, he and the other 
owners cleared $25,000 for the season, as St. Louis turned out to be excited over baseball.  The 
profits grew from there, as St. Louis fielded a team in the American Association during its 
                                                 
1 “The Cleveland Club” FHB, The Sporting Life, December 15, 1886, 1; “Fully Organized” NA, 
The Sporting Life, December 15, 1886, 1. 
2 “From Cincinnati” O.P. Caylor, The Sporting Life, December 15, 1886, 3. 
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inaugural 1882 season, pulled in about $50,000, and continued doing so well that Von der Ahe 
devoted almost all of his attention to baseball because of the great profits realized from the 
national pastime.3 
Caylor later provided his readers with an important caveat when it came to official 
attendance figures, however, and one we should keep in mind over the course of this chapter.  He 
once described how it was standard practice for teams to exaggerate attendance figures by up to, 
and sometimes exceeding, forty percent in order to make their teams appear more successful to 
the public than they actually were.  The only club that reported exact figures consistently, he 
believed, was Boston, although Caylor believed New York also did so for the most part.  That 
left fourteen other major league teams, however, where inflated attendance figures were the 
order of the day.  “St. Louis always did magnify their crowds, and other clubs not desiring to be 
outdone in the eyes of the public in a drawing sense got into the habit gradually of adding a 
percentage to their actual numbers.  This system has done much harm.  It has made the players 
believe the club for which they played has made a great deal more money than was the fact.”  
Caylor, as a former team manager who handled the visitors’ share of the gate receipts, was in a 
position to speak with authority on this matter.  He also pointed out that there might be a modest 
discrepancy between actual attendance and paid attendance, as many spectators obtained free 
passes to the games (more on this matter later) but, in all, we should take the official figures 
given by most clubs with at least one grain of salt.4   
His remark about official attendance figures misleading the players is an important one, 
however.  One of the factors that motivated the players towards forming the Players’ League for 
the 1890 season was that they believed there was more money in baseball than their salaries 
                                                 
3 “Base Ball” NA, The Sporting News, February 5, 1887, 5. 
4 “Caylor’s Comment” O.P. Caylor, The Sporting Life, May 16, 1888, 9. 
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indicated.  If teams reported the terrific attendance numbers that they sometimes did, how, then, 
could the same teams cry poverty and do things like pass the Brush Plan (see chapter sixteen) 
claiming that such things were necessary to prevent financial ruin?  In this respect, baseball’s 
magnates contributed to their troubles with their players.  The revolt of 1890 was a self-inflicted 
wound in this regard. 
Charles Byrne, owner of the Brooklyn franchise, joined Caylor in his belief that most 
teams exaggerated their attendance numbers, although he claimed that his team was pure in this 
regard.  After Brooklyn opened the 1889 season on the road against the Philadelphia Athletics in 
front of huge crowds, Byrnes said, “There was a big crowd there, and the lowest number I have 
heard estimated is 12,000, and I am informed that the Athletic management gave out 15,000 as 
the figures.  As a matter of fact there were about 10,000 people on the ground.  This much I am 
certain of, and that is that the Brooklyn Club was paid for 9,935 admissions at the three gates.”  
Byrne also agreed with Caylor that this deluded players into a belief that all the teams were more 
profitable than they truly were.   “Now over in Brooklyn we never lie about our crowds.  There 
are the turnstiles and the exact number of persons passing through them are given to the press 
and the public.  That is what the turnstiles are for.  I shall have a talk with the Athletic people to-
morrow and will endeavor to show them the harm they are doing in adding to their crowds.”5 
Keeping this in mind as we proceed, we can get a round estimate of the overall 
profitability of the game from Chicago’s Al Spalding.  He once admitted that the eight teams of 
the National League profited $750,000 for the five seasons of 1885-1889.  Even if the teams 
plowed some of that profit back into their own organizations, in the form of improving their 
grounds, grandstands, and so forth, as Spalding claimed, that still leaves a nice sum in 
                                                 
5 “Big Base Ball Crowds” Charles Byrne, The Sporting News, April 27, 1889, 1. 
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management’s pockets each year.6  This equates to $150,000 profit per season for the league as a 
whole, or $93,750 per team over the five-year period, or $18,750 average profit per team, per 
year.  Teams did not participate in any kind of revenue sharing plan, however, other than the 
share of gate receipts awarded the visiting team at each game, and so these averages conceal 
significant discrepancies between each team.  As with the tendency to inflate attendance figures, 
we must keep this fact in mind as we delve into team finances. 
Estimations of the wealth of the backers for each club are not easy to make, especially 
considering a person’s wealth varies with the vagaries of business, but nonetheless, one writer 
attempted to do so for the American Association’s teams in 1887.  The goal was to refute the 
claim of Boston Triumvir J.B. Billings that the National League was in stronger financial 
condition than the Association. Claiming that some figures might be low, but none high, he 
provided the following figures for the wealth of each team’s head its ownership group: 
 
Philadelphia Athletics - $100,000 
Brooklyn Grays - $450,000 
Baltimore Orioles - $500,000 
Cincinnati Red Stockings - $1,000,000 
Cleveland Blues - $500,000 
Louisville Colonels - $250,000 
New York Metropolitans - $10,000,000 
St. Louis Browns - $250,000 
 
                                                 
6 Seymour, Baseball, 119. 
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The sum of all these is a shade north of $13 million, although clearly the vast wealth of the New 
York franchise, headed by Staten Island developer Erastus Wiman, raises the group’s average 
considerably.7 
 There are documented attendance figures to help us in our estimates, although 
regrettably, the leagues did not start to publish official attendance figures until 1891.  Teams 
sometimes published attendance totals on their own authority prior to 1891, however, and 
baseball researchers have reconstructed totals by reading newspaper reports and taking 
attendance totals from those reports, with the understanding that the totals might contain some 
owner-created inflation.  Below is a table indicating total yearly attendance, average yearly 
attendance, and revenue from attendance (see the discussion in note eight below for more detail 





















                                                 
7 “New York Chat” Regular, The Sporting Life, February 23, 1887, 5. 
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Table 1 Yearly Total Attendance, Average Attendance, Estimated Attendance Revenue, and 
Winning Percentage for Major League Baseball Teams, 1885-18898 
 
  Total Average Attendance Winning 
Team Season Attendance Attendance Revenue Pct. 
Baltimore AA 1885 66,000 1,200 $24,750 37.6 
 1886 70,000 1,129 $26,250 36.6 
 1887 142,000 2,254 $53,250 57.0 
 1888 38,000 679 $14,250 41.6 
 1889 115,000 1,797 $43,125 51.8 
      
Boston NL 1885 110,290 1,969 $68,931 41.1 
 1886 133,683 2,285 $83,552 47.9 
 1887 261,000 4,314 $163,125 50.4 
 1888 265,015 3,955 $165,634 52.2 
 1889 283,257 4,426 $177,036 64.8 
      
Brooklyn AA 1885 85,000 1,518 $31,875 47.3 
 1886 185,000 2,624 $69,375 55.5 
 1887 273,000 3,957 $102,375 44.8 
 1888 245,000 3,427 $91,875 62.9 
 1889 353,690 5,053 $132,634 67.9 
      
                                                 
8 All attendance figures in this table come from estimates found at baseball-almanac.com, and 
researchers have reconstructed these estimates from attendance figures given for games in 
sporting newspapers.  They are, admittedly, estimates, but should be sufficient for our purposes.  
The dollar values given in the attendance revenue column are my projections, based on 
multiplying the home attendance by 62.5 cents for National League cities and 37.5 cents for 
American Association cities.  In the National League, tickets cost 50 cents for general admission 
and 75 cents for a seat in the grandstand, while in the American Association the numbers were 
25 and 50, respectively.  I have averaged the two.  As a result, these numbers are not absolutely 
correct, but reasonable estimates.  O.P. Caylor, one of the most astute observers of baseball and a 
former team manager for two different clubs, believed teams took in an aggregate of about 
$900,000 in 1888.  The data in this table for 1888 sums to a total a bit higher than Caylor’s 
estimate, although if we take the possibility that teams over reported their totals a bit, then our 
numbers square well with his estimate.  Frank Brunell in Cleveland actually used a higher figure 
than I have or Caylor did, 65 cents per game, in his calculations of the Cleveland club’s revenue, 
so my figure of 62.5 cents probably is near the mark.  “Brunell’s Budget” F.H. Brunell, The 
Sporting Life, July 17, 1889, 7.  Finally, for American Association data for 1888, I used a 
multiplier of 50 cents, because that was the year that the Association switched to National 
League ticket prices at the beginning of the season but reverted to their old prices about halfway 
through the campaign, so I average the two standard multipliers to get this number.  All data 
from baseball-almanac.com accessed January 30, 2015. 
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Table 1 (Cont.)  
  Total Average Attendance Winning 
Team Season Attendance Attendance Revenue Pct. 
Buffalo NL 1885 35,000 660 $21,875 33.9 
      
Chicago NL 1885 117,519 2,080 $73,449 77.7 
 1886 142,438 2,261 $89,024 72.6 
 1887 217,070 3,418 $135,669 58.7 
 1888 228,906 3,366 $143,066 57.0 
 1889 149,175 2,194 $93,234 50.8 
      
Cincinnati AA 1885 120,000 2,143 $45,000 56.2 
 1886 138,563 1,965 $51,961 47.1 
 1887 185,397 2,726 $69,524 60.0 
 1888 132,606 1,936 $49,727 59.7 
 1889 131,000 1,858 $49,125 54.7 
      
Cleveland AA 1887 72,000 1,241 $27,000 29.8 
 1888 60,000 1,000 $22,500 37.9 
Cleveland NL 1889 144,425 2,124 $90,266 45.9 
      
Columbus AA 1889 90,000 1,304 $33,750 43.5 
      
Detroit NL 1885 43,000 827 $26,875 38.0 
 1886 105,000 1,694 $65,625 70.7 
 1887 95,000 1,557 $59,375 63.7 
 1888 75,000 1,136 $46,875 51.9 
      
Indianapolis NL 1887 84,000 1,333 $52,500 29.4 
 1888 78,000 1,182 $48,750 37.0 
 1889 105,850 1,557 $66,156 44.0 
      
Kansas City NL 1886 55,000 821 $34,375 24.8 
Kansas City AA 1888 50,000 877 $18,750 32.6 




Table 1 (Cont.)  
  Total Average Attendance Winning 
Team Season Attendance Attendance Revenue Pct. 
Louisville AA 1885 108,000 1,929 $40,500 47.3 
 1886 123,000 1,836 $46,125 48.5 
 1887 128,000 1,882 $48,000 55.9 
 1888 76,000 1,357 $28,500 35.6 
 1889 60,000 938 $22,500 19.6 
      
New York AA 1885 64,000 1,231 $24,000 40.7 
 1886 67,000 1,063 $25,125 39.3 
 1887 105,000 1,780 $39,375 33.1 
      
New York NL 1885 185,000 3,304 $115,625 75.9 
 1886 189,000 3,176 $118,125 63.0 
 1887 270,945 4,406 $169,341 55.3 
 1888 305,455 4,663 $190,909 64.1 
 1889 201,989 3,206 $126,243 65.9 
      
Philadelphia AA 1885 169,000 3,018 $63,375 49.1 
 1886 179,000 2,594 $67,125 46.7 
 1887 163,000 2,362 $61,125 48.1 
 1888 201,000 2,680 $75,375 60.9 
 1889 220,000 3,235 $82,500 56.4 
      
Philadelphia NL 1885 150,698 2,740 $56,512 50.9 
 1886 175,623 3,081 $65,859 62.3 
 1887 253,671 4,125 $95,127 61.0 
 1888 151,804 2,335 $56,927 53.1 
 1889 281,869 4,439 $105,701 49.6 
      
Pittsburgh AA 1885 82,000 1,478 $30,750 50.4 
 1886 195,000 2,847 $73,125 58.4 
Pittsburgh NL 1887 140,000 2,258 $87,500 44.4 
 1888 112,000 1,672 $70,000 49.2 
 1889 117,338 1,778 $73,336 46.2 
      




Table 1 (Cont.)  
  Total Average Attendance Winning 
Team Season Attendance Attendance Revenue Pct. 
St. Louis AA 1885 129,000 2,304 $48,375 70.5 
 1886 205,000 2,950 $76,875 66.9 
 1887 244,000 3,615 $91,500 70.4 
 1888 166,000 2,459 $62,250 68.1 
 1889 175,000 2,593 $65,625 66.7 
      
St. Louis NL 1885 62,000 1,107 $38,750 33.3 
 1886 99,000 1,623 $61,875 35.2 
      
Washington NL 1886 60,000 968 $37,500 23.3 
 1887 80,000 1,356 $50,000 37.7 
 1888 57,000 891 $35,625 35.8 
 1889 68,652 1,295 $42,908 33.1 
 
 We should not take the estimates in the “Attendance Revenue” column as an exact 
income for each team each year, because teams had many other sources of income, and this 
column only estimates revenue from attendance.  In addition, remember that the attendance 
estimate only includes championship schedule games, and teams played many exhibition games 
each season to supplement their incomes.  Outside of the games themselves, there was also 
advertising and concessions, as we will see below.  Still, we can use these figures as a decent 
beginning to understand how much money a typical team might make in one season. 
 An additional factor here is that not all gate revenue went to the home team.  The home 
club split the gate receipts with the visitors, in various ratios and with various stipulations over 
the years.  During the 1886 season, for example, the visiting team for National League games 
received thirty percent of the gate from the game.  This was, in most cases, more liberal towards 
the visiting nine than the American Association rule, which stipulated that the visitors receive a 
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flat sum of sixty-five dollars.9  At their league meeting preparatory to the 1887 season, eastern 
owners of NL franchises succeeded in pushing through a change in this policy similar to the 
American Association rule.  The change was that for 1887, all visiting teams received a 
guarantee of $125 each game, except on national and state holidays, when they would get fifty 
percent of the gate.10  One interesting quirk of these league meetings was that owners coveted 
appointments to the Scheduling Committee, so that they could schedule home games for their 
teams on important holidays and other choice days when crowds would be huge.  This rule was 
supposed to help alleviate such practices, although teams that generally saw lighter attendance 
might acquiesce in playing road games on big holidays anyways because they did receive half 
the money taken in that day.   
 It is important not to underestimate the gate receipts from turnout on holiday games, 
either.  As an example, Henry Chadwick once reached back into his misty memories of the 
game’s early years to produce some facts regarding the 1869 Cincinnati Red Stockings.  After 
scanning old files of the Brooklyn Eagle, he announced that the 1869 team drew 23,217 fans for 
six May match ups, banking $11,500 in the process.  Yet, he claimed, “The six matches above 
referred to did not equal the number present at the Polo Grounds on Decoration Day, 1886, nor 
did the entire receipts of those six May games of 1869 equal those of the single game of last 
Decoration Day in which the Detroits and New Yorks took part.”11 
 
* * * * * 
 
                                                 
9 “The Base Ball Business” NA, The Sporting Life, November 10, 1886, 2. 
10 “The Maroons Victory” NA, The Sporting News, November 20, 1886, 1. 
11 “Chadwick’s Chat” Henry Chadwick, The Sporting Life, February 16, 1887, 2.  Today, we call 
Decoration Day Memorial Day, and it falls on May 30 of each year. 
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Teams debated what was better, a straight guarantee for the game or a percentage of the 
gate.  The answer, of course, varied depending on whether your home crowds were larger or 
smaller.  The Boston Beaneaters of 1886, for instance, paid the National League’s four western 
franchises $6,847.05 more from games in Boston than it received from games on the road with 
those clubs.  For the league as a whole, the Beaneaters came out $5,740.80 poorer because of the 
scheme of dividing the gate receipts with thirty percent going to the visitors.  Furthermore, 
according to the team’s account books from which their sportswriter took these figures, Boston 
had subsidized every western team in the same way in every season going back to 1883, with the 
singular exception of the Detroit team of 1884.  This writer also noted Boston’s official 
attendance in 1886, which was 133,682 spectators, and claimed this figure was significantly 
weaker than in the previous few seasons when the team won more frequently (they won 56 
games against 61 defeats in 1886) and drew more fans to their ballpark at the South End 
Grounds.12   
The Chicago White Stockings also resented supporting visitors with thirty percent of the 
take when those visitors did not reciprocate by equally strong attendance on the return 
engagement.  Following the 1885 season, with the National League down to six members after 
Providence and Buffalo dropped out, Chicago owner Al Spalding favored the National League 
staying with six teams instead of the typical eight.  One reason he cited was that in road games 
played at Buffalo in 1885, his White Stockings realized only $383 in revenue, not even enough 
to pay their hotel bills during the stay.13 
On the other side of the coin from Boston and Chicago was the Detroit Wolverines.  
Their ownership beefed up the club, and its payroll, significantly when they acquired the “Big 
                                                 
12 “From the Hub” Mugwump, The Sporting Life, November 17, 1886, 4. 
13 “Sporting Affairs” NA, Chicago Daily Tribune, January 3, 1886, 10. 
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Four” of Dan Brouthers, Hardy Richardson, Jack Rowe, and Deacon White prior to the 1886 
season.  They did so in pursuit of a business model that fit their situation in the City of the 
Straits.  They knew that their home market would struggle to support a large payroll, being 
eighth out of the eight National League cities in population, but of course, they still wanted to 
field a first-class nine and win games.  Their solution was to put together a team of heavy hitters 
that would draw big crowds on the road, and then use their thirty percent visitors’ share of the 
gate receipts to make up for the fact that they could not draw as many cranks to their home 
games at Recreation Park.14  Their plan had merit.  For instance, of the approximately 189,000 
cranks who witnessed games played at New York’s Polo Grounds in 1886, 64,000 of those, 
about one-third, attended games featuring Detroit.  Figure two shows estimated attendance in 
National League cities when Detroit came to town in 1886. 
 
Table 2 Estimated Attendance at National League Ballparks in Games Featuring the Detroit 
Wolverines in 188615 
 
Total Detroit Detroit's
City Atendance Attendance Percentage Take
Boston 133,682 30,000 22.4% $5,625
Chicago 142,438 65,000 45.6% $12,188
Kansas City 55,000 No data No data No data
New York 189,000 64,000 33.9% $12,000
Philadelphia 175,623 48,000 27.3% $5,400
St. Louis 99,000 No data No data No data
Washington 60,000 12,000 20.0% $2,250
Total $37,463  
                                                 
14 Confusingly, Pittsburgh, Detroit, and the Philadelphia Quakers all played at home fields 
named Recreation Park in 1886.  
15 “Detroit Dethroned” MAT, The Sporting Life, December 1, 1886, 4.  Note that these numbers 
are estimates and as such, are in the ballpark but not absolutely accurate.  Also, remember that 
Philadelphia charged twenty-five cents for admission to the bleachers, so the Detroit take in 
Philadelphia was smaller than it was in other cities. 
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If the percentages attributed to the Wolverines seem absurdly high, accounts from 
individual games seem to back the claim.  When the Wolverines went to Gotham to play a 
double header with New York on Decoration Day in 1886, 7,000 fans paid to watch the first 
game and 20,000 the afternoon contest.16  A June 19 game in Detroit against Chicago saw 10,000 
in attendance.  The next month, when Detroit visited the Windy City, 14,000 people came out to 
watch on July 10, which observers believed to be the largest crowd in the city’s history.  Another 
11,000 cranks watched Detroit play in New York on August 9, with 9,000 in the stands the 
following day, and 8,000 more were on hand on August 11 to see the Giants beat the Wolverines 
for the third straight game. Even on September 30, with New York out of the race for the 
pennant, 5,200 came to the Polo Ground to witness Detroit’s last appearance in the city that 
year.17  The following season they were again one of the League’s top drawing cards, as an 
August three game series in Chicago saw an aggregate attendance of about 28,000.18 
The salaries Detroit offered its players were indeed substantial, and in many cases quite a 
bit higher than the supposed $2,000 dollar maximum for 1886 described in chapter three.  
Second baseman Fred Dunlap pocketed $4,500 for the season, while first baseman Dan 
Brouthers and outfielder Hardy Richardson pulled down $4,000 for themselves.  The left side of 
the Wolverine infield, shortstop Jack Rowe and third baseman Deacon White, earned $3,500 
each, and catcher Charlie Bennett $3,000, while the club’s best pitcher in 1886, Charles “Lady” 
Baldwin, got $2,500 for his efforts.  The club’s other primary outfielders, Ned Hanlon ($2,250) 
                                                 
16 “Around The Bases” NA, The Sporting News, March 5, 1887, 5. 
17 “Chicago Wins The Game” NA, New York Times, June 20, 1886, 2; “Detroit Again Defeated” 
NA, New York Times, July 11, 1886, 2; “New York Whips Detroit” NA, New York Times, 
August 10, 1886, 3; “Detroit’s Unhappy Nine” NA, New York Times, August 11, 1886, 3; “It Is 
A Habit They Have” NA, New York Times, August 12, 1886, 3; “Detroit Defeated” NA, New 
York Times, October 1, 1886, 2. 
18 “From Detroit” MAT, The Sporting Life, August 24, 1887, 4. 
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and “Big Sam” Thompson ($2,000), also made the limit or more, and even their backup, Jack 
Manning, got $1,900 for his rather mediocre work with the stick.  To round out the club’s 
expenditures, pitcher Charlie “Pretzels” Getzien made $2,000, pitcher Larry Twitchell $1,200, 
pitcher Billy Smith $1,750, reserve catcher Tom Gillen $1,500, reserve catcher Charlie Ganzel 
$1,750, and pitcher Pete Conway $2,000.  The salaries of team officials and workers to keep the 
grounds in shape ran the club another $6,000 or so, while the rent for the grounds was roughly 
equal to the sale of scorecards and such during the season.  All of these salaries sum to a player 
payroll of approximately $41,350 for the season, though the true total is slightly higher, $46,500, 
as the team also engaged a few players who did not finish the season with the club.  Adding on 
administration, the team spent in the neighborhood of $52,500 in 1886.19 
This strategy worked well for 1886, as Detroit played outstanding ball on the field and 
went 87-36 (.707 winning percentage), narrowly missing the pennant and finishing 2.5 games 
back of the Chicago White Stockings.  It reported home receipts of $55,000 for the season.20  It 
appears, therefore, that even the National League team playing in the league’s smallest market 
could break even or profit, given quality players to attract spectators and management with a 
business model appropriate to its circumstances.  Detroit predicated its success on bringing fans 
to the park on the road, however, so when the NL announced its change in ticket revenue 
distribution for 1887, Wolverines ownership went berserk.  So much so, the team considered 
ditching the League and joining the American Association, in its public pronouncements, at least.  
Given that the Association’s road revenue sharing plan was still more miserly towards visitors 
than the one the League just adopted, all the bluster appears no more than an attempt to gain 
                                                 
19 “Pretty Hefty” NA, The Sporting Life, December 1, 1886, 1. 
20 Ibid. 
 424
leverage in their negotiations with the League, but still, this change meant Detroit would have to 
scrap its entire business plan.   
Detroit’s protest worked, but for only one season.  They did stay with the National 
League, in part because Chicago’s Al Spalding decided to allow Detroit, but only Detroit, to 
continue operating under the financial rules of 1886 for the coming season.  With this guarantee, 
Detroit’s owners kept their team together, and even won the pennant in 1887 by edging the 
Philadelphia Quakers, but after that had to start dismantling its team because of the team’s 
reduced revenue stream.  By 1888, they slipped to fifth in the standings after parting with second 
baseman Fred Dunlap, and by 1889 things were so bad that they ceased to field a major league 
team.21  Detroit’s president Fred Stearns gave an accurate summation of the situation after the 
1887 season when he said, “we have a team that entitles us to a percentage all around.  Our 
salary list is $49,000.  Chicago’s is $29,000.  While we are the greatest attraction that comes to 
Chicago, we have made $10,000 on the season and Chicago has made between $80,000 and 
$90,000.”22 
Was this move to the guarantee plan an intentional one, part of a byzantine plot intended 
primarily to derail the Wolverines?  Without getting inside the heads of the other National 
League owners it is impossible to say with certainty, but at least some circumstantial evidence 
points in that direction.  The Wolverines put together a great team, and their rivals knew it.  
Their 1887 club featured three players, Brouthers, Thompson, and White, in the Hall of Fame for 
their playing skill (Ned Hanlon is also enshrined in Cooperstown, but for his innovative tactics as 
                                                 
21 See the November 24, 1886 issue of The Sporting Life for more details on Detroit’s dilemma.  
Several articles in this issue address their grievances over the National League’s change of policy 
regarding ticket revenue.  Also, see “What Spalding Says” NA, The Sporting News, November 
27, 1886, 1; “Stearns on the Situation” NA, The Sporting News, November 27, 1886, 1.   
22 “Base-Ball Notes” NA, Chicago Daily Tribune, October 30, 1887, 13. 
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a manager much more than for his abilities as a player, which were respectable but nothing 
more) as well as several others such as Dave Rowe, Fred Dunlap, Hardy Richardson, and Charlie 
Bennett who were regarded among the better players in 1880s baseball by contemporaries.  This 
collection of stars rivaled or exceeded what the White Stockings, Quakers, or Giants put on the 
field any given day.23   
With the Wolverines constituting a significant threat, but a fiscally vulnerable one, other 
National League teams might realize better opportunities if they pulled Detroit’s legs out from 
under them financially.  Doing so through manipulating revenue distribution also had the 
advantage of seeming fair and neutral by equalizing the visitors’ take at all games, which 
appeared to treat all teams equally.  Such a move had the added bonus of being justifiable by the 
social Darwinist-inspired attitudes of the late nineteenth century, a time when many believed that 
organisms succeeded or failed solely because of the traits with which nature endowed them.  In 
this view, if a club like Detroit could not support itself on the merits of its home attendance, it 
deserved to go under, or at least it should slash its payroll, because it was unfit to support its 
current level of spending.  (The Wolverines might counter that they had adapted through their 
innovative approach to building their roster, but the rest of the National League could again 
counter that nature, symbolized by the rules of the game, had changed and Detroit was unfit to 
survive in the new circumstances.)  As an example of this mode of thinking, when the American 
Association took up the percentage or guarantee question in 1887, Cincinnati president Aaron 
Stern put it bluntly.  “I am of the opinion that if a city cannot support its own club it has no 
business in the Association. . . . I cannot see what right the other clubs have to my receipts.”24  
                                                 
23 For more on Hanlon’s managerial innovations, see Jaffe, Evaluating Baseball’s Managers, 92-
95. 
24 “Hedging on the Percentage Question” NA, The Sporting Life, August 24, 1887, 1. 
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The problem with such logic, as the reader has doubtless already realized, is that the receipts 
taken in at the home ballpark were not solely a function of the quality of the home team.  Some 
visitors, like Detroit, drew better than others, based on the quality of their team and how many 
magnetic, charismatic players it had to attract spectators, and statements such as Sterns’ simply 
ignored this fact. 
As for how this destroyed the Detroit club, without this revenue from road games, they 
could not keep their team together, and the other National League owners knew this.  By 
granting Detroit the exceptions they did for 1887, they could even project the appearance of 
helping a wounded brother, but like wolves circling injured prey, they realized it was only a 
matter of time.  The Wolverines managed to profit in 1887 with the help given them, coming out 
about $10,000 in the black according to the club’s president (who also assured Detroit’s 
correspondent for The Sporting Life that every team in the National League, even the newly-
minted Indianapolis franchise, made a profit in 1887, and a profit greater than Detroit’s, at that, a 
statement also confirmed by Indianapolis management), but after that season, the tide started to 
turn against them.  Every time Detroit had to sell one of its star players, the richer teams were the 
ones to benefit.  Facts bear this out.  When the Wolverines started unraveling after the 1888 
season forced them into baseball’s equivalent of debtors prison, Dan Brouthers went to Boston 
along with Hardy Richardson and Charlie Bennett, while Sam Thompson journeyed east to 
Philadelphia.  Jack Rowe, Ned Hanlon, and the aging Deacon White, part of the club’s second 
tier of stars, ended up with Pittsburgh, joining Fred Dunlap, who had gone to the Smoky City the 
year before.25 
                                                 
25 “What Detroit’s Stockholders Get” NA, The Sporting Life, October 5, 1887, 3. 
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Despite all these maneuverings, the demise of the Wolverines was still rather sudden.  
Part of the reason, besides the financial maneuvers already described, was a perfect storm of bad 
luck.  Having won the championship of the world the year before, Detroit cranks expected 
another big effort from their nine in 1888.  That did not happen.  Instead, the team went 68-63 
and finished in fifth place, putting an enormous damper on fan enthusiasm.  (Another piece of 
bad luck here was that their record should have been much better than it was.  The team’s 
Pythagorean record was a full six games better at 74-57, which would have put the Wolverines in 
third place.26)  The worst was when the ball club suffered sixteen consecutive losses in July and 
August as injuries decimated its ranks.  This turned off fans in a major way for the remainder of 
the season.  These injuries cost them slugging outfielder Sam Thompson for all but 56 games, 
and even some of those he did play in, he could barely throw the ball, an immense liability for 
the right fielder.  Likewise, Hardy Richardson took the field just 58 times at second base, and he 
was another critical piece of the Wolverine arsenal.  Replacements like Count Campau were not 
very effective, and a slew of unexpected losses resulted.  The overall lousy weather of 1888 also 
played its part, and the result was financial hardship in the City of the Straits. 
As a result, team management folded its hand.  It is hard to say with certainty looking 
back, but it appears they panicked unnecessarily.  Even if they lost money in 1888, a healthy 
roster likely would have resulted in a better performance in 1889, and along with jettisoning a 
couple pricey players, things probably would have been manageable once again.  Deacon White 
                                                 
26 A team’s Pythagorean record is the record it should have achieved, given its number of runs 
scored and runs allowed.  Over the course of a season, outscoring the opposition by ten runs 
equates to about one win, on average.  In 1888, the Wolverines played 131 games, scored 721 
runs, and allowed 629.  Being +92 in runs scored should have equaled about nine wins, therefore.  
A team with equal runs scored to runs allowed should have gone 65-65 in 130 games.  Since 
Detroit was +92 in runs, that should have given them nine more wins, 74 total, in an average 
season.  The fact that they only won 68 means the team suffered from bad luck, for lack of a 
better word. 
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was still a good hitter, but was also forty years old.  His defense at third base cannot have been 
sublime by this time, and parting ways with the Deacon alone would have freed up $3,500.  Lady 
Baldwin made about $2,000 for pitching in just six games.  A decision part ways with those two 
men alone would have about evened the books, but taking the short view instead of thinking 
ahead, Detroit management cashed out.  The team briefly considered a move into the American 
Association, thinking that offering fans tickets for a quarter might draw more of them to 
Recreation Park.  However, this may have been simply a cover story as the team considered its 
future prospects and found them looking rather bleak.  “The club has lost money this year.  It is 
thought that with 25-cent games people can be got to the park who will not pay twice that sum, 
but the real motive of the deal is the certainty that Detroit will be frozen out unless it gracefully 
retires.”27 
Instead of persevering or changing leagues, Wolverine management began auctioning off 
its men before closing shop.  Boston and Pittsburgh were the most frequent shoppers.  While 
some of the men involved had no personal objections to their potential purchasers, this did bring 
back the question of whether teams should be able to sell their men without consulting them.  As 
Deacon White put it, “I think it would have been better for Mr. Stearns to have consulted the 
players before he went on his peddling trip.  I do not like the idea of being auctioned off like a 
slave.”28  White was especially leery about any possible sale to Boston, as back in 1877 the team 
had released him without paying him his full salary.29 
The club milked the situation for all it was worth.  It sold its top players auction-style, 
most going to the Gas City or Beantown.  It also sold its franchise as a member of the National 
                                                 
27 “Various Base-Ball Talk” NA, Chicago Daily Tribune, October 11, 1888, 3. 
28 “The Boston-Detroit Deal” NA, New York Times, October 25, 1888, 2. 
29 “Notes And Comments” NA, The Sporting Life, October 24, 1888, 2. 
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League, along with the remaining, less desirable players.  Cleveland, alienated by its American 
Association brethren (see chapter sixteen), was ready and willing to change leagues.  The club 
bought the franchise from Detroit and transferred its allegiance back to the National League, 
where the city began in professional baseball in 1879.30  The city of Detroit, meanwhile, demoted 
itself to International League status, as a new group of investors sold stock in a new team and 
opened up an operation in that circuit for 1889.31 
Once again, as things always seemed to be when Detroit was involved, the League’s 
timing was interesting and possibly conspiratorial.  Just one month after the Wolverines decided 
to close shop, the League adopted the Brush Classification Plan (see chapter sixteen) in an 
attempt to limit future player salaries.  Had Detroit known of the intent to do this back in 
October, it is quite conceivable its management might have changed its collective mind and 
decided to remain in the National League with this measure to help contain future costs.  Instead, 
by the time the new plan went public, the team had sold many of its players already, making any 
such ideas moot. 
Despite all the cries of poverty and losing money, however, players must have taken note 
when the team’s ownership revealed the exact state of its finances when closing its affairs.  
Rather than a cash-strapped franchise that was nearly destitute, the Wolverines were more like 
the poker player who has had a good day and cashes out while ahead.  One Detroit writer asked 
team president Fred Stearns, “What is the amount of the assessment the stockholders are called 
on to pay?”  He replied, “Assessment!  Ha!  Not much.  We declared a dividend of $54,000, and 
there is still more money in bank to be divided.”  The writer, incredulous and perhaps unsure he 
heard Stearns correctly, said, “What!  A dividend of $54,000?”  Stearns answered again, 
                                                 
30 “The Base Ball Situation” NA, The Sporting Life, October 24, 1888, 2. 
31 “The New Detroit Club” Mac, The Sporting News, November 17, 1888, 1. 
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“Exactly.  It is payable June 1, and the holders of the shares, the par value of each being $50, will 
receive $135 each.”  If Detroit closed the affairs of its supposedly failing franchise by paying 
shareholders two and a half times the original price of its stock, it seems legitimate to question 
whether other clubs also were considerably better off than they stated to the public.  Players 
around major league baseball certainly took note.32 
 
* * * * * 
 
Readers should not assume that just because baseball’s two major leagues included words 
in their names like “league” and “association,” with the cooperation such words imply, that the 
owners of the individual franchises behaved with the group’s well-being in mind.  Often, it was 
the contrary.  The National League’s constitution, for instance, allowed for the expulsion of 
league members if two-thirds of the league approved, and it was always possible to trade favors 
for votes.  As a result, for 1887, the National League’s revenue distribution scheme further 
enriched the already wealthy at the expense of the rest of the league by forcing out Detroit and 
forcing it to sell its top players to the highest bidders. 
This is part of the reason why there were so many rumors regarding franchise movement 
in the 1880s.  Owners were out to make money for themselves, not necessarily for the good of 
the game or the league of which they were a member.  Sportswriters frequently hurled this 
charge in the direction of the American Association especially, although League owners 
occasionally came in for criticism as well.  As one Washington, DC writer put it in 1887,  
when I attended the League meeting in New York, I saw and heard many things which I 
have not cared to print, but which, nevertheless, convinced me that there is but little 
                                                 
32 “The Old Detroit Club” MAT, The Sporting Life, April 29, 1885, 1. 
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sentiment among base ball magnates so far as the National game is concerned.  They are 
in it for business reasons and some of my Washington friends would be astonished to 
know how slender is the thread that binds the Washington Club to the League.33 
 
Later, the same correspondent wrote, “the League would cheerfully extend the right hand of 
fellowship to Brooklyn with its present strong team, and it would not be a difficult matter to get a 
two-thirds vote to drop out the weakest Eastern club.”  That meant trouble for the hometown 
Nationals, because “from a business standpoint no reasonable man will attempt to compare 
Washington with Brooklyn, and it therefore behooves the Washington management to put a 
strong team in the field next season if it wants to retain its membership in the League.”34 
 St. Louis Browns owner Von der Ahe also verified these beliefs in his comments in 
December of 1887, as he described how, if his Browns had won the World Series that year, they 
had planned to move to the American Association’s New York market, recently vacated after 
Brooklyn owner Charles Byrne had bought the entire New York Metropolitans franchise a few 
months earlier.  As Von der Ahe put it,  
there is more truth than poetry in the statement.  The matter was not only seriously 
considered but a move of the kind had almost been determined on.  As we did not beat 
the Detroits, however, the plan missed fire.  We had talked the matter over and had come 
to the conclusion that the Browns as Champions of the World if located in New York 
could clear at least $100,000 a season.  At that rate and counting on them holding their 
position they could clear $500,000 in five years.  That is about twenty times what they 
could clear here even under the most favorable circumstances.  For that reason we had 
contemplated their removal to the Metropolis.  Under the circumstances and looking at 
the matter from a purely business standpoint who could blame us for making the move.35 
 
All of this opens the question of whether or not these changes regarding revenue 
distribution were for the better.  In the short run, some of the individual teams gained, like 
Boston, while others, such as Detroit, were hurt.  Taking a longer view, however, economic logic 
                                                 
33 “From The Capital” Bob Larner, The Sporting Life, December 28, 1887, 5. 
34 Ibid. 
35 “Nearly Lost Them” NA, The Sporting News, December 31, 1887, 1. 
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suggests that modification of the rules to help the wealthier franchises at the expense of teams 
like Detroit was probably unwise.  Greater inequality of wealth between the franchises only 
served to lower the level of competitive balance in the league.  Wealthier teams had more 
resources with which to sign talented players in the first place, and with the reserve clause to 
help them, the wealthier teams also held on to those quality players.  As a result, the poorer 
teams had a tougher time getting their hands on talented players, which meant they had a harder 
time drawing fans to their grounds without hope of having a winning team.  Lousy teams do not 
draw many spectators, either at home or on the road, and so when these weak teams came to play 
the stronger ones, attendance in the larger cities declined as well.  Eventually, these weaker 
teams tended to drop out of their leagues, replaced by similarly uncompetitive new entries.  The 
fact that major league baseball’s attendance fell off in 1888 and 1889 after peaking in 1887 
seems to corroborate this conclusion.36 
Observers, especially the hoary veteran sportswriter Henry Chadwick, took note of this 
trend, already emerging by the winter of 1886-1887, with disapproval.  Before the 1887 season 
began, he discussed the fact that while most teams saw a profit in 1886, not all did, and he did 
not mince words as to the reason.  The blame, Chadwick offered, lay not with the public, or any 
lack of popularity with the game itself, but instead with poor management and greed that hurt the 
game’s reputation with the public.  He quoted the first two articles of the National League’s 
constitution: 
 
                                                 
36 Remember that without anything resembling a modern farm system of minor league affiliates, 
small market teams such as Detroit could not rely on trying to develop young players as some 
major league teams do in the 2010s.  Instead, teams had to purchase all new players from a minor 
league team somewhere, and those purchases cost money that the teams did not always have. 
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1. To encourage, foster and elevate the game of base ball; to enact and enforce proper rules for 
the exhibition and conduct of the game, and to make base ball playing respectable and honorable. 
 
2. To protect and promote the mutual interests of professional base ball clubs and professional 
base ball players. 
 
Likewise, article one in the American Association constitution stated that the Association existed 
“to perpetuate base ball as the National game of this country, and to surround it with such safe-
guards as to warrant for the future absolute public confidence in its integrity and methods.”  In 
Chadwick’s eyes, when wealthier teams from larger markets abandoned the less profitable ones, 
or changed the rules to benefit themselves rather than the group, they failed to live up to these 
high-minded professions of intent, especially the part about promoting their mutual interests.  
The same held true regarding the cutthroat efforts to lure teams from one league to another, 
depending on the whims of the moment.37   
 Sustaining Chadwick in this matter was his fellow graybeard and walking baseball 
historian Harry Wright.  Considered one of the fathers of the game, Wright saw clearly that each 
league had an interest in making sure the smaller cities fielded a competitive nine, both to 
maintain the overall level of competition, and to make sure fans turned out when those teams 
went on the road.  He actually advocated a hybrid of the guarantee and percentage systems, 
calling for a minimum guarantee of $150 for all games, and then allowing the visitors a 
percentage of the gate whenever they drew enough spectators to bring in more than $150 under 
the percentage plan.  Pushed to pick between the two, however, Wright did not hesitate in his 
                                                 
37 “Chadwick’s Chat” Henry Chadwick, The Sporting Life, January 12, 1887, 5. 
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choice.  “I think the percentage system is more fair and just. . . . If Detroit goes to Boston and 
draws an immense audience give Detroit the benefit of its drawing abilities.  If some other club 
goes to Boston and draws poorly let them have $150, and so on through.  It is decidedly in the 
interest of the big league cities to have good clubs in cities of smaller population.”38 
 The Sporting Life took up this question as well, and believed it was one of the problems 
bedeviling the American Association, and that it would do the same to the League if the League 
insisted on staying with the guarantee plan.  The paper’s editor, respected baseball observer 
Francis Richter, believed that the guarantee plan promoted selfishness and shortsightedness 
among owners, and led to an unbalanced league with only a few competitive teams.  Richter had 
a point here, considering that by 1887 the St. Louis Browns were well on their way to the third of 
what would be four straight Association championships, with no rival finishing within six games 
of them and three of the four championships coming by more than ten games.  When they finally 
lost their stranglehold on the championship in 1889, the team to unseat them, the Brooklyn 
Bridegrooms, was another large market team with deep resources to acquire talent, and even 
then, the Browns still posted a championship caliber 90-45 record.   
This was also the reason that the Association’s National League rivals could induce 
teams like Pittsburgh to leave the Association, tempting them with a better organization.  Richter 
also saw what was going on between the National League and Detroit as an opportunity for the 
Association, writing, “all roads lead to Detroit now.”  He hoped that if the Association adopted 
the percentage plan, the Wolverines, with all their talent and established drawing power, might 
really consider leaving the League, thus strengthening the Association with its hoards of talented 
hitters who could bring fans to parks throughout the league.  Richter also offered a very prescient 
                                                 
38 “Affairs At Detroit” NA, The Sporting News, August 13, 1887, 2. 
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prediction of what would befall the Association should they refuse to change, a prediction that 
came true by 1892.  He wrote,  
the poorer clubs will inevitably be overborne by the power of concentrated capital and 
frozen out and then the dream of base ball monopolists will be realized, namely, one 
great League with undisputed arbitrary power, close corporation tendencies, even more 
galling slavery for the unprotected and refugeless player than now, unmitigated  by the 
salve of big salaries, and—either future disturbing Union Association experiments in the 
many frozen-out cities, or gradual decadence of base ball for lack of healthy rivalry and 
competition.39 
 
The National League changed courses again for 1888.  At its November meeting it voted 
to adopt a hybrid system, giving visitors $150 plus twenty-five percent of the gate.40  The reason 
may well have been that Detroit threatened to do just what Richter predicted.  The Wolverines’ 
president, Fred Stearns, said “I told the Association people to be all ready, and in case we were 
not given our dues in the League we would join them.  I made no threat, but was fully prepared 
to make the jump.”41 
 
* * * * * 
 
While selling tickets to home games was by far the most important source of income for 
major league teams, another source of revenue, which we should not underestimate simply 
because they are very rare today, was exhibition games.  There were several kinds of exhibitions.  
Major league teams played minor league clubs or even collegiate and amateur nines in April to 
prepare for the championship season.  They played each other as well, sometimes within their 
league and at other times against teams from their rival league.  Cross-town rivalries, or matches 
                                                 
39 “The Association” Francis Richter, The Sporting Life, August 10, 1887, 1. 
40 “The Men Make Their Point” NA, New York Times, November 18, 1887, 2. 
41 “Notes And Comments” NA, The Sporting Life, December 7, 1887, 5. 
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with geographic neighbors, were of this type.  The two Philadelphia teams played for city honors 
in the spring.  While St. Louis had two teams, in 1885 and 1886, they also played.  Washington 
and Baltimore was a popular combination, as was New York versus Brooklyn.  Cincinnati, 
Cleveland, and Louisville offered possibilities.  Finally, there were postseason exhibitions, 
including, but not limited to, the champions of the respective leagues, for honors as the best team 
in the country, region, or city.  Any of these types of exhibition games could prove lucrative.   
As an example, prior to the 1887 season, the defending champion St. Louis Browns 
played a pair of games with a trio of western opponents.  For just half a dozen exhibition games 
with Louisville, Indianapolis, and Cincinnati, about 37,000 fans paid to take in the action.42  
Almost 25,000 people, more than 8,000 per game, turned out for the preseason three-game series 
between the Browns and White Stockings in 1887 as those two clubs repeated their battle for 
supremacy in the World Series of the prior year.  Between those three games in St. Louis and the 
matching three games in Chicago, the Browns realized about $3,500 in profits and the White 
Stockings about $4,000.43  In the World Series of 1886, three games in Chicago netted about 
$6,500 while the reciprocal games in the Mound City brought in about $7,400.44  When the same 
St. Louis team battled Detroit for the World Series championship following the 1887 campaign, 
their series of fifteen games drew 51,455 spectators and the clubs garnered in the neighborhood 
of $40,000 combined.  This despite the fact the games took place in mid and late October when 
the weather in cities such as Detroit, Pittsburgh, Boston, and New York (the clubs decided to 
play a tour of games, rather than a home and home series in 1887) was anything but dependable 
                                                 
42 “Around The Bases” NA, The Sporting News, April 16, 1887, 5. 
43 “From St. Louis” Joe Pritchard, The Sporting Life, April 20, 1887, 4; “Notes and Comments” 
NA, The Sporting Life, April 27, 1887, 11. 
44 “Base Ball” NA, The Sporting News, September 10, 1887, 5. 
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for baseball.45  Even the 1888 World Series, handicapped by some rough weather and the 
superior play of the New York Giants, who disposed of St. Louis rather quickly, resulted in a 
profit of about $8,000-9,000 to each team.46  When The Sporting News broke down the financial 
results of the New York-St. Louis affair, based on figures from the account books of St. Louis 
Browns secretary George Munson, revenues were $21,362 while expenses ran about $5,000 
total, resulting in a profit of $8,181 to each participant.47   
Exhibition games did not have to be World Series games to pocket a tidy sum, however.  
When the two Philadelphia clubs, the Quakers (some already referred to them by their current 
name, the Phillies, by this time however) and Athletics played their city rivalry games in 1887, 
they played twelve contests and 57,000 spectators came to watch.  Athletics executive Lew 
Simmons claimed this netted $16,400 for the two clubs while his manager, Frank Bancroft, 
claimed his team alone pocketed nearly $10,000.48 
These exhibitions often produced considerable revenue if the opponent was a strong 
drawing card.  When the Boston Beaneaters brought their “$15,000 man,” Mike Kelly, to 
Baltimore for three matches in April of 1887, about 18,000 denizens of the Monumental City 
came out to watch.  The third game was on the Monday following Easter, and 8,000 fans 
showed, which one Baltimore sportswriter believed was the largest crowd yet to see a game at 
Oriole Park.  The writer claimed that is was standard procedure for the visitors to get 40-45% of 
                                                 
45 “From St. Louis” Joe Pritchard, The Sporting Life, November 2, 1887, 5. 
46 “St. Louis Siftings” Joe Pritchard, The Sporting Life, November 7, 1888, 3. 
47 “The World’s Series” NA, The Sporting News, November 10, 1888, 1. 
48 “Philadelphia News” NA, The Sporting Life, April 20, 1887, 10; “Chats With The Ball Men” 
NA, The Sporting News, April 23, 1887, 5; “Chats With The Ball Men” NA, The Sporting News, 
April 30, 1887, 5. 
 438
the gate for these games if they were of major league caliber, and estimated that the Beaneaters 
realized between $1,800 and $2,025 profit for the series.49 
In their attempts to procure more lucre, some teams took the concept of the exhibition 
series to extremes.  Consider the trio of exhibition games played in late August and early 
September 1887.  One game was between the New York Giants and Indianapolis Hoosiers on 
August 31, both of the National League.  The Philadelphia Quakers also played intra-league 
games with both Spalding’s White Stockings, on September 2, and the Detroit Wolverines that 
same year.  There appeared to be no legal grounds for such games, as the National League’s 
constitution stated, in section 55, that every game played until the completion of the 
championship series shall be a game for the championship.  This rule appeared an ironclad 
prohibition against teams scheduling their own exhibition matches outside the championship 
season schedule.  However, the teams involved, along with National League president Nick 
Young, interpreted “completion of the championship series” to mean that once the two teams had 
finished playing each other in their championship season schedule, they were free to play 
exhibition games despite the fact that many games still remained with other members of the 
league.50   
Exacerbating the problem was that, with nothing on the line, teams understandably saved 
their top players and put a second-rate nine on the field for these contests, thus bilking the fans 
with sub par baseball.  The result was that “the Giants and Indianapolis club played what was 
supposed to be an exhibition of ball playing.  It was an exhibition, but a lot of school-boys could 
have done better.”51  Furthermore, “these exhibition games are a fraud and delusion, misleading 
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and confusing to the public and of no compensating pecuniary benefit to the clubs.  Only a year 
or so ago the Association was criticized for indulging in these catch-penny games and wisely 
prohibited them.  Now we find League clubs falling into the old ruts in their eager chase after the 
‘nimble six-pence.’”52 
There were some lengths, lamentably, to which players and teams would not go.  In 
September of 1887, St. Louis Browns president Chris Von der Ahe scheduled an exhibition game 
in West Farms, New York, against the New York Cuban Giants.  Although Von der Ahe 
contracted for the game with the manager of the Cuban Giants, his team never appeared on the 
grounds.  In public, Von der Ahe citing the crippled condition of many of his key players trying 
to recover from injury as the reason for bowing out of the engagement.  In private, however, the 
cause of the Browns’ refusal was that the Cuban Giants featured African American players.  The 
Browns sent their president a letter, signed by all except first baseman Charlie Comiskey and 
reserve outfielder and pitcher Ed Knouff, which read, in part, “We, the undersigned members of 
the St. Louis Base Ball Club, do not agree to play against negroes to-morrow.  We will 
cheerfully play against white people at any time, and think by refusing to play, we are only doing 
what is right, taking everything into consideration and the shape the team is in at present.”  
President Von der Ahe was furious about this refusal (although whether it was because he was a 
more ethnically and racially tolerant man, or because of the loss of projected revenue, went 
unsaid) but bowed to the wishes of his players on this occasion.53  He tried to smooth over the 
insult to the Cuban Giants by rescheduling the game for October.54   
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The Cuban Giants managed to schedule a fair number of games despite their skin color, 
however, and apparently played well, as The Sporting Life reported the club played 161 games in 
1887, winning 107, and the team posted similarly exceptional records in other seasons during the 
1880s.  It did not report, however, the level of competition or the professional status of the 
opponents, which probably varied greatly depending on who would consent to play them,55 but 
the Detroit Free Press did extol the prowess of some of the team’s players and its overall 
performance.  It wrote, “The Cuban Giants, of which club Malone, of Detroit, is a member, 
contains some very fine ball talent, and has proven its prowess by vanquishing the best of 
League and Association clubs.  These men would prove a boon to some of the weak clubs of the 
League and Association, but if there is one thing the white ball player insists on doing it is 
drawing the color line very rigidly.”56  Part of the reason they were so successful is that, unlike 
minor league teams, no major league teams wanted their top talent, or even their secondary 
talent, for that matter, so the players had ample experience playing with each other.  “The 
majority of these players have played together in the same nine for the past ten years, hence their 
great success.”57   
Regarding post-season exhibition games, although there was a World Series between the 
League and Association champions in the 1880s, other teams played postseason games, too, in 
an effort to top off their coffers following the championship schedule’s conclusion.  Consider the 
October schedule of the Association’s Cleveland Blues in 1887.  They played a series of five 
games with the League’s Indianapolis Hoosiers, four with the Pittsburgh Alleghenys, and three 
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with Cincinnati, as well.  Those were just the games against other major league clubs.  They also 
scheduled home games with various minor league and independent nines, including the same 
Cuban Giants that the St. Louis players found so objectionable.  They wanted to schedule the 
Chicago White Stockings, too, but Chicago was already busy with a postseason schedule of its 
own, which featured six games with Cincinnati, then match ups with St. Paul and other clubs 
from the Northwest League.58 
Another post-season option was a trip west to the California.  In 1886, an exhibition team 
mainly featuring members of the Louisville Colonels had traveled to California for a winter full 
of games against West Coast nines, and fared well financially.  Like sharks smelling blood in the 
water, other clubs raced to cash in on this modern day version of the California gold rush in the 
1887 off-season.  No less than four teams journeyed to the Far Slope that winter.  The New York 
Giants played a guaranteed schedule of games with teams from the California League, many of 
them at San Francisco’s Haight Street Grounds, opening on November 24 and playing into 
February.  The Philadelphia Quakers, Chicago White Stockings, and St. Louis Browns also went 
west, with Philadelphia playing even more exhibition games at Cincinnati, Denver, Las Vegas, 
Santa Fe, Los Angeles, and San Diego on their way to the Bay Area.  The players on this 
traveling exhibition signed contracts specifying the division of receipts, length of service, and 
good behavior required (read: no drunkenness) with some of the money reserved in case the 
players did not live up to their word.59 
This winter’s action in the Golden State was not as profitable as the year before had been, 
however.  Mother Nature must shoulder some of the blame, as one of the players, John Ward, 
reported frequent rain and the coldest temperatures since 1854.  Charley Powers, who traveled to 
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California to umpire some of the games, even reported that it was so cold at the San Francisco 
hotel where he stayed, the water in its pipes froze.  More problematic, however, was the fact that 
four teams tried to take part in the tour.  Unlike 1886-1887, when there was just one club taking 
on the local nines, now there were plenty of choices for Californians who wanted to watch the 
national game played by major league players.  With the novelty gone, and spectator interest 
diluted, the clubs made a bit of cash, but all admitted the trip was not the financial success they 
had planned on back in October.  Ward believed that one eastern team, playing against a 
combination of local players and major leaguers from the West, would have drawn much 
healthier crowds.60 
 
* * * * * 
 
Ticket sales for championship season or exhibition games, although by far the main 
source of revenue for the teams, were not the only one.  As teams still do today, they sold 
scorecards to the public to enhance their revenue stream.  After the 1886 season, rumor had it 
that the Pittsburgh Alleghenys wanted to print their own scorecards at Recreation Park, so they 
would be more responsive to daily demand.  Apparently, there were times in 1886 when 1,500 
scorecards were insufficient, and team management wanted to tap into this source of revenue in 
the most efficient manner.  By 1888, Pittsburgh upped their estimate to selling 100,000 
scorecards for the season, and looked to prosper by $3,500 thereby.   The Boston Beaneaters also 
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decided to print their own scorecards by 1887.61  Offering the privilege of peddling scorecards at 
the grounds netted teams about enough cash to pay the salary of one marginal player for a 
season, if the $1,500 that the St. Louis Browns received in 1887 is any indication of the going 
rate for this concession.  Cincinnati manager O.P. Caylor agreed with this figure, stating in 1887, 
“I fixed its value at $1,500, and did not underestimate it.”62  Selling advertising space at the 
grounds was another option to boost revenue.  The St. Louis Maroons, for instance, estimated 
that sales of advertising at their Union Grounds would gain them $2,000 for the 1887 season.63   
Besides advertising, teams sold snacks, such as peanuts and candy, rented seat cushions, 
and sold liquid refreshments on the grounds, although most National League teams pretended to 
bow to middle class respectability and did not offer alcohol officially or openly.  However, as 
Cleveland sportswriter Frank Brunell stated regarding the prohibition of liquor sales at National 
League games in 1886, “there were not more than two of the League clubs of 1886 who did not 
knock the life out of this provision of the League constitution, either by evasion or openly.”  Al 
Reach, one owner of the Philadelphia Quakers, when revealing how much money a team might 
realize from selling beer at its grounds, claimed to be one of the true believers in morality, 
stating, “I am for upholding the character of the National game always even if the club should 
suffer pecuniarily or otherwise.  Why, we could get $5,000 for the privilege of selling liquor on 
those grounds.64  American Association teams were more likely to sell beer at games without the 
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charade of pretending they did not; this helped earn the league its nickname of the “Beer and 
Whiskey League.”  
Teams even attempted to make money from their grounds during the off-season, as in the 
winter of 1886-1887 when several made their grounds available to accommodate tobogganers as 
a minor craze for that sport swept the northern states.  “The toboggan slide at Recreation Park [in 
Pittsburgh] is doing a land-office business thus far.  The ladies, especially, admire the sport.”  
White Stockings field general Cap Anson did, too.  The Chicago papers reported he was a 
constant presence at the West Side Park toboggan runs all winter long.65  Henry Chadwick, that 
solon of baseball writers, did not believe that tobogganing would pay, however, due to Mother 
Nature’s unpredictability, but the toboggan slides at Recreation Park in Pittsburgh made money 
that winter, and the company owning the operation announced plans to return the following 
winter with a grander operation.66  In fact, team secretary A.K. Scandrett contracted with the Fort 
Wayne Railroad to bring in ten carloads of snow from the West each day when none fell in the 
Smoky City on its own account, hoping thereby to keep the slide in operation all winter long.67  
Over in New York, however, The Sporting Life correspondent George Stackhouse claimed that 
the money made from tobogganing there “would not fill a two-pint growler.”68 
Even though official ticket prices stood at fifty cents for the bleachers and seventy-five 
for the grandstand in the National League, and twenty-five and fifty for the same locations in the 
American Association, teams sometimes offered deals to bring in more fans.  There were a great 
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many schemes involving ticket prices, depending on the location and the season.  In Louisville in 
1887, for instance, the Colonels charged fifty cents for a grandstand ticket, with prices dropping 
to thirty-five and twenty-five cents as the cranks moved further away from home plate.  If a man 
brought a female companion, the woman entered the grounds free of charge, unless it was 
Sunday.  Men with more than one female guest, or a lady on her own, paid twenty-five cents for 
each woman.69  According to team president Zach Phelps, about three-quarters of Louisville’s 
patrons opted for seats in the first two classes, and only one-quarter chose the bleaching boards.  
“Upon one occasion we had 10,000 people present and we sold only 1,900 25-cent tickets.”70 
In 1888, the American Association broke precedent and, after a tight vote at its league 
meeting in December 1887, decided to try a fifty- and seventy five-cent admission charge for the 
upcoming season, just like the League did.  Brooklyn, St. Louis, and Cleveland favored the 
change while Louisville, Philadelphia, and Cincinnati (who attempted to get the clubs to 
compromise at forty cents) at first did not.  The fifty-cent tariff supporters eventually carried the 
day, although as in the National League, Philadelphia had permission to sell tickets at twenty-
five cents as long as the NL’s Philadelphia Quakers stayed at a quarter for admission.  Given the 
fondness of John Rogers for twenty-five cent tickets, it seemed no change was likely to happen 
in the near future, but surprisingly, Rogers also decided to get in line with his brother owners in 
the National League and charge fifty cents beginning in 1888, and so the fifty-cent admission 
minimum became the standard throughout major league baseball.  Zach Phelps justified the 
move by pointing out that his team, and the American Association generally, was offering the 
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public greater attractions, in the form of higher quality baseball, than the Association had done in 
the past.71   
The debate between clubs over twenty-five or fifty cents for a ticket was an interesting 
one.  Simple math indicated that, even if attendance fell off moderately, teams would still be 
better off financially with the higher rate.  Things like scorecard sales and concessions not 
included in the price of admission would not increase in price, so a decline in patronage would 
cost teams a bit in this regard, although some teams sold the rights to the concessions to outside 
contractors, so depending on the team, this might not matter.  Yet, only rarely did sportswriters 
paint the issue as a mathematical one.  Certain cities had reputations for being in favor of one 
price or the other, and these reputations came from, at least in part, the reputation of that city’s 
working people.  St. Louis was possibly the most complex in this regard.  People argued that 
during weekday games, the difference in price would not matter much, as better-off cranks 
tended to patronize weekday games.  However, as St. Louis was also a Sunday baseball town, 
and as Saturday and Sunday were when the working classes of the Mound City came to the 
ballpark in large numbers, if they chose to stay away because they could not afford pricier 
tickets, the team might still suffer financially. 
Some also believed that upping ticket prices throughout the Association would hurt its 
efforts to find an eighth member for the 1888 season.  When Brooklyn bought the franchise of 
the New York Metropolitans, the Association needed an eighth member, but prospective cities 
such as Buffalo and Milwaukee feared that if their teams were weak and tickets also cost fifty 
cents minimum, so many fans would come to the ballpark disguised as empty seats that their 
teams would never prosper.  “No man will pay that much to see a team made up of the rag-tag 
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and bob-tail of other clubs defeated, and unless the Association managers open their hearts and 
give a good team to the city that accepts a franchise the outlook for the League’s greatest rival 
will be gloomier than it now is.”72   
The Association eventually adopted Kansas City as its eighth member for 1888.  All the 
reasons that the National League had given for booting the Cowboys from its circuit after 1886 
seemed irrelevant now.  Brooklyn owner Charles Byrne gave his reasons for admitting the 
Cowboys, or strings of words pretending to be reasons, when he said, “it is a thriving town, and 
will be a ‘go.’  A year ago I opposed the admission of Kansas City, for several good and 
sufficient reasons.  Now it is different.  They have the right kind of men behind the club, and it 
will be a success, or I am mightily mistaken.”73  He was mightily mistaken.   Not only was this 
new Kansas City team backed by men similar to the group of 1887 when no one wanted them, 
the new incarnation of the Cowboys lasted just one year longer than the previous one, two years, 
never winning more than forty percent of its games, although it did bring to baseball one of the 
game’s all-time best hitters, outfielder “Sliding” Billy Hamilton.  The club did have strong 
enough financing, however; when it applied for admission to the American Association, it stated 
that Fred Heim, of the Heim Brewing Company, was worth between $125,000 and $200,000 (in 
the words of one writer, “he is the happy possessor of a big boodle”74) while also claiming forty 
to fifty other stockholders in the club were worth somewhere between $50,000 and $200,000 
each.75 
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The practice of charging more for better seats, taken for granted in sports for decades, 
made perfect sense then just as it does now.  Not only did the pricier tickets give access to better 
seats, often with a roof to protect spectators from the afternoon sun (remember that all games 
were day games in the 1880s by necessity) but, even in supposedly classless and socially 
egalitarian America, many fans (and owners, like Spalding) wanted to maintain a difference in 
price as a mark of social distinction.  In the words of Baltimore’s Albert Mott, “there are many, 
in fact the great majority, on the grand stand would rather pay the difference and see some 
discrimination.  They don’t want to be squeezed up by a lot of dirty, yelling, misbehaving 
hoodlums on a hot day, or any other day in fact, and if the management heeds the wishes of its 
grand stand patrons, it will charge an extra price for that luxury and make it to some degree 
exclusive.”76   
Management had to be careful here, however.  There was a fine line between the rowdy 
element and the working class, and teams had to be careful not to cross the line and alienate 
potential supporters.  As Charles Byrne of Brooklyn put it,  
the right kind of people and the people we want for our patrons will be more attracted to 
the sport as they see the roughest element excluded per force of prices.  Don’t 
misunderstand me—I do not refer to the laboring classes by this latter phrase, for they are 
the people we want to benefit by furnishing relaxations—a kind of labor-to-refreshment 
benefit—but we do want to exclude the tough and the rowdy whose presence is degrading 
to a gentlemanly sport, and has been handicapping its success . . . the man or overgrown 
boy who audibly swears at the players and umpire, and he is the one who is inciting riots 
on the grounds.  He is always ready to jump into the field to assault the umpire, and is 
constantly under the impression that his mission is to punch somebody’s head. . . . While 
the high tariff will not entirely eliminate the rowdy element, it will go far towards doing 
it.77 
 
Still, despite the drawbacks and risks detailed here, the Association decided to take the 
plunge in 1888.  Most of the clubs agreed, “The experiment is a risky, but not necessarily a fatal 
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one.  With the present high salaries, increased incidental expenses, and the superior quality of 
ball furnished, the 25-cent rate is too low.  The margin of profit is too small, and it is for this 
reason that the local clubs are unable to compete with Chicago, Boston and New York for high-
priced star players.”78  Calling on the experiences of decades of observing the national game, 
Henry Chadwick agreed with the move, writing, “from wretched accommodations and rough-
looking grounds, the scene has changed to present costly grand stands and finely-prepared fields. 
. . . All things considered, therefore, the raise in the tariff made by the Association is a proper 
move, and one made necessary by the increase of expenditure incurred by the clubs for 1888.”  
Even with the increase, Chadwick maintained, “the exhibition of manly sport presented by our 
leading professional organizations on their well-ordered ball grounds is now not only the 
cheapest sport to be had at half a dollar, but the most attractive field entertainment known to 
public out-door sports.”79  (For a fuller description of how this experiment by the Association 
turned out, see chapter seventeen.) 
 
* * * * * 
 
 When it came to the costs of actually running a team, we must remember that player 
salaries were not the only expense clubs had.  Travel to road games and hotel expenses were a 
factor.  In addition, teams needed employees to run operations at the ballpark on game day.  The 
Chicago White Stockings, just to give one example, in the mid-1880s typically employed seven 
ushers, six policemen, four ticket sellers, four gatekeepers, three groundskeepers, three cushion 
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renters, six people to sell refreshments, and eight musicians, for a total of forty-one game day 
employees.80 
In addition to operating the grounds, renting the home grounds (or constructing your own 
grounds) and keeping the grounds in playing condition cost money.  For example, when its team 
entered the American Association for 1887, Cleveland paid about $7,000 to get the stands in 
shape, put up fences, and so forth, although the team expected to recoup some of these costs 
through selling advertising space on its fences.  Once a team completed these things, however, 
this cost would not be so high in seasons to come unless it undertook major renovations to make 
its grounds a more attractive venue.81  The yearly expense of renting grounds appears to have 
been much less under ordinary circumstances.  When Cincinnati Red Stockings owner Aaron 
Stern sought to renew his lease on the grounds at League Park in Cincinnati after the 1888 
season, he balked when he discovered the asking price was $6,200 per year for a three-year 
lease.  Stern claimed this was a squeeze, and resented that the owner of the grounds wanted him 
to pay twice the amount he had paid for the last lease, so from this the normal rent for grounds 
would be near $3,000 per season, in Cincinnati at least.82 
 The location of the grounds was very important.  In the 1880s, walking or public 
transportation was the only way for cranks to get to the ballpark and take in nine innings.  
Therefore, having your grounds in a major city and located near main streetcar lines was critical.  
Even a team with a market the size of New York might struggle with fan support if its grounds 
were undesirably located.  The New York Metropolitans met this fate after the 1887 season, in 
which they tried to play their games at the St. George Cricket Grounds.  These grounds were on 
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Staten Island, which necessitated transporting fans to the game via ferry.  Team ownership hoped 
to profit by selling ferry tickets and game tickets together, but this inconvenience proved too 
much for many New Yorkers, and when the team did not play well, the fans did not show up.  
We can imagine the fear that seized New York Giants owner John Day, then, when he learned 
that the city planned to remove the fences at the original Polo Grounds before the 1889 season 
began.  This would require him to move operations across the Hudson River to Hoboken, New 
Jersey, as New York City had no other available grounds for baseball at that time.83  Other 
sources had them moving their games to Jersey City, but either way, such a move threatened to 
be a huge step backwards in terms of patronage and revenue, should worst come to worst.  
Eventually it did, as we will see shortly.84 
 Likewise, even teams that had grounds were on the lookout for better ones.  If properly 
vigilant, a team considered factors such as the growth patterns of its city, future improvements in 
public transportation, and the like.  For example, during the 1888 season, Brooklyn had strong 
attendance at Washington Park, but often cranks arrived in a disgruntled mood because the 
streetcar lines were overloaded and many had to walk a fair distance to reach the ballpark.  As a 
result, the following winter the team began casting about for a better location, so it could 
purchase the land and construct a first-class facility easily accessible to a greater number of 
Brooklynites.85 
Another reason teams might search for new or better grounds was to escape the clutches 
of corrupt city officials requiring bribes to continue play at its current location.  One of the most 
serious examples of bribing municipal officials over baseball comes from, not surprisingly, New 
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York City.  In 1885, the city’s Board of Aldermen was on the verge of passing a resolution to 
pave a road through the Polo Grounds where the Giants played their games.  At the board’s 
request, the team decided to pass along 100 books of season tickets, valued at $3,000 
collectively, to keep the board quiet and table the resolution to build the road.  Of this set of 100 
season tickets, some went to the board, while others went to “political friends outside the board . 
. . where they would do the most good.”86   
This enabled the Giants to remain at the Polo Grounds in 1885, but by 1889, they were no 
longer so fortunate.  Despite the fact that the Giants handed out 400 free season tickets to city 
officials (the approximate value by this time was $20,800, because the schedule was longer by 
1889) during the 1888 season, in February of 1889, the city decided to grade the road through the 
Polo Grounds, forcing the Giants to play elsewhere.87  As one paper wrote, “the New York Club 
could, it is believed, easily come to some agreement for suitable grounds in New York City, 
were it willing to surrender some of the club stock, which valuable stock some of Gotham’s 
avaricious rich men, who know a good thing when they see it, have had their greedy eyes 
upon.”88  As another wrote, “The delay is embarrassing, and many people affirm is caused 
simply by the absence of boodle which was expected to pour into the aldermanic chamber from 
the management of the Polo Grounds.  The Giants have no boodle for such purposes.”89   
The team did not surrender any stock, however, or sufficient amounts of boodle, and as a 
result struggled to find secure accommodations as the 1889 season began.  It lost a great deal of 
money in the process, especially considering that its success on the field, a second straight 
National League pennant after a dramatic race with the Boston Beaneaters, should have yielded 
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it a financial bonanza.90  New York owner John Day, rather than surrender stock or bribes in the 
form of more season tickets, tried to win the public opinion battle in an effort to preserve his 
grounds for one more season.  He offered to give $10,000 to charity if the Giants could retain use 
of the Polo Grounds through October, but this gambit was not enough.91   
The team eventually began the season at the old home of the New York Metropolitans on 
Staten Island while purchasing land for the construction of a new Polo Grounds.  While 
observers knew that the new, temporary location would cost the team severely at the box office, 
some managed to see a bright side in terms of the Giants ridding themselves of the parasites in 
city government.  “The number of Polo Grounds deadheads in the past three years has been very 
large, amounting, perhaps, to 800 season books, and no end of free passes for single games.  The 
removal to Staten Island cuts off the bulk of those, the New York aldermen alone relinquishing 
about 400.  As most of these books were used every day, it will be seen that the saving will be a 
large one.”92 
Also in 1889, officials in Philadelphia tried to put the same squeeze on the Philadelphia 
Quakers, but Philadelphia owner John Rogers, perhaps thanks to being a member of the legal 
profession, was several steps ahead of them. 
When we secured the grounds do you suppose we did it blindly, without thought of the 
future?  We ascertained at the Survey Bureau that Carlisle street was not on the city plan, 
and so we were safe to go ahead.  For Councils to open the street now an ordinance 
would have to be introduced to put it on the city plan.  Then the matter would have to go 
into the courts, where the necessity of such an opening would have to be shown, and 
then, mark you, we would have to be paid every cent of damage the destruction of our 
grounds would entail.93 
 
                                                 
90 For more on New York’s search for a place to play in 1889, see Pearson, Base-Ball in 1889. 
91 No title, NA, The Sporting Life, April 10, 1889, 6. 
92 “New York News” W.I. Harris, The Sporting Life, May 8, 1889, 5. 
93 “Philadelphia Pointers” NA, The Sporting Life, March 27, 1889, 4. 
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The Washington Nationals worked their own version of this scheme, securing jobs in 
Uncle Sam’s service for members of its nine in exchange for tickets.  “There was a time when 
the Government virtually supported the National Club.  When the old Red Stockings, of 
Cincinnati, champions of the world, were transferred to this city, almost every member of the 
team was given an appointment in one of the departments, and thus Uncle Sam was allowed to 
pay the greater proportion of the salaries.”  Although things in 1887 were not this serious, “even 
now two or three of the home team are on the Government pay rolls.”  The Nationals found this 
arrangement fair because, “many of the high officials are regular attendants at Capital Park and 
as a majority of them are the holders of complimentary tickets, it is but fair that they should help 
the management out whenever they can without injuring the public service, especially during the 
snow ball season.”  This made one of the team’s premier players, Paul Hines, angry because “the 
Washington management has not treated him fairly in securing employment under the 
government for other members of the home team and leaving him to hustle during the winter.94  
Washington management apparently gave out a great number of complimentary tickets, as “a 
large proportion of the members of the House of Representatives are base ball enthusiasts, and 
should a call of the House be made while a game of ball is in progress, Chief Clerk Clarke and 
Sergeant-at-Arms Leedom would not search Capital Park for the absentees, as they are also 
admirers and regular attendees of the National game.”95 
 We can get some understanding of a team’s cost for the season from an article written for 
The Sporting Life in 1886 by an unnamed but “well-known” manager.  The manager claimed 
that, “at the salaries now paid to players a club will often carry a salary list of $30,000.”  
However, “the salary list is by no means the only expense of a club.  There is the cost of fitting 
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up the grounds, the rent, traveling expenses and club equipments, which will run up the expenses 
of a club to $40,000 or $50,000 for the season.”96  If a club needed $50,000 to break even for the 
season, National League teams, with an estimated average ticket price of 62.5 cents as described 
in footnote eight, needed about 80,000 patrons annually; American Association teams, with their 
lesser admission charge, would need about 133,000.  If the lower figure comes closer to the truth, 
this would indicate a break even number around 64,000 spectators for the League and 107,000 
for the Association.  Referring back to figure one, most teams had no trouble drawing this many 
fans in an average season by the late 1880s.  Even though salaries did rise a bit each year, 
pushing up these numbers somewhat by the end of the decade, they remained within reach, given 
decent management and a reasonably competitive team. 
 Even in Louisville, one of baseball’s smallest markets, things were not so dire that the 
franchise tottered on the brink, just waiting for financial misfortune to push it over the edge.  The 
men of the Falls City made money in 1886, though not a great deal of it, as the following figures 
show. 
 
                                                 
96 “The Base Ball Business” NA, The Sporting Life, November 10, 1886, 2. 
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Table 3 Revenues and Expenses for the Louisville Colonels, 1886 Season97 
Receipts Amount
Ticket sales, ballpark $31,666.40
Ticket sales, other locations $6,078.10
Revenue from road games $7,646.20
Season tickets $243.00
Members tickets $440.00
Rent from the grounds $294.45
Ballpark concessions $450.00
Player fines $335.00






Revenue shared with visitors $7,021.95
Dividens paid to stockholders $586.00
Total Expenditures $46,833.40  
 
Furthermore, the team claimed a balance of $4,435.57 and profits of about $6,500 for the 
year, the difference between this number and figure three arising from exhibition games and 
such.  The financial picture might have been even better, but unfortunately the team’s late season 
swoon, in which it lost 20 out of 21 games at one point, greatly diminished fan enthusiasm, 
which team officials estimated cost them in the neighborhood of $6,000 additional revenue.98  
One Louisville sportswriter asserted that, in answer to rumors that the club was a financial loser, 
“the club has never lost money, and good crowds are the rule.  The financial statement is made 
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public every year, and the visiting teams can testify to the fact that the crowds are large when the 
drawing card is not below par.”99  The club’s owner, Zack Phelps, reiterated this midyear in 1887 
when rumors flew that his team might be up for sale.  He insisted, as did one local paper, the 
Louisville Courier Journal, that the club was making money and would pay a dividend to its 
stockholders at the conclusion of the season.100 
 Phelps and Louisville’s management reiterated this theme in August 1887.  With the team 
playing well, battling their archrivals from Cincinnati for second place behind the St. Louis 
Browns, the team’s board of directors held a meeting and announced that it would raise salaries 
for the team’s players in 1888.  Furthermore, the board declared its intent to spend additional 
money to strengthen the nine for the following season, if possible, and said the team was already 
in the black for the 1887 season.  Even if the club lost all its remaining home games to rain, the 
club still had the revenue to pay its players and all other expenses required.  Thus, the team 
continued to profit despite operating in one of the smallest markets in major league baseball.101   
Conditions in the Falls City seemed brighter still when the American Association voted 
to adopt a hybrid of the guarantee or percentage system for ticket receipts late in the summer of 
1887.  Believing that a larger guarantee, plus a share of gate receipts, would prove a boon to a 
team featuring such crowd-attracting players as Pete Browning, Guy Hecker, and Tom Ramsey, 
the club strengthened its commitment to securing talent in the off-season, dreaming they might 
even challenge the mighty St. Louis Browns in 1888.  Their confidence bolstered by profits over 
$12,000 for the season, and looking forward to more in the following campaign thanks to the 
new financial scheme, the team’s directors even went so far as to imply they might try to 
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purchase a major talent to strengthen the club.  This would be a departure from its traditional 
operating principles, as in the past, the team had depended on finding talented youngsters or 
developing unproven players, rather than spending freely on already established ones, due to the 
financial constraints it faced.  Despite these constraints, the team’s management took pride in the 
fact it had never operated in the red, and like Detroit, proved that even a small market team like 
Louisville could profit in Gilded Age baseball given a proper business model.102 
It was unfortunate, therefore, that the 1888 season was a horrible one for the Colonels.  
Some formerly productive players fell off in their batting, the defense often let down pitchers 
like Tom Ramsey, some players like Pete Browning and Ramsey let down the team with heavy 
drinking, and the club finished in seventh place that year.  Even still, when a writer asked new 
owner Mordecai Davidson if the club had lost heavily at the turnstiles, he responded in the 
negative.  “It is not true.  The club has not had a bad season from a financial standpoint.”103  Vice 
president John Botto said the same.  “The Louisville Club is all right, don’t you forget it.  1888 
was not a good year for us, but we did not lose money.  We are all right for next season.  I have 
shown my confidence by holding on to my stock, when I have been offered good prices for it.”104  
By the time Davidson finished selling two players, Elton “Ice Box” Chamberlain and Hub 
Collins, late in the season, for a reported $4,000 each, the Colonels showed a profit of about 
$12,000 in 1888.  (We cannot determine the exact figure, because Louisville ceased releasing 
financial statements to the public after Davidson took over management.)105 
Although the Colonels held their own financially up through 1888, what happened in 
1889 demonstrates what could happen to a team if it abandoned the appropriate model.  For this, 
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the team’s new owner, Davidson, should take most of the blame.  Although not a baseball man, 
(he once stated about his pitchers, “the trouble is that the average pitcher does not do enough 
work.  They should be put in the box at least every other day.”) Davidson took over active 
operations in Louisville after purchasing shares of stock from Zach Phelps and becoming 
majority owner.  Among his early moves was to part with two of the team’s best players, pitcher 
Chamberlain and second baseman/outfielder Collins, immediately weakening a team that had 
only went 48-87 for the year even with those two valuable men.106  (See chapter seventeen for a 
detailed description of how Davidson’s poor decisions led to Louisville’s complete breakdown in 
1889.) 
 Information from the 1887 Washington Nationals corroborates these numbers regarding 
expenses incurred in a typical season.  Their writer for The Sporting News reported that it would 
cost the club about $40,000 to operate and meet all expenses for that season, and that to finish in 
the black, the team required an average of nearly 2,000 fans at each of its sixty-three scheduled 
home games, or roughly 125,000 total.  Furthermore, the writer hoped that Washington’s efforts 
to strengthen the nine would produce this result or better, because the cranks of the nation’s 
capital would rally behind a winning team.  “People do not like to witness a club defeated in one 
game after another as was the case last season.  On the other hand, if a good, strong and active 
nine is put in the field which will make the other clubs play all they know how, the seats at 
Capitol Park will be filled at every game.”107 
                                                 
106 “Louisville Laconics” NA, The Sporting News, November 10, 1888, 1.  Confusingly, both 
major sports weekly papers had a column titled “Louisville Laconics” in 1888. 
107 “The Washington Club” Sam, The Sporting News, January 29, 1887, 2.  Given our estimates, 
it seems this writer overestimated the number of patrons required for financial solvency.  Or, 
perhaps Washington needed this many total attendees because so many members of the US 
government possessed complimentary tickets, and the number given, 2,000 per game, recognized 
that not all of these attendees actually paid for their tickets. 
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 Games against top-notch competition sometimes packed the grounds, and thus the 
pockets of team owners.  New York writer “Layman” reported more than 30,000 spectators for a 
three-game series between New York and Detroit in the heat of the 1886 race, and believed this 
number would have been greater had it not been for uncertain weather.  Furthermore, he claimed 
that 113,000 cranks packed the Polo Grounds for the dozen home contests with the Wolverines 
and White Stockings that year.108  If correct, this means the Giants pocketed something like 
$70,625 for twelve games.  If the team carried a payroll of $30,000 that year, this means that the 
Giants covered their entire player payroll expenses for the year in just three or four home games.  
Because of numbers like this, however often teams cried poverty, not all writers believed 
that salaries were killing the financial strength of the clubs.  In 1886, Louisville’s correspondent 
for The Sporting Life described their rivals in the Smoky City of Pittsburgh with the statement 
“last season their patronage was so great that they made up former losses and got back the 
immense amount of money they had paid as bonus for players.  They also stood third in the 
championship race.  This season the attendance at their games has been unprecedented, and they 
will doubtless make more money than any other club in the Association.”109  There was probably 
some exaggeration here, however.  In actuality, the club made about $12,000 for the 1886 
season, according to attorney A.C. Hoyer, who undertook legal action against the team in 
January of 1887 on behalf of a minority of the franchise’s shareholders.110  They operated about 
the same distance in the black the next season as well, totaling receipts of about $58,000, which 
ran about $10,000 ahead of expenses for the year, with one of the club’s directors later admitting 
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the revenue figure was slightly higher, and that 1887 was the club’s most profitable season to 
date.111 
On the same day, The Sporting Life reported that the Boston Beaneaters would finish 
1886 $50,000 in the black if they maintained their current standard of attendance.112  When, in 
that off-season, the Beaneaters negotiated the acquisition of King Kelly from Chicago for 
$10,000, they offered proof of their financial strength.  Not only that, the team envisioned 
Kelly’s acquisition as the key to further profits.  One of their Triumvirs, Billings, told the 
Chicago press “Kelly will pay back most of the outlay for him.  Since we made that big deal the 
whole of Boston has gone mad on base-ball, and, from all indications, our attendance at the 
opening games will be something greater than was ever seen in Boston before.  There is no doubt 
that we have struck the key-note to success.”  In addition to the future prosperity Kelly would 
bring, current circumstances were flush as well.  “We have now something like $90,000 in our 
treasury.  This money we now intend to spend to make our club a success, if such a thing is 
possible.  We want the strongest players in the land, and we will get them if money has anything 
to do with it.”113  Besides feeling emboldened to offer big money to acquire top players, the 
Boston club was so flush that it also decided to upgrade its ballpark at the South End Grounds for 
the 1888 season, tearing down the grandstand and replacing it with a pavilion at a cost of about 
$60,000.114 
Did acquiring Kelly work as planned, financially speaking?  The answer seems an 
unqualified “yes.”  Attendance at the South End Grounds reached about 261,000 in 1887, 
                                                 
111 “From The Smoky City” Circle, The Sporting Life, September 28, 1887, 7; “Pittsburg 
Pencillings” Circle, The Sporting Life, November 9, 1887, 4. 
112 “Notes and Comments” NA, The Sporting Life, August 18, 1886, 5. 
113 “Base-Ball Brevities” NA, Chicago Daily Tribune, March 16, 1887, 9. 
114 “Hub Happenings” Mugwump, The Sporting Life, November 9, 1887, 6. 
 462
roughly double what it had been in 1886.  This increase came despite the fact that the club barely 
improved at all on the field.  It did raise its record from 56-61 to 61-60, but this modest gain still 
left it in fifth place in the standings at the conclusion of the 1887 season, just as it had been in 
1886.  Furthermore, as the club acquired no other players of significant national reputation prior 
to the 1887 campaign, it seems fair to conclude that most of the increased patronage resulted 
from acquiring Kelly.  The team saw an increase of over $50,000 in gate receipts, largely thanks 
to the King.115  As we will see later, this prompted them to attempt the same strategy with 
another premier Chicago performer, pitcher John Clarkson, the following winter, as “the Kelly 
investment was such a paying one that the Boston magnates are prepared to go down deep into 
their pockets for Clarkson.”116 
Go down deep into their pockets they did.  By the beginning of the 1888 season, their 
estimated payroll stood as follows:  
 
Mike Kelly, right field/catcher, $4,000 
John Morrill, first base/captain/manager, $3,500 
John Clarkson, pitcher, $3,500 
Charlie Radbourn, pitcher, $3,000 
Bill Sowders, pitcher, $3,000 
Kid Madden, pitcher, $2,800 
Dick Conway, pitcher, $2,800 
Sam Wise, shortstop, $2,500 
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Billy Nash, third base, $2,500 
Ezra Sutton, infield, $2,000 
Joe Hornung, left field, $2,000 
Dick Johnston, center field, $2,000 
Pop Tate, catcher, $2,000 
Jack Burdock, second base, $2,000 
Tom O’Rourke, catcher, $2,000 
Tom Brown, outfield, $1,800 
Con Daily, catcher, $1,800 
 
This sums to $43,200, “an amount the Boston club can well afford to pay,” especially 
considering that the prior season’s increase in attendance alone brought in more money than 
Boston planned to pay its nine in 1888.117 
 Once the team pulled the trigger on acquiring John Clarkson for 1888, allowing him to 
team with Mike Kelly at catcher to form the Kelly-Clarkson battery, attendance shot up again, 
just as planned.  As in 1887, the other circumstances were the same.  The team’s record 
improved again, but not magnificently, going from 61-60 to 70-64 as the Beaneaters climbed the 
standings one notch to fourth place.  Also like 1887, they acquired no other new players of 
immense national stature or popularity.  Yet, by mid-September, over 238,000 cranks had passed 
the turnstiles at the South End Grounds to see Boston play 51 home games.  On Decoration Day, 
18,429 turned out to see games with Indianapolis, while over 11,000 showed on Bunker Hill Day 
to see the Chicago White Stockings.  More than 11,000 cranks attended the Labor Day contests 
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with Washington as well.  “At the present rate the total attendance for the season will reach the 
enormous figures of 325,000, which will mean receipts of over $160,000, of which $40,000 goes 
to the visiting club, leaving $120,000 to Boston.  Everyone must admit that the public has 
returned most generously the outlay on the part of the club for players.”118  Even Jim O’Rourke, 
a member of the rival New York Giants, admitted about the Boston fan base, “they treat their 
players with kindness and consideration if they do their best, win or loss.  New York is a great 
ball city, but for a fine crowd, well up to the game give me Boston.”119 
 The Boston club did so well financially in 1888 that Tim Murnane remarked, “if this isn’t 
more money than any club took in at their own grounds in one season I am badly mistaken.”  
Given the rate at which Boston fans filled their team’s coffers, they might have expected the 
management to shower a bit of the largesse on the nine in 1889.  Given Arthur Soden’s previous 
actions, however, they should have known better.  “The triumvirs say they will pay very little 
advance money this fall, and will not increase one man’s salary.”  The owners did buy several 
new players, as it turned out, but did not offer much increase in salary to the men already in the 
fold.120 
Undaunted by the modest on-field results of the last two seasons in the player purchasing 
game, but clearly pleased by the financial results, Soden and company decided to make even 
bigger moves preparatory to the 1889 campaign.  This time, their plan was to raid the roster of 
the Detroit Wolverines as the Wolverines auctioned off their men and quit the National League.  
The Beaneaters made a huge haul.  They lassoed catcher Charlie Bennett, a doubly useful move 
as it allowed King Kelly to avoid catching as often and go back to the outfield where he could 
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play in almost every game.  Dan Brouthers came on board at first base, providing a monster 
upgrade over John Morrill, as Brouthers lit up National League pitching to the tune of a 165 
OPS+, which dwarfed the mark of 70 that Morrill achieved after moving to Washington.  Joining 
Morrill in the capital city was shortstop Sam Wise, no longer necessary after the purchase of 
Hardy Richardson to play second base, which allowed Boston to move last year’s late season 
infield acquisition, Joe Quinn, into Wise’s spot.  Finally, Boston netted Charley Ganzel, an all-
around substitute, giving them a capable reserve at catcher and the outfield. 
Still, even with these additions, Boston’s effort to buy a championship failed in 1889, but 
just barely.  Their record jumped to 83-45, and they finished a single game behind the still-
formidable New York Giants.  More than 295,000 cranks jammed into the South End Grounds to 
watch the Beaneaters, despite some lousy September weather, with a high of over 13,000 to see 
one game with New York.  The Triumvirs cleared more than $100,000 in profits after seeing to 
all of their expenses.121 
While other National League clubs did not quite reach this level of revenue, certain cities 
did almost as well.  Some estimated that Chicago cleared $50,000 in profit for the 1886 season.  
The Chicago Daily Tribune believed even this total too low, writing, “The earnings of the 
Chicago club last season are reported on good authority to have been $62,000.”122  Likewise, 
near the end of the 1887 season, the Daily Tribune wrote, “they say the Chicago club made 
$62,000 last year and New York nearly $100,000.  This year it is said Chicago is making more 
money than it did last year, and I know Boston is making more than Chicago, and New York 
more than either.”123  Another veteran baseball observer declared that, for the Chicago White 
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Stockings in 1887, “at a low estimate the Chicagos have cleared over $90,000 this season.”124  
Over in the American Association, the Cincinnati Red Stockings pocketed about $35,000 thanks 
to their strong showing in 1887, according to their owner.125 
 
* * * * * 
 
Figure one also reminds us that in 1880s baseball, as today, the size of a team’s market 
made a substantial difference in yearly attendance.  The 1890 census lists New York, Chicago, 
Philadelphia, Brooklyn, and St. Louis, in that order, as the five largest cities in the country.  A 
casual glance at Table One shows that these same cities typically ranked among the attendance 
leaders in any given season.  Even cities near the bottom of the list for average attendance were 
not automatically in trouble, however.  Louisville, despite having roughly one-tenth the 
population of New York City, still attracted enough spectators to keep up financially, as we have 
seen.  They claimed a profit for 1886, and their board of directors voted to declare a twenty 
percent dividend on the team’s stock, which raised the total dividends to fifty percent of the 
stock price since the team’s arrival in the American Association in 1883.126  At least one player, 
John Kerins, invested in his own future by buying Louisville stock in November of that year.127 
Even the League’s newest member, the Kansas City Cowboys, claimed it was making 
money in 1886 despite the fact their club stood in seventh place for most of the season and 
played in a relatively small market.  Their president, J.J. Heim, told The Sporting Life, in 
response to a question regarding what the Cowboys would do in 1887, “We have a good thing, 
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and are making money instead of losing it, and the talk of our quitting is the rankest nonsense. . . 
. If there are two vacancies in the League next year it will be caused by St. Louis and 
Washington dropping out, and Kansas City will not figure in the matter at all.”128  In early 
November, president Heim also vowed to strengthen the nine in the future, saying “we will have 
time to look over the field and find some good men, and as money is no object, you can state that 
the Cowboys will be strengthened until we get a team that will make the Eastern clubs hustle.”129  
Team ownership confirmed its commitment a few weeks later, stating that the club’s manager, 
Dave Rowe, was about to “depart for the East in search of players, and will secure them at any 
price.  We have placed no limit upon him, so he can negotiate at his own option; but what we 
desire is good men, and you can bet we’ll have them.”130   
Despite the owners’ confidence in the team’s future, the rest of the National League’s 
owners did not agree with Heim.  At the League’s winter meeting at Chicago’s Tremont Hotel in 
November, they voted to expel the Cowboys from the National League and replace them with 
Pittsburgh.  From the League’s perspective, it was a sound move financially.  Pittsburgh had 
nearly three times the population of Kansas City from which to entice fans to the ballpark, and 
required much less travel to reach for the eastern clubs in the League as well, the railroad trip 
from New York to Kansas City being approximately thirty-five hours.  However, the fact that the 
other owners expelled the Cowboys against their wishes, after welcoming Kansas City in their 
time of need the year before, merits an adjective somewhere between ruthless and dishonorable, 
depending on how charitable the reader desires to be.131  Angered, the Kansas City owners 
vowed to fight back, saying that they would “hold their franchise and players if they have to 
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invoke the aid of the courts to do so.”132  Furthermore, “the League has opened war against us 
and I guess the probabilities are that we will now show them the fight is only just begun.  We 
will not be forced out of the League.  We will stay in if we want and we will go out if it suits us 
to, and we won’t be driven out inch by inch by those fellows that are trying to manipulate things 
to suit themselves.”133  All the bluster came to naught in the end, however, and eventually 
Kansas City applied to join the American Association in place of the just-departed Pittsburgh 
franchise.  The Association’s owners rejected the Cowboys’ application at their November 
meeting, despite Kansas City’s offer to pay for all railroad travel west of St. Louis, and a $7,000 
bonus to the Association to sweeten the deal.  Instead, the Association chose to reintroduce the 
city of Cleveland to major league status.134 
Kansas City did all it could, fighting the good fight until the very end.  Its ownership, 
whose pockets were deep indeed (Heim was “a wealthy brewer who will not stop at expense”135), 
actually tried to buy the franchise of the St. Louis Maroons in February of 1887 for a figure in 
the $15,000 neighborhood.  Heim not only intended to strengthen his nine by transferring the St. 
Louis players onto his own roster; he also tried to hold his spot in the League at the same time by 
reducing the number of teams in the National League to eight.  Officials from the Cowboy City 
even tried to turn the tables on the too-far-to-travel argument, as president E.E. Menges stated, 
“damn it all, man, it is no further than Kansas City will have to travel.”  In his meeting with 
Spalding, John Day, and Nick Young in February, Menges even offered to pay any railroad fares 
for the other franchises west of the Mississippi River in order to offset complaints about travel 
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costs.136  It was all in vain.  When the National League held its spring meeting, it accepted the 
Indianapolis franchise into the League, paid off Kansas City and St. Louis, then began disposing 
of the players still under contract to the league but now without a team.137 
Concerning railroad costs, an interesting event entered into the calculations of baseball 
men during the winter of 1887.  On February 4 of that year, the United States Congress passed 
the Interstate Commerce Act.  Meant to regulate the sometimes perceived, sometimes actual 
monopolistic tendencies of the nation’s giant railroad corporations, one of the business practices 
the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) did away with was the practice of rebating, whereby 
the railroads charged different rates to different customers depending on volume shipped, 
location, and so forth.  It seems that baseball teams were among the beneficiaries of this practice 
of rebating, the railroads recognizing that an affiliation with baseball provided much positive 
advertising publicity, and so some baseball observers feared that the ICC might drive up their 
transportation costs if it put an end to rebating.  Some railroads actually put tin baseball flags on 
their cars in an effort to garner the public’s good will.  All, that is, except for the “small-potato” 
president of one Baltimore line, who refused the Orioles this privilege unless compensated for 
it.138 
It did not take long, either, before teams starting blaming the new ICC regulations for 
curtailing their travel schedules.  The Buffalo club intended to open their 1887 season with an 
exhibition series at Louisville, but cancelled, citing the increase in expected costs from the 
Interstate Commerce Bill, according to team manager Jack Chapman.  Another observer, 
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Louisville owner Zack Phelps, also believed the increased costs would be ruinous, but apparently 
well-versed in the regulatory history of Gilded Age America, he predicted railroad magnates 
would find clever ways to evade the ICC’s new rules.  Phelps himself admitted to holding 
contracts for reduced rates with “several” roads for the 1887 season, an advantage he claimed no 
other team in the American Association could boast of,139 as he “had an intimation that it would 
be done and secured railroad contracts for the entire season.”140  A Chicago sportswriter 
estimated traveling costs would double, and that this might curtail the ability of some clubs to 
spend money on premier talent.141  Washington, meanwhile, had trouble scheduling a full slate of 
exhibition games for 1887, because some teams they hoped to play canceled due to higher 
railroad rates, forcing them to warm up for the championship season by taking on such 
juggernauts as the Williams College Club.142 
Another option, quickly developed by the American Association, was to devolve the new 
costs onto the players.  At its spring meeting the Association passed a resolution taxing each 
player fifty cents per day while on the road to meet the perceived increase in expenses.  The 
National League had had such a rule for years, even before the ICC, but the Association lost no 
time in copying its elder brother once a suitable reason presented itself.143  Although the change 
would not occur until 1888, as the leagues drew up their contracts for 1887 before Congress 
acted to create the ICC, some writers, such as Cleveland’s Frank Brunell, lost no time in labeling 
this a poor policy.  “This clause is not only picayune, it is useless.  The player knows it, and 
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losing $40 or so from his salary by it, insists on making clubs pay him $100 or so more.”144  O.P. 
Caylor agreed with Brunell and took him one further, stating the new policy was “silly, 
unbusiness-like, and will not save the club a dollar.  Every player who makes a contract for next 
year will have that 50 cents per diem—about $40—on his mind, and will put his figures about 
$200 higher in consequence to offset it.”145  Players for the Louisville Colonels, meeting at 
pitcher Guy Hecker’s baseball headquarters, made plans to resist the new tax immediately.  “A 
number of players were discussing the rule at Hecker’s the other day, and they decided to resist 
it.  It is understood that the men have seen a lawyer to learn what the consequences of their 
opposition will be.”146 
With dire predictions falling from the lips of every manager and team official in the 
game, it seems, how draconian was the new regulation in fact?  According to Brunell, it was a 
matter of perspective.  He believed it would cost each club about $2,000 per season, or 
approximately a four or five percent increase in operating expenses.  As he put it, “two thousand 
dollars is not a big sum . . . unless a club is a loser” but he did believe this new legislation might 
form the basis of a geographical redistribution of teams, so that there would be one league 
consisting only of eastern teams, and another of western ones.  He thought a geographic 
redistribution of the teams would offset these new costs and even put a little extra into the 
pockets of the newly realigned teams.147  Other writers began floating similar schemes.  Another 
popular one called for the combination of the two leagues into one league with twelve franchises, 
six in the East and six in the West.148  O.P. Caylor figured about the same as Brunell, in terms of 
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added cost to the clubs.  “I believe no club in the Association travels over 11,000 miles in a 
season of scheduled championship games.  At the rate of three cents a mile, standard rate, this 
would make every club pay for every man in its team $330 railroad fare during the season, an 
increase of about $130 a man over that paid in former years.”  Multiplied by a generous fifteen 
traveling players (teams did not always travel with their entire roster on road trips, to pare down 
their travel costs) this meant a cost increase of $1,950 for the season.  “I have seen clubs lose 
more than $1,950 in one day just because they failed to provide enough tarpaulin, at a cost of 
about $200, to keep the diamond dry during a rain storm.”149 
In the end, this whole situation turned out to be much ado about next to nothing.  In the 
true spirit of the regulatory atmosphere of the Gilded Age, it was less than one year before 
baseball’s executives turned the tables back in their favor.  In late March of 1888, National 
League president Nick Young deputized Washington’s correspondent for The Sporting Life, Bob 
Larner, to visit the United States Senate in an effort to remove this financial handicap.  The story, 
as related by Larner, demonstrates just how farcical attempts at government regulation could be 
in the 1880s.   
Larner began his pilgrimage in the office of Maryland senator Arthur Gorman.  The 
senator may not have had much interest in actually legislating, being absent for 41.3% of the roll 
call votes taken during his four terms in the Senate150, but he was a man whom “all base ballists 
know and recognize as their friend.  In addition to being a member of the Commerce Committee, 
he is deeply interested in the success of the National game.  I found that he was perfectly familiar 
with the question I had on hand.”  Gorman informed Larner that baseball teams should have no 
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trouble securing reduced rates from the railroads if the railroads agreed to it, as the commission 
sought only to protect the public against extortion and unreasonable rates, not manage the 
railroads.  Larner closed his account of the audience with Gorman by reminding his readers that, 
“the Senator is also a director of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Company, which should give 
additional force to his remarks on the subject.”151 
From there, baseball’s emissary proceeded to the offices of the Interstate Commerce 
Commission itself, which confirmed Gorman’s views.  Commissioner Aldace Walker informed 
his petitioner that, “this subject rests entirely with the railroads.”  In essence, the Commission 
only investigated if someone made a complaint that the railroads had engaged in an unfair 
practice.  As long as no one complained, there were no grounds for an investigation, and the 
matter rested with the railroad corporations.  The Commission simply needed to make sure that 
railroad rates were “reasonable and just,” and to prevent “undue and unreasonable 
preferences.”152 
 
* * * * * 
 
 While most franchises seem to have prospered during the later 1880s, not all did.  Politics 
and competition help explain why.  Consider the case of Henry Lucas, owner of the National 
League’s St. Louis Maroons franchise.  The Maroons joined the NL in 1885 after Lucas’s 
abortive attempt to found the Union Association and compete with the NL and AA in 1884.  At 
the conclusion of the Union War, as part of the peace settlement Lucas brought his St. Louis club 
into the League.  When he sold his interest in the Maroons to his brother-in-law in August of 
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1886, he told The Sporting News he had lost $10,000 the previous year, and that only the sale of 
Fred Dunlap to the Detroit Wolverines had allowed him to break even for the current season.153 
Unlike his National League counterparts in, say, Boston or Chicago, Lucas could point to 
several reasons why his club had not fared well at the turnstiles.154  For one thing, he had to 
compete with another franchise in his city, and a highly successful one at that, the St. Louis 
Browns.  In addition, the Browns, as members of the Association, charged twenty-five cents for 
bleacher admissions.  Due to National League policy, Lucas could not.  One would expect that, 
given a choice between the Maroons, who in 1885 finished eighth out of eight while charging 
fifty cents minimum for tickets, and the Browns, who easily won the American Association that 
year while charging twenty-five cents, fans in the Mound City would opt for the Browns.  They 
did, too many of them, anyway, and Lucas ended up $10,000 poorer as a result.  As one St. Louis 
writer put it, “a city the size of St. Louis cannot support two clubs.  The Browns have obtained a 
strong hold on public favor, and until they play poor ball and lose their grip it will be impossible 
to establish another club in St. Louis, and establish it upon a paying basis.”155 
Lucas tried to get the National League to approve his team to play home games on 
Sunday, looking to recoup some of his losses by playing ball in front of weekend crowds (he 
estimated that playing Sunday games, either regular or exhibition, would bring in anything 
between $5,000 and $25,000, depending on how many games the team could arrange156), but the 
League again responded in the negative.  Sabbatarianism was still a force to reckon with in the 
1880s in many cities, as we will see in the next chapter.  The National League did relent on the 
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ticket price issue for 1886, but by then it was a lost cause.157  The Maroons rose to sixth in the 
NL, but only because the other new teams in the circuit, Kansas City and Washington, were even 
less talented than they were, while the Browns cruised to another Association championship.   
 There may be no smoking gun to verify it, but the circumstantial evidence is rather 
suspicious that the NL used Lucas and his Maroons.  The league embraced him when it needed a 
replacement for the departing Cleveland Blues after the 1884 season, but subsequently refused 
Lucas the tools he needed to build a competitive and financially stable team.  The National 
League kept the Maroons around for 1886 because Buffalo and Providence left the league in the 
off-season and they needed any team they could get to keep the league at eight teams, and 
offered the twenty-five cent ticket concession to keep St. Louis in the fold.  Following 1886, 
however, with first Pittsburgh and then Indianapolis ready to enter the National League, it let St. 
Louis go.  The Maroons made a final plea for Sunday baseball in late August, 1886, at a National 
League meeting, but only they and the Kansas City voted in the affirmative, and at the end of the 
season the Maroons disbanded and passed into history.158 
 Why would the National League act in such a fashion towards one of its own members?  
After all, everyone knew that franchise instability hurt the league in sundry ways.  Whenever an 
old club dropped out of the league and a new one took its place, the new team was invariably 
weak, as it had not had the chance to sign players of major league quality over the past several 
seasons as older league members had.  Timing also loomed large as far as when in the off-season 
the new club gained admission to the League.  For instance, in the winter of 1887, as 
Indianapolis and Pittsburgh joined at the expense of Kansas City and the Maroons, the transition 
was easy for the Alleghenys.  They brought their team intact from the American Association.  
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Not so with Indianapolis.  As late as March, only about eight weeks before the championship 
season began, they did not know yet if they would even be in the National League, as the 
existing franchises dickered over whether to admit them or stay with St. Louis.  This gave the 
new franchise, when it finally gained official National League status, less than two months to 
sign players, properly prepare their grounds, and take all other steps necessary to fielding a major 
league baseball team.  As other teams had already engaged the vast majority of quality players 
by that time, the Hoosiers could only sift through the scraps left by the rest of major league 
baseball when putting together their nine, and hope that the existing teams might release a player 
or two they could use. 
Predictably, the initial season was very tough for these new entries, as typically they 
struggled to win forty percent of their games.  In addition, these new clubs needed several 
seasons, in most cases, to find talented players and sign them, so it was not easy for them to 
achieve parity with the established teams.  This hurt the entire league financially, as losing teams 
struggled to find fan support, either at home or on the road.  Baseball observers had known this 
for years—as far back as 1875.  That year, the last season before the National League came into 
existence, the Boston club of the National Association (baseball’s major league from 1871 to 
1875) was so dominant that few fans watched them play because the games were not 
entertaining.  In 1875, the Red Stockings posted a 71-8 record and won all 37 of their home 
games.  In an average game, they outscored the opposition by six runs, and twenty times they 
won by ten runs or more.  Despite Boston’s brilliant play, however, “so one sided were the 
games that the club lost money.”159   
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More recently, there was the Union Association’s one season of 1884 to make this same 
point.  The St. Louis Maroons won 94 games against only 19 losses in 1884, with no other team 
in the league posting more than 69 wins, and this hurt the league’s ability to draw spectators to 
its games.  The St. Louis Browns, during their run of glory from 1885 to 1888 in which they won 
four consecutive American Association pennants, experienced the same phenomenon.  Because 
the race for the pennant was so lopsided, and they distanced themselves easily from most of their 
competition by midseason, spectator turnout declined as the season went along due to lack of 
competition to create interest in the outcome.  This seems to be why, along with fears of alcohol 
abuse by some of those involved, St. Louis management started selling some of its crack players 
to other teams in the winter of 1887-1888.  As team owner Von der Ahe put it, “No, I am not 
weakening my team intentionally, but the playing strength of all the teams has got to be made 
more uniform.  We will let Welch, Gleason, Caruthers and Bushong go, but will fill their places 
with good men.  It don’t pay, you know, to have a club so far superior to all the other clubs in the 
Association.  There is lots of glory in it, but no money.”160 
Clearly, one incentive to the National League’s behavior was that fewer strong teams 
meant a better chance for the older franchises to win the league in any given season.  On the 
financial side, the answer seems to be the rule change in place prior to the 1886 season regarding 
the reserved contracts of players.  Recall that this change said that players were not under reserve 
to their actual team, but that the league itself held all the reserved contracts.  This meant that, 
should an existing club disband, the other teams of the league would have first crack at all the 
players now without a team to play for.  Therefore, whenever the National League gave the boot 
to an existing team and replaced it with a new one, it meant a chance for the remaining teams, 
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like vultures picking at a carcass, to bolster their own rosters without paying other teams 
anything in return, either cash to buy a player or another player in a trade.  Owners Al Spalding 
of Chicago, John Day of New York, and National League secretary Nick Young comprised the 
committee handling the contracts of all players whose teams disbanded or withdrew from the 
league.  This committee had the power to dispose of the homeless players “as it sees fit.”161  
Apparently, the teams figured that whatever might be lost in attendance by going this route, they 
could replace that loss through their savings from not needing to buy quality players that they 
wanted.  Whatever scraps remained when the big dogs finished eating would go to the league’s 
newest member.   
Whenever rumors started circulating that a team might disband, the sporting press flew 
into speculation about where the orphaned players with reserved contracts would go.  Just one 
example comes from the rumored breakup of the League’s St. Louis Maroons in early 1887.  
“There will be a fight over the distribution of the Maroon players.  Chicago wants Glasscock, so 
does Detroit; Jerry Denny will go to New York, Boyle to Philadelphia, Healy and Graves to 
Washington, and the remaining players, with those of Kansas City, will probably be left for the 
new Indianapolis Club.”  Detroit’s manager Watkins stated, “If the Maroons disband Glasscock 
must go to the Wolverines or there will be a row.”  His competitor in the potential tug-of-war for 
“Pebbly Jack,” Al Spalding, retorted, “Glasscock comes to Chicago and Detroit can have 
anything or everything that is left so far as Chicago is concerned.”162   
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When such rumors started circulating, some teams would try to get the jump on their 
opponents by making offers to the soon-to-disband team to acquire players before the team even 
broke up.  In the above case with the St. Louis Maroons, the Boston Beaneaters offered Maroon 
ownership $7,500 for shortstop Jack Glasscock (overlooking, it seems, Glasscock’s January 26 
arrest and lockup on charges of drunken, disorderly conduct at the Wheeling, West Virginia 
opera house, during which he made things “very lively” for the officers attempting to corral 
him), the New York Giants were willing to part with $5,000 for third baseman Jerry Denny, and 
Detroit $3,000 for pitcher Henry Boyle, while pitchers Egyptian Healy and John Kirby “are 
wanted by half a dozen clubs, who would all give good prices for them.”  In addition, Chicago 
“would pay a big price” for Denny or catcher George Myers, while the Washington Senators 
were after outfielders Emmett Seery and Jack McGeachey to boost their anemic offense.163 
 The Senators needed to upgrade their offense, because they were one team that admitted 
to losses in 1886.  Recall that they were a last-minute entry into the National League for 1886, 
and only after major league teams deprived them of a quartet of important players whom the 
Nationals hoped to bring into the League with them (see chapter three), so they were operating at 
a distinct disadvantage compared to their more established opponents.  It is no great surprise, 
then, that they operated in the red in their inaugural League season.  The club’s directors were 
not discouraged regarding the team’s future, however.  “The report of the treasurer shows that 
the club comes out about $10,000 behind the gross outlay.  The directors are not discouraged at 
this showing, as they realized that they would be under unusually heavy expense during the first 
year by reason of the expenditure for new grounds and the advances necessary to secure 
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players.”164  When a sportswriter asked him if the season was a financial success, one club 
director, Billy Broughton, stated, “Yes, even more so than we at first expected, and at the ending 
it was a pleasant surprise to us to see our bank-balance in such a healthy condition.  When we 
entered the League we had to hustle to get our grounds in order and get a team together and this 
cut quite a figure in our cash book. . . . Yet to-day we are in a better condition than we expected 
to be.”165  The team’s directors felt good enough about the financial future of the club that in the 
1887 off-season “it was unanimously agreed to give Manager Gaffney carte blanche in the matter 
of securing players for the purpose of strengthening the team.”166 
 When the National League held its spring meeting and finally did get around to 
distributing the orphaned players of St. Louis and Kansas City, it simply began assigning these 
players as it saw fit.  Washington gained the trio of third baseman Jim Donnelly, second baseman 
Al Myers, and pitcher “Grasshopper” Jim Whitney from Kansas City at a cost of $2,500.  They 
also acquired a first baseman named Billy O’Brien that year, although he was not a refugee from 
the disbanding ball clubs.  The new Indianapolis team paid $1,000 for catcher Mert Hackett and 
shortstop Charlie Bassett, also from the Cowboys.  The New York Metropolitans scooped up 
outfield Paul “Shorty” Radford for the bargain rate of $500, while Kansas City’s other core 
players, catcher Fatty Briody, first baseman Mox McQuerey, pitcher Stump Wiedman, pitcher 
Silver King, and outfielder Jim Lillie, became the property of the National League, as they were 
“reserved by the league in case some of the other clubs need their services.”  The fact that such 
maneuvers prevented these men from finding a new team, and thus prevented them from 
pursuing their livelihood for the coming season, even though plenty of teams around the country 
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would have signed them gladly and paid them respectable salaries, received little comment.  
Wiedman ended up with the Detroit Wolverines when they had members of their pitching staff 
come down with sore arms and needed an extra man, while McQuerey suffered a demotion in 
status, finally signing with the Hamilton, Ontario team of the International League. 
 As for the St. Louis players now without a team, their two jewels, Glasscock and third 
baseman Jerry Denny, transferred to Indianapolis, on the condition the Hoosiers actually kept 
them rather than turning around and selling them.  Considering the level of demand for their 
services (at the meeting, various teams bid up to $18,000 to acquire the pair) both men must have 
been angered when they found their salaries for 1887 would be about $2,000 each.  The Sporting 
Life even admitted that, “if they were with any of the other teams they would be drawing double 
this amount.”  The paper also revealed that Indianapolis had a reputation among the players for 
stinginess.  “Mr. Newberger said that he did not propose to pay any of his men over $2,000.  
Glasscock got $3,000 last season, and there are reasons to believe that he, Denny, and Boyle 
would not sign for the amount stated.  It was rumored that the brotherhood of professional base-
ball players would take some action in the matter if the demands of the men are not complied 
with.”167   
 Dave Rowe, who both managed and played for Kansas City in 1886, thought he had a 
good read on why the National League admitted Indianapolis while kicking his Cowboys to the 
curb.  “It was simply the greed of the Eastern managers that led to it.  They wanted Glasscock, 
Denny, and one or two others, and when they couldn’t get them they shut us out and took in 
Indianapolis in the expectation that she will drop out at the end of the year and they will then be 
able to get the players they want.”  Concerning Indianapolis and its desire not to pay its new 
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players the going rate for their talents, Rowe said, “Newberger has declared that he will not pay 
any player more than the $2,000 limit.  I told him that kind of talk was nonsense and that it was 
foolish to expect that he could get men like Glasscock, Denny, Boyle, and Myers to play for limit 
salaries.”168   
Others agreed with Rowe’s assessment of the situation.  In their eyes, the only reason the 
League’s owners allowed the coveted St. Louis players to transfer to Indianapolis was that, with 
four highly desirable players and eight teams trying to acquire them, no one could stand to see 
their rivals get their hands on a marquee player and risk not getting one themselves.  They had no 
interest in strengthening the new club to make it more competitive and a better draw at their 
home grounds; rather, they fully expected Indianapolis to go under after one season due to lack 
of funds.  As a result, the League included the restriction that Indianapolis could not sell any of 
the players for one season, so that the desirable players would be available once again prior to 
1888.169 
When asked whether the National League’s deliberations had transferred him to the 
Hoosiers as well, Rowe pointed out one of the benefits of being a playing manager.  “I am not 
reserved, and the league has no control over me . . . I will play wherever it suits me.”170  Rowe 
ended up taking a year off from major league baseball, playing and managing the Lincoln club in 
the Western League, before returning to the game in 1888 for one last hurrah when Kansas City 
regained major league status in the American Association.171   
Trying to instill confidence in their new acquisitions, the Hoosiers made Glasscock the 
team captain, hoping that this title would alleviate the risk of his becoming a disgruntled 
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malcontent.172  The money offered was not the only thing Glasscock and Henry Boyle were 
worried about, however.  Boyle questioned the National League’s wisdom in admitting the 
Hoosiers in the first place.  “I see by telegraph that Indianapolis has not the necessary money 
with which to carry her club through the season.  We are however expected to go there without 
regard to the club’s financial standing. . . . We may not be there a month before the club breaks 
up and then we will be transferred again like so many niggers.”  Boyle also lamented that events 
resulted in his moving against his wishes, saying, “I have an offer from Detroit at a good salary, 
and other players are as well off in this respect as I am, but we must all go to Indianapolis and 
take our chances.  I have had some correspondence with Glasscock and we have about concluded 
to bring our case before the brotherhood.”173  In St. Louis, where these two men toiled before 
their forced move to Indianapolis, some in the sporting press upheld their complaints.  Both were 
hard working players without any history of kicking over salary, and The Sporting News did not 
believe they were getting a square deal, especially Glasscock, “the greatest infielder in America,” 
who “has not feathered his own nest, nor looked as well after his own purse as he might have 
done. . . . But for his arbitrary transfer to Indianapolis he would receive nearly twice as much as 
this [$3,000] from any other club in the League.”174  Many of the new Indianapolis players, 
fearful that the team really did lack the financial backing to last the 1887 campaign, demanded 
personal contracts with the owners of the club, so they would not be left stranded if the worst 
case scenario unfolded.175 
                                                 
172 “Happy Indianapolis” AGO, The Sporting Life, March 16, 1887, 4.  AGO was short for A.G. 
Ovens. 
173 “Around The Bases” NA, The Sporting News, March 19, 1887, 5. 
174 Ibid. 
175 “Getting Into Line” Joe Pritchard, The Sporting Life, March 30, 1887, 1. 
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The actions of the Indianapolis management did nothing to quiet the fears and suspicions 
of its team’s new players.  In fact, quite the opposite.  Louis Newberger took over operations of 
the team in securing contracts with the club’s newly acquired talent, and alienated about half the 
team’s roster immediately.  To those players who had already inked pacts with the Maroons, he 
told them Indianapolis would offer the same terms.  To the rest of the team, however, he wired, 
“Report for duty at once; salary $1,200, with $50 advance money.  We want to show the boys we 
are liberal.”  This left the players in receipt of Newberger’s telegram “gasping for more wind” 
and “not only disappointed, but fighting mad,” leading one to query “But what can you expect 
from a Jim Crow town like Indianapolis?”176 
The insulted players wasted no time in kicking against the team’s insulting terms.  Henry 
Boyle, the pitcher coveted by several clubs, postponed his marriage until he could sort out the 
situation.  Joe Pritchard, the St. Louis sportswriter, spoke with some of the players offered 
$1,200, and anticipated some colorful reactions from the rest.  For instance, outfielder Jack 
McGeachy hoped for $2,000, but would “talk Scotch-Irish pretty lively when he receives the 
proposition.”  Pitcher “Egyptian” John Healy wrote to Pritchard, “The gall, the awful gall of 
some people . . . I’ll pick up rags in Cairo [Illinois] for a living before I’ll go to Indianapolis for 
$1,200.  I don’t like the town to begin with, but I might learn to like it if the salary was even 
reasonable.”  The Egyptian announced plans to work in his brother’s drugstore rather than labor 
for Newberger’s peanuts.  Although only nineteen years old in 1886, Healy had led the team in 
wins and innings pitched, among other things, and clearly, he felt the Hoosiers owed him a few 
more ducats.177 
                                                 
176 “From St. Louis” Joe Pritchard, The Sporting Life, March 30, 1887, 2. 
177 Ibid. 
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His mound mate, John Kirby, felt about the same.  “Twelve hundred is a small salary, and 
Mr. Newberger can just count me out.  I’ll not play ball unless they raise the ‘ante,’ and the 
‘limit,’ too, for that matter.  The nerve of some people is great.”  Reserve Dick Mappes echoed 
Kirby’s sentiments as well.  “Tell me where the Hoosiers got so much unadulterated cheek.  
Twelve hundred dollars for a season’s work and live on snow balls and fried liver all winter.  No, 
thank you, none of that for me.  If Newberger & Co. can’t pay us boys a decent salary why don’t 
they give a town a show that has got the money, backbone and the people?”  One former 
employer of these players, Bill Stromberg of St. Louis, even chimed in, saying, “I feel confident 
that the club will not last three months.”178 
Boyle’s anger is understandable, and not just because of the interruption to his 
matrimonial plans.  He also told Pritchard 
I signed with St. Louis for less than I would have signed elsewhere, the reason being that 
I felt under obligation to the people here for the manner in which they treated me last 
season when I was disabled.  My salary went on just the same as if I had been working.  I 
appreciated the kindness shown by Mr. Schmelz and the others connected with the club, 
and when Mr. Stromberg asked me to sign for a little less than $2,500, I had not the heart 
nor the cheek to say no, after the treatment I had received at their hands.  And 
Indianapolis is to reap the benefit of other peoples kind actions.  Just put me down as 
dead set against the town.179 
 
 Indianapolis sportswriters, of course, did all they could to dispel the rumors about the 
team disbanding and the negative talk about the club’s stinginess.  Indianapolis had signed all its 
players by mid-April, not bad considering the tight window they had to work with after gaining 
admittance to the league.  Their correspondent for The Sporting Life at least claimed that the men 
were in fine spirits and pleased with the city, and that the city responded in kind.  At least fifteen 
business establishments, many of them cigar retailers, contracted with a local telegraph company 




for inning-by-inning updates on scores when the club was away from home, and even for 
exhibition games “the bulletins displayed attract crowds that block the sidewalks.”180 
 It appears the Indianapolis people were correct in the end.  When the Hoosiers traveled 
west to St. Louis for some exhibition play, the former Maroons amongst them spoke with 
Pritchard again, and sang a new tune.  Now, he received comments such as, “I have played in 
several clubs since I first started out as a professional, and I can truthfully say that I was never 
treated better in my life than I have been by the Indianapolis people.”  One of the early doubters, 
this unnamed player quickly came around once he had the chance to settle in.  The stories about 
the team cutting salaries to the bone were “bosh,” and he closed by remarking, “just say the gang 
are all well satisfied, and put it as strong as you like.”181 
 That is not to say, however, that the predictions about Indianapolis’s lack of potential as a 
baseball town were wrong, because within two season the team was in danger of financial 
insolvency and only managed to play out the 1889 season without going under because of some 
reshuffling of its backers to infuse more cash into a failing enterprise.  For the 1887 and 1888 
campaigns, the club had total receipts of $184,128.41, against total disbursements of 
$183,946.89.  The receipts, however, included over $52,025 of loans from banks and other 
guarantors, of which the club had paid back only $32,775 by the time it underwent its 
reorganization, leaving the team with a debt of $19,250 as the 1889 season neared.182  
Indianapolis clearly was in serious trouble, and so it surprised no one when the National League 
began hunting for a replacement for 1890.  All eyes looked to Cincinnati or Brooklyn, as chapter 
seventeen describes in full detail. 
                                                 
180 “Happy Indianapolis” AGO, The Sporting Life, April 13, 1887, 1. 
181 “From St. Louis” Joe Pritchard, The Sporting Life, April 13, 1887, 9. 
182 “Not All Velvet” NA, The Sporting Life, February 6, 1889, 5. 
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* * * * * 
 
In baseball, as in the Gilded Age business world in the US, there was always the dream of 
monopoly.  Like an oasis in the desert, it shimmered in the distance, enticing baseball’s magnates 
onward with the promise of never-ending profits, if they could but reach the promised land.  Al 
Spalding certainly dreamed of the day when the National League would either absorb or plow 
under its competitor, the American Association.  With one league, the owners hoped they could 
have the best of all worlds.  With just one major league organization, there would be no more 
quarrels over territory, no competition with a rival league in the nation’s largest cities.  
Baseball’s magnates could standardize and universalize their preferred fifty-cent ticket plan, and 
spectators would have no choice if they wanted to see major league baseball.  With fewer teams, 
each one could strengthen its own nine, alleviating the common problem of trying to draw fans 
to see weak teams with few star players as drawing cards.  Furthermore, if there were fewer 
teams but more quality players for each team (supply of quality players was high), then bidding 
wars over the good players were less likely (demand for individual players was low) and all 
teams could fatten their bottom line by decreasing their labor costs.   
A few facts stood in the way, however.  As this chapter demonstrates, demand for 
baseball among cities was high.  Baseball would pay in more than eight cities.  As long as both 
the National League and the American Association fielded a lineup of cities where most turned a 
yearly profit, there was no good reason for either league to fold or sell out to the other.  Some 
entertained the idea of combining leagues in such a way as to produce a single league with more 
than eight teams, but this also presented problems.  Conventional wisdom was that a league 
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required geographical balance, with the same number of cities both east and west of the 
Appalachian Mountains.  (In the geography of Gilded Age baseball, Pittsburgh was a western 
city.)  This is why, between 1886 and 1887, for example, when the National League dropped two 
of its western franchises, Kansas City and St. Louis, they needed two western cities to replace 
them, eventually luring Pittsburgh into the NL from the American Association and offering 
Indianapolis a new major league franchise.   
A league with more than eight teams created other problems, too.  Foremost among these 
was maintaining interest from top to bottom in the league.  A league, of whatever size, has some 
competitive teams vying for the championship in any given year, and some weaker teams that 
clearly have no realistic chance at a championship after midseason or so.  The interest level of 
fans is bound to wane in the latter group of cities, and sooner rather than later if the teams fail to 
compete several years in a row.  If a league had too many teams in this second, noncompetitive, 
category, that meant an awful lot of days when weaker teams met stronger ones, thus depressing 
overall attendance due to decreased fan excitement.  As with league geography, experience and 
conventional wisdom indicated that eight teams was the ideal size to cope with this potential 
problem.  True, there would always be a few bottom feeders, but not too many, and eight teams 
allowed enough variety of opponents that fan interest would not grow stale from seeing the same 
teams come to town all year long. 
A third drawback, although probably not as important as league geography and 
maintaining competitive balance, was that just one league allowed no possibility for postseason 
or interleague play.  Postseason games like the World Series, given proper promotion and 
cooperative weather, brought in money for the contestants.  Interleague exhibition games also 
could be lucrative, whether those games featured rivals from the same city, as in Philadelphia, or 
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rivals between teams that placed highly in their respective leagues the season before.  Teams 
could still play exhibitions against clubs from the minor leagues, but these games usually lacked 
the luster of a match up between, say, New York and Brooklyn.  
A final issue to consider was that of promoting the game nationwide.  The more cities 
that boasted a major league baseball team, the greater fan interest in baseball generally.  The idea 
of having permanent, professional baseball leagues was only in its second decade in the 1880s, 
and while all baseball people knew the game was very popular nationally, it was equally clear 
that significant room for growth existed.  According to Bill James, the average American of the 
1880s probably attended a baseball game every twenty-seven years, or about twice in a lifetime.  
For the 1890s, the number was once every thirty years, as the nation’s population expanded but 
the number of professional baseball teams shrank.183  Clearly, baseball had the potential to do 
better. 
This dream of a baseball monopoly came true by 1892.  In the late 1880s, however, it 
remained just a dream.  As the 1880s ended, the salary debate raged on in baseball.  The players 
remained convinced that teams were making huge profits while the men who played the game 
received relative peanuts in return.  Teams such as Chicago sold their top talent for huge sums, 
while the players looked on and wondered where their share of the sale money was going.  They 
saw the immense crowds in Boston and Brooklyn and believed that if those cities would just 
share a bit of their profits with smaller towns such as Indianapolis and Kansas City, all the 
complaints about noncompetitive small market franchises being unable to pay their men 
competitive salaries would be a thing of the past.  When they finally organized the Players’ 
League in 1890, the members of the Brotherhood tried to rectify some of these seeming abuses.   
                                                 
183 James, The New Bill James Historical Baseball Abstract, 39, 57. 
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The magnates of the National League and American Association, on the other hand, did 
not see things in the same light.  Their collective desire to maintain their prerogatives as team 
owners, as well as their desire to maximize profits and control labor, made them largely 
unreceptive to the pleas of the BPBP, especially during the critical 1889 season.  Unable to come 
to a mutually acceptable compromise on these important issues, the National League added fuel 
to the fire instead when it refused to meet the Brotherhood after the BPBP requested a 
conference in 1889.  By the end of that season, all that the situation required was a spark to ignite 





The Sunday Baseball Question 
 
 
At first glance, it might seem strange to encounter a chapter on religion’s impact on 
Gilded Age baseball.  Publicly at least, players in this era almost never mentioned religion.  In 
this post-Darwin age, they did not attribute their success to divine help or blessings, at least not 
in the newspapers, nor did baseball scribes write about “God-given talent.”  Teams did not ask 
for divine sanction before undertaking some kind of action.  In the public realm, there was a lot 
of commentary regarding superstition, but almost none about religion.   
Yet religion shaped baseball in this era in some important, albeit negative, ways, in the 
sense that religion often placed limitations on what teams could or could not do.  The most 
prevalent religion in the US, then as now, was Christianity, and Christian leaders often sought to 
impose their morality upon the public.  On many occasions, baseball teams had to respond to 
these moral crusades to uphold what Christian leaders deemed the best interests of society.  
However, public morality, as with the other issues previously described such as drinking, fitness 
and training, gambling, or violence, in and of itself was of little interest to baseball’s moguls.  
Like these other issues, they cared about the money at stake and how decisions regarding Sunday 
baseball might hurt them in their wallets. 
Of the two major leagues, this influenced events in the American Association much more 
than the National League.  The National League played no games on Sundays, but the 
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Association did.  As part of the Association’s reputation as the league catering more to the 
working class, its owners believed it was important to play on the Sabbath so that working class 
audiences who had to be at jobs five or six days of the week could at least come and see a game 
of baseball once a week.  Sunday baseball was extremely lucrative for the Association; with 
lower ticket prices than the National League, Association teams had to draw more fans to keep 
up financially, and so they could hardly afford to automatically abandon play one day each week 
just for the sake of pleasing the religious sensibilities of America’s leisured class.  Many times 
Association owners ignored the temptations of transferring operations to the National League, 
citing that they would have to give up Sunday baseball to do so.  Minor leagues could go either 
way on the Sunday baseball question, but it seems most chose to follow the Association’s lead 
for the same financial reasons. 
The determination to play Sunday baseball, however, often brought teams into conflict 
with public morality laws.  In 1886, the Queens County sheriff’s department put a stop to Sunday 
baseball games at five different ballparks on September 5, including one between the Brooklyn 
Grays and the Philadelphia Athletics that it interrupted in the sixth inning.1  The next year, the 
Grays played another Sunday game on the sly, drawing in 8,000 fans for a Sunday exhibition 
game with an amateur Boston nine.  (If they drew 8,000 customers to an exhibition weekend 
game, one wonders how many might turn out to see them square off against major league 
competition.)  Also playing the day of the Brooklyn-Boston game were Newark and the Cuban 
Giants of New York.  Once again, the Queens County sheriff attempted to impose his authority 
and cancel this game, but the crowd of 2,000-3,000 would have none of it.  “The crowd, 
however, had come out to see ball played, so with a howl of rage they stood up as one man and 
                                                 
1 “Baseball on Sunday” NA, New York Times, September 6,1886, 5. 
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then began to clamber over the seats toward the Sheriff.  Cries of ‘slug him’ and ‘lynch him’ 
were heard from all sides, proceeding from those on the outskirts of the crowd.”  Although the 
sheriff gave a final order for the game to cease, he then left the grounds, and “the players 
resumed their positions, the crowd fell back, and the interrupted work was taken up.”2   
The threat of violence seemed ever-present whenever the Queens County sheriff 
appeared to halt Sunday games.  The next year he tried again, with fifteen deputies this time, at 
Atlantic Park in Brooklyn, but “Captain Kavanaugh and his fifteen deputies were surrounded by 
the crowd, and for a time it looked as if there would be trouble.  Some of the crowd urged the 
players to proceed with the game despite the presence of the officers, and others picked up stones 
threatening the officers’ lives.”  The sheriff prevailed this time, however, as the officers drove 
back the crowd and brought the game to a halt.3 
That was not the end of Sunday baseball in Brooklyn in 1887, however.  There were 
other, wiser solutions besides intimidating law enforcement if a club wanted to play some 
Sunday baseball.  Teams employed bribery, as well.  Noted sportswriter and former New York 
Metropolitans manager O.P. Caylor described how it worked in his column for The Sporting Life 
in 1888.  When describing the value of Sunday baseball at Brooklyn’s grounds, Caylor stated, 
“One Sunday every seat was occupied and the field pretty well surrounded, so that I know just 
about what those crowds averaged in hard cash, and it wasn’t nearly so much as was generally 
believed.”  The reason the take fell short of expectations was “twenty per cent of the gross went 
to the owners of the grounds, and I don’t know how much to the Sheriff of the county.  You see 
                                                 
2 “Sunday Ball Playing” NA, New York Times, April 11, 1886, 2. 
3 “No Sunday Games” NA, The Sporting News, April 16, 1887, 1. 
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the Sheriff stopped those games in the spring and then let ‘em loose with a string fastened onto 
the cash box.”4 
Almost by accident, Caylor described another instance of this in an 1887 essay about the 
American Association’s spring meeting.  One decision made at this meeting was to limit the 
practice of teams offering free passes to their games, capping the total at twenty-five.  Anyone 
who issued more than this limit faced a $500 fine.  Caylor thought this bad policy, and gave 
some examples justifying his opposition.  The press required free admission, or the team would 
receive negative coverage in print.  With no radio or television, of course, print was the only 
source of information for the public besides word of mouth, so this was a serious matter indeed.  
There was also the fact that the Association’s constitution clearly stated that each team had 
control of its own grounds and affairs.  The interesting point came, however, when he wrote 
about the owner of his former employer, Cincinnati.  “Mr. Stern has already issued twenty-eight 
press tickets—three more than the restricted number.  That is a $1,500 fine on A.S.—first crack.  
Besides if he doesn’t give a few out to the city officials there will be a raid made on Sunday 
games.  How will Louisville make twenty-five passes go around in the distribution to 
councilmen?  It’s a tough problem.”5   
A writer in Caylor’s former home of Cincinnati, Ren Mulford, Jr., agreed.  “There is one 
thing certain and that is that if the Cincinnatis’ gates are not thrown open to the Councilmen and 
Aldermen there will be a revival feeling among the city fathers that Sunday base ball is injurious 
to the moral good of the city.”  Mulford went on and asserted, “That twenty-five-free-tickets 
limit rule will be hard to enforce against the pressure of municipal thumb-screws that would at 
                                                 
4 “Caylor’s Comment” O.P. Caylor, The Sporting Life, February 8, 1888, 3. 
5 “Caylor’s Screed” O.P. Caylor, The Sporting Life, March 16, 1887, 5. 
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once be applied by blackmailers under the mask of those acting for the public good.”6  Caylor 
and Mulford were quite correct, as events soon demonstrated.  Early in the 1888 season, 
Cincinnati team officials denied some city aldermen free admission to their grounds.  As a result, 
“at yesterday’s meeting Morgan J. Lewis presented an ordinance to make base ball playing a 
penal offense on Sundays. . . . Not only that, but the threat has been made to condemn the park 
for the purpose of extending a West End street.  No call for such a course has been made by the 
public . . . it is but truth to declare that it smacks of official blackmail.”7  Caylor believed that 
teams honored the rule only in the breach anyway, later writing, “When I took the Mets to 
Philadelphia to play the Athletics on halves, I found that about every fifth fellow who entered 
had a pass.  The same state of things existed elsewhere, and particularly on the Athletic 
grounds.”8 
Regarding the potential cancellation of Sunday baseball and the American Association, in 
1887 Louisville’s management went on high alert when the Kentucky General Assembly began 
making noise about banning Sunday baseball in its state for 1888.  This caused one Louisville 
writer to describe the high state of agitation amongst the city’s clergy, as “the Ministerial 
Association passed a resolution condemning base ball on Sunday, and one minister preached a 
red-hot sermon against it.”  This commotion was peculiar, perhaps even hypocritical, because on 
Sundays, “the best people in the city attend the games.  The leading lawyers, doctors, merchants 
and bankers all go, and many of the ministers can be seen there.  The attendance of ladies has 
always been very large, and has much to do with making base ball so popular.”  The writer also 
stated the potential financial costs to the team.  “I hear that the step is quite seriously 
                                                 
6 “From Cincinnati” Ren Mulford, Jr., The Sporting Life, April 6, 1887, 2. 
7 “A Squeeze” Ren Mulford, Jr., The Sporting Life, May 16, 1888, 1. 
8 “Caylor’s Comment” O.P. Caylor, The Sporting Life, December 28, 1887, 2. 
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contemplated, and the club officials will have to make a pretty fight at the State capital.  They 
certainly could not afford to dispense with the Sunday games. . . . The average attendance at the 
later is between 4,000 and 5,000, and a little calculation will show that a large portion of the 
club’s revenues come from that source.”9 
In effect, teams had three options when faced with threats to Sunday games.  They could 
give in and not play, but this would result in financial loss, which was not acceptable.  They 
might move their operations to where Sunday morality laws did not apply, somewhere outside 
the city limits or in a neighboring town where local leaders were more favorably disposed.  
Finally, they could bribe their way out of the situation.  The failure to pursue one of these three 
strategies, perhaps, was the problem in Queens County.  As the Chicago Daily Tribune pointed 
out in its description of the 1887 police raid on Sunday baseball, “the Sheriff did his duty nobly 
in preventing the base-ball men from desecrating the Sabbath day, but he was a trifle lax in 
respect to the individuals who manipulated the sweat-boards on the public thoroughfare near the 
grounds.  All sorts of little games were in full operation, but so long as it was not base-ball they 
seemed to be all right.”10  Perhaps Al Spalding had a good idea in Chicago.  Even though the 
White Stockings were in the National League and so did not play Sunday baseball, as an extra 
precaution he gave out complimentary tickets to eight Windy City ministers in 1887 because “he 
liked their presence.”11   
                                                 
9 “From The Falls City” JA, The Sporting Life, November 2, 1887, 3. 
10 “Base-Ball” NA, Chicago Daily Tribune, April 20, 1887, 3.  A sweat-board was a game where 
the house drops three dice into a bowl or cup with no bottom.  The game board is a cloth 
numbered one through six, and the bettors who put their money on the numbers that come up on 
the dice win double their bet.  The house has the advantage because sometimes the same number 
comes up on more than one of the dice on the same role. 
11 “Notes and Comments” NA, The Sporting Life, September 28, 1887, 6. 
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The Nashville nine in the Southern League did not escape so lightly as the folks in 
Queens County when they violated a Sunday baseball state law in 1887.  Instead of just calling 
off the game and sending everyone involved home, a Nashville Grand Jury indicted both teams 
on the grounds on May 2, Nashville and Savannah, along with the officers and directors of the 
Nashville Baseball Association, for playing on Sunday.  In Tennessee, an 1885 law made this sin 
punishable by a fine ranging from twenty-five to fifty dollars, and so the clubs had to pay up.  
The same week, the Illinois state legislature passed a similar statute by a vote of eighty-five to 
forty.12   
In Ohio, the newly formed Cleveland club of the American Association had a similar 
problem with that city’s Law and Order League, which wanted to shut down Sunday baseball in 
the city.  The Law and Order League succeeded in denying the Blues the use of the grounds at 
Association Park for Sunday games for most of 1887.  Rather than bribery or ruffianism, 
however, the Blues sought a couple of different ways around the law.  One, as mentioned earlier, 
was to look for another place to play on Sunday that was outside city limits.  This presented 
problems for 1887, as “the Cedar Avenue Driving Park, or Glenville Race Track, will be used, 
probably the former.  But neither are in suitable trim and would disgust a crowd.”  Therefore, 
Cleveland sportswriter Frank Brunell hoped that “next season, if all goes well, a suburban 
Sunday ground will be established that can be reached by one of the lines of railroad in fifteen 
minutes.”13  They did play at the Cedar Avenue Driving Park one day in August, and despite 
                                                 
12 “Nashville Players Indicted” NA, The Sporting News, May 7, 1887, 1; “No Sunday Games” 
NA, The Sporting News, May 7, 1887, 1. 
13 “From Cleveland” F.H. Brunell, The Sporting Life, August 24, 1887, 2. 
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unseasonable rains and the state of the grounds, drew 2,400 spectators.  A local Baptist preacher 
tried to halt the proceedings, but the police did not interfere in this case.14 
The local ministers in Cleveland eventually combined forces and contested this 
desecration.  “In the meantime, Jos. C. Batchelor, an amateur saint, who lives near the park, 
swore out a warrant for Stricker’s arrest and he surrendered and gave bond with President 
Robison as surety.”  The arrest of Cub Stricker, the team’s captain, necessitated Cleveland’s 
other tactic, which was to challenge the ban’s legality in the courts, with Stricker’s arrest serving 
as a test case.  Stricker did not win, however, and ended up parting with ten dollars plus court 
costs.  Cleveland management vowed to mount an effort to repeal this injurious ban on Sunday 
ball playing at the next session of the Ohio legislature.15  By early 1888, however, the team 
reconsidered mounting the lobbying drive, perhaps feeling the fight was not worth the hassle, 
cost, or negative publicity.  “It is not probable at this time that the Cleveland Club will ever 
attempt to play Sunday games.  The temper of the town is against it, and, unless the legislative 
bar is removed, no experiment is likely to be made.”16 
As mentioned earlier, minor league teams faced this dilemma of whether to play on 
Sundays as well, and as their financial situation tended to be even more tenuous than that of 
major league teams, the very existence of the team might hinge on the outcome.  The 
management of the Sioux City club in the Western Association tried the same measure that 
Cleveland did when local churchmen tried to prevent it from playing Sunday ball in 1889.  The 
clerics formed a Sunday League and invited businessmen to join them, although few did because 
“they were too busy with their own affairs.”  Regardless, the men wrote a “declaration of war” 
                                                 
14 “From Cleveland” F.H. Brunell, The Sporting Life, August 31, 1887, 4. 
15 Ibid.; “Notes Of The Game” NA, New York Times, August 26, 1887, 3. 
16 “Chips From Cleveland” Buckeye, The Sporting News, February 4, 1888, 4. 
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against Sunday ball.  Team management considered asking the Western Association to change its 
schedule, but then decided that if the worst should occur, they could cross the Missouri River to 
Nebraska and play in South Sioux City, where the city fathers, “offered to fit up a ground and 
treat the boys handsomely if they will play their Sunday games there.”17  Perhaps this dissuaded 
the Sunday Leaguers, or perhaps the general apathy of the people of Sioux City was responsible, 
but either way, “the preachers found that a good many people who are good citizens seven days 
in the week were of the opinion that it was not much of a sin to watch a game of base ball 
Sunday, and the talk of determined opposition has about all died out.”18 
One of the most interesting stories regarding opposition to Sunday baseball came from 
Johnstown, Pennsylvania.  In the spring of 1887, the Woman’s Christian Temperance Union 
(WCTU) threw its weight behind a measure to ban the city from organizing a ball club and 
playing games at the Franklin Park grounds.  The reason, it seems, is that various saloons in 
Johnstown had bulletin boards where they posted the scores of games both national and local, a 
common practice at the time.  The WCTU reasoned that because baseball was popular, and the 
impressionable young men of the city wanted to know the scores of games, when saloons posted 
scores they encouraged said young men to patronize their drinking establishments, and thus 
contributed to immorality and dissipation amongst the gentlemen of the city.  The sporting 
population of Johnstown was disappointed with this turn of events, because Franklin Park was 
the only grounds large enough for baseball in the city, and this would essentially end baseball 
there for the 1887 season.  As it turned out, however, the WCTU was unable to convince the 
                                                 
17 “Sioux City’s Sunday Question” NA, The Sporting Life, February 13, 1889, 1. 
18 “Will Play Sundays” NA, The Sporting Life, February 27, 1889, 1. 
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Street Railway Company, the owner of the grounds, that playing baseball on Sunday threatened 
to debauch the youth of Johnstown, and the club organized and began play as planned.19   
Curious as the events in Johnstown might have been, the most unusual story regarding 
sabbatarianism comes from Manistee, Michigan, in 1889.  Local authorities there arrested a 
traveling team composed of women ballplayers who tried to play an exhibition game on Sunday.  
This led one paper to remark, “That town says it can stand dog fights and prize fights, but when 
it comes to letting girls play ball on the Sabbath they just won’t have it.”20 
The biggest threat of all to Sunday baseball came in 1889, when an April decision by the 
Kansas City Court of Appeals declared that Sunday games in the state of Missouri were 
unlawful.  This was serious indeed, as two of the American Association’s members, St. Louis 
and Kansas City, resided in that state, and both depended heavily on Sunday games to keep their 
exchequers in decent shape.  There was also the fact that the American Association had already 
set its season schedule by that time, and its championship season games were supposed to start 
only one week after the court handed down its decision.  The Association’s leaders did not panic 
immediately, however, as everyone realized that the appeals process would probably take one 
year at least, and so Sunday baseball continued in Missouri during the 1889 season.21 
Although there are many cases of teams attempting to evade restrictions on Sunday 
baseball, at least a few people thought that refraining from play was a good idea.  The National 
League, as we have seen, barred Sunday games as part of its attempt to appeal to the more 
“respectable” class of patrons in National League cities.  Some players disliked the practice, as 
well, and this might be especially problematic if a player was in the American Association, 
                                                 
19 “Bad For Johnstown” NA, The Sporting Life, April 20, 1887, 11; “Johnstown All Right” NA, 
The Sporting Life, April 27, 1887, 7. 
20 “Notes And Comments” NA, The Sporting Life, August 7, 1889, 4. 
21 “Sunday Base Ball” NA, The Sporting Life, April 24, 1889, 1. 
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where Sunday ball was a staple.  One was pitcher Scott Stratton, of Louisville.  Before the 1889 
season began, he held off from signing with the Colonels because he wanted a special contract 
clause exempting him from pitching on Sundays.  A Sunday school teacher, Stratton volunteered 
to pitch more often on weekdays to make up for his Sunday absence.22  He stated, “if he should 
return to playing on Sunday his influence would be ruined and he would lose his own self-
respect.”  Although Louisville cranks “had never heard anything to equal it,” Stratton was able to 
carry his point in conversations with team owner Mordecai Davidson.  The owner said, “I do not 
want to force him to play against his conscience, and I am glad he has manliness enough to speak 
out before he signs.  Ball playing is a business and a respectable one and I like to see men of 
character in it.”23  He eventually signed for $1,600 and a promise to pitch more weekday games 
to make up for observing a day of rest on Sunday.24 
These stories were rare, however.  Few within the game believed in outlawing Sunday 
baseball outright, although if teams did so voluntarily or an entire league decided to interrupt 
play, like in the National League, that was acceptable.  O.P. Caylor, for one, thought that Sunday 
baseball was a bad idea, and urged the American Association to drop it, but he never condoned 
using the law to force teams to lay off on Sundays.  For most Association owners, however, the 
remunerative potential of Sunday baseball was just too great for them to let go.  This is why, in 
one very important sense, sabbatarianism contributed to the demise of the entire American 
Association. 
The two Association teams that constantly flirted with switching leagues in the late 1880s 
were Brooklyn and Cincinnati.  These two teams, along with St. Louis and perhaps Philadelphia, 
                                                 
22 “Louisville Laconics” JA, The Sporting Life, March 6, 1889, 1. 
23 “Louisville Laconics” Colonel, The Sporting News, March 9, 1889, 3. 
24 “Lousiville Laconics” JA, The Sporting Life, April 10, 1889, 3. 
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were the most successful and most financially stable entries in the Association.  Both also faced 
legal challenges to Sunday baseball by the close of the 1889 season.  Faced with the likely loss 
of Sunday ball, both decided to make the move and join baseball’s senior circuit preparatory to 
the 1890 campaign (see chapter eighteen for more details).  Without these two stable franchises, 
the American Association’s clout in baseball affairs diminished notably, and the loss of these 
two teams made an enormous contribution to the Association’s demise two years later.  In a very 
real sense, religion helped destroy the two-league structure of major league baseball and 
contributed to the advent of a one-league monopoly by 1892.  It also contributed to the drop in 
player salaries and weak level of competitive balance that came with monopoly.  These events 
might have happened anyway, but the Sabbatarianism of the late nineteenth century also 





Mascots and Racism 
 
 
 Almost all sports fans are superstitious.  They always have been, and probably always 
will be.  Lucky shirts, hats, socks, foods, or habits are as much a part of watching baseball as the 
bat and the ball.  The same is true of many players.  They too can be wildly superstitious, to the 
point of absurdity.  Players in 1880s baseball were no exception.  To cite one example, veteran 
pitcher Pud Galvin, when signing to play for Pittsburgh in 1889, was the thirteenth man on the 
club to sign for that season.  He was supposed to sign his new contract on November 13, but 
fearing too much ill luck, waited a day just to be sure.1  Noted catcher Doc Bushong had a lucky 
mustache.  “When I shave my upper lip, it always makes my eyes discharge more or less water, 
and a man can’t see in such a condition.  The day that I had my finger broken in Louisville by a 
pitched ball I had no mustache.  It had been taken off the day before, and I truly believe that this 
alone was the cause of the accident.”2  Also looking to find luck, each year in the later 1880s, the 
New York Giants opened up their exhibition schedule prior to the season by playing a local 
college nine, the Manhattan Jaspers.  “The Giants seem to think that the Jaspers possess mascotic 
influences, and hence always open the season with those plucky youngsters as their opponents.”3 
                                                 
1 “Notes And Comments” NA, The Sporting Life, November 28, 1888, 5. 
2 Nemec, The Beer and Whiskey League, 100. 
3 “New York News” George Stackhouse, The Sporting Life, March 27, 1889, 3. 
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 As this quote suggests, one of the most frequent forms that the quest for good luck took 
in Gilded Age baseball was finding the team one or more mascots.  In the 1880s, however, 
mascot did not mean the team name.  The Detroit mascot was not a live wolverine, nor did 
Louisville bring an actual colonel to their grounds for good fortune.  Nor was the mascot an 
amorphous and brightly colored blob, a la the Phillie Phanatic of modern times, or a creature 
portrayed by a person in a stuffed suit, such as the Mariner Moose, who entertains the spectators 
during games and travels to schools for guest appearances during the off-season.  Instead, 
mascots in 1880s baseball tended to be living creatures, usually people but occasionally other 
animals, which had some distinguishing feature that seemed to bring luck. 
 An important thing to remember about mascots was that, typically, a team could not plan 
what or who their mascot would be ahead of time.  It was more likely that a player would notice 
something unusual, the team would win that day, and a mascot was born in the process.  There 
were a few exceptions to this, certainly, such as the story of Clarence Duval mentioned in 
chapter seventeen and expanded here.  For the most part, however, finding a mascot was a matter 
of chance.  A final point is also relevant when it comes to mascots.  Because mascots gained 
their lucky status because of characteristics that players deemed unusual or exotic, this opened 
the door for racism to show its face in baseball all too often. 
 The story of Clarence Duval’s experiences as the Chicago mascot is more complete than 
most, because he traveled around the world on Al Spalding’s 1888-1889 tour (see chapter 
sixteen).  Having served as a Chicago mascot at times during the 1888 season, he deserted the 
team for a position with Johnson and Slavin’s Minstrel Company while in Philadelphia.  By mere 
chance, however, the company crossed paths with Spalding’s tourists as the two teams played an 
exhibition game in Omaha in late October of 1888.  Tom Burns, third baseman for the White 
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Stockings, happened to notice Duval first, crying out, “there’s the little coon.  Come on Clarence, 
hurry up.  That’s Clarence Duval, the mascot we had with us down East.”  Duval clambered into 
Burns’ carriage, the “little African, black as the ace of spades, and clothed in some very dizzy 
hand me-downs,” stating he had just lost his position in the traveling company because the 
manager, Miss Jarbeau, intentionally left town without him.  “She done treat me meaner a poah 
dog, and turned me loose dis mawnin’ widout a cent and nuffin to eat.”4  Duval was familiar to 
the All-American team as well, John Ward writing, “every base-ball patron in the East will 
remember the little black ‘coon’ who swung the baton and marched the Chicagos onto the 
field.”5  (Despite this comment and use of the word “coon,” it does not appear that Ward was 
truly a racist.  In 1887, he tried to persuade Giants ownership to sign George Stovey, an African 
American who had a reputation as an excellent pitcher.)6 
 After some of the Chicago players encouraged him to join them, Duval next led a 
procession of the players, tossing his baton “with a series of movements and tactics that would 
have made the leader of any military band in the country famous for life.  The spectators were 
evidently astonished at first, for they were very quiet, then as the approaching ball players drew 
nearer with the little African cavorting about in front of them, the crowd broke forth in a hearty 
burst of applause.”  Following this, Duval had a brief interview with Chicago’s captain, Anson, 
in which Anson reminded Duval the White Stockings had blacklisted him as their mascot after 
he deserted them in Philadelphia and ran away in a set of clothes the team purchased for him.  
Anson was not one to espouse racial tolerance.  He reportedly said, “I’m dead sore on you. . . . 
                                                 
4 “The Great Trip” Harry Palmer, The Sporting Life, November 7, 1888, 4.  
5 “Across The Continent” John Montgomery Ward, Chicago Daily Tribune, November 11, 1888, 
25. 
6 Lee Lowenfish, The Imperfect Diamond: A History of Baseball’s Labor Wars (Lincoln: 
University of Nebraska Press, 2010), 28. 
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We want nothing to do with you. See?”  Duval responded, “I reckon I don’t deserve nuffin’ 
bettah, cap’n, but I’se done had a mighty hard time ob it already.”  Next, Duval reportedly went 
off and cried over his curt dismissal.  Other White Stockings players showed more pity than their 
captain had, however, and allowed Duval to stick around.7 
 When Al Spalding rejoined the team a little farther down the line at Hastings, Nebraska, 
he gave Duval an interview, and “decided immediately to take the little chap with the party.  He 
was made to sign an iron-clad contract by which he agrees to be thrown over-board, keel-hauled, 
drawn and quartered or suffer any other penalty in case he attempts to desert the club a second 
time.”  This led Anson to test his mascot’s commitment.  “It won’t surprise me if you leave us at 
San Francisco. . . . I believe you would desert us now for Jarbeau, if she asked you to.”  Duval 
answered, “If I do, you can break my neck, Massa Anson.  I ain’t no such niggah, Massa Anson.”  
Chicago writer Harry Palmer, who accompanied the expedition to the antipodes as its official 
scribe, wrote, “Without a doubt he is a great little nig.  He can dance in a style that would turn a 
professional song and dance man green with envy.  His little nut is filled with funny negro songs 
and sayings, while his drum major act is as novel as it is inimitable.”8   
As Duval had to sign a regular National League contract (it was approved and officially 
promulgated by the League’s president, Nick Young), and 1889 was the year the National 
League implemented the Brush Classification Plan, this posed the question of if and where 
Young would classify Duval.  Obviously, Young did not do so, but that did not stop The Sporting 
Life from jesting, “the interesting question now is: Was the mascot classified, and, if so, in what 
class was he placed?  Considering that the mascot foolishness has evidently not yet died out, 
                                                 
7 “The Great Trip” Harry Palmer, The Sporting Life, November 7, 1888, 4. 
8 Ibid. 
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these are interesting questions whose answer will be awaited with breathless interest by a horde 
of actual and would-be mascots.”9 
 Duval had both good times and hard times while steaming around the world.  He had the 
opportunity to perform his act and lead the royal band of the King of Hawaii when the tourists 
arrived there.  He participated in the procession as it moved towards the royal palace, past a 
“curb crowded with bare-footed and open-mouthed Kanakas, Chinamen, half castes and whites 
mingled in picturesque confusion.  Horsemen clattered up the roads to see the cavalcade.  
Windows and doors in the low-browed houses bulged with dusky humanity.”10 
 The young man had to earn his keep on the way to the antipodes, however, unlike the rest 
of the party.  One of the correspondents accompanying the players reported, “Clarence Duval, 
the ebony-hued mascot, considers himself the most abused individual in the combination.  The 
purser has set him to work for his board in the butcher shop, and the black little baton-twirler is 
in high dudgeon.”11  Nor did Anson’s resentment of his presence abate.  When plowing the 
waves of the Indian Ocean on their way to Sri Lanka, the players noticed a shark swimming 
alongside of the ship, and they informed the captain and made an effort to catch the creature.  
“Anson offered to solve the question of bait by offering Clarence Duval, the little ebony-hued 
mascot of the Chicagos, as a tidbit for the shark, but Clarence made such strenuous objections 
that the plan was abandoned.  In lieu of the pickaninny a small bit of fat pork was fastened on the 
hook, and it was sent far astern.”  We can only hope Anson’s comment was in jest, but the fact 
that a jest took such a form is certainly in keeping with the big Iowan’s character.  As for the 
                                                 
9 No title, NA, The Sporting Life, February 6, 1889, 2. 
10 “The Great Trip” Harry Palmer, The Sporting Life, December 26, 1888, 4. 
11 “Notes Of The Trip And Travelers” S. Goodfriend, Chicago Daily Inter Ocean, December 30, 
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shark, the crew caught it, pulled it in, killed it, and, the curiosity of the players satisfied, cast it 
back into the ocean.12   
Duval fared a bit better in one respect when the teams left Australia and headed towards 
India.  Despite Anson’s offer to use him as bait, the ship’s German crew apparently treated him 
much better.  The ship captain allowed Duval to enjoy his music box,  
and the little darkey turned the crank for two hours while he yelled with laughter at the 
odd airs it played.  His coonship, by the way, is traveling ‘first-class’ on the Salier.  On 
the Alameda he was made to do light chores of different kinds to pay for his passage, but 
here the German waiters attend to his wants as though he were an Indian prince.  Indeed, 
two of them got into a scrap last evening over a dispute as to who should serve Mr. 
Duval, and the captain has made one of the poor beggars ‘walk the bridge’ to-night by 
way of penalty.13 
 
These developments cheered Duval sufficiently that he introduced the ballplayers to the game 
craps while en route to Sri Lanka, which kept many of the players entertained and helped to pass 
the time on deck.  It also helped satisfy their taste for gambling, which many of the players did 
constantly.  Because he was the mascot, however, the party could blame Duval if it experienced 
bad luck.  When the thermometer rose too high for their tastes, the men blamed their mascot, 
forcing him to take a saltwater bath in order to break Mother Nature’s hot streak.14  This torment, 
as it turned out, caused the end of Duval’s association with the White Stockings.  Once the team 
returned to the US, Duval and the White Stockings parted ways, as Spalding released the young 
man from his Chicago contract and gave him ten dollars to see him on his way.  Duval did not 
forgive the two main perpetrators, Mark Baldwin and Tom Daly, for the way they treated him, 
and this soured him on mascoting with the White Stockings from that point forward.15 
                                                 
12 “The Grand Laugh” NA, The Sporting News, February 2, 1889, 3. 
13 “At Sea” Harry Palmer, The Sporting Life, March 6, 1889, 2. 
14 “The Great Trip” Harry Palmer, The Sporting Life, March 13, 1889, 2. 
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It might have been a relief to the young man, but Duval had competition as a mascot 
before the trip was over.  When the players landed on Ceylon (Sri Lanka) to play ball for the 
people there, there happened to be another American ship in port, the Essex.  On conversing with 
the crew, pitcher Ed Crane met up with a sailor who, like himself, was from South Boston, and 
had played ball before heading out to sea.  As a gesture of friendship, the man gave Crane a 
monkey to serve as mascot for the Giants and aid them in their defense of their pennant in 1889.  
Crane’s monkey was not the same monkey that attacked Mark Baldwin in chapter six, however.  
Baldwin also purchased a monkey as a pet, but it was much larger and more resistant to 
Baldwin’s training techniques than Crane’s creature, which apparently was quite tame.  Crane 
also appears to have been one of the more unprejudiced men on the trip.  One time, when the 
crewmen stoking the coal furnaces below deck threw out a young Singhalese, on account of his 
skin color, who their captain had hired to help them, Crane first soothed the young man by 
supplying a bottle of beer, then applied a choking grip to one of the offending stokers, and 
threatened the rest so severely that they gave the youngster no trouble from that point forward.16 
Duval, meanwhile, was happy just to make it alive from Colombo to Suez.  On the 
voyage to Egypt, a few of the travelers, led by the tourists’ top prankster, Jim Fogarty, began the 
rumor that their ship was under attack from pirates (the German ship had fired off two cannon 
blasts in honor of German Emperor Wilhelm’s birthday) and before everyone realized it was a 
mere joke, Duval, “the affrighted coon . . . made a dash for the trunk and hid himself effectually 
from view.”17   
It is useful, at this point, to dissect Duval’s experience in major league baseball for what 
it shows about racism generally in the Gilded Age.  One of the most obvious is the way that 
                                                 
16 “Crane’s Kindliness” Harry Palmer, The Sporting Life, March 13, 1889, 2. 
17 “The Game At Colombo” S. Goodfriend, Chicago Daily Inter Ocean, March 10, 1889, 17. 
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newspapers rarely quoted black people in correct English.  Given the status of many blacks as 
farmers and manual laborers, and the puny sums of money many states spent on education for 
African Americans, it is true that as a group, they may not have always used perfect grammar.  
This is also true, however, of millions of recent European immigrants to the United States, and 
sports newspapers always printed their statements in grammatically correct English.  It is also 
important to examine what they said, along with how newspapers portrayed them as saying it.  
The statements attributed to Duval also display the excessive amount of deference that black 
people were expected to show to whites whenever they met in public.  Calling whites “massa,” 
“captain,” or various other respectful titles was part of a public performance that African 
Americans had to keep up to please whites.   
This portrayal of language had other purposes, such as making blacks appear childish.  
This served to confirm the need for white society’s paternalistic treatment of African Americans 
in the eyes of white Americans, which helped justify denying African Americans the right to 
vote, hold public office, serve on juries, be members of police forces, gain admission to white 
colleges, and so forth.  The situation went even deeper than that, however.  In addition to 
appearing child-like, black people had to seem happy with their inferior position.  When the 
writers describing Clarence Duval’s behavior mentioned things like the “plantation” songs and 
dances he knew, or wrote about his baton twirling routine, this was to show how pleased he was 
with his present condition, in his simple-minded and childish way.   
There is also the fact that, frequently, one of the only public roles African Americans 
could assume was one in which they entertained whites, often through debasing themselves to 
appear childish yet happy.  Granted, in Duval’s case, he really was a child.  Most mention of him 
on the Spalding tour, however, referred to some combination of his marching in parades, his role 
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as the butt of jokes played on him by the tourists, as in the Cairo rail station described in chapter 
sixteen, or the ways in which the tourists used him for entertainment by proposing him as shark 
bait or scaring him with rumors of pirates.  Even Duval’s other occupation, as an extra in a 
minstrel show, fits this mold.  (For another prominent example of debasing the humanity of 
black people for public entertainment, the reader should look up the story of Ota Benga’s 
incarceration in the Bronx Zoo in September, 1906.) 
There is also the fact that Duval was the only member of the tour who had to work to 
earn his passage.  It is hard to imagine John Ward or Cap Anson washing dishes after a meal, but 
Duval had to do so.  It is true he had very few responsibilities on the tour, but as Spalding invited 
him to go and signed him to a regular National League contract, he arguably could have expected 
equal treatment to the other tourists, rather than having to earn his keep.   
All these events serve as reminders of how deeply engrained racism was in American 
society at this time.  The fact that, in print at least, none of the tourists or journalists objected to 
Duval’s treatment speaks volumes about what was acceptable behavior towards African 
Americans at this time in US history.  Combined with the other examples of racism on the 
Spalding tour discussed in chapter sixteen, this demonstrates some of the ways that society’s 
views of African Americans manifested themselves in baseball during the Gilded Age. 
 
* * * * * 
 
The practice of teams adopting a mascot as a good luck charm was common in the 1880s, 
and some players were always vigilant for signs of one.  For instance, John Kerins, a player who 
enjoyed a decent seven-year career in the American Association and later umpired, was a big fan 
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of mascots, once securing Willie Pollard, “a bright-faced boy of African descent,” to accompany 
his club, the Louisville Colonels, for the 1887 season.18  The White Stockings had at least one 
human mascot prior to Duval, a six-year-old named Willie Hahn, who once broke his arm at the 
ballpark but, when a doctor arrived, refused anesthesia before having the fracture set, despite the 
concerned pleas of the “weak females” in attendance.19  Some supporters of the team took to 
Hahn, it seems, because at the end of the 1886 season they rewarded him with pictures of himself 
with various players, including his unofficial guardian, Ned Williamson, “whom Willie thinks is 
the king of all ball players.”  As Chicago catcher Silver Flint put it, “Williamson is Willie’s beau 
ideal of all that is good and kind and companionable on earth, and the little chap’s greatest 
ambition is to be a ‘crack shortstop like Ed.’”20  Chicago’s correspondent for The Sporting News 
even penned some painfully mediocre verse in honor of Hahn and his “god-father,” Williamson. 
 
“Williamson and the Chicago’s Mascot” 
He rules the roost 
Though he is 
The youngest chick of the brood 
It’s a Fourth of July unloosed 
To interfere with his mood. 
He belongs to the gang— 
That’s to say: 
The gang all belong to him; 
                                                 
18 “The Louisville Team,” NA, The Sporting News, November 27, 1886, 6. 
19 “A Plucky Would-be Base Ballist” NA, The Sporting Life, November 11, 1885, 1. 
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They’d do that for which they might hang 
To humor His Majesty’s whim. 
 
Hahn performed many other deeds to bring the team luck, earning the admiration of his 
older teammates in the process.  He accompanied Chicago to Detroit for a key series in the 1886 
pennant race.  He told his team, “you fellows tend to the Big Four, and I’ll do their mascot.”  
When Detroit played its final series in Chicago that year, the Wolverines brought a huge 
Newfoundland dog to counter Hahn’s powers.  During one game, Hahn snuck over to the Detroit 
bench and captured the animal, leading it triumphantly to the Chicago side of the field.  Now 
missing their canine good luck charm, Detroit improvised a final effort to produce a lucky 
talisman, planting a stake with a rooster’s head impaled on it near their bench.  This was not 
nearly enough to stop Hahn, however, as he swooped in to steal this totem as well when Detroit 
took the field in the seventh inning and the action on the field distracted everyone’s attention.21 
 Given Hahn’s prestige and talents, the White Stockings found themselves in the enviable 
position of turning down further mascot applicants.  In 1887, owner Al Spalding received an 
application for engagement as a mascot from J.J. Smith of Kansas City, asking Spalding to state 
his terms and salary for the position.  He also mentioned he was a “colored Gentleman.”  Clearly, 
this man had no chance for employment with the White Stockings, according to the reporter 
relaying the story, although his skin color was not the main reason, given how many other teams 
did employ young African Americans for luck.  The problem, rather, was that the team already 
had Hahn, and that Smith had already served Kansas City, a team that limped to a 30-91 record 
                                                 
21 “Williamson and the Chicago’s Mascot” NA, The Sporting News, February 19, 1887, 1. 
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with Smith on its side.  “The record of the club under the mascot-age of Mr. Smith is enough to 
kill all the mascots ever born.”22 
 Rather than engage Smith, the White Stockings showed their full faith in Willie Hahn by 
signing him to a regular National League contract for 1887.  This included a clause introduced 
by Al Spalding forcing all White Stockings to pledge sobriety for the upcoming season.  
According to one of the team’s executives, Sam Morton, when he told Hahn the news, “you 
should have seen the little fellow open his eyes when I read the clause calling for the absolute 
abstinence from all malt or spirituous liquors during the term of his engagement.  He believes 
himself now a regular member of the Chicago team.  We are making a regular uniform for him 
and it will be a facsimile of those worn by the other members of the Chicago club.”23 
For the 1886 season, the St. Louis Browns employed one of their players as their mascot.  
This was right fielder Hugh Nicol, also known as Little Nick (he stood five-foot, four-inches 
tall), whom they picked up from the Chicago White Stockings prior to their 1883 campaign.  
“Little Nick is the luckiest man in the country, and is certainly the Browns’ mascot.  When the 
little gentleman gets on first base—well, look out for a tally.  He is a great favorite at home as 
well as abroad.”24  Little Nick was certainly one of the most aggressive base stealers baseball has 
ever seen, even if people have forgotten him.  Playing for the Cincinnati Red Stockings in 1887, 
he stole 138 bases in 125 games, allowing him to score 122 times despite only getting 102 hits 
that year.  This came a mere one year after a bout with malaria that left him unable to finish the 
1886 season.   
                                                 
22 “He Wrote Just a Little Too Much” NA, The Sporting Life, April 13, 1887, 1. 
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Later, a writer asked him to explain his technique for stealing bases, and Nicol’s response 
is interesting because it shows that already, by the mid-1880s, skillful players employed 
techniques for stealing bases recognizable today.  Nicol said, “I set my left spikes and get a 
spring in that foot.  At the first and faintest motion to pitch I fire myself away from that left foot 
and make a gain of five feet anyhow, and then it’s a sprint for second.”  When arriving at the 
base, Nicol continued, “most players begin to slide too soon. . . . Always, just the instant before 
making the dip, I look to see how the ball is coming.  If it’s coming high I take the belly-buster 
in front of the baseman, for nine out of ten of them swing back with the ball, and I ain’t there.”  
However, “if it’s coming low I go behind them and twist out with my right toe and left knee.”  
For close plays where he was likely to be thrown out “I’ve got all my legs and arms to kick up a 
big dust, so the umpire can’t see how the thing is, and my story is as good as the second 
baseman’s when the cloud clears away, don’t you see?”25 
Hugh Nicol’s status as a good luck talisman was so great that The Sporting News felt 
compelled to report the fact when the Browns lost his services to Cincinnati before the 1887 
season.  “Cincinnati has secured the best and only mascot in the world.  Ever since the day Little 
Nic joined the Browns good luck has followed them.  Good luck deserted the Chicagos when he 
left them.  It is to be hoped good luck will not with him leave the Browns.”26  As it turned out, 
the Browns need not have feared.  They won the American Association pennant easily, finishing 
fourteen games ahead of Nicol’s second place Cincinnati Red Stockings.  They started slowly 
out of the gate that year, however, and the press immediately speculated that Nicol’s departure 
was the reason.27  As for the Chicago team running out of luck without Nicol, the club did go 
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two years, 1883 and 1884, without a pennant, but then won championships the next two seasons 
after that.   
This does not mean there was nothing to Nicol’s reputation, however, as his supporters 
could point to the fact that in 1886, before his arrival, Cincinnati was a mediocre 65-73, and 
improved dramatically to 81-54 the next year with Nicol on their side.  Almost every time the 
sporting press mentioned Nicol, the papers inserted some comment regarding the good fortune 
that surrounded him.  Cincinnati owner Aaron Stern was so infatuated with Nicol’s lucky 
attributes and style of play that he once said, “I was very lucky in securing him.  An offer of 
$5,000 would be no temptation for his release.  He could not be purchased.”28  Fortune did seem 
to favor Nicol, regardless of the odds.  In December of 1887, he went to an opera, entered a 
drawing for a silver water pitcher valued at $25, and ended up with the winning ticket.29  
Similarly, while in California playing during that same winter, fortune smiled on him yet again, 
as he won a gold watch in a raffle.30 
Absent Nicol, the Browns cast about for a new mascot, and by 1888, thought they had 
found one in the person of Rudy (no known relation to Willie) Hahn.  If ever there was a mascot 
dedicated to helping his nine win at all costs and sacrifices, it was Rudy Hahn.  A St. Louis 
native, “Rudy Hahn is seventeen years of age and a great lover of the game.  Rudy would be a 
player but he has only one finger on his left hand.  He lost the other three in a St. Louis box 
factory three years ago while fooling with a buzz saw.”  Although he sometimes worked to 
support himself in St. Louis, once the 1888 season began, “he quit work and followed the St. 
Louis Club to Kansas City in the latter part of April.  He came home to St. Louis with the club, 
                                                 
28 “From St. Louis” Joe Pritchard, The Sporting Life, April 13, 1887, 9. 
29 “Notes and Comments” NA, The Sporting Life, December 21, 1887, 5. 
30 “Cincinnati Chips” Ren Mulford, Jr., The Sporting Life, February 8, 1888, 2. 
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but was with the Browns when they went to Cincinnati.  He journeyed to Baltimore, but did not 
go to Cleveland because he thought the champions could get along without a mascot there.”  
Aware of the team’s travel schedule after the Baltimore series, “Rudy worked his way from 
Baltimore to Philadelphia.  He arrived there five days before the Browns.  He scraped up an 
acquaintance with Johnny Ryan, the ball tosser, who superintends the Athletic grounds, and did 
odd jobs for him in exchange for his board and lodging.”  When he turned up to greet the Browns 
in New York at the Grand Central Hotel, the players heartily welcomed him an inquired how he 
arrived.  “Oh, I’m all right.  I came over with the club last night.  I rode between the seats and the 
conductor did not see me.”31   
When the team learned of Rudy Hahn’s hazardous mode of railroad travel, someone 
asked him how he continually managed to hitch rides on the railroads without the conductors 
detecting him and throwing him off the train.  He responded that, “If he is discovered he 
discloses his identity and he says very few conductors will put a ‘mascot’ off their train.  They 
are superstitious, too.”  The team did its best to make sure Hahn got food from the hotel where 
they boarded while on the road, and when President Von der Ahe discovered how Rudy Hahn 
had helped his nine, and how much the men valued his services, Von der Ahe purchased a new 
suit of clothes for him.  While Von der Ahe was not personally superstitious, Cincinnati owner 
Aaron Stern was, as he once barred Hahn from Cincinnati’s grounds at League Park after the 
Browns defeated his team the previous day.32 
President Von der Ahe might not have been superstitious, but many of his men were.  So 
much so, that in 1888 they even had a backup mascot to reinforce the powers of Rudy Hahn, the 
seven-year-old son of third baseman Arlie Latham.  Even though “only seven years old he walks, 
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32 Ibid. 
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trots, and jumps around just like his father.  He came on the field in Tuesday’s game in full 
Brown Stocking uniform and looking like a genuine mascot.  He has been with the Browns ever 
since.”33  The lad, named Cliff, was quite effective in his mascoting, as the Browns won almost 
three-quarters of their games in September and October before clinching the pennant during the 
last week of the season.  “The Browns have lost but these games since little Cliff set himself up 
in the luck-bringing business.”34 
Besides Hugh Nicol, other players might gain the reputation of a mascot simply by being 
in the right place at the right time.  Joe Gunson was one such player.  Playing in various minor 
leagues between 1885 and 1887, spending the last season with Topeka in the Western League, 
good fortune seemed to follow him.  “Gunson, of Topeka, is home again.  He seems to be a 
mascot, having played for the last three seasons in pennant winning clubs.  Pennant aspirant 
clubs for 1888 take notice.”35  Gunson’s talent was probably not the reason for all these 
championships, however, given that in 874 major league at bats he compiled a miniature OPS+ 
of 47, so perhaps there was something to the mascot theory.   
The same might be true of newspaper reporters.  The Sporting Life reported, “Ed 
Anthony, of the Commercial-Gazette, is making the trip with the Cincinnatis.  The boys have 
voted him a decided mascot, unlike Ban Johnson, of the same paper, who made the first trip and 
proved a hoodoo.”36  Even public officials might gain mascot standing.  “Secretary Rush, of the 
Department of Agriculture, is a frequent attendant at the games in Washington, and is also, by 
the way, a regular mascot, as he had not up to this week seen the Senators beaten.”  Given that 
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the Nationals were the worst team in the National League by a full eighteen wins, the secretary 
was indeed a powerful good luck charm.37 
During the 1886 season, New York Giants manager Jim Mutrie also called for his team to 
adopt a new mascot, after a Gotham dogcatcher had corralled the yellow dog named Jack the 
team had counted on for good luck in 1885.  His rumored choice was “a pretty little girl dressed 
in white and maroon.”38  This young lady would replace Jack and the club’s other mascot from 
1885, a “colored boy” discovered by catcher Buck Ewing, who was “admitted to the Polo 
Grounds every day free of charge to satisfy the superstitious whims of the players.”  Among 
other things, this young man would rub the arm of pitcher Mickey Welch in order to secure good 
fortune on the diamond.39  Instead of a young woman, however, in 1886 the Giants ended up 
going with “Master Preston,” a five-year-old boy “who knows the rules of the game as well as 
the players . . . the little fellow practiced before the game, and during the contest he was perhaps 
the most interested person on the ground.”  When the club played a series of poor games in 
September, some patrons, and some of the players, too, attributed the team’s weak effort to 
Preston’s absence.  They were so concerned that second baseman Joe Gerhardt convinced 
Preston to join them again for a game on September 18.  “His appearance was greeted with 
cheers by the spectators and hailed with delight by the players.  Whether or not the presence of 
the mascot had any effect on the nine is not quite clear; but at any rate they played the best game 
since their return from the West.”40   
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When the Giants won a pennant in 1888 after several years of near misses, many 
surmised that their mascots were the reason.  In July, the team gained Fred Boldt as a good luck 
charm, a fourteen-year-old boy with dedication like unto that of Rudy Hahn.  Early in the season, 
he tried to convince the Giants to adopt him, going so far as to ride on top of the team’s carriage 
to a game in Chicago, despite the fact that “he was so persistent and cheery and pointed in his 
remarks that he was ordered to make himself scarce.  Eventually it required the end of a bat to 
drive him off.”  Undaunted, when the Giants returned to Chicago later that year, he appeared on 
the grounds, and the team won two straight games from the formidable White Stockings.  “That 
settled it.  He was taken in tow at once by Ewing, Welch, Gore, and O’Rourke.  They smuggled 
him on board the train and got him as far as Crestline, Ohio.  They paid his fare to Pittsburg from 
there.”   
After he was discovered and tossed off the train between Pittsburg and the team’s next 
stop in Philadelphia, the Giants decided to test how lucky Boldt really was.  “He said he was 
bound to get to New York and would do it somehow, so the boys let him go to see if he really 
had the pluck and the luck that entitled him to be a true Mascot.  A lad that couldn’t beat the 
railroad wasn’t of any account as a Mascot. . . . His last words were ‘Boys, I’ll join you at 
Philadelphia.’”  In the meantime, the Giants lost a game, so when Boldt appeared at the 
Continental Hotel in Philadelphia, “the Giants welcomed him with open arms.”  The team also 
clothed him and cleaned him up, fortunately, as Boldt had no parents and had been homeless in 
Chicago.  “They have brought him to New York and are at present taking care of him.  Aside 
from the mascot part of it, the Giants have done the boy a good turn.”41  Boldt’s story had a 
strange ending, however, as it appears that in August he borrowed some clothes from one Giant, 
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ran up a large bill at a lunch counter, then disappeared with a pair of Ledell Titcomb’s shoes.42  It 
did not take the Giants long to find a replacement, however.  By September, they turned to Dow 
Appleton, “the freshest kid on earth,” after Boston inexplicably parted ways with him.  Appleton 
was “picked up by the Giants in Detroit and is now a full-fledged attaché of the Polo Grounds.”43 
In 1886, the Detroit Wolverines had had an African American batboy, Billy Malone, but 
he left the team to join one in Pittsburgh composed of black players as a player himself.44  By the 
next year, Malone’s skill on the diamond had earned national recognition because of his work 
with the New York Cuban Giants, with one Detroit sportswriter relating, “Billy Malone, 
Detroit’s fine colored ball player, who has just ended a successful season with the Cuban Giants, 
has returned to Detroit.  Malone used to be the mascot of the Wolverines.”45  Nor was Malone 
the only former mascot to graduate to semi-stardom with the Cuban Giants.  In 1888, a man 
named Seldon joined him on the team.  Seldon used to live and mascot in Boston, and “people 
who patronized the Boston games at the South End several seasons ago will remember a bright-
faced colored boy who was called Boston’s mascot, and whose special duty it was to carry the 
bats to and from the batsman’s position, a task that he performed faithfully.”  By 1888, however, 
“instead of carrying bats, or posing as a mascot, he has developed into a skillful professional 
pitcher, and he twirls the sphere for the famous colored team known as the Cuban Giants.”46 
Sometimes a team felt compelled to “keep up with the Joneses” and secure a charm of 
their own to counteract the good luck bestowed by an opponent’s mascot.  In June of 1886, the 
Chicago White Stockings and the Detroit Wolverines were engaged in a heated race for the 
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National League pennant.  Excitement in the City of the Straits ran so high that 10,000 cranks 
arrived at Detroit’s Recreation Park for the game, necessitating a rope fence in the outfield to 
accommodate the extra spectators.  This huge turnout overloaded the Woodward Avenue and 
Brush Street streetcar lines and, in the process, the extra seating shortened the fences so 
drastically that any ball flying or rolling into the crowd counted as a ground-rule double, thus 
eliminating any triples or home runs that day.  This was common in these days of non-enclosed 
ballparks with wooden grandstands.  As the White Stockings, complete with mascot Willie Hahn 
and a large broom emblazoned with the motto “Record Breakers,” emerged from their carriages 
to take the field, Detroit proudly countered with their own broom, declaring “Record Makers, the 
Big Four, and Fine Men,” and their counterweight to Hahn, “young Charlie Gallagher, a Sixth 
Ward boy, who was adorned with the uniform of the home team.  He is said to have been born 
with teeth, and is guaranteed to possess all the magic charms of a genuine mascot.”47 
As this last line indicates, sometimes baseball players considered physical abnormalities 
of one kind or another a source of luck.  When the Boston Beaneaters engaged in a titanic 
struggle with the New York Giants for National League pennant honors in 1889, they hoped they 
could finish strong down the stretch when a fan sent a package to one of their players.  When the 
man, Joe Quinn, opened the parcel, it was simply a well-used child’s shoe.  Slightly puzzled, 
Quinn then noticed the note attacked to the lucky shoe, which read, “This is a dead sure winner.  
Take it along, for the shoe was worn by a hunchback.”  After a quick council, the Beaneaters of 
course decided the shoe must accompany them to the ballpark.48 
Although these examples suggest that children or teenagers were the most common 
choice for mascots, this was not a requirement.  Besides the examples of Hugh Nicol in 
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Cincinnati and J.J. Smith in Kansas City, adults sometimes carried the requisite luck for mascot-
dom.  For example, the Cincinnati Reds, while much improved in 1887 over the prior year, did 
hit a streak of bad luck in August when they lost seven games out of ten early in the month.  
With even the likes of Hugh Nicol unable to reverse their misfortunes, owner Aaron Stern’s 
solution was to find a man who had never seen the Red Stockings lose a game.  Learning of this 
fact, an African American barber located Stearns and, unfortunately portrayed in the broken 
English with which many newspapers stereotyped African Americas in the 1880s, said to him, 
“Misa Stern, I never seed the Reds licked yet.”  Stern asked what the “knight of the razor” made 
in a day, discovered it was two dollars, and told the man he would pay him two dollars plus free 
admission to be the team’s good luck charm.  Cincinnati writer Ren Mulford, Jr., described the 
man’s career as mascot with a story that might be funny for what it tells us about player 
superstitions, if not for the fact the story is drenched in all the racist views of the time.   
Imagine a little coon as black as the ace of spades, who smokes all the cigarette stumps 
he can pick up, and carries a blacking kit ornamented with a chestnut bell, and you can 
imagine in your mind’s eye a picture of the Cincinnatis’ new mascot.  He turned up last 
Saturday, and was knocked off the score board by a foul ball.  After that incident the 
Reds made the only run of the game.  Yesterday, after eight innings had been played and 
nothing netted . . . ‘Little Nick’ took that mascot and smeared his face with whitewash.  
After the artistic finish he looked like a Fiji cannibal with his war paint on.  Then Nic 
rubbed that pickaninny’s woolly pate, while the crowd on the bleaching boards yelled 
with delight.  That broke the hoodoo.49 
 
Some mascots accompanied their team on the road, so that the nine would not be at a luck 
disadvantage when traveling.  Indianapolis engaged a man named Romeo Johnson as their 
mascot in 1887, and Johnson traveled with the club for an August and September road trip.  
Unfortunately, the team lost nearly all of the games (they were 13-50 on the road that season 
overall) and it was in the midst of an especially poor stretch of play, netting just two victories 
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between August 28 and September 18.  Many cranks in Indianapolis put the blame on Johnson, 
rather than the fact that the team was in its first season in the National League and had few 
quality players.  Highlighting the risks of being an unsuccessful mascot, when the club finally 
returned to Indianapolis in September, some were out for Johnson’s blood.  “Healey, Moffett and 
McGeachy and Romeo Johnson, the latter the club’s mascot, have reached home, coming from 
Pittsburg in squads and by different routes . . . Johnson to elude a mob organized to emphasize 
the popular feeling and preclude the possibility of his ever again serving in that capacity.”  The 
poor man was so frightened that he “did not appear upon the streets until this afternoon late, and 
then under the protection of a few unwavering friends.”  Johnson said, “He received no less than 
one hundred telegrams from Indianapolis people asking him in all the known dialects to come 
home and give the club a chance to win, some of them advising him to make way with himself.”  
He tried to shift the blame for all the losses sustained by the Hoosiers, claiming that the team was 
playing to its capabilities, and staying sober to boot, but it had just run up against a streak of bad 
luck where the other clubs performed just a little better than it had.50  Johnson stayed with 
Indianapolis after 1887, but wisely retired from mascoting.  Instead, he became the team’s 
official scorer.51 
Just as adults might serve as a team’s mascot, animals could as well.  In addition to the 
canine mascots described already, the New York Metropolitans had a donkey in 1887.  The Mets 
loved this creature so much that when it “wandered out on the Staten Island grounds . . . a 
policeman drove him away . . . Manager Caylor fell off the players’ bench in despair.”52  
Regarding Caylor and his strong belief in luck, “He believed good things followed when he saw 
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a wagonload of empty barrels passing outside the ball park and only bad things could happen if 
he saw a cross-eyed man or the number “6” entered in the scorebook.  To change his luck, he 
would wear his hat backward or move to a different seat on the bench or, if the situation was 
especially desperate, keep score on the back of a letter from his wife.”53 
Both New York-area teams that remained by 1889, the Giants and Brooklyn 
Bridegrooms, continued the mascot trend in their quest for their respective pennants, and both 
went with animals.  We have already learned that New York pitcher Ed Crane obtained a good 
luck monkey while in Sri Lanka, and the creature apparently did made it alive back to the United 
States.54  However, as April neared, Crane had not returned to the United States yet, and the team 
was unwilling to forego the help of a mascot.  Therefore, just to be on the safe side, “the Giants 
have a fighting chicken for their mascot, their old owl mascot having given up the ghost.”55   
The Giants had an exhibition series with Brooklyn scheduled for April of 1889, and 
Brooklyn had come up with a creature of their own.  While one Bridegroom stated, regarding the 
power of mascots, “we don’t believe anything like that,” he was unwilling to put his money 
where his mouth was, also adding, “but as other clubs have got them we might as well have 
them.”  Some on the team feared going mascot-less might have been the reason for their failure 
to overtake the St. Louis Browns for the pennant in 1888, so in 1889, they were taking no 
chances.  “The club laid very little stress on the mascot last year, but propose to have a full-
fledged luck-bringer this year.  The mascot is a little puny monkey which arrived at the park 
yesterday . . . comfortable quarters have been made for the mascot, and woe to the man who 
offends his Long-Tailed Majesty.  George Smith, the clever short stop, has been appointed lord 
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chamberlain to his monkeyship.”  When the author wrote about comfortable quarters, he meant 
it.  Not only would the monkey wear a Brooklyn uniform, “a handsome little chain is to be 
provided, too, until the animal becomes more docile.  He will be chained to the players’ bench 
during the progress of the games.  When he becomes accustomed to his surroundings he will 
probably be allowed to roam around the park at his own sweet will.”56   
The monkey did not last very long, although as it turned out, Brooklyn’s play improved 
without their luck-bringing primate.  The Bridegrooms let their mascot go due to its bad 
manners, and the monkey only confirmed the justice of their decision when it broke out of its 
new home and painted the town in June.  “A mascot monkey . . . startled the city a few days ago 
by breaking loose and tackling several saloons, in each of which he was royally welcomed, the 
result of which was that he got boiling drunk and was in the humor to smash things.  The monk 
is a confirmed ‘lush.’”57 
In rare cases, a mascot need not even be animate.  On their way south for an exhibition 
tour in February 1888, the Cincinnati Reds revealed their mascot from the prior season to 
sportswriter Ren Mulford, Jr.  It was a guitar.  As Kid Baldwin said, “on one of our trips last year 
John [first baseman John Reilly] took this and we did well.  Next time he took a banjo and we 
lost everything except our pants.  Say you can bet we left the banjo home and stuck to the guitar 
after that.  On that third trip we only lost three games out of fifteen, I believe.  I took charge of 
the guitar, for I’d carry a trunk if it would help us win!”58   
These types of objects might bring bad luck, as well, no matter how tenuous their 
connection to baseball.  The 1889 season was a roller coaster for Cleveland.  As high as second 
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place early in the season, battling with National League powerhouses New York and Boston, in 
July and August they hit a really bad stretch, winning but ten times in forty games.  Add to this 
the clear fact that an unusual number of their losses were by only one run, and it was obvious 
something unnatural must explain their continual defeats.  They decided the culprit must be an 
old toboggan run that operated on the grounds the preceding winter.  After all, a toboggan slide 
was one expression used in baseball to describe when a team slumped and was losing too many 
games, so an actual toboggan slide surely meant bad luck.  “This accounts for it.  The influence 
of the old toboggan is fatal.  The past record of the grounds is hoodooing the present occupants.  
Strange no one thought of this before.  Won’t some one please throw ashes on the slide or work 
some potent charm to break the spell?  A toboggan slide on a base ball grounds is a sure hoodoo 
in the fullest sense of the word.”59 
It was a rare and brave team that disdained mascots altogether.  Following their failure to 
edge Chicago in the 1886 pennant race, the Detroit Wolverines gave up the mascot game the 
following season.  It must have surprised many observers, therefore, when the team won the 
National League pennant and then triumphed in the World Series over the St. Louis Browns.  
Perhaps the Browns’ luck finally ran out without having Hugh Nicol around, but the Wolverines 
decision to eschew the luck of a mascot earned comment in the press.  “The Detroits never 
owned a mascot.  They do not believe in luck.  According to their theory nothing wins in 
baseball but condition, hard hitting and perfect fielding.  And they are right.”60 
 
* * * * * 
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 All these examples of mascots were supposed to bring good luck.  Whether they did is 
not as important as the fact that people believed that they did, and acted accordingly.  Was it 
possible, therefore, to bring bad luck on someone else?  To curse them, so to speak?  
Surprisingly, little evidence for this possibility seems to exist.  At least, sportswriters of the 
Gilded Age rarely mentioned any instances where a player or team deliberately sought to 
sabotage the efforts of another club by channeling occult powers.  The closest example was when 
Boston Beaneaters manager Jim Hart, at least supposedly, hatched a plan to hire a platoon of 
cross-eyed men to attend games at the New Polo Grounds in New York.  Hart’s club was in a 
close pennant race with the Giants in 1889, and he hoped to bring down bad luck on the Giants 
by hexing them in this fashion.  Giants manager Jim Mutrie got word of the scheme, however, 
and instructed his ballplayers to cross their fingers whenever possible in order to ward off the 
hoodoo.  “Mutrie has also been observed expectorating over his left shoulder of late, and thinks 
of purchasing several white horses and have them roam over the grounds whenever a game is not 
in progress.”61  This seems the only effort of its kind, however, if it was even a legitimate story.  
Players might play dirty or play rough, and attempt to injure or handicap their opponents in that 
manner.  They might also psychologically intimidate their foes through taunts and insults, but 
players typically kept their efforts to hurt the performance of others to a mundane level. 
 This is not to say, however, that people associated with 1880s baseball did not believe in 
bad luck, because they certainly did.  Among the most frequent examples of this was when 
certain teams had a knack for beating other teams regardless of the circumstances.  Especially if 
the successful team was a poor one, and the team they consistently defeated was nominally 
superior to them.  Another situation in which teams used bad luck to explain their failures was if 
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the team was losing games despite otherwise decent play.  If the club was hitting, pitching, and 
fielding respectably, but losing anyway, some would chalk up the losses to simple bad luck.  
(This is one thing that has not really changed between the 1880s and today.  In the 2010s, instead 
of bad luck, observers will say that a team lacked clutch hitting, but it is really the same thing.)  
The final instance in which teams could be unlucky was when it came to injuries.  If a club had 
an unusually large number of men out of action all at the same time, or if a particularly important 
player had to miss critical games while recuperating, this was another form of ill fortune. 
 The blanket term used to describe bad luck was to call a team or a player a “Jonah.”  One 
team might be a Jonah to another, or a batter who performed especially well against a certain 
pitcher was that pitcher’s Jonah.  For instance, early in the 1889 season, the powerful Brooklyn 
Bridegrooms struggled in a few games against the American Association’s newest member, the 
Columbus Solons.  Columbus captain Dave Orr explained the situation by stating, “Well, we’re 
they’re Jonah—their hoodoos.”62  Likewise, a pitcher who consistently defeated one opponent 
was a Jonah for that opponent, as Pittsburgh’s Ed Morris was to the New York Giants in 1888.  
“Morris, who this year was a veritable ‘Jonah’ to Mutrie’s pets, uses a slow drop ball every time 
he faces them.”63  Fortunately for the jinxed team, however, an opponent could lose their Jonah 
status.  In 1888, the Pittsburgh Alleghenys had good luck against both Chicago and Indianapolis, 
earning the Jonah label.  By the next season, however, “Pittsburg is a Jonah no more.  It has 
fallen.  Last year they were hoodoos to Chicago, Indianapolis, and John Clarkson, and this year 
they no longer wear the proud title.”64 
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* * * * * 
 
 Whether the luck they brought was good or bad, mascots were an important part of 
Gilded Age baseball.  Almost every team tried one at some point, and certain teams like the New 
York Giants always had at least one, and sometimes more than one, at any given time.  Because 
mascots were such a constant presence in baseball, we can generalize a bit about their meaning 
and importance.  In some respects, they were just nods in the direction of superstition, and 
essentially harmless.  Whether or not Doc Bushong sported a mustache, or the Cincinnati Reds 
traveled with a guitar or a banjo, is not particularly important in the larger scheme of things.  The 
treatment of African Americans or handicapped people as mascots, however, is rather more 
important.  This treatment was just one facet of the prejudice or stigma attached to these groups 
in Gilded Age America.  The reason they possessed “lucky” characteristics was that they were 
outsiders to what most people considered normal.  This status as an outsider is what gave people 
in these groups their supposed powers to influence events on the field.  With the exception of the 
player-mascots like Hugh Nicol, it was rare that people considered “normal” could earn mascot 
status. 
 This serves to remind us that even in baseball, the prejudices of US society were never 
too far from the surface.  In addition to barring black people from playing in major league 
baseball to begin with, teams and players also demeaned black people at times by relegating 
them to the status of mascots, somewhat like jesters entertaining courtiers during the Middle 
Ages.  Then, they would cast aside these mascots should their luck happen to run out at the 
wrong time.  The same was true, as we have seen, for people like Rudy Hahn with unusual 
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physical characteristics.  They too stood out because of their appearance, and rather than show 
compassion for such people, baseball teams employed them to add public entertainment instead. 
 There was also the callous way in which baseball teams and players treated animals.  
Whether it was killing sharks just to see what they looked like, or bringing monkeys to the 
ballpark until the players got tired of them, this type of treatment of animals was also 
characteristic of the age.  The second half of the nineteenth century saw a tremendous increase in 
the rate at which animal species went extinct, or nearly extinct, as Americans either killed them 
or destroyed their habitat in the name of industrial progress.  Whether it meant killing bison to 
use their hides for leather, slaughtering birds up and down the East Coast to put them on 
women’s hats, or poisoning wolves and prairie dogs so they would not interfere with cattle 
ranching, this era witnessed a sharp decline in the number of animal species present in the United 
States.  Baseball players were not immune from the tendency to see animals as simply critters or 
varmints that existed for the benefit of humans, rather than unique creations that at least deserved 
the right to exist.  Granted, they were a little too busy playing baseball to do too much damage to 
animal populations personally, but their behavior reflected the values of American society in this 
regard.   
 This tendency to see animals as profit or as existing for the sake of human convenience 
was also, if we reflect on it a moment, little different from how the owners of baseball teams saw 
their players.  Owners did not kill players who lost their skill, of course, but did discard them 
when they no longer deemed the players’ services necessary.  Most owners did see players as 
mere instruments to boost profits, just as industrialists viewed bison or ranchers viewed cattle.  
The fate of the individual player mattered as little as the fate of individual animals; their 





The Winter of 1887-1888 
 
  
 As winter followed Detroit’s championship over St. Louis in the Fall Classic of 1887, 
some new developments took hold that increased the financial strain under which major league 
baseball teams claimed to operate.  The attempt at a salary limit was dead.  The players, 
influenced by their perceptions of how much money their teams had made during the just-
concluded season, continued pressing for greater pay.   
 While this is true, generally speaking, there are specific reasons why things were more 
complicated.  One was that all major league teams, in their efforts to find new players, found 
themselves paying larger and larger sums to acquire those new players.  This meant that not only 
were total costs rising, but the wealthier teams could better afford to pursue new blood, adding to 
their overall talent advantage.  In turn, this caused their holdover players to ask for more money.  
When a team paid $2,000 or $3,000 to acquire a new, untried player, veterans took note.  Those 
veterans believed they should be able to command at least that much money, if not more.    
 When this happened, some franchises found themselves in a tough spot.  If costs rose too 
much, they approached a limit beyond which a team such as Louisville could not go in its efforts 
to field a competitive team.  So the smaller market teams said in public, at least.  The players, as 
a body, were not convinced of this, and their disagreement raises an interesting point about 
whether the interests of the players really were identical to the interests of the owners on salary 
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questions.  From the perspective of ownership, reasonable profits were necessary in order to 
make sure that franchises stayed in the league from one season to the next, and that major league 
baseball, as an institution, gained stability and permanent status as a paying investment.   
The players did not have the same concerns.  Given the finite length of their playing 
careers, financially speaking their goal was to get as much money as possible for their services 
while those services remained marketable.  Just as the employee of a business is not concerned 
what becomes of his or her employer once he or she receives a final paycheck, baseball players 
with no financial interest in their team had no great incentive to behave with the game’s long-
term stability in mind.  As a result, the salary disputes and roster moves of this winter reveal no 
organized opposition to a particular action on management’s part, but simply a rational decision 
made by major league players to do what was in their collective financial interests. 
 Using the term winter to describe the off-season maneuverings in Gilded Age baseball is 
a little misleading, because in the 1880s the competition for new players to fortify rosters 
generally began in October.  Preparatory to the 1888 season, the rules allowed teams to sign new 
players starting October 20.  Rumors, however, did not have to wait until October 20.  Late in the 
1887 campaign, talk circulated that the Pittsburgh Alleghenys offered the Chicago White 
Stockings $10,000 (after the Kelly deal the previous year, it seems that anything sensational 
enough to compare to that had to have a rumored value of $10,000, and again, according to the 
rumor mill, the club later raised its offer to $15,0001) for their captain and first baseman, Cap 
Anson.  Given that the big Iowan was Al Spalding’s right hand man, as well as a stockholder in 
the Chicago club, this seemed more fanciful than hopeful on Pittsburgh’s part.  Perhaps 
Pittsburgh figured it never hurt to ask. 
                                                 
1 “Pittsburgh Club News” NA, The Sporting Life, October 26, 1887, 1. 
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 That did not mean, however, that other key White Stocking players were untouchable.  
Boston, hoping to repeat what the purchase of Mike Kelly did for its bottom line in 1887, was in 
the market for a new pitcher to team with the still formidable Charles Radbourn and up-and-
coming young left-hander Kid Madden in the pitcher’s box for 1888.  There was no finer pitcher 
in the game than Chicago’s John Clarkson, and the Triumvirs cast their covetous gaze westward 
once again as the 1887 season reached its final days.2  They hoped to move quickly, perhaps 
because word reached them that the Cincinnati Red Stockings were also after the great pitcher.  
Rumor had it Cincinnati was willing to pay the White Stockings $7,000 for Clarkson’s release.3  
Sadly for the Red Stockings, Clarkson poured cold water on their hopes late in the month when 
he declared his intent to play for an Eastern team in 1888.  He was born in Cambridge, 
Massachusetts, and said he wanted to make his home near relations in the East and help his 
father in business, although, seeing that players had trotted out the “going into business” line so 
frequently as to make it cliché, no one much believed that part by now.4  Clarkson left no doubt, 
however, that he would play somewhere else in the coming year.  “Yes, I am on the market, but 
don’t know where I shall bring up.  I am anxious to get away from Chicago.”5   
 Meanwhile Clarkson’s employer, Al Spalding, seemed to be signing every promising 
minor league player in sight, perhaps preparing for a major move by the Brotherhood, or for the 
loss of some of his old standbys, or both.  The story of how he signed pitcher Gus Krock, from 
Oshkosh of the Northwestern League, illustrates how competitive the winter hunt for new blood 
could be.  One day in early November, Spalding was in his office talking with the Detroit 
                                                 
2 “Clarkson And Chicago” NA, The Sporting News, October 1, 1887, 4. 
3 “A Hunt For Playes” NA, The Sporting News, October 22, 1887, 4. 
4 “The Latest From Clarkson” NA, The Sporting Life, October 26, 1887, 1; “Diamond Dust” NA, 
St. Louis Daily Globe-Democrat, October 28, 1887, 8. 
5 “Delighted Detroit” MAT, The Sporting Life, October 26, 1887, 5. 
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Wolverines’ manager, W.H. Watkins, about the signing of players.  The word was out that 
Watkins was also after Krock, and that he had dispatched an agent to Milwaukee to search the 
town “with a fine tooth comb” in order to find Krock and sign him to an agreement.  As the two 
men sat talking, Krock just happened to poke his head into Spalding’s office in the hope of 
negotiating a White Stockings contract for 1888.  Luckily for Spalding, Watkins was facing 
away from the door, so Spalding excused himself and immediately hustled the young pitcher 
down the hall and away from his office.  Threatening Krock with death (figuratively, we hope) if 
he were to say anything, Spalding led him through the mail room, hid him in a corner, piled 
shipping boxes and a bicycle on top of the bewildered player, and warned him not to move a 
muscle until Spalding returned.  A short time later Spalding did, and inked Krock to a pact on the 
spot.  This goes to show the level of exertion clubs would go to in order to acquire a prospect of 
Krock’s magnitude, as baseball observers described Krock as “a giant in size, with fearful speed 
in delivery and really excellent command of the ball.  Although big, his is said to be even more 
active than Anson and to be a steady and reliable batsman.”6 
For the rest of 1887, vague rumors circulated on occasion that Clarkson would go 
elsewhere for 1888, and while Spalding did his best to squelch the rumors, they never quite died 
altogether.  In January of 1888, Detroit’s ex-president Fred Stearns cranked the rumor mill back 
into motion, stating, “Clarkson may go to Boston this year.  I know that Spalding will release 
him . . . Clarkson is not the valuable man he used to be, and Spalding will sell him if any club 
will offer what he is worth, or rather what Spalding thinks he is worth.”7  Later, Clarkson himself 
became more particular, stating it was Boston or the business world for 1888.  He claimed to 
have no beef with Chicago, and no ill will towards Al Spalding or Cap Anson, merely that he 
                                                 
6 “Chicago News” Harry Palmer, The Sporting Life, November 16, 1887, 4. 
7 “Stearns on Clarkson” NA, The Sporting News, January 7, 1887, 1. 
 536
disliked moving from his home to Chicago for half of every year, away from family and friends.8  
He also added some complexity to the situation by saying, “he is the sole owner of his skills as a 
ball player, and if any pecuniary consideration is necessary to obtain Chicago’s consent to the 
release, he should come in for his share of the money so paid.  He believes that the full sum 
given should come to him, but is willing to allow the club from which he is released 50 per cent 
of the ‘purchase’ money.”9  There was another rumor concerning Clarkson making the rounds at 
this time, claiming he had secured the services of a fellow Massachusetts resident, former Civil 
War general, Congressman, supporter of the freedmen, and current lawyer Benjamin F. Butler, to 
aid him in his attempt to escape from Spalding’s clutches, but this appeared to be unfounded.10 
 As they sensed the possibilities of a deal once again in February, the Triumvirs poured on 
the charm in their efforts to woo Clarkson.  After a meeting with Boston management, Clarkson 
said, “my dealings with the Boston management have been anything but unpleasant.  I am 
prepared to defend them from the aspersions which are constantly being hurled at them by 
newspaper writers who never saw either one of the gentlemen.”11  Interestingly, Spalding 
continued to downplay the entire situation to such an extent that one wonders if he really 
believed any of it.  He said, in answer to a letter from Clarkson, “of course the inference was that 
he wanted to play in Boston, but he has never said the Boston people wanted him, nor have they 
ever said to me that they would engage him if his release could be obtained.”12  As late as March 
he appeared unconvinced that Clarkson was in earnest, or at least he let the public believe he was 
                                                 
8 “Hub Happenings” Mugwump, The Sporting Life, January 18, 1888, 2. 
9 “The Great Pitchers” TIM, The Sporting News, February 4, 1888, 1.  TIM was Boston 
sportswriter Tim Murnane. 
10 “Washington Whispers” Bob Larner, The Sporting Life, February 8, 1888, 3.  The freedmen 
were the slaves emancipated during (via the Emancipation Proclamation) and after the Civil War 
(by the Thirteenth Amendment). 
11 “The Boston Players” TIM, The Sporting News, February 4, 1888, 1. 
12 “President Spalding” NA, The Sporting News, February 4, 1888, 4. 
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unconvinced.  As Clarkson put it, “Mr. Spalding seemed to think it was a huge joke when I asked 
him to name a price for my release, as I was ready to pay a good sum for it.  He thought I was 
joking, but I wasn’t, and I shall not weaken, either.”13 
 The intermittent three-way negotiations between Clarkson, Spalding, and the Boston 
management reached their final stages starting with the National League’s spring meeting in 
New York City.  Clarkson attended the meeting and, in a talk with Spalding, refused to budge, 
telling him, “It’s no use talking, Mr. Spalding, I won’t play in Chicago next season under any 
conditions.”  The Chicago magnate countered by stating, “John, I can’t let you go.  You know 
how the Chicago people felt when I let so many strong players go last summer.  They won’t 
stand another transaction of that sort, especially when it comes to parting with you, who are a 
great favorite in the city.”  Unmoved, Clarkson answered, “Mr. Spalding, it’s not a matter of 
salary with me at all, and you can not name any price that would be an inducement for me to 
play in Chicago next season, not even if it were largely in excess of the one I now receive.”14  
This may have finally gotten Spalding’s attention.  When Boston writer William Sullivan asked 
him what he planned to do with Clarkson, the purveyor of sporting goods told Sullivan, “I hate to 
let John go.  I shall have to go back to Chicago and think it over.  I think John is perfectly honest 
in all he says.  But I don’t see how I can let him go.  Yes; I know they need him in Boston, but so 
do I need him in Chicago.  John is a great pitcher and I know it as well as anybody.  If I let him 
go there will be a howl in Chicago.”15 
 Spalding eventually opened up negotiations with Soden all the same, hoping to salvage 
something and avoid total defeat.  “Soden came to me and asked me if I would release John, but 
                                                 
13 “Hub Happenings” Mugwump, The Sporting Life, March 14, 1888, 2. 
14 “A Stormy Meeting” NA, The Sporting News, March 10, 1888, 5. 
15 “Hub Happenings” Mugwump, The Sporting Life, March 14, 1888, 2. 
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the amount of release money he offered was so far below anything I would consider that I closed 
the interview in short order.”16  Spalding made another move for Clarkson.  “I told him I would 
pay him a salary which would satisfy him.  He replied that it was not a question of salary.  I then 
said I would much prefer to have him return at a higher salary than to receive $10,000 for his 
release.”  With Clarkson refusing to budge and Boston trying to lowball him, Spalding let out 
that he was also entertaining offers from other clubs for the ace right-hander.17  One report had it 
that, instead of a straight sale to Boston, that Chicago would receive Charlie Radbourn and some 
cash in exchange.  Another had Clarkson going to Philadelphia for the best pitcher the Quakers 
had to offer, Charlie Ferguson, in return.18 
 The agony of both the cranks and team officials in Boston of whether they would get 
their man continued into the very last days of March, but finally, the Triumvirs got their prize.  
Always the master of spin, all that Spalding could say was, “we had the championship before 
Clarkson pitched for us, and we can win it again without him.  I don’t know anything about what 
he intends to do, and I don’t care.  We have five good pitchers in Van Haltren, Krock, Sprague, 
Brynan, Clark, and Baldwin, and that’s enough.”  Spalding was upset enough that the reporter 
taking his statement did not even bother to mention that Spalding had just listed six pitchers 
rather than five.  Thus, the peerless right-handed pitched for the Beaneaters in 1888.  Soden and 
his fellow Triumvirs certainly worked Clarkson enough to get their money’s worth on the field, 
even if he did cost them $10,000 in purchase money and another $4,000 in salary for 1888.  
Clarkson went on to start 54 games that year (in a 140-game schedule) and 72 in 1889, more than 
                                                 
16 “Chicago Chat” Harry Palmer, The Sporting Life, March 14, 1888, 4. 
17 “Is Clarkson Going To Sign” NA, The Sporting News, March 17, 1888, 1. 
18 “The White Stockings” Eli, The Sporting News, March 17, 1888, 1. 
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half of Boston’s contests.19  When Clarkson finally inscribed his name on a Boston contract for 
1888, fans in the Hub were ecstatic.  “At the hotels, theatres, and clubs the topic of conversation 
among admirers of the National game was the lucky stroke of the Boston management. . . . 
Nothing since the signing of Mike Kelly has created such a sensation in base-ball circles in this 
city.”20  Soden, Billings, and Conant must have been ecstatic as well, envisioning both more 
wins on the field and more coins ringing in the cash box. 
 
* * * * * 
 
 Charles Byrne, president of the Brooklyn Grays (soon renamed the Bridegrooms when 
several of the team’s players married over the winter), had bigger plans than merely acquiring 
one single player.  In the first week of October, he completed negotiations to buy the entire New 
York Metropolitans organization, franchise, players, and all, from Staten Island entrepreneur 
Erastus Wiman.  Wiman had purchased the New York franchise from John Day’s Metropolitan 
Entertainment Company and then relocated its home grounds to the St. George Cricket Grounds 
on Staten Island for 1887, hoping that he could increase his profits by transporting fans to the 
games by ferries that he owned, and then selling the fans tickets.  The plan never panned out, 
however, as the location and difficulty of getting to the grounds turned off many potential fans, 
and the poor record of the Metropolitans (44-89, seventh in the American Association) did, too.  
Byrne, then, simply bought everything, added the players from New York’s team that he wanted 
                                                 
19 “Clarkson And Chicago” NA, The Sporting Life, April 4, 1888, 1; “Settled At Last” 
Mugwump, The Sporting Life, April 11, 1888, 1. 
20 “Base-Ball Notes” NA, Chicago Daily Tribune, April 8, 1888, 2. 
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to his reserve list, and began trying to sell the releases of the rest.  Acting as trustee for a 
syndicate of buyers, he paid $25,000 to Wiman and his associates.21   
It was an expensive, but effective, way for Byrne to improve his club.  After going 60-74 
in 1887 and finishing in sixth place, the team improved to 88-52 in 1888 and took second place 
in the American Association.  The reader need not worry over Wiman’s financial situation, 
however.  Despite the monetary losses he suffered on his baseball team, Wiman’s connections 
with the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad provided him with cash considerations for the next ninety-
nine years.  He also saw some returns for all people using the Staten Island ferry during the prior 
two years.  This is why he located operations there in the first place, and allowed him to recoup 
his baseball losses and come out more or less even in the end.22 
 This left the American Association with a big problem.  Not only had it just lost its team 
in the nation’s largest city and biggest market; it now had just seven teams, and the league 
required an even number to play its schedule for 1888.  That winter, the Association scoured the 
American landscape for an eighth entry.  Would another team emerge in New York?  That would 
be best, but no one seemed ready to step forward in Gotham and buy the franchise back from 
Byrne.  The spotlight then shifted to other cities in New York State and nearby areas, with 
Buffalo, Rochester, and Newark entering the discussion.  Did these cities have enough 
population, and therefore enough potential patrons, to support a major league club, given that 
salaries and expenses seemed to rise significantly each year?  The general conclusion was that 
they did not.23   
                                                 
21 “C.H. Byrne Buys the Mets’ Franchise” NA, Chicago Daily Tribune, October 9, 1887, 13. 
22 “A Big Surprise” NA, The Sporting Life, October 12, 1887, 1. 
23 This is somewhat surprising given that Buffalo stood eleventh in country in population 
according to the 1890 census, at 255,664 people, while Newark was seventeenth at 181,830.  
Either of these cities had a greater population than three other locations that currently or had 
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There was also the possibility of bringing Kansas City back to major league status, as 
fans there had supported their nine in decent fashion during the Cowboy City’s short-lived 
experience in the National League in 1886, but this possibility presented a geographic problem.  
Replacing New York with Kansas City would give the Association five teams in the West 
against three in the East, necessitating a western team, probably Cleveland, be grouped with the 
eastern teams for traveling purposes, which would increase expenses for the Forest City club to 
unacceptable levels.  The same held true with the Association’s other preferred western choice, 
Milwaukee.  The American Association spent the better part of the 1887-1888 off-season trying 
to solve this conundrum.   
Eventually, Kansas City gained the vacant membership spot.  It had both advantages and 
disadvantages.  The local population was in the neighborhood of 225,000 people, and according 
to Louisville owner Zach Phelps, the team drew great crowds for weekend games especially.  
“Every Saturday they have a half holiday and everybody turns out.  It is a splendid Saturday and 
Sunday town and the people are very fond of base ball.  The club they had there last year cleared 
$5,000 [playing in the minor league Western League] and of course they expect to do much 
better this year.”  Cowboys management also promised to help other Association members offset 
their travel costs out onto the Great Plains by covering traveling expenses west of St. Louis.  In 
return, the other Association moguls guaranteed Kansas City that if the owners decided against 
Kansas City’s membership at the end of the season, the Association would buy back all the 
team’s players in order to provide the Cowboys some financial security.24   
                                                                                                                                                             
recently enjoyed major league status, those being Kansas City, Louisville, and Indianapolis.  It 
seems that baseball observers remembered that when Buffalo last had a major league team, in 
1885, the club had not drawn well. 
24 “Louisville Laconics” JA, The Sporting Life, February 1, 1888, 4. 
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There were further complications, however, as Kansas City was also the home of a 
Western League Kansas City franchise, owned by Ed Menges, who did not propose to go quietly 
while the Association stormed his ramparts.  After getting the boot by the National League after 
the 1886 season, Menges headed up a group to put a Kansas City team in the Western League, 
and the team had done fine against the likes of Denver and Omaha.  Menges believed he would 
outdraw the Association Cowboys and make the Association regret challenging him, partly due 
to the Association’s decision to charge fifty cents for tickets in the upcoming season.  “You’ll 
find, though, that my Western Association club will win more games and have a much better 
attendance.  You know as well as I do that this is a twenty-five-cent admission town, and if my 
men play ball as is expected, the American Association club will be sick of their bargain ere 
three months have elapsed.”25   
Not only did Menges bank on having a more attractive and contending team, he had the 
advantage of location for his grounds.  “I’ll have the finest grounds in the country, which can be 
reached from the heart of the city by two cables and are only a three-block walk from another 
horse car and cable line.  I tell you quick transportation, fine grounds and a winning team will 
catch base ball lovers in the this city, and I am laying my wires accordingly.”  Menges believed 
this would outweigh the Association’s clear advantage of big name, nationally known talent and 
allow him to prosper despite the fierce competition for patronage.26  When the case finally made 
its way to baseball’s Board of Arbitration, the Board did not know what to make of the mess, and 
finally recommended that the two clubs fight out their battle in the legal system.27  This pending 
legal battle did not stop the two teams, however, from arranging a spring exhibition series with 
                                                 
25 “The Association Baby” LJK, The Sporting Life, February 8, 1888, 2. 
26 Ibid. 
27 “The League Meeting” NA, The Sporting News, March 10, 1888, 5. 
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each other in hopes of raking in some extra dough.  Given the high profile of the dispute between 
the rival organizations, “liberal patronage is expected” and both teams were so confident of 
victory that they decided the winner of the series would pocket all the gate receipts.28 
It appeared that the two teams might never play any exhibition games, however.  The 
American Association, invoking the clause in the National Agreement guaranteeing that no club 
could operate within five miles of a major league team, tried to prevent the Western Association 
team from playing ball at all.  This move, while expected, was not exactly fair to Menges and his 
organization, considering that they had already played in Kansas City for a full year, and if the 
Association were successful in its legal case, they would have to disband their team or move it 
elsewhere.  Menges and associates felt, therefore, that they had a good chance in court, based on 
the claim that this deprived them of their property.  Realizing how much money was on the line, 
however, the two clubs eventually played a series of five exhibition games.  They decided there 
was no need to miss the extra boodle while the courts took up the case.29 
It was also in the winter of 1887-88 that the marvelous team assembled by Detroit in 
1887 began breaking up.  The calendars had hardly turned to November before the team decided 
to release highly regarded second baseman Fred Dunlap to the Pittsburgh Alleghenys for $5,500.  
Reports differed on whether Detroit was looking to reduce its payroll or if there might be a bit of 
bad blood between Dunlap and other Wolverines (denied by the second baseman), but Detroit 
president Fred Stearns told the press that if he sold Dunlap, he would do so to a weaker team to 
equalize the league’s playing strength and not allow his chief rivals to upgrade their talent at his 
expense.30  It appears that the Wolverines did consider Dunlap a bit of a malcontent, regarding 
                                                 
28 “The Rival Cowboys” Klein, The Sporting Life, March 14, 1888, 1. 
29 “The Rival Cowboy Teams Play Together” NA, The Sporting Life, April 18, 1888, 1. 
30 “Another Big Deal” MAT, The Sporting Life, November 9, 1887, 1. 
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him as “a disturbing element . . . a born agitator, and very keen” who also “showed too grasping 
a spirit,” leading one Detroit sportswriter to claim that while “I regard Dunny as a marvelous ball 
player and found him an agreeable fellow,” in the eyes of Detroit management “he is not accused 
of any specific serious offense, but was simply not regarded as a desirable man for any club.”31 
Dunlap did his best to block the deal, however, claiming that if he were to go to 
Pittsburgh, he wanted half of the sale price or else he would not go willingly to the Smoky 
City.32  Stearns’ response was a canny one.  He decided to release Dunlap outright, after getting 
agreement from all other teams in the National League not to negotiate with him, so that only 
Pittsburgh could sign the second baseman.  It seems Stearns determined that if Dunlap wanted 
half the price paid for his release, Stearns must find a way to deny his request, obviously fearing 
that future players would emulate the Sure Shot and demand a share of the boodle for 
themselves.  “I believe in treating players generously, but when they attempt to gouge us, why 
they won’t make much by it.  Dunlap won’t get half of the release money, because none will be 
paid.”33 
Despite this setback, Dunlap had not exhausted his maneuvers.  He went to Pittsburgh 
and met with team president Nimick to inform Nimick of his decision to play ball in the Smoky 
City in 1888.  Nimick, delighted at the news, asked what salary Dunlap requested.  The 
Allegheny executive surely knew the Sure Shot would not come cheap, given that he had 
garnered $4,500 with Detroit the previous year.  At least according to some accounts, Nimick 
was floored, literally, when Dunlap said, “I have decided to play with Pittsburg next season, 
                                                 
31 “Detroit Dotlets” MAT, The Sporting Life, February 8, 1888, 4. 
32 “Dunlap and Stearns” NA, The Sporting News, November 26, 1887, 1. 
33 “Dunlap to Be Released” NA, Chicago Daily Tribune, December 20, 1887, 3. 
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provided I get $7,000 for doing so.”34  (Sadly, Nimick’s wife had the same experience when an 
explosion of illuminating gas at her home almost killed her the same week.35)  Dunlap also had 
an ace in the hole to evade Stearns’ simple release strategy.  His contract with the Wolverines 
was a personal services contract, so should Pittsburgh not accommodate his desires, he planned 
to insist that Detroit honor the second year of his two-year personal contract with the club.36  The 
second baseman also continued his propaganda offensive in the press.  When asked about his 
reputation as a troublemaker, he stated, “some people say I am a disorganizer.  That is a lie.  I 
will leave it to any player in the Detroit team if I ever had an angry word with any of them.”37  In 
the end, Dunlap got the best of things.  He went to Pittsburgh for the 1888 season, with a contract 
said to cover two years and pay $5,000 annually, and got $2,000 of the money paid for his 
release as well.38  Nimick, however, disputed these figures, saying the salary was “less than a 
great many think.”  Pittsburgh’s correspondent for The Sporting Life, while given the opportunity 
to see the contract personally, declined to reveal the exact figures.39 
That was not the end of the drama for Pittsburgh.  Of their existing team left from 1887, 
all but two declared their intent to hold out for better pay before signing contracts for 1888.  
Pitcher Jim “Pud” Galvin was unafraid of voicing his grievances over the club’s treatment of him 
in the past.  Galvin was one of the true stalwart pitchers of baseball’s early years.  He had 
pitched at least 370 innings every season going back to his first full campaign in 1879, going as 
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high as 656 for Buffalo in 1883, and given his durability and dependability, he felt sore at 
Pittsburgh’s management for their treatment of him the previous two seasons.  He said to team 
secretary Al Scandrett, “I ain’t going to say what I want until I am ready to sign, and I may not 
be ready to talk business until April 1.  You had me in a hole for two years and want to get me 
again, and I have not decided whether I will play ball or not.”  The reference to being in the hole 
referred to an incident where the team denied him pay in 1885 for one of his rare arm injuries, 
causing Galvin to say “I will see them in hell before I sign for their price . . . they signed me in 
Buffalo for $3,500, and when my arm gave out cut me down to $2,000 in 1886.  Last year they 
gave me $100 of an increase.”40  (Scandrett was, apparently, quite good at his secretarial work.  
Besides his work for the Alleghenys, he also worked as a clerk in the Pittsburgh Sheriffs office 
for 1887 before transferring to the Pittsburgh Registers office granting marriage licenses early in 
1888.  Given the realities of the spoils system, which featured political favors as the main criteria 
for such offices in Gilded Age America, this caused The Sporting Life’s Pittsburgh correspondent 
to remark, “this is certainly a high compliment to his ability, as the positions are ‘plums’ for 
campaign work.  It is rare when efficiency is taken into consideration in cases of this kind.”41)   
Nimick had a plan to deal with Galvin.  The strategy was to sign Hardie Henderson, a 
pitcher many considered washed up despite being just twenty-four years old, due in no small part 
to his inconsistent sobriety, as the team’s third man for the pitcher’s box.  While Nimick 
blustered, somewhat dubiously, that Henderson was “a better pitcher than Jimmy Galvin,” the 
hope was that Galvin, seeing the team no longer needed him quite as much as it did before, 
would soften his demands when faced with the reality that Pittsburg had other options for its 
                                                 
40 “Pittsburg Pencilings” Circle, The Sporting Life, January 4, 1888, 3; “Affairs At Pittsburg” 
NA, The Sporting News, January 7, 1888, 1. 
41 “Pittsburg Pencilings” Circle, The Sporting Life, January 11, 1888, 2. 
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pitching staff.42  Perhaps the team really did hope to get some value out of Henderson, as well.  
He claimed to have avoided alcohol for several months running, and once Dunlap joined the 
team as its captain, he said, “if Hardie lives up to his good intentions, and I think he’ll do it, let 
me tell you he will fool some of the League’s heavy hitters.  He is capable of great work when he 
is in proper condition.”43  Dunlap then took it upon himself to train Henderson (Dunlap was a fan 
of racket sports and competitive walking) to help Henderson slim down from 220 pounds to a 
more effective playing weight for a man a full two inches shy of six feet in height.  “Dunlap says 
that if Hardie follows his course of training for a month he will be down to quarter-horse 
condition.”44  (They were all deceived, however.  Henderson’s actual work in the box consisted 
of 35 innings pitched in which he tied his career-worst totals for fewest strikeouts and most 
walks per nine innings.) 
Galvin signed before his self-imposed April 1 deadline.  Near the end of February, he 
worked things out with Pittsburg and signed for $3,000, somewhat closer to his Buffalo salary 
than what he had made during the last two years in the Smoky City.45  He offered the Alleghenys 
a choice of paying him $3,500 with no advance money up front, or $3,000 with $1,000 advanced 
before the season began, and the club chose to agree to his second proposition.46  He also pulled 
a neat trick on the team in order to get the management to up its salary offer.  He pretended to 
                                                 
42 Ibid. 
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take over the primary ownership of a saloon in which he had an interest, even going so far as to 
put his name on the sign at the front of his supposed grog shop.  This convinced Allegheny 
management that he probably could hold out until April 1, as he said he would, and believing 
that this reduced its leverage over the veteran pitcher, the team decided to accept one of his 
offers.47 
 
* * * * * 
 
The same week that the news concerning Dunlap began circulating, another potential 
blockbuster transaction went public.  Washington decided to part with their top offensive player 
from 1887, outfielder Paul Hines.  The deal was interesting in several respects.  For one, 
Washington was essentially Hines’ hometown, as he had been born nearby in Virginia (after his 
playing career he lived in Hyattsville, Maryland, and his family interred him in Washington, DC 
when he died) and he was able to play in front of his family on a regular basis in Washington.  
While most players considered this a good thing, Hines claimed that the hometown cranks 
expected so much from him that the pressure had become too great, and he believed he would 
play better in a different location.  While these sentiments might not mean much under normal 
circumstances, Hines also had a clause in the contract he had signed with Washington the 
previous year where the team promised not to reserve him for 1888 if he wanted to go 
somewhere else.  With this ace up his sleeve, he proclaimed his discontent with playing in the 
nation’s capital, and led people to believe he did not care where he played in 1888, so long as it 
was not in Washington.   
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Upon hearing this news, like wolves pouncing on wounded prey, several teams sprang 
into action, with Boston, Pittsburgh, New York, Indianapolis, and the Philadelphia Quakers all 
making offers to the Nationals.  In the end, Washington negotiated Hines’ release to 
Indianapolis, basing their logic on the same principles Detroit had—that if someone was going to 
strengthen their nine at Washington’s expense, it should be one of the weaker teams in the 
league.  In return, the Hoosiers compensated the Nationals with $5,000, but seemed perfectly 
satisfied they would get their money’s worth.  One stockholder told the sporting press, “when we 
get around next year with such stars like Glasscock, Denny, Hines, and our other fine players we 
will be one of the best drawing cards in the League.  If the percentage system is adopted we will 
get our $5,000 we paid for Hines back the first month.”48  Besides Hines’ obvious merits on the 
field, everyone knew that he “does not need watching at home or abroad, and he was never 
known to suffer from “Charlie-horse,” or any of the ailments which attack so many star players 
during a season,” making him all the more attractive to the Hoosiers.49 
Of course, it would not be an off-season in major league baseball without some drama 
emanating from Bob Caruthers.  As usual, he entered November regretting that the recently 
concluded season was his last.  This time, the plan was to join his brother selling hardware.  (His 
brother James did own a hardware store, at 186 Kinzie Street in Chicago.)  “Positively I will quit.  
I guess I have pitched my last ball.  I know people will think me to be working for a bigger 
salary but they will find out that they are in the wrong.”  He did leave the door open for a return 
to the diamond, just barely.  “If I should ever play ball again which is almost out of the question, 
I want it understood that it will not be in St. Louis.  Mr. Von der Ahe has not treated me as he 
should and for that reason I will shun him forever. . . . I will without a doubt settle down in 
                                                 
48 “From Washington” WUD, The Sporting Life, November 2, 1887, 1. 
49 “From The Capital” Bob Larner, The Sporting Life, December 28, 1887, 5. 
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business and once settled down will remain there.”  Chris Von der Ahe, perhaps savvy to the 
right-hander’s bluffs by now, was not impressed.  “I suppose he expects me to run after or to call 
on him but I don’t propose to do any thing of the kind.  If he wants to see me he can call at my 
office.”50 
It did not take long for the ruse to become transparent to all.  Within a week or so, 
Caruthers was negotiating with Brooklyn to play in the City of Churches in 1888.  The team 
offered $4,500 while Parisian Bob sought an even $5,000.  While he still claimed to have 
communications from his family telling him to make no deals for any reason, already he had let 
people know that “$5,000 for six months’ work is a good deal of money and he would like to 
sign a contract with any one for that salary.”51  Cincinnati also was in the hunt for Caruthers, 
however, especially when Caruthers’ mother sent him another letter stating that she would “sever 
the bonds of filial affection and love existing between them if he persisted in going to Brooklyn 
to play ball.”  Apparently, she believed that her twenty-three-year-old son might succumb to the 
vices and temptations of the big city, and so Cincinnati entered into the negotiations.  Mrs. 
Caruthers’ dislike of baseball does seem sincere, at least.  In an interview at her home, 530 La 
Salle Avenue in Chicago, she said, “I have never seen a game of base-ball, and will not go to see 
one as long as he is connected with the game. . . . During the last two weeks I have received 
telegrams from base-ball Presidents and their agents, but paid no attention to any of them.  I 
didn’t even answer them.”52  (His father James, a former State Attorney and judge in Tennessee, 
did approve of baseball, but had died the prior year.53)  Caruthers’ new tune was to claim, “I 
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can’t go to Brooklyn; that’s settled.  I’ll play in Cincinnati next year, or I’ll be behind a counter 
in Chicago selling hardware.”  Rumor had it that, in response, Cincinnati offered St. Louis 
$9,000 for Parisian Bob’s release, along with a $5,000 yearly salary.54 
By then, baseball observers knew that they should take nothing Caruthers said regarding 
money or contracts at face value.  The denouement came when he agreed to go to Brooklyn in 
mid-December.  His mother took a great deal of convincing, but eventually relented.  For 
Brooklyn, the price was steep.  The Bridegrooms paid $8,250 to St. Louis to secure Caruthers’ 
release, and then signed Caruthers to play for them at a salary north of what Mike Kelly received 
from Boston the previous year.  The parties did not reveal the precise terms to the press, but did 
confirm the sum was nearer to $6,000 than to $5,000.  Brooklyn owner Charles Byrne summed 
up the enormity of the transaction by stating, “we had started in to get Caruthers, and were 
forced to follow him up until we got him at an enormous cost.  Still, in my opinion, he is the best 
ball-player in the country and is worth more than any other.  We expect to get the benefit of the 
deal out of the increased price of admission, and the large crowds that a good team will attract, 
not only in Brooklyn, but everywhere we go.”55  As Mike Kelly’s deal with Boston the year 
before had proven, the seemingly astronomical sums of money paid to acquire premier talent 
could actually turn out to be bargains, and with his signing of Caruthers, Byrne was hoping to 
achieve the same coup that Soden and company had in Boston.  Indeed, to increase the hype, 
Byrne and others in Brooklyn’s organization constantly mentioned the fact that the Caruthers 
deal exceeded the value of the Kelly deal from 1887, in the hope of stirring interest and enticing 
cranks to Washington Park to see baseball’s highest salaried player in 1888.  (It was a great 
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winter all around for Parisian Bob, as he also married that March in Chicago, pledging his eternal 
devotion to “a prominent north side belle.”)56 
Perhaps the study of Caruthers and his salary-seeking antics deserves some analysis.  No 
doubt, the reader has realized that even with the reserve rule, dissatisfied players could still, on 
occasion, get away from teams they disliked.  Sometimes, it was simply a scheme to inveigle 
more money, while, at others, genuine grievances existed over how the player’s team treated 
him.  It would be easy, and to some extent justified, to cast a player like Caruthers into the first 
of these two groups without thinking twice.  Yet, given the presence of something like the 
reserve rule, it is difficult to see what other option a player had in his effort to try and get the 
salary his talents would be worth in an open market.  Given that owners tended to show hostility 
towards an idea such as multi-year contracts, perhaps fearing the effect that such job security 
would have on player motivation, there was little else a player could do than whine, complain, 
and, like the kid on the playground that we all hated growing up, threaten to take his ball and go 
home.  Therefore, while in retrospect it seems easy to lambaste a person like Caruthers for his 
manipulations and apparent lack of honor, we should keep in mind that he and other players had 
few other options.  The situation was clearly more complex than it seems at first glance. 
Things were not always straightforward for the teams, either.  It is true that, because of 
the reserve clause, they had no obligation to move a petulant player to another team.  They could 
simply reserve the man, work out a salary, and be done with it.  There were many risks in such a 
way of doing business, however.  For one, an unhappy player might not give premium effort on a 
daily basis.  As anyone who has played baseball knows, there are many ways to give less than 
full effort without obviously dogging it on the field.  Pitchers might experience unusual bouts of 
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wildness.  Infielders could accidentally make bad throws, while outfielders could get a late jump 
on a fly ball or lose the ball in the sun, and it was next to impossible to determine if these 
mistakes were genuine or planned.  Replacing such sulking players was not always an option, 
either, because clubs only carried fourteen or fifteen players (oftentimes, even fewer than this on 
road trips, to save on expenses) of which most were extra pitchers and catchers.  Most teams had 
one or maybe two substitute fielders, because carrying more would cost money they were 
unwilling to spend.  In addition to this, if a club acquired a reputation for stinginess, it risked that 
new players would be unwilling to sign with the club, and thus struggle to keep up its talent level 
as the years passed.  All of these factors meant that it was a delicate task, for both players and 
their teams, to negotiate salary from one year to the next. 
What is also interesting is that players such as Dunlap, Mullane, and Caruthers received 
frequent condemnation from the sporting press.  One, for instance, referred to Dunlap as a 
“bloated capitalist” after his maneuvers of December 1887.57  When a player worked the market 
for all it was worth and succeeded, this was somehow a bad thing, or reflected negatively on 
their character by implying greed, yet team owners who did the same (with the exception of the 
most crass and petty forms of exploitation, which did earn them the occasional media rebuke) in 
order to fatten their bottom lines only rarely received such censure.  Writers tended to refer to 
them as capitalists (without the bloat), conservative men of sound principles, sensible 
businessmen who wanted to put the game on a permanent basis, and the like.  A smart manager 
who succeeded at signing new players was a “hustler,” a term with largely positive connotations 
at the time, unlike today, but players rarely were.   
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Furthermore, condemning players for their role in pushing up salaries ignores the role 
that the club managers themselves played in the process.  Frequently, players agitated for their 
release, and justified their desire to leave, by claiming another club was willing to offer them a 
higher salary.  This was sometimes a bluff, but sometimes not.  It was not against baseball’s rules 
set forth in the National Agreement for a manager to make an offer to a player under contract to 
another club necessarily, but the practice did risk unduly aggravating their fellow team 
executives.  In their enthusiasm to procure top players, then, managers often tried to lure players 
from their current team but did so indirectly, employing a journalist or another well-placed 
individual as a go-between to communicate his desire to talented players.  Under such 
circumstances, it seems difficult to blame a player for wanting to go somewhere else if promised 
more money, especially considering that their baseball career had a finite length and they could 
only hope to earn money through playing ball for a relatively short number of years. 
 
* * * * * 
 
Without Bob Caruthers, Chris Von der Ahe conducted other business as he tried to retool 
his St. Louis Browns after their World Series defeat by Detroit.  To the great surprise of baseball 
observers, he decided to undertake a major retooling of his roster.  He sold his catcher, Doc 
Bushong, to Brooklyn for $4,500 and his centerfielder, Curt Welch, to the Philadelphia Athletics 
for two-thirds that price.  He also traded shortstop Bill Gleason to the Athletics, receiving catcher 
Jocko Milligan and reserve infielder Chippy McGarr in return.58  It was only the beginning of a 
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major makeover in St. Louis that winter, as Von der Ahe also sold pitcher Dave Foutz to 
Brooklyn, where he rejoined Caruthers. 
He gave his reasons in an interview.  Welch had to go on account of his drinking.  Not 
only did he imbibe too often; he had the unfortunate habit of convincing teammates to join him 
in after-hours frivolity.  Foutz, who rotated between pitcher and right field due to his exceptional 
skill at both positions, went to Brooklyn for $5,000.  Von der Ahe believed, based on Foutz’s 
lackluster performance in the World Series with Detroit, that Foutz had a sore arm and was done 
as a pitcher (and was essentially correct, for while Foutz continued to pitch on occasion 
afterwards, he appeared in the box just eighty times in his final seven seasons, after pitching in 
171 games his first four campaigns.  Foutz also saw his ratio of strikeouts to walks, which had 
been 1.93 to 1 between 1884 and 1886, fall to a very pedestrian 1.04 to 1 in 1887, a total only 
marginally above the average in major league baseball) and so was expendable, given that he had 
also signed several new players.  Shortstop Bill Gleason, though popular in the Mound City, 
brought two useful players in return, one of whom was a catcher, Milligan, giving him the 
chance to sell the popular Doc Bushong as well.  Von der Ahe felt that Bushong was a selfish 
and divisive player, especially after a quarrel with Arlie Latham.  At the time of the interview, he 
still hoped to keep Caruthers, although Caruthers also ended up in Brooklyn before all Von der 
Ahe completed his makeover.  Still, Von der Ahe believed his nine would be as strong as ever in 
1888, due to the new blood he had procured, and it nearly was, as the team’s record dropped only 
slightly, from 95-40 to 92-43, good enough for yet another American Association pennant.59   
That is not to say, however, that Von der Ahe was correct that the team’s new blood 
would be its salvation, or that he was a genius of player evaluation.  Despite the team’s 
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continued strong performance, the facts say otherwise.  These departed players, Welch and 
Caruthers especially, left a glaring hole in the St. Louis lineup.  Combined, they accumulated 
14.5 WAR in 1888, a very significant total.  The Browns made up for the losses not with their 
new players, as primary replacements Jack Boyle (catcher), Bill White (shortstop), Harry Lyons 
(center field), and Tommy McCarthy (right field) were, as a group, pedestrian at best.  Their 
combined WAR was a measly 2.2, mainly due to McCarthy’s 2.9 WAR performance, but by 
promoting two pitchers left over from the prior season, Silver King and Nat Hudson, to leading 
roles, the Browns persevered.  Foutz and Caruthers, as the team’s two leading pitchers, combined 
for 731 innings pitched and 8.6 WAR in 1887, but their replacements, King and Hudson, put in 
918 innings pitched in 1888 and combined for a mammoth 18.5 WAR, with King contributing an 
olympian 14.5 mark.   
To be fair, when making the decision to move his old players Von der Ahe expected he 
would have James “Bug” Holliday in his outfield, but the player ended up taking the field in Des 
Moines, Iowa, after a disputed contract situation in which Von der Ahe tried to ink Holliday to a 
pact a day before the rules allowed him to officially.  Von der Ahe claimed to possess a telegram 
from the outfielder legitimating the Browns’ side of the story, but upon further examination, the 
Arbitration Committee ruled in favor of Des Moines.60  When Holliday surfaced in the major 
leagues in Cincinnati the following season, he blasted 19 home runs and had an excellent OPS+ 
of 143.  The Browns would, without doubt, have posted a few more win in 1888 with Holliday in 
center field rather than Harry Lyons. 
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This did not necessarily mean that the Browns were simply sitting on a stockpile of great 
pitchers in 1887.  For the 1887 season, major league pitchers walked 3.0 batters per nine innings 
pitched, while striking out 2.9 batters per nine innings.  In 1888, those numbers were 2.2 for the 
walks and 3.8 for the strikeouts.  (A change in the rules, requiring only three strikes, rather than 
four, to strike out a batter, was the primary reason why walks decreased and strikeouts increased 
between the two seasons.)  In 1887, Bob Caruthers posted 1.6 walks per nine innings but a mere 
2.0 strikeouts per nine innings.  Foutz’s totals were 2.4 for the walks and 2.5 for the strikeouts.  
Recalling that the number of hits a pitcher allows is a function of how many batters he strikes out 
(more strikeouts by the pitcher equating to fewer hits for the batters) we would expect both men 
to allow more hits than the league average for 1887.  Yet this was not the case in St. Louis.  
Caruthers surrendered 8.9 hits per nine innings, Foutz 9.8, in a season where the league average 
was 9.9 hits allowed per nine innings.   
Now let us investigate the performance of their replacements.  Silver King’s 1888 
statistics show him with 1.2 walks and 4.0 strikeouts per nine innings.  Nat Hudson registered 1.6 
walks per nine innings against 3.5 strikeouts.  This resulted in King allowing a stingy 6.7 hits per 
nine innings pitched and Hudson 7.6 hits per nine innings pitched, in a season where the major 
league average was 8.4 hits allowed per nine innings.  Again, given the numbers, we would 
expect to see King yield a total number of hits very near the league average, and the same for 
Hudson, with King slightly better than average and Hudson slightly below.  This is not the case, 
as both were significantly better than average at denying hits.   
Only one conclusion explains these numbers.  The St. Louis Browns fielded a team with 
incredible defensive ability during these two seasons, in terms of depriving batters of hits.  
Combine this with the fact that all four men walked fewer hitters than an average pitcher, and the 
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combination was devastatingly effective.  The 1888 Browns, in particular, were amazing.  Taken 
as a whole, the team’s pitchers struck out 3.8 batters per nine innings, exactly the league average, 
yet Browns pitchers allowed just 7.0 hits per nine innings, or almost one and a half fewer hits per 
game than an average team.  Another statistical measure confirms this observation.  The recently 
devised statistic called Fielding Independent Pitching (FIP) attempts to determine what a 
pitcher’s earned run average would have been had he been backed by a league-average defense.  
The Browns’ pitching staff for 1888 had a collective FIP of 2.66 but an actual ERA of 2.09, 
meaning that the team’s defense was worth more than half an earned run in an average game.  
These numbers indicate that, over the course of a 140-game schedule, the team’s defense saved 
about 80 earned runs, which equates to about eight wins. 
What this also says is that the team’s pitchers deserve far less credit for their strong 
pitching performances than their earned run averages and won-lost records would indicate.  It is 
an exaggeration, for sure, but only a mild one, to say that the Browns could have used pitchers 
who underhanded the ball to the plate, softball style, and still had effective pitchers as long as 
they got the ball over the plate and avoided walks.  This also means, of course, that the huge 
money Brooklyn paid for Foutz and Caruthers over the winter of 1887-1888 was not a prudent 
investment of funds.  They overpaid, significantly, for the quality of player they acquired.  Many 
pitchers could have equaled the success of these men, given the sterling defense with which their 
teammates in St. Louis supported them.   
 
* * * * * 
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There was one other issue of importance in baseball during this winter, and it involved 
the gate distribution plan of the American Association.  As one might expect, whenever 
something controversial arose regarding the American Association, it involved St. Louis and its 
Boss President, Chris Von der Ahe.  In a reversal of what the National League had done the 
winter prior, Von der Ahe clamored for the Association to ditch its guarantee plan that gave all 
visitors a set share (sixty-five dollars) of the gate receipts for games and adopt a percentage plan 
instead.  Unlike in the National League which, other than Chicago, featured Eastern teams like 
New York and Philadelphia amongst the strongest and most influential franchises, in the 
Association, three of the four best teams in 1887, St. Louis, Louisville, and Cincinnati, were in 
the West.  The St. Louis Browns were the best of the bunch, and because their team was so 
strong on the field and at the gate, owner Von der Ahe’s desires carried a lot of weight in the 
Association.  (Recall that the ill-conceived changes to Section 33 of the Association’s 
constitution, to allow greater latitude in blacklisting players, which the entire Association wanted 
to repeal almost before the ink was dry on the document, passed in the first place largely because 
of Von der Ahe’s personal influence.) 
This was important because the American Association found itself in the opposite 
position the National League faced the year before.  In the League, wealthier Eastern clubs, with 
the help of Chicago, forced the guarantee plan on the western members of the organization.  In 
the Association, however, the Browns had the most clout, and as they were the Association’s top 
drawing card, if they wanted a percentage system to distribute gate receipts, the other franchises 
had to listen.  Von der Ahe did not hesitate to use the greatest trump card he held, the threat that 
the Browns would leave the Association and join the League.  Stating, “I am in deadly earnest as 
far as my demand for the percentage system is concerned,” Von der Ahe and the rest of the 
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American Association decided to hold a special meeting in early September to discuss the 
situation.  Secondary issues for discussion at the meeting included discussion of replacing 
Wheeler Wikoff as leader for the Association and dealing with the issue of betting on games at 
pool halls around the nation. (Apparently, the pool hall issue was a serious problem for the 
National League as well, as Washington complained about them, while in Boston, “the police are 
amusing themselves in raiding the base ball pool rooms of the city.  Five minutes after the raids 
business is running at full blast again.”61)   
Giving further credence to Von der Ahe’s threat, the National League held its own 
special meeting at the same time.  Its main business was rather less dramatic, with some 
relatively minor matters of a forfeited game and the attempted blacklisting of a couple players, 
but it also planned to reopen the guarantee vs. percentage question, with a great deal of feeling 
on both sides.  While there was no guarantee that the League’s moguls would send Von der Ahe 
greetings from Asbury Park, New Jersey, where they planned to meet, the swirling rumors made 
it seem a distinct possibility.62 
Von der Ahe was in dead earnest because, like Detroit in the League, his club was simply 
making money for the rest of the Association, and he did not see why this should continue.  As 
Cleveland manager Jimmy Williams, who also supported the change, figured it, the Browns lost 
a potential $25,000 yearly because they drew such large crowds on the road while getting the 
measly sum of sixty-five dollars per game in return.  Williams feared that the League might 
decide to lure Von der Ahe into its arms by promising him a percentage of the gate from the 
League’s most lucrative cities, essentially pursuing the same course it had followed with Detroit 
                                                 
61 “From The Hub” Mugwump, The Sporting Life, August 31, 1887, 2. 
62 “The American Association” NA, The Sporting News, August 13, 1887, 1; “Beatin And 
Kinslow” NA, The Sporting News, August 13, 1887, 1; “The Meetings” NA, The Sporting Life, 
August 17, 1887, 1. 
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the year before.  Both Von der Ahe and Williams, however, hoped that the Association would 
avoid a showdown on this issue, as in addition to St. Louis and Williams’ Cleveland team, the 
Mets and Louisville favored the percentage plan, meaning that if Cincinnati or Baltimore came 
around, the Association could avert disaster the Browns would stay put.63   
One Baltimore sportswriter hoped his home city would see the light, describing how the 
team had lost money in more seasons that it had profited in its Association career so far.  He 
admitted this was due in part to a losing team with poor overall patronage (and admitted that on 
occasion the club had exaggerated its attendance to hide the fact) but realized this was a good 
reason for the team to favor the percentage plan rather than oppose it.64  Others hoped that by 
switching to the percentage plan, the Association might lure the Detroit Wolverines from the 
League to the Association, as all remembered how disgruntled Detroit management was when 
the League switched in the opposite direction for 1887.  Considering the vast array of talented 
offensive players the Wolverines would bring with them, such a move might boost attendance in 
all Association cities, partly because of Detroit’s quality and partly because of the novelty of 
seeing such great players as Dan Brouthers and Sam Thompson for the first time.  As another 
Association supporter put it, “President Wikoff ought to be empowered to act in this matter and 
he ought to open negotiations with the Detroit president without further delay. . . . If the 
Association wants the Detroits let the percentage system be adopted and then set the nets and the 
club will be landed high and dry.”65  Detroit did not jump, but the Association did achieve a 
more equitable financial plan. 
 
                                                 
63 “Local Hits” NA, The Sporting News, August 13, 1887, 5. 
64 “From Baltimore” TTT, The Sporting Life, August 17, 1887, 2. 
65 “From St. Louis” Joe Pritchard, The Sporting Life, August 31, 1887, 4. 
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* * * * *  
 
 Certainly, there was plenty of drama during the 1887-1888 off-season, but it was a 
different kind of drama than had been the case in years past.  This time, there was no owner-
imposed salary limit, at least not one that anyone paid any attention to, to anger players and 
cause them to hold out or complain.  Many players did try to induce their clubs to pay them 
more, certainly, but there was no unifying rationale to their actions.  The players did so because 
they believed their teams were in the black, and they wanted a larger share of the pie.   
 That does not mean that nothing important took place, however, as this off-season 
brought to light two important trends that grew in importance in the seasons to come.  The first 
of these was the increased amount of money teams spent to find new talent.  Just to purchase a 
new player, Gus Krock or Bug Holliday, for instance, in some cases teams saw their outlays rise 
to levels beyond what their 1886 salary cap had tried to enforce on all players.  This is one of the 
reasons established players often held out for more cash.  If a new, unproven player was worth 
$2,500 to a team, why should veterans settle for less?  (See chapter two for a discussion of the 
financial relations of major and minor league teams, and the move to extend the reserve rule to 
the minor leagues at this time.)  The prevailing methods of acquiring new talent thus served to 
inflate the prices teams had to pay to all of their men. 
 In turn, this led to the second key trend that emerged at this time.  As salaries for all 
players rose, this strained the resources of teams in certain locations.  A club such as Boston 
could afford to drop $10,000 to acquire John Clarkson.  Other clubs, Louisville or Kansas City, 
for instance, could not even dream of doing so.  The total salary a team paid to its nine was, for 
some ball clubs, reaching the tipping point beyond which they claimed they could not go.  If 
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their operating expenses grew any larger, they had but two choices.  They could raise ticket 
prices as the American Association did for 1888, and hope fans would continue patronizing their 
games even at the increased expense, or they could imitate Detroit and sell off their best players, 
hoping to make up their operating deficiencies with the money obtained thereby.   
 This first option was quite risky, and was not even under the control of team 
management.  Only the leagues as a whole could approve changes in ticket prices.  The second 
option had limited applications.  Unless a club was lucky enough to find and sign cheap new 
talent, which was not all that cheap by this time anyway, to take the place of the veteran players 
they had to sell to make ends meet, its performance was going to decline at some point.  In 
addition, the larger market teams buying these valuable players got stronger, and the talent gap 
between the top clubs of each league and the bottom ones grew larger.  A decline in performance 
meant fewer cranks at the games, which meant less revenue, and that was a death spiral.  A team 
might try the route of the St. Louis Browns and sell off its overvalued assets (Foutz and 
Caruthers), and invest that money in new men, but that would be an anachronistic suggestion, 
considering that the player evaluation models used to demonstrate that these players were 
overrated did not exist in 1888.   
 Baseball observers began to note and pay attention to these emerging issues as the 1888 
season got underway.  Some looked to the Millennium Plan (see chapter fourteen), or some 
similar scheme, to set things right.  Others hoped that a winning team would draw sufficient 
patronage to keep up with rising costs.  In any event, with hindsight, we can see that the 
foundations underlying the game, never completely sturdy to begin with, gained a few more 





The Brotherhood, Contracts, and the Millennium Plan, 1887-1888 
 
 
For the first year of its career, the Brotherhood of Professional Base Ball Players kept a 
low profile.  Between July 1886, when it announced its existence to the public, and July 1887, it 
played a marginal role in the affairs of major league baseball.  It would be going a bit far to say 
that people forgot about it during the first months of the 1887 season, but for most observers, it 
was a minor blip on their radar.  This began to change in August 1887.  In that month, the BPBP 
started to involve itself in the intertwined questions of player salaries and the language in player 
contracts.  Although it was probably inevitable that this would happen at some point in the 
Brotherhood’s career, by taking these questions up, it raised its profile considerably.  The players 
in major league baseball began looking at the organization in a new light, and the moguls who 
ran the game did as well, although the light appeared either brighter or dimmer, depending on the 
observer’s point of view. 
There were other important movements afoot in major league baseball at the same time, 
however.  When the American Association held its yearly meeting in 1887, there were many 
issues to deal with, the demands and continuing membership of the St. Louis Browns in the 
organization foremost among them (see chapter thirteen).  The Association meeting was of 
greater moment, however, than the mere future of the Browns as a member, critical though that 
issue was.  In addition, in mid-August (the Association’s meeting was on September 5) The 
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Sporting Life teased its readers with vague hints that the Association would discuss a measure 
that would revolutionize the game.  The paper would not describe the measure in detail, but 
merely stated it would end the career of the “odious and tyrannical reserve rule” and make the 
percentage vs. guarantee debate, which both the National League and American Association 
seemed to wrestle with on a yearly basis, a moot one.1  The Chicago Daily Tribune publicized 
the rumor as well, stating, “the last report has it that the reserve rule will be done away with at 
the next meeting of the American Association.”2 
As rumors of such revolutionary moment swirled, Al Spalding added to the murkiness, as 
he often did.  In an interview with the Old Brooklynite, Henry Chadwick, he claimed that if St. 
Louis ever joined the National League, it must do so without Sunday baseball.  Spalding also 
said he was not in favor of an amalgamation of the two leagues, and that he wanted a return to 
the percentage ticket plan after trying the guarantee plan for one year in the National League.  
When Chadwick asked Spalding about the White Stockings and his temperance pledge, it evoked 
a lengthy response demonstrating the issue remained central to Spalding’s vision for the 
respectable future of the game.  He told Chadwick, “you have no idea of the contrast afforded 
between the condition of things which prevailed in my club last season and this season.  Why, 
sir, last year I was worried and tormented so much with the result of the drinking habits of our 
team that I felt like giving up the whole damned business.  This year everything is running so 
smoothly that it is a real pleasure to run the club.”  When asked about rumors that Silver Flint 
had returned to his old habit of rushing the growler, Spalding beamed with pride.  “There is not a 
word of truth in it . . . Flint is keeping to his word like a man.”  He remained steadfast in his 
desire to hold the line on C2H5OH, instructing his subordinates to “put the screws on the first 
                                                 
1 “The Meetings” NA, The Sporting Life, August 17, 1887, 1. 
2 “Around the Bases” NA, Chicago Daily Tribune, September 1, 1887, 3. 
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man that broke the rule, even if it cost us the loss of the pennant,” but remained confident that 
“the men are doing splendid work, retain their self respect, and are saving money, besides 
making their families and relatives happy by their manly course.”  Spalding’s hatred of player 
drinking, it seems, was one issue, maybe the one issue, on which he never wavered or 
equivocated.3   
The Chicago owner also offered cautious praise of New York shortstop and Brotherhood 
president John Ward, probably because Ward, with his education and good personal habits, met 
Spalding’s profile of the type of man baseball needed more of.  In addition to a rumor that Giants 
owner John Day was considering selling Ward to Washington, Ward and Day were also in the 
news because Day had demoted Ward earlier that summer, taking his team captaincy away from 
him.  “Al has a high opinion of Ward,” Chadwick wrote, and concerning replacing Ward as team 
captain, “suffice it to say that he does not side with Mr. Day’s published opinion on the subject.”  
Spalding went so far as to say that if his own captain, Anson, should die, as a replacement “I’d 
want no better man than him.”4  (Some upheld Day in his decision, however, with one New York 
sportswriter praising the qualities of Buck Ewing, Ward’s replacement, writing, “Ewing has 
developed into quite a captain, and his generalship on the field has been excellent.  He promises 
to develop kicking propensities of the Anson stripe, and the Giants will no longer submit to 
injustice with their former meekness.”5  Indeed, in future seasons, Ewing became so effective at 
persuading umpires, many baseball writers accused him of stealing games for the Giants through 
manipulation alone.) 
                                                 
3 “Chadwick’s Chat” Henry Chadwick, The Sporting Life, August 17, 1887, 3.  The Society of 
Old Brooklynites was an organization featuring people who had resided in the United States for 
fifty years or more and had lived in Brooklyn for that entire span.  Chadwick gained eligibility 
for the organization in 1887. 
4 Ibid. 
5 “New York Mention” George Stackhouse, The Sporting Life, August 31, 1887, 3. 
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Interestingly, however, for such a crusader on the temperance issue, Spalding did not 
favor a consistent league policy regarding liquor sales on the grounds during games.  While he 
remained adamant that Chicago would never sell beer at its ballpark, he did not oppose other 
clubs’ right to do so if they chose.  The New York Giants, for instance, did so openly despite 
National League official policy, so perhaps Spalding saw no point in denying what everyone 
already knew.  He did say, however, that the National League would uphold its league policy 
concerning fifty-cent ticket prices.  Why each team could decide its own policy on selling beer in 
violation of league rules but not tickets, he did not elaborate.6 
 
* * * * * 
 
 Meanwhile, the Brotherhood whirred into motion and tried to flex its muscles a bit.  It 
was in August 1887 that John Ward penned his famous essay in Lippincott’s magazine 
describing ball players as chattel.  One can imagine the New York shortstop’s chagrin, therefore, 
when rumors circulated that same month that his team might sell him to the Washington 
Nationals.  Technically, it was a trade rather than a sale, as according to the rumor, the Giants 
would get the Washington battery of pitcher Dupee Shaw and catcher Barney Gilligan in return, 
but nonetheless, Ward was not pleased at the prospect.  Nothing against Washington, of course, 
the city had a law library he could only envy, but he objected to the principle of the whole 
situation.  Washington cranks could talk of nothing else, however, as in that city, “Ward is talked 
of more than President Cleveland.”7  The New York shortstop did not go to Washington, 
however much the cranks there wished otherwise, and for the second time that season the 
                                                 
6 “Chadwick’s Chat” Henry Chadwick, The Sporting Life, August 17, 1887, 3. 
7 “Washington After Ward” WUD, The Sporting Life, August 17, 1887, 1. 
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Nationals came close to landing a big-name player, only to come up short.  Washington owner 
Hewitt claimed that the deal would have gone down but for the outrage expressed by the New 
York sporting press over losing Ward, causing New York owner John Day to reconsider 
something manifestly unpopular with the sportswriters who wielded so much influence over 
public opinion.8   
The rumors continued, however, as by October it was Brooklyn that was about to acquire 
New York’s famed shortstop.  Brooklyn owner Charles Byrne believed that the National League 
teams would allow Ward to clear waivers and join his club (the way the player claim system 
worked at the time, if a National League team wanted to release a player, all other teams from 
the NL had a chance to claim the player before teams in the American Association could do so, 
and vice versa) because they would be happy to see the president of the Brotherhood out of the 
National League and causing trouble somewhere else.  This time, New York owner Day threw 
up a public wall of denial immediately.  “Ward is a good player, and the New York Club cannot 
afford to lose his services.  As regards my colleagues, they are not fearful of the threats of the 
Brotherhood.  I would not accept a larger sum than you would be willing to give to part with my 
short stop.”9 
 More importantly for the Brotherhood, August 1887 was also when its leadership started 
making a strong public case for the goals of the organization for the first time.  The Sporting Life 
printed excerpts of a lengthy interview with Ward about the intentions of the Brotherhood, and 
Ward stated that he, on behalf of his brothers, had asked for a conference with the moguls of the 
National League, and that the Brotherhood wanted to work out a new form of contract.  Ward 
                                                 
8 “The Washington Team” Sam, The Sporting News, August 27, 1887, 5; “From the Capital” 
WUD, The Sporting Life, August 31, 1887, 1.  The other superstar nearly landed by the 
Nationals, recall, was Mike Kelly, who they tried to acquire the preceding winter. 
9 “The Brooklyns Want Ward” NA, New York Times, October 9, 1887, 3. 
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stated his belief that “the old form has outlived its usefulness.  The absolute power which it gives 
to the club may have been necessary at the time it was first made, but times have changed, base 
ball is a different game, ball players are not the same men and it is no longer necessary that the 
clubs should possess such an arbitrary power.”  He also repeated one of the key themes of his 
Lippincott’s essay.  “Ball players are at present forced to subscribe to contracts giving the clubs 
the most absolute control over them, and many of the grievances of the players, with which the 
public have become familiar through the press, are authorized and, to a certain extent, legalized 
by these contracts.”10 
 Ward then described the revisions he was seeking.  One problem was that the current 
contract contained phrases binding the player to agree to and uphold all articles of the National 
League’s constitution and the National Agreement between the League and the Association.  
Ward, and other players, disliked these references to outside documents and wanted all 
responsibilities clearly stated in the contract because “it is simply impossible for a player to 
know what those documents are.  They are changed from time to time and one cannot keep track 
of them at all.”  He also pointed out that “if the player is willing to concede the right of 
reservation to the club, let that be stated in the contract, and if there are any limitations on the 
right, let them also be stated.  Let the words of the contract itself contain the entire agreement 
between club and player, then any player may at any time know what to expect and what is 
expected of him.”11 
 Speaking about the reserve rule, Ward reiterated his belief it was necessary in some form, 
but also proposed modifications to it that, incidentally, bore some similarity to the current system 
whereby a player became a free agent after six years of major league service time and was no 
                                                 
10 “League Players” NA, The Sporting Life, August 24, 1887, 1. 
11 Ibid. 
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longer bound to his team.  “I do not think the time has yet come when base ball can do away with 
the reserve rule.  The great majority of players still favor it, though they think it needs 
modification.  The time during which a club may reserve a player should be limited to, say three 
or five years and the number of reserved should possibly be reduced.”  Furthermore, instead of 
the current practice by which every contract was a one-year agreement with an option to renew 
the contract the following year, Ward said, “contracts should be signed for one, two, or five years 
if agreeable to both parties.  A player could then take his family with him and feel secure of his 
stay for a definite time.”12 
 Ward concluded the interview with a statement calling for the end of his personal 
nemesis, the buying and selling of players.  “A club has a right to sell its claim on a player under 
contract to it when the player also agrees to the transaction.  But let it be distinctly stated that in 
such a case the buying club buys only the unexpired term of the contract and not the right of 
reservation or sale, and at the termination of the contract the player goes free upon the market.”  
Ward pointed out this simple clause would do away with selling players almost entirely, because 
there would be little value for the acquiring team without the right of reservation.  “As for the 
selling of a player not under contract, let no such right be recognized at all.  A player released 
from reservation to be free upon the market to all clubs, and no such thing tolerated as a release 
of a player from one club to another.”13 
 In a separate interview, Ward used the celebrated case of Mike Kelly to make this last 
point.  “What did the Chicago club ever give Kelly in return for the right to control his future 
services?  Absolutely nothing; and yet that club sells that right so cheaply acquired for $10,000.  
But I repeat it never gave such a right, and any such claim by one set of men of the right of 




property in another is as unnatural to-day as it was a quarter of a century ago.”  Ward concluded 
his point regarding Kelly by stating, “Kelly received his salary from the Chicago Club . . . and 
returned every dollar of it several times over, and yet the Chicago Club makes $10,000 for 
releasing Kelly from a claim for which it never paid him a dollar, but which it acquired by 
seizure some years ago.”14 
 The magnates of the National League received the Brotherhood’s request at their mid-
August meeting.  They did not comment about the request to the sporting press immediately, 
however, and “it was not divulged what action was taken upon it.”15  Ominously, they did not 
even send Ward any immediate answer to his request, although because of their decision to 
stonewall the media on the issue, no one could say for sure whether this was an act of disrespect 
towards the BPBP or an act to buy time to coordinate a coherent response.16 
 Undeterred by the lack of a response, the Brothers forged ahead.  Fred Pfeffer, 
representative of the White Stockings, described their plans.  “I don’t know what we will do, but 
there will undoubtedly be some action in reference to the one-sided character of the contracts 
with players as they now exist.  We don’t want to make any row in the league, but there is a 
degree of justice that should be recognized in dealing with players, and we propose to find a 
remedy that will effect this.”  He believed that, “the brotherhood is strong enough to make any 
demands it might choose to do, but no extreme measures will be proposed or tolerated. . . . We 
believe that the club officials can be induced to deal fairly with us.  So far as I am personally 
concerned I have no complaints to make, but there are men I know who don’t get a fair show.”  
                                                 
14 “Base Ball Slavery” NA, The Chicago Daily Inter Ocean, July 16, 1887.  The event of twenty-
five years ago was, of course, the end of slavery in the United States via the Emancipation 
Proclamation and thirteenth amendment to the US Constitution. 
15 “Current Topics” NA, The Sporting Life, August 24, 1887, 1. 
16 “The Brotherhood Will Meet” NA, The Sporting News, August 27, 1887, 1. 
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He finished by stating, “I don’t believe we shall be able to do anything the effect of which will 
be felt immediately, but that our organization will be able to bring about needed reforms I am 
certain.”17 
 Proving that sometimes one can speak too soon, by the following day, Pfeffer did have a 
complaint to make.  Captain Anson fined the second baseman a herculean $100 for misplaying a 
ball in a game.  There was some dispute over whether Pfeffer, who carried a reputation as a fine 
defensive player, muffed the ball intentionally (others claimed he just wanted to create a close 
play at first so he would have an excuse to fire the ball to Anson) just to earn the ire of his 
captain, as it appears the two were not on good terms at that particular moment.  Pfeffer, 
apparently more popular with his teammates than the grizzled first baseman, wrote to team 
president Spalding demanding he cancel the fine, or else Pfeffer would refuse to play.  As one 
Chicago observer put it, “I can’t say I blame him for fining Pfeffer.  I saw the play he made, and 
it was a very bad exhibition, but Pfeffer seems to have the most friends in the matter.  I don’t 
know how it will end.  Anson will not stand a bluff.”18  Spalding declined to take sides in public, 
but did decide to force both men to accept an armistice so that Pfeffer would continue to take the 
field with the team.  He then declared his intent to review the matter at a more appropriate time.19  
Pfeffer did not, however, take his grievance to the Brotherhood at its meeting, despite rumors to 
the contrary.20 
 The BPBP held their meeting on August 28.  The delegates in attendance were Fred 
Pfeffer of Chicago, Arthur Irwin from Philadelphia, Cliff Carroll from Washington, Mert 
Hackett representing Indianapolis, Ned Hanlon on behalf of Detroit, Ward and Tim Keefe from 
                                                 
17 “Notes Of The Game” NA, Chicago Daily Tribune, August 28, 1887, 11. 
18 “Brought A Black Cloud” NA, Chicago Daily Tribune, August 29, 1887, 2. 
19 “The Old White Stockings” Eli, The Sporting News, September 3, 1887, 1. 
20 “New York Mention” George Stackhouse, The Sporting Life, September 7, 1887, 4. 
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New York, Abner Dalrymple of Pittsburgh, and Jack Burdock and Robert Hackett from Boston.  
They did indeed draw up a new contract “which is not so slavish” as the existing one, and 
decided to present it to the National League’s owners at the League’s next meeting, with the 
hope that that body would acknowledge the fair-mindedness of their reforms.  As men such as 
Ward had said all along, they made no move against the reserve rule at this meeting.  “Many 
people thought that the players would attack the reserve rule and tear it to pieces, but they did 
not.  It was the sentiment of all the players that the reserve rule should stand.  They say that it 
might be improved with a few minor changes, but that the rule, in the main, is in the interest of 
base-ball and the players.”  In addition to asking concessions on the language of player contracts, 
the Brotherhood also decided to condemn the practice of selling players.  Finally, they stated that 
if a club wanted to release a player, the release should free the player from all obligations and the 
player should be able to go wherever he wanted to; likewise in the case where a player’s team 
disbands.21 
 They offered the League something in return, stating, “the brotherhood will give the 
league all the help it can in fighting drunkenness among players, and resolutions will be 
submitted to the league suggesting that a player who drinks shall be fined $25 for the first 
offense, $50 for the second, and $100 for the third.  Then if the player has no intelligence left the 
fourth offense shall be punished with suspension and the blacklist.”22  This pronouncement 
probably had a few goals.  First, by repudiating the drunken element, the BPBP could earn 
respect and support from the general sporting public.  This could be quite valuable.  The sporting 
public could hurt teams where it counted most, in the pocketbook, by withholding their 
patronage and not going to games.  Having their support was no small matter, and earning their 
                                                 
21 “Reforms Proposed by the Brotherhood” NA, Chicago Daily Tribune, August 29, 1887, 2. 
22 Ibid. 
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trust meant counteracting stories like what happened on August 24, when a minor league 
player’s companion in Eau Claire, Wisconsin, broke into a brothel, intimidated the owner with 
his firearm, trashed the furniture, jumped out a window, pistol-whipped another man, and then 
fled from the authorities who tried to arrest him.23 
The same goal, improving the organization’s public image, held for relations with the 
sporting press.  Because they were the only means for disseminating information to the public in 
the Gilded Age, having the newspapers on your side, or at least neutral, was very important.  In 
addition, the players knew perfectly well that Al Spalding cut the largest figure in the National 
League during meetings, and they also knew how much he abhorred drinking, both for the 
damage it did to his own team, and to the game’s image in general.  Getting his support for, or at 
least toleration and acknowledgment of, their brotherhood might go a long ways towards getting 
other owners to fall in line.  The players still had no idea how the League might respond, 
however, and so they finished by stating that should the League refuse to treat with them, they 
would work out the necessary reforms on their own.  The meeting concluded after appointing a 
committee consisting of Ward, Irwin, and Hanlon to carry forward the Brotherhood’s resolutions 
and meet with ownership on the BPBP’s behalf.24 
 It appears this course met with approval from League players.  At the same time the 
Brotherhood held its meeting, the majority of the Pittsburgh club voted to join.  The Brotherhood 
had not had the chance to organize the Pittsburgh players, other than Abner Dalrymple who had 
                                                 
23 “Another Player on a Rampage” NA, The Sporting Life, August 31, 1887, 1, 
24 “Reforms Proposed by the Brotherhood” NA, Chicago Daily Tribune, August 29, 1887, 2; 
“Base Ball” NA, Galveston Daily News, August 30, 1887, 6; “The Players Up In Arms” NA, The 
Sporting News, September 3, 1887, 1. 
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come to Pittsburgh from Chicago, as the team had been a member of the American Association 
until 1887, but now its players joined the fold.25  
 The League, meanwhile, continued to debate the temperance question, and how best to 
discipline recalcitrant drinkers.  Part of the problem was their lack of cooperation on what to do.  
All too often, when one club grew tired of the shenanigans of a lushing player, another club 
would step in and offer money for the release of the wayward player, hoping they would have 
better luck with him.  This did not exactly encourage drinking or reward the player directly, but 
it did not encourage them to shape up, either.  The only real penalty, as things stood at the 
moment, came when a player had let down so many teams time and again, like Sadie Houck, 
Charlie Sweeney, or Billy Taylor, that no one was willing to take a chance on them any longer.   
The current lack of procedure also offered no solution of what to do with the likes of Jim 
McCormick or Mike Kelly, players who imbibed too frequently but had enough talent that 
someone would always want them, regardless.  As things stood in August, teams could only fine 
them or deal with them in some other way, however the club’s manager thought best.  As a 
result, the League’s magnates considered putting a temperance clause into the language of player 
contracts for 1888.  The plan the owners discussed included fining the player through the league 
office, rather than through the individual teams, so the response would have greater uniformity 
than in the past.  They also considered coming down on repeat offenders with suspensions, with 
the other owners barred from asking to purchase any player under suspension.  “This it is thought 
will effectually weed out the drinking element or make them abandon the habit entirely for six 
months in the year.”26 
                                                 
25 “Joined The Order” NA, The Sporting Life, August 31, 1887, 1. 
26 “Temperance In Base Ball” NA, The Sporting Life, August 31, 1887, 1. 
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 This indicates that, under the right circumstances, there was ground for cooperation 
between the players and owners.  The players offered help in weeding out alcoholism, which all 
owners favored.  The moguls could reciprocate by giving a little on the issue of player releases, 
player sales, and the language used in contracts.  The question was, of course, would the owners 
meet with the players?  Doing so would advance them towards one of their most cherished goals.  
The risk, however, from ownership’s point of view, was that if the players negotiated 
concessions here, they might want more in the future, and the Brotherhood might grow bolder in 
the process.  This idea, of giving any voice to labor, was anathema to many capitalists in Gilded 
Age America, so no one could say for sure how the owners might respond. 
 The potential for compromise existed alongside the potential for conflict, and the sporting 
press realized the fact.  One writer, with either inside knowledge or a fair amount of prescience, 
offered that, concerning the contract question, “suppose the directors of the League refused to 
grant it.  Suppose, further, that the players thereupon should form a co-operative league of their 
own, apportion their own players and their territory, and begin next season on their own hook?”  
While conceding, “very likely nothing of the sort will be attempted so soon,” the author also 
believed “such a thing is by no means impossible, and in case no change is made in the present 
constitution of the League and the Association it is hardly improbable.  Base ball is a new 
business, comparatively—less than twenty years old—and its principles are not yet thoroughly 
determined.”  In the end, the writer sided with the players on the contract question, writing, 
“Pecuniarily, it is a tremendous success, but the relations between employers and employees are 
not yet settled, and are not likely to be until they are put upon a fairer basis than the present 
one.”27 
                                                 
27 “It’s In The Air” NA, The Sporting Life, August 31, 1887, 1. 
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 Similarly, New York sportswriter George Stackhouse wrote regarding the Brotherhood, 
“if the members continue in their present manly course, the organization will be a benefit to base 
ball as well as the players.  The meeting was a quiet and orderly one, and if some of the League 
moguls had heard some of the speeches made they would have at once become convinced that 
the brains of base ball are not all incased in the skulls of the directors.”  After speaking with 
Ward, Stackhouse agreed that the organization was gaining strength, and warned that its 
suggestions of today might become its demands of tomorrow, should baseball’s capitalists fail to 
take heed.28 
 The Brothers also discussed the possibility of organizing teams from the American 
Association and adding them to their organization.  When asked about the possibility, president 
Ward stated,  
we had it about fixed for a man to go ahead and do the work.  He was a member of the 
Pittsburg Club.  Just at that time Pittsburg came into the League, and that fact knocked us 
out.  There are several men who are fully competent to organize the movement, and, 
since the Association players are with us in the matter of breaking up the old contract, I 
expect to see a brotherhood organized shortly.  Comiskey, Stovey, Burns, Fennelly and a 
dozen others could be mentioned who could get the matter in shape.  Of course we would 
help them.29 
 
 When asked about his thoughts on the Brotherhood’s request, Al Spalding said he would 
approve of meeting their representatives because “it would enable club officials and directors to 
explain many points in connection with the question which Ward brings up which I think they do 
not fully understand.  I shall always be ready and willing to discuss any questions bearing on the 
relations between the clubs and their players, if such discussion will make our relations any more 
satisfactory.”30  When questioned on specifics, however, such as when to meet, his personal 
                                                 
28 “New York Mention” George Stackhouse, The Sporting Life, September 7, 1887, 4. 
29 “The Association Players” NA, The Sporting Life, September 7, 1887, 4. 
30 “From Chicago” Harry Palmer, The Sporting Life, August 31, 1887, 2. 
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views on the organization and its objectives, and the like, Spalding returned to the noncommittal 
stance of his capitalist brethren, telling Chicago sportswriter Harry Palmer, “why discuss 
Christmas presents during the ice cream season?”31 
 
* * * * * 
 
 When the time came for the Association’s owners to hold their confab, somewhat 
unexpectedly, harmony reigned.  The big question was whether the Association should keep their 
present revenue distribution plan of a simple guarantee to the visiting team, or switch over to a 
percentage plan whereby the visitors received a variable piece of the gate depending on that 
days’ attendance.  Prior to the actual meeting, Von der Ahe met with his chief opponent on the 
percentage or guarantee question, Brooklyn owner Byrne, and the two smoothed out most of 
their differences over beers.  Byrne agreed to cast his vote for the percentage plan in exchange 
for Von der Ahe’s help on the Sunday baseball question in Brooklyn.32  When the Association’s 
magnates took up the question at the actual meeting, there was a robust debate on what to do, and 
the owners finally agreed on a hybrid plan.  The new plan called for a guarantee of $130 to all 
visitors for every game, and then for any money realized on top of $130 from ticket sales, the 
visitors got thirty percent.33  It also provided visitors receive the same number of complimentary 
free tickets to distribute as the home club, and that each club could designate one day each week 
when ladies received free admission to the grounds, weekends excepted.34 
                                                 
31 “From Chicago” Harry Palmer, The Sporting Life, September 7, 1887, 3. 
32 “Everything Is Now Lovely” NA, The Sporting News, September 3, 1887, 1. 
33 “Our Flag Is Still There” Pete, The Sporting News, September 10, 1887, 1. 
34 “The Association Meeting” NA, The Sporting Life, September 14, 1887, 1. 
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 Perhaps more importantly, it was at the Association’s meeting that The Sporting Life’s 
editor, Francis Richter, unveiled his proposal to revolutionize the business of baseball.  Leading 
with an editorial titled, “The Millenium,” Richter’s Millenium Plan made just about every 
promise conceivable.  As the paper proclaimed, the plan would accomplish all of the following: 
• Players would no longer desert their clubs. 
• There would be peace between all professional leagues, and the leagues need no longer 
fear teams disbanding in the middle of a season. 
• Without teams disbanding, leagues need not trouble with filling vacancies in the off-
season. 
• It solved the percentage or guarantee question on distributing ticket revenue. 
• All clubs, from the major leagues to the newest minor league, would profit. 
• The plan would equalize the talent within each league to the point that no teams would 
hopelessly drop out of the pennant race until late in the season. 
• The plan would equalize talent across each season, so that a team finishing at the bottom 
of a league one year had the same chance to contend the next season as the team finishing 
at the top. 
• An absolute salary rule scaled to the capacity of each league, with player salaries 
equalized according to a scale. 
• Eliminating the salary advances and bonuses paid to players in order to skirt the much-
abused salary limit issue. 
• Maintaining or slightly improving player salaries while saving each club one-third of 
their present costs, allowing teams to more accurately predict their costs for the season. 
• Better discipline of the players without the arbitrary methods currently employed. 
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• Eliminating record playing.  (Record playing was the Gilded Age term for players who 
refused to take difficult chances just for the sake of avoiding errors on defense and 
improving their fielding statistics.) 
• It would eliminate the adversarial relationship between labor and capital, thus rendering 
such organizations as the BPBP unnecessary. 
• The plan would simplify the National Agreement. 
 
While stating that readers might, at first reading, proclaim the plan “impossible, Quixotic, 
chimerical,” Richter nonetheless claimed that he had already shown the scheme to many baseball 
men, including team owners in the American Association, and that they favored the idea.  Not 
indulging in modesty, he finished his first essay on the Millennium Plan by writing,  
it is grand in conception, comprehensive in scope and tremendous in wide-reaching 
ramifications; and yet withal it is so simple and direct in action, so easy of application 
and so harmonious in detail that once adopted the entire base ball world . . . will wonder 
why nobody ever thought of such a grand yet simple plan before, to the saving of years of 
disaster, failure, labor, worry, anxiety and enormous aggregate financial losses.35 
 
 It took an agonizingly long time, but Richter and The Sporting Life finally got around to 
publishing all the details of the Millennium Plan in early December.  Richter began by describing 
the existing problems with the National Agreement.  The main thrust of his argument was that 
the agreement should include all baseball leagues in America, not just the two major leagues and 
the handful of minor league organizations they saw fit to admit.  Although he probably 
exaggerated to some extent, he gave several sound reasons why the existing agreement was 
ineffective.  “The two big leagues have tried to cover the ground and monopolize authority, and 
                                                 
35 “The Millenium” Francis Richter, The Sporting Life, September 7, 1887, 1.  The author 
realizes that the word millennium is spelled incorrectly, but that is how The Sporting Life spelled 
it in their publication, so I will follow their spelling whenever they refer to their plan. 
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failed.  They have monopolized the power of reserve and yet receive no benefits therefrom, 
except a yearly increase of salaries and expenses, which could hardly be higher if there were no 
reserve at all.”  Not only that, “they have destroyed the benefit of the reserve rule; they have 
appropriated to themselves the fruits of the minor leagues’ labors, and yet have paid more for it 
in the long run than would have been the case under fairer methods.”  Regarding the relationship 
with the players, “they have essayed to rule their players as absolutely as they would have liked 
to control the market, with the result that they have driven them into a counter-organization, and 
finally they have forced other organizations into such antagonistic positions that necessary 
control of the players’ market has been made impossible.”  Through his plan, Richter advised 
baseball’s leaders to “make common cause with the minor leagues, treat them upon a footing of 
equality, pool issues, work together under the same laws; in short organize upon equal, not 
qualified, basis a union of all for offensive and defensive purposes.”36 
 The first step towards improving the situation, in Richter’s eyes, was extending the 
reserve rule to all minor league organizations.  With a fair degree of accuracy, he described the 
present situation without the minor league reservation rule, and demonstrated how his plan 
would help check the evils of the present system.  He believed those evils included overpaid 
players, which led to an undisciplined labor force, which injured the permanency of the sport.  
“The fact that players can get as much salary in a minor league, under less severe discipline and 
without reservation, as they can in a big league, where the work is continuously exacting and 
reservation from year to year certain, is certainly not calculated to easily land young players in 
big leagues or make old players in big leagues anxious to retain their places therein.”  Richter 
recounted several instances from 1887 where “players were made dissatisfied or indifferent by 
                                                 
36 “The Millenium” Francis Richter, The Sporting Life, December 7, 1887, 1. 
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communications from old confreres who had gone into minor leagues descriptive of the ‘very 
soft snaps’ they were enjoying; and is further illustrated at the present time when we see so many 
players who give every indication of future greatness resolutely refusing the most flattering 
offers from big clubs.”  They refused these offers because in the minor leagues “the pay is nearly 
equal, and their work is less likely to be overshadowed.”37   
Richter did not approve of this practice of the minor leagues offering remuneration nearly 
equal to that of major league teams, but admitted the clubs had little choice.  “Of course, the 
minor leagues should not pay these excessive salaries so damaging to themselves and the entire 
business, but they cannot help themselves so long as they are driven into competition season 
after season with the big leagues.”  The major leagues were at fault here because they “force 
salaries up by breaking up the minor clubs, each season taking therefrom more players than they 
actually need, outbidding each other, and compelling the minor leagues in sheer self-defense to 
pay up to the standard set by the higher leagues, as they must have players, and pretty good ones 
at that, no matter what the cost.”38  This in turn hurt the major leagues because, having to pay 
inflated salaries to entice minor league players into the major leagues, existing major league 
players became jealous of these high salaries paid to unproven talent, and logically enough asked 
for even higher pay for proven players such as themselves. 
It seems Richter felt that as long as the market for players was even moderately free, and 
players could play off major league teams against minor league ones offering nearly equal 
compensation, competition between the various teams injured the sport.  It did so by driving 
down profits and making it less likely that capitalists would invest in baseball in the first place.  
He believed that this pushed the best men out of the game, leaving room for lesser ones who 




frequently made mistakes.  This was in some measure true, but interestingly, it was also 
disturbingly elitist and social Darwinian at the same time.  As he wrote about the game in 
general, “there should be a very large margin of profit, otherwise it cannot command the 
attention and ability of the best class of business men, who would otherwise gain nothing, either 
socially or commercially, by connection with base ball.  The more money there is in it the higher 
the class of people in command and the stronger the guarantee of absolutely honest conduct of 
the game.”  In Richter’s view, profits must be guaranteed, or nearly so, otherwise the best men, 
with their honesty, would not involve themselves.  He also implied that the people at the top of 
the business world were more honest and capable than others, rather than having superior 
opportunities or more wealth to begin with, a nod to the Horatio Alger myth, and that explained 
why they held such a lofty position.  Yet the statement contradicted itself.  If these business 
leaders really had risen to the top solely based on their talent and honesty, why did they need a 
virtual guarantee in order to entice them into the game?  If they were on top because of their 
talent, should not their talent as businessmen allow them to succeed where lesser mortals failed, 
if success was possible at all?   
There were other interesting economic implications in Richter’s statements.  A true 
capitalist was supposed to believe that competition was beneficial, because the need for greater 
efficiency would drive down costs.  Whoever provided the best product at the least cost should 
be most successful, other things being equal.  Yet baseball seemed to invalidate this principle, at 
least in part.  In baseball, competition between the clubs, major and minor league, over the best 
players was ruining things, not improving them.  In theory, competition between the leagues 
should also be for the general good, by weeding out the less competent and allowing the better 
organizations to survive.  It was a recognized fact, however, generally acknowledged even by 
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many owners, that teams in any given league were interdependent.  The New York Giants were 
better off financially if the Washington Nationals fielded a competitive club, because a 
competitive club would draw more spectators in New York than a noncompetitive club would.  
The same was true in any league, and even between the major and minor leagues.  The major 
leagues needed the minor leagues to have some measure of success and stability in order to 
produce the talented players the major leagues would need in the future.  
Therefore, this aspect of the Millennium Plan was both capitalist and non-capitalist at the 
same time.  Or, perhaps more accurately, Richter believed that ownership of baseball must be 
based on his (however flawed) conception of enticing leading capitalists to involve themselves in 
the game.  Within the game itself, however, competition and free market principles must be 
limited in order for the game to be most successful.  Summing up his suggestions regarding the 
minor leagues, he wanted to make them more stable, more profitable, and thus an asset to both 
the major leagues and baseball in general.  As he put it, “let the minor leagues make a regular, 
steady, profitable business of base ball, instead of an intermittent fever, as now, and they will 
soon pass into the hands of responsible, practical men, who will work hand in hand with the big 
leagues, and in brief time control the entire game and country so thoroughly . . . that nearly all 
the evils now afflicting and threatening the game will be overcome.”39 
What would the players get from this change?  Richter believed it would give more job 
security to minor league players by making minor leagues more stable, although at the expense 
of the better salaries they earned at present, and that it would encourage them to practice and 
further hone their craft before reaching the major leagues.  He hoped to cure the perceived evil of 
teams signing young blood to fat deals, but then simply carrying the young blood as dead weight 
                                                 
39 “The Millenium” Francis Richter, The Sporting Life, December 7, 1887, 2. 
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on their rosters.  If a team gave the young player a few opportunities, but the player did not 
perform up to expectations in these limited trials, the team would often him go, thus realizing no 
return on its investment.  Richter did not understand, or at least did not state in print, that teams 
signed young players voluntarily.  In a free market, firms weigh the risk of an investment before 
entering into it.  They only proceed if they think the benefits justify the risks.  Major league 
baseball teams did the same when signing unproven players.  It is true that they had to get 
players from somewhere, but there was always the possibility to purchase them from other clubs, 
or sign veteran minor league players rather than young bloods if a club sought to mitigate its risk 
and engage in less chancy methods of running its organization.40 
Once baseball took this first step in the Millennium Plan, the next issue was to make sure 
that all clubs had a voice on the Arbitration Committee.  This committee, composed at present of 
three owners from major league baseball, should expand and include representatives from the 
minor leagues.  “It would be well to remember that all the base ball brains is not confined to the 
major leagues, and that with an infusion of intelligent minor league blood new ideas may 
develop and such valuable assistance given the present able guardians that much good may 
accrue to the National game.”41 
One of the most radical aspects of the Millennium Plan was its call for a draft each year.  
Under the plan, following each season the major league teams would be able to draft talent from 
the minor leagues as a means of replenishing their talent base.  The advantages seemed plentiful, 
from the business standpoint.  A draft would obviate the need for bidding wars over minor 
league players, because teams would have no one against whom to bid.  The plan further 
diminished competition between the clubs by stipulating that the National League and American 




Association would select the talent pool jointly, rather than the individual teams just picking 
whatever man looked good to them.  Richter wanted to leave the exact means up to the major 
league teams to work out, writing, 
All major clubs could designate to the presidents of their respective organizations what 
players they would like.  This list could be compared by the League and Association, and 
a joint committee appointed to draft and apportion; or the League and Association could 
agree upon the players to be drafted within the limit and apportion them by lot; or the 
players could, after draft, be made a matter of trade between these clubs.  Any of these 
methods could, with some simplification, be made to answer, the main purpose being to 
get the desirable players at comparatively little cost.42 
 
By limiting the number of players any particular minor league team could lose in a given season 
to a number between two and four, the plan struck a balance between maintaining the 
competition level in the minor leagues (better teams would be more likely to lose valuable men, 
thus equalizing the playing field with less talented ones after each season) but still allowing 
minor league teams to keep most of their roster intact from one season to the next, providing the 
much-needed stability that all minor leagues sought.   
Minor leagues might approve of this part of the plan, first, because they would receive 
compensation for drafted players.  Richter suggested either a cash payment or, in lieu of cash, the 
drafting team supply one of its own players it deemed expendable.  The money, however, did not 
go to the team that lost the individual player, but to the minor league, which would then 
redistribute the money amongst league members, further equalizing the resources and level of 
competition within the league.  The minor leagues would also see more stability, increased 
competition, and more predictable player turnover, which presumably added up to greater 
prosperity and permanency.43 




More radical still was the plan’s proposal that the leagues, rather than individual teams, 
would reserve all the players.  Once again, Richter meant this part of the plan to remedy several 
evils.  No longer would clubs change leagues, or threaten to do so unless their fellow owners 
granted them certain concessions, because they would have no players to take with them.  
Richter also believed “such reservation would prevent such deals as in the past broke up the 
Providence, Buffalo, St. Louis, Cleveland, and Metropolitan clubs, would in short, prevent one 
club from buying out another piecemeal, for the sake of a few players, leaving the gutted club to 
eke out a miserable existence or drop out altogether to the great detriment of its fellow clubs.”44   
All of this was a mere prelude, however, to the most controversial part of the plan, the 
method of equalizing the playing strength of the major league clubs.  The plan called for each 
team to reserve one player, its captain, provided that person was not a pitcher or catcher.  Next, 
“the club presidents, assisted by two, three or four practical managers could, as a committee, sort 
out all the players under reserve by the league, except the already selected captains, into their 
respective positions, and then by comparison of records and habits, and personal knowledge of 
ability, grade them as nearly equally as human skill and judgment could do it.”  Each league 
would determine thereby the eight best pitchers, catchers, shortstops, and so on for each position 
on the field.  Once properly ordered, the clubs would draw by lot for the right to choose which 
men they wanted at any given position.  Finally, there could be no transfer of players between 
teams after the initial draft.  The entire intent was the equalization of talent throughout the 
league.  Richter saw the following advantages in such a scheme: 
 
• It would end the controversial buying and selling of players. 
                                                 
44 Ibid.  I have described the stories of the Buffalo, St. Louis, and Metropolitan clubs in other 
parts of this dissertation. 
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• All teams, rich, poor, or in between, would have an equal chance at top players. 
• The teams in the largest markets, marshalling the greatest financial resources, would not 
derive any advantages in acquiring players from that financial strength. 
• Because the talent within the league would be much more even, all of the pennant races 
would be competitive, and the days of teams waving their chances at a pennant goodbye 
in June or July would be over.   
• Keeping all teams in the pennant race longer would increase patronage at games, as fans 
would keep their excitement much deeper into the season, and turn out in greater 
numbers to see competitive games as opposed to lopsided or meaningless ones. 
• The membership of the teams would never grow stale, as each year fans would have a 
mostly new corps of players to cheer. 
• The last place team of one season stood a chance at becoming a champion the next, so 
that several seasons of lackluster play could not demoralize teams and their fans. 
• Fans could then judge the true talents of captains and managers, because each would have 
equal material to work with each season. 
• There would no longer be any temptations for players to play poorly on purpose, just to 
anger their teams into releasing them. 
• There would be no reason for teams to pay players advance money or bonuses any more, 
because they would not know who their players would be until the season was about to 
begin.45 
 
                                                 
45 Ibid. 
 589
 Each team would, by this process, end up with a roster of thirteen players.  This would 
leave a handful of players without a team for the next season, however.  Therefore, the 
Millennium Plan also called for each team to field a reserve team that would consist of a 
combination of marginal major league players and top minor league talent, paid at the going rate 
of the highest-level minor league teams.  These teams would play each other, as well as 
exhibition games when the opportunity offered, and thereby pay for themselves, or nearly so.  
Furthermore, these reserve clubs would supply replacements to their parent teams in the case of 
injury, and give teams an ax to hold over the heads of players who sulked, quarreled with 
management, lost their talent due to age, and so forth.46   
 Grading the players in order to assign them each year also gave Richter the means to cure 
what, in his eyes, was the most important threat to baseball—rising salaries.  “Here we touch the 
very marrow of the base ball question and apply the knife to the cancer that will surely eat the 
life out of base ball unless checked.”  His plan would standardize player salaries based on the 
position of the player, with pitchers and catchers getting the highest pay due to the greater risk 
and physical toll that came with playing those positions.  Each league, major and minor, could 
scale its salaries to its level of revenue, thus preventing salaries from racing ahead of league 
income.47 
 This leads to the final aspect of the plan, the one designed to prevent players from feeling 
demeaned by, and resenting, the whole concept of a position-based salary cap.  Richter realized 
that a salary cap would certainly result in a loss of salary for the better players.  In addition, once 
a player was in the major leagues, but had no hope of a higher salary in the future, there might be 
a need for motivation, other than pride and commitment to one’s teammates, to get players to 




strive for continued improvement.  This is where the unruly and spoiled children must be made 
to do what management thought was in their best interests.  Because of the presence of reserve 
teams, and the threat of demotion they presented, “therefore a player, even if disposed to resent 
what he may in his own unreasoning way consider an injustice—limiting salary—could not 
afford to let down in his work, apart from the fact that with every year new blood would come up 
to crowd him out unless he could hold his own.”48  
Since players obviously would sulk over these limits and might be reluctant to give their 
best when there was no hope of increased personal gain, the Millennium Plan must account for 
this as well.  Therefore, Richter advised giving players of the championship team twenty percent 
above their regular salary as a bonus, players of the second place team fifteen percent, the 
members of the third place team ten percent, and the players of the fourth place team an extra 
five percent.  This would also correct for the rare occurrences when one or two teams did end up 
being greatly superior to the competition, because the players on other clubs would still have a 
bonus to strive for even if the championship was beyond their reach.  Another interesting feature 
of this part of the plan was to encourage team discipline.  Richter rightly surmised that if one or 
two players on a contending club began lushing, and threatened to hurt the team with their 
actions, the other members of the club, seeing their bonuses in jeopardy, no doubt would call out 
their brethren in short order.  This would make fines from management less necessary, as players 
would tend to police themselves better, and thereby reduce friction between the players and 
management.49   
Interestingly, this last was the one piece of the plan (besides extending the reserve rule to 
the minor leagues, which baseball’s owners considered even before the Millennium Plan went 




public) actually implemented by the American Association, although in an extremely diluted 
way.  Prior to the 1888 championship season, the Association passed a measure providing $1,000 
in bonus money (from the Association’s guarantee fund) to the first place club, $750 to the 
second place finisher, and $500 to the organization finishing third in the race in 1888.  At first, it 
was not clear whether this bonus money went to the teams finishing in each position, or the 
players on those teams, and so no one was sure exactly how useful the measure would be.50  It 
seems the money went to the club rather than the players, however, based on Cincinnati 
president Sterns’ announcement to his players in March that, should they win the championship, 
he would divide the boodle amongst his men, implying that the funds were his to distribute in the 
first place.  O.P. Caylor confirmed this distribution of the money as well.51  Brooklyn owner 
Charles Byrne, however, tried to reassure the baseball world that the players were supposed to 
get the bonus money all along, telling observers, “every one at the meeting knew that this was 
just what the rule was intended for.  We could not make the rule read that way for many reasons, 
but it was clearly understood that it was to be done.  The rule was wholly for the benefit of the 
players.”52  Whatever Byrne said, observers should have known better than to take it at face 
value.  When the St. Louis Browns won the Association pennant again in 1888, the players saw 
nary a penny of the bonus money.53 
 There was also provision in the Millennium Plan for players who did not want to 
cooperate with the grading and distribution scheme.  Any player who did not agree to the 
reapportion plan would not be graded, and therefore not assigned to a team.  Since his league still 
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reserved him, however, and all minor leagues were part of the Millennium Plan, there would be 
no place for the player to go, if he did not like the terms offered by his league.54 
The plan, taken in total, clearly leaned towards management and sought to prevent 
players from realizing what their services were worth in a free market.  Despite the plan’s claims 
that players would benefit from more stability in the minor leagues, which meant more 
successful minor league teams, which meant more jobs playing baseball, players might still chafe 
at the restrictions imposed by the plan.  Likewise, even though the plan promised a more merit-
based method of promotion to the major leagues than existed at present, Richter felt the need to 
sweeten the pot a little, to throw the players a bone, as it were.  He pointed out that because the 
players were reserved to the league, rather than individual teams, it would be impossible for 
teams to arbitrarily fine their men, lay them off without cause, or threaten to release them for 
poor play, because the clubs would no longer have the rights to their individual players.  Nor 
would teams any longer pay less to marginal players because they had to pay more to their top 
ones just to keep them happy.  For the rare instances when controversy arose, the plan called for 
a Committee on Grievances, where the players would have representation.55 
 
* * * * * 
 
It seems important to lay out the provisions of the Millennium Plan in detail, partly 
because it would be such a radical break with established baseball practices in the mid-1880s.  It 
was also at odds with the prevailing business and social attitudes of the United States in this era.  
The notion of a group of competitors working together for the mutual gain of the group must 
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have astonished many at the time.  Favoring cooperation over competition as the means of 
establishing a prosperous business ranked among the vilest of heresies in an era featuring the 
likes of John D. Rockefeller and Andrew Carnegie.  Any social Darwinists who also followed 
baseball must have been apoplectic. 
In addition, the plan would necessitate a radical reconfiguration of the baseball business.  
It was certainly a more orderly and systematic way of doing things than baseball had at the time.  
The tradeoff for the order and system was that each individual team would have to give up a bit 
of its independence of action.  It would probably hurt the wealthier teams more than smaller 
market ones, as their financial strength would be of less advantage than at present.  Because the 
owners of those wealthy teams wielded the greatest influence in league meetings, persuading 
them was the most important obstacle to adoption. 
In any event, such was Richter’s plan.  The question whether it would gain traction, and 
whether anyone in baseball would have the nerve to try it.  The paper printed some of its 
responses in the next issue, claiming “an immense number” of positive responses against “not 
half a dozen” negative ones.  The Pittsburg Times found the plan “somewhat Utopian” but saw 
many favorable features.  It disliked the pay-for-position scheme, writing, “it is for the man that 
the price is given, and not for the position,” but liked the incentives provided by giving players a 
salary bonus based on their club’s position in the standings at the end of the championship 
season.   
The Philadelphia Sunday News declined to discuss the minutiae of the plan, but opined, “I 
do not expect that anything like it will be adopted for several seasons to come, but parts of it 
must be adopted in the near future.  Some such scheme for equalization must be taken up soon.”  
The Sunday News’ rival paper, the Philadelphia North American, wrote, “perhaps one or two of 
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the most sweeping changes—equalization of the playing strength and the inviolable salary limit, 
for instance—would not stand the test of practice, but regarded as a whole the Millenium Plan is 
the most complete and ablest ever advanced for the perpetuation of the greatest field game yet 
invented.”  Apparently popular amongst its Philadelphia brethren (The Sporting Life’s home 
office was in that city), the Philadelphia Sunday Item wrote, “it is a good thing, and the Item, 
knowing a good thing when it sees it, has no hesitation in endorsing it.”  Meanwhile, the 
Pittsburg Chronicle decided, “it is not at all likely to meet with unanimous approval, but in many 
of its features it has much to commend it and will afford food for much argument during the next 
month or two.”   Like-minded, the Cincinnati Times-Star decided, “Rome was not built in a day, 
nor will the Millenium Plan arrive this year.”  However, “as each season brings its tremendous 
load of increased expenses, the plan will be a beacon of light, showing managers the way to 
escape from threatened ruin.  The project appears just a day before the President’s message, and, 
it is safe to say, will create much more of a furor in the base ball world than Grover Cleveland’s 
little document of 22,000 words will do.”56 
A few other papers were lukewarm in their responses.  The Philadelphia Times thought 
the plan exceedingly complex in implementation, given how many changes to accepted practices 
it entailed, and struggled to see how the plan served the best interests of the players in the ways 
advertised.  The Toronto World thought, “the proposed equalization of playing strength is so 
revolutionary of existing methods, that it is doubtful if it will meet with favor.”  The Philadelphia 
Record agreed with the World on this issue, stating, “the most objectionable feature about it is 
the annual shifting about of players, which would be disagreeable not only to the men 
themselves, but to the public as well.”  These were minority opinions, however, or at least a 
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minority of those published in the paper (although it is easy to see why it might hesitate to print 
items condemning its own plan) as most responses, like that of the New Orleans Daily States, 
agreed with the views already stated.  The Daily States believed “there are some faults in the 
Millenium scheme, but on the whole it approaches nearer perfection than any plan it has been the 
pleasure of the States to read of.”57   
The correspondents for The Sporting Life also chimed in with their views and interviews, 
and while once again remembering the caveat that they were unlikely to bite the hand that fed 
them, they too heaped praise on the idea, for the most part.  None seemed more pleased, and 
none supported the scheme with greater fervor in the years to come, than Baltimore writer Albert 
Mott, who urged the immediate adoption of the plan for the 1888 season and continued urging its 
adoption on an almost weekly basis in his letters for months thereafter.  Louisville’s 
correspondent interviewed team president Zach Phelps, who approved of the idea of reserve 
teams and offering players incentives based on their position in the final league standings.  As 
any team president would do, of course he approved of any plan that would limit player 
salaries.58   
Over in Beantown, “Mugwump” decided “everyone must admit the cleverness of the 
whole plan in all its details, even though they may think the Millenium will actually come before 
it is carried out.”  He recognized, however, that the players might not approve, especially 
concerning the part of the plan that would equalize the clubs by redistributing the players each 
year.  The constant movement and relocation of a player’s home each season, with no monetary 
compensation for the trouble, might be hard for the players to stomach.  Even the miserly Arthur 
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Soden, owner of the Beaneaters and never one to be overly concerned about player welfare, 
agreed on that point, stating, “it would not be right to make those who have homes and 
associations in one city, break off all their ties and go off where they have no friends, to begin 
again.”  Interestingly, Soden did think that the financial motivations for finishing higher in the 
standings were a wise move, and offered some suggestions about how to regulate salaries, as he 
believed only a committee of men from outside the game might be trusted to grade the players 
impartially.59 
Harry Palmer “heartily endorsed” the plan from Chicago, although he limited his 
commentary because “my enthusiasm would carry me away beyond the limit of space.”60  Bob 
Larner, writing from the nation’s capital, believed the plan, “if honestly and faithfully carried 
out, would unquestionably redound to the interest of base ball.”  However, Larner was concerned 
that when it came to getting team owners to buy in, “it will be a difficult matter to convince these 
gentlemen, who have gone down deep in their pockets to secure a strong base ball team, that it 
will be to their interest in the end to throw the material they have been accumulating for years 
into a general pool and draw out in return whatever Dame Fortune decides they shall receive.”  
Larner was, therefore, doubtful that the major leagues would actually try out the plan.61 
While Larner was certainly onto something with his commentary, out of all the paper’s 
correspondents, O.P. Caylor’s and Frank Brunell’s musings regarding the plan probably hit 
nearest the mark.  While many of their contemporaries seemed to believe, deep down, that the 
game’s leaders really did have the good of the game at heart, rather than their own personal 
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interests, these two men were much more perceptive of what made businessmen tick in the 
Gilded Age.  Caylor wrote, 
We hear constantly of a millenium idea which demands that one club or a few clubs, or a 
League or Association of clubs shall do something for the general good of the whole or 
sacrifice some individual advantage that general good may come to the game.  Those are 
millenium theories, but have any one of them ever been practiced?  Has anybody ever 
heard of a club or a body of clubs which has sacrificed some advantage, that good might 
come in a shower. . . . I have been a close observer of base ball for twelve years and I 
have yet to discover the first instance of a sacrificing spirit in any base ball club official 
exercised for the general good of the game.  If any of your readers can think of some act 
of any ‘magnate’ which might in his charitable mind smell a little milleniumish, I wish he 
would specify it in The Sporting Life, so that I may hold an autopsy. 
 
None did.  Caylor went on to add that, while he approved of the plan from the perspective of the 
overall good of the game, referring to baseball’s leading men, “they have things their own way 
and they will not soon cease to forget it.  The Millenium plan they will say is a good thing; a 
most excellent thing—for the rest, but we have a good thing of our own and will hold on. . . . The 
‘magnates’ will talk about it, praise it, say it ought to be adopted some time hence, and that is 
all.”62  Brunell believed the same, writing,  
I talked at odd times with every man who had a vote at the Association meeting about 
The Sporting Life plan, and found them all—practical and otherwise—opposed to it on 
the ground that it was impracticable.  This was the machine’s decision on the plan, and 
settled it.  There is as much of a ring in the American Association as in the League.  
Amongst us it is Byrne, Barnie, Von der Ahe and Phelps, with Stern just on the threshold, 
as the League business is done at the beck of Spalding, Rogers, Day, et. al.  The 
Association ring being pretty well fixed for players, and being satisfied with their present 
outlook, didn’t want any literary fellers bothering with their business, and so the literary 
fellers’ scheme was knocked in the head with the club of impracticability.63 
 
 The statements by Brunell and Caylor are worth closer consideration.  Not merely 
because time proved them correct, but because these two men discerned another critical trend 
developing in the late 1880s that has gone largely unnoticed in discussions of this era.  Part of 
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the Milennuim Plan’s purpose, through the grading of players and standardization of salaries, 
was to hold down costs so all members of the various leagues might compete on an equal, or 
nearly equal, financial footing.  Teams did not compete on the same financial footing in the late 
1880s, any more than they do in the 2010s.  As Brunell put it, “the player is waxing fat and 
arrogant off the clubs who have to sustain $50,000 teams in $12,000 towns because New York, 
Boston, and Chicago—$50,000 towns, every one of them, to say nothing of a small profit from 
$50,000 to $80,000 per town per annum—have $50,000 teams and must be competed with.”  
Brunell did not blame the players for this, writing he would act in the same way were he in their 
stead, but simply pointed to the logical result of this system.  Because the managers and owners 
of certain clubs could do things like pay $10,000 for Mike Kelly, and then pay him a $5,000 
salary too, eventually, those teams would corral the best players when the financially weaker 
clubs could not offer comparable money.  “The men who reared and rounded out the Detroit 
Club ought to have made $100,000 out of the team. . . . Yet they didn’t get one-fifth of $100,000 
a year.  And why?  Because they did not have the right town.  With less work and talent the club 
in New York has earned four times as much.”64 
 This led to him to predict, on several occasions, exactly what transpired by 1892: the 
combination of the two major leagues into one large league without the smaller market teams 
that struggled to compete financially.  That it happened on the National League’s terms, rather 
than as an equitable merger, was irrelevant; it happened all the same.  Furthermore, he believed 
that the ownership of the larger market teams planned it that way.  “Base ball prices will not fall 
and an equitable plan, like that proposed by The Sporting Life, will never be adopted by the big 
clubs, who have set, and will set, a financial pace which they can stand, but other clubs cannot.  
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Base ball must be operated by groups and the best talent will go into the first and best paid 
class.”65  On another occasion, he remarked, “the only real trouble is that the richer clubs set the 
pace and run the poorer ones—paying more according to financial ability based on income—off 
their feet.  If there were less howls at the players and more attention to stable laws that would 
stand, and advance that which they rule, there would be less need of cries and more time to give 
to the good of the game.”66 
 Caylor arrived at essentially the same conclusion.  He wrote, “the evil in the present 
system of salaries lies in its unfairness and inequality. . . . But can you blame any player in either 
League or Association for demanding an excessively large salary when one man gets $5,500 and 
another $4,500 . . . while just as good and valuable players are asked to take part in the same 
championship fight for half the sum and less?”  The primary responsibility for the present 
financial state of things, then, lay with the management of the clubs.  “There is no use in laying 
the blame for this threatened ruin upon the player.  It is the rich and reckless club owner who 
must shoulder the responsibility, and the primitive offence came from Boston.”  Players, after 
witnessing the Triumvirates’ actions in the Mike Kelly signing, “naturally reasoned that if clubs 
had $10,000 packages of greenbacks to pay for a release, they had money to pay for increased 
salaries.  The reasoning was good . . .  but they did not stop to think that only one out of every 
three clubs could afford such prodigality, or any prodigality at all, and that what was an 
advertisement for the Boston Club was a death warrant to some of the rest.”67 
By 1891, the National League consisted of Boston, Chicago, New York, Philadelphia, 
Cleveland, Brooklyn, Cincinnati, and Pittsburgh.  This group contained the six most populous 
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cities in the nation (1890 census) except for St. Louis (which ranked fifth), with Cincinnati 
ranking ninth, Cleveland tenth, and Pittsburgh thirteenth.  In the same year, the American 
Association fielded teams in Boston, St. Louis, Baltimore, Philadelphia, Columbus, Chicago (a 
replacement for Milwaukee, which dropped out of the circuit after thirty-six games), Louisville, 
and Washington, DC.  When the National League forced the American Association out of 
baseball in 1891, it did away with the competing teams in Boston, Chicago, and Philadelphia, 
absorbed St. Louis, Baltimore, Louisville, and Washington, DC, and dropped Columbus.  The 
new National League, with twelve teams, kept this configuration until the 1900 season, but the 
smaller market teams had little chance against their more prosperous brethren.  Louisville, for 
instance, twentieth in population in the 1890 census, never finished better than ninth out of 
twelve before leaving major league baseball for good after 1899.  Washington, DC, fourteenth in 
population, likewise finished above ninth just once in the 1890s, in 1897 when the club tied for 
sixth.   
Therefore, when writers like Brunell or Caylor complained about escalating salaries, as 
they often did, what they really meant was that these salaries would doom the game, not because 
the players did not deserve their fair value, but because in the absence of a more equitable 
scheme to distribute revenue between the ball clubs, they strained competition to, and eventually 
past, the breaking point.  By the late 1880s, teams in cities such as Detroit or Louisville could 
pay only so much before they started losing money.  Teams in Boston, Chicago, or New York 
could pay much more before reaching the same financial precipice.  Therefore, the talent 
gravitated to these larger markets, baseball became less competitive, and patronage suffered.   
When evaluating the Millennium Plan, bit and pieces of it became policy.  The minor 
leagues gained the right of reservation, a version of it, anyway, as discussed in chapter two.  The 
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idea of a pay scale for the players eventually found purchase in the form of the Brush Plan in 
1889, but Brush’s version was not exactly what Richter laid out.  The American Association 
tried an extremely weak variation of the plan to reward teams for their final position in the 
standings.   
Such half-hearted measures remained very limited in impact, however, and no league 
ever tried the plan in its entirety.  Writers in the sporting press continued urging it for the next 
two years, but as the 1889 season wound down and the Brotherhood and National League drifted 
further apart, that issue stole the spotlight.  It is impossible to guess whether the Millennium 
Plan, or something near it, might have kept peace, because no league ever used it.  By the time 
the 1890 season and the Brotherhood War were over, things were radically different in baseball.  
By 1891, the National League was on its way to monopolizing major league baseball, and the 
Millennium Plan gradually faded from view.  Its publication was an event specific to a certain 
time and set of circumstances, and when those circumstances changed, the new landscape in 
baseball had no place for the Millennium Plan. 
 
* * * * * 
 
 While all this talk of millennium plans and an enlarged role for the Brotherhood in the 
affairs of the game took place, members of the press continued to refine their views of the 
organization, some for the better, others for the worst.  One example was Harry Palmer in 
Chicago, who wrote about some of the typical ideas put for to counter the Brotherhood.  While 
he sympathized with some of the organization’s complaints, he also worried it might become an 
exclusive organization that would work to the benefit of its membership rather than the general 
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benefit of the game.  (How this was different than, say, how the National League’s moguls 
treated their brethren in Detroit or Kansas City, he left unsaid.)  He saw danger in the possibility 
that the Brotherhood might request multi-year contracts for some or all of its players.  Palmer 
believed this might become a tool for existing members to use to preserve their own positions in 
baseball and keep out younger talent.  He also worried what these contracts might do to player 
motivation.  Would they continue to work and strive for improvement if their contract 
guaranteed employment several years into the future?  He therefore cautioned younger players to 
think twice before joining the organization.  In his attempt at persuasion he also continued to 
repeat several complete or partial fallacies regarding the players, writing such nonsense as that 
ballplayers dressed their wives in silks and diamonds, and that they worked just seven months of 
the year.68 
One thing that Palmer did not bring up, but should have in order to make his point, was 
what would happen should a player get hurt and lose his effectiveness before the contract was 
up.  Given the injury history, of pitchers especially, in Gilded Age baseball, this was no small 
matter.  He also neglected to mention, considering the other side of the issue, that a long-term 
contract had benefits.  Foremost among these is that it achieved the same purpose as the reserve 
rule; that is, keeping the player on the team, and the core of the team intact, over an extended 
period but without the negativity produced by the restrictiveness of the reserve rule.  It would 
also avoid the yearly disputes over salary that had done so much to complicate the lives of 
owners such as Chris Von der Ahe in recent years.  Finally, a long-term contract gave each club 
more predictability.  If a team were to sign a player to a three-year deal, for instance, the team 
could better predict what its costs would be three years into the future and plan accordingly, 
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instead of having to worry about what would happen to its financial situation should an 
important player become dissatisfied and demand more cash before signing for the next season. 
In a way, however, these points were moot, as the Brotherhood spent the fall of 1887 
discussing the language of contracts as its top concern, rather than their length.  Ward also 
responded to Palmer’s critique, writing a letter to The Sporting Life describing Palmer’s position 
as misinformed.  Ward tried to clarify that the Brotherhood did not desire to make multi-year 
contract obligatory.  Rather, “I expressed the opinion, individually, that there was no good reason 
why contracts, instead of for one year, might not be made for two, three or even five years, and I 
meant, of course, if agreeable to ball club and player.  But as for making this condition 
obligatory, I never entertained any such absurd idea.”  Seeking to avoid burning bridges 
unnecessarily, Ward also said of Palmer, “several of the ablest articles on the subject of the 
players’ wrongs have been contributed by your Chicago correspondent . . . we confidently expect 
his continued co-operation.”69 
Palmer was not easily mollified, however.  He believed the Brotherhood in the wrong to 
focus on the issue of player sales, and tried to turn around Ward’s story of the Kelly sale to make 
his own point.  In his eyes, “when Kelly’s release was sold to Boston it was sold because Kelly 
had positively refused to play another season in Chicago.  Before it was sold, however, Kelly 
was consulted by the purchasing club.  He stated that the transfer was agreeable to him and 
named the salary he would play for.  Was there any “slavery” in this transaction?”70  At the same 
time, he began conjuring up new fears regarding the Brotherhood’s intentions.  Palmer warned 
that if the BPBP succeeded on the contract issue, other leagues would, in short order, have their 
own brotherhoods to deal with, and that eventually, these separate brotherhoods would 
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consolidate.  Taking new players into their ranks as fast as the clubs discovered them, the 
consolidated brotherhood would then destroy baseball within one season.71 
This dispute between Ward and Palmer aside, in order to make headway on the contract 
language question, the BPBP needed official recognition from the National League.  As of mid-
September, that recognition was not forthcoming from National League president Nick Young, 
or anyone else in baseball’s senior organization, and the Brotherhood’s leadership became 
restless.  Perhaps seeking to divide and conquer, or to test the BPBP’s cohesiveness and resolve, 
Young and associates told Ward they were happy to meet a delegation of players, but that the 
delegation could not represent the Brotherhood.  Interviewed in Pittsburgh, John Ward said, “If 
this resolve is persisted in there will be trouble.  The brotherhood has come to stay, and not one 
of us will sign a contract until a delegation from our organization confers with the 
representatives of the National League. . . . President Young and others look upon us as 
something weak, but they will find out their mistake if a conflict takes place.”72  The owners 
were unmoved, however.  When a sportswriter queried Pittsburgh president Nimick about the 
organization, he simply stated, “I know nothing about it.”73 
When asked what the Brotherhood would do if the League continued on its course and 
the players refused to sign, Ward said, “I am not at liberty to say what we will do.  Let me say, 
however, that there is plenty of money at our disposal to organize any association or league.  We 
know of any amount of capitalists who want to invest their money in base-ball.  I will go further 
and say that we will be recognized as an organization, and we will all play next year whether the 
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league people like it or not.”74  We might interpret this hinting at forming a rival organization in 
several ways.  Perhaps it was premature confidence on the part of Ward and the Brotherhood.  
He might have been bluffing, hoping to startle the National League into showing its cards.  
Finally, these statements might have been Ward’s attempt to throw the National League owners 
off balance when they were already starting to argue among themselves through the press about 
the merits of returning to the percentage system for distributing ticket revenues after deciding on 
the guarantee system for 1887.   
Lastly, in this interview, Ward also drew attention to the benefits the Brotherhood already 
provided its membership in an effort to cast the organization in a fair and reasonable light for the 
public.  He mentioned the case, briefly described earlier, of Boston Beaneaters pitcher Charles 
Radbourn.  The ownership in Boston, the Triumvirs, suspended Radbourn without pay in 
September 1887 for what they deemed ineffective pitching, with insinuations that Radbourn was 
not giving his best effort each day, thus defrauding them of money.  The fact that the Triumvirs 
reversed course within a few days, Ward felt, was a testament to Boston’s fear that the 
Brotherhood might take up Radbourn’s cause.  He told his interviewer, “The union meant to 
respect the reserve rule, but would not tolerate a system by which honest players can be cast 
aside for weeks without pay simply because he is not playing as well as the club directors would 
like to see him.”75  As another member of the Brotherhood put it a short time later, “The point I 
made in his case was that indefinite suspensions are illegal under the contract or otherwise.  It is 
not proposed to uphold wrong-doers, but in all cases the player must, and will, have a hearing, 
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and the punishment must not be unreasonable, etc.”76  (The Old Hoss did not hold a grudge, 
apparently, as by the end of the season Bostonians were complimenting him once again for his 
fine work in the pitcher’s box.)  Radbourn’s case was not the only time observers suspected a 
team of suspending a man just to save money in 1887.  A Washington sportswriter believed the 
same fate had befallen one of the Nationals’ players as well.  In a general critique of the club’s 
management offered to explain the team’s weak performance that year, in September he wrote of 
the team’s president, “only this week he suspended a player for an offence committed prior to 
June 16, and after the man has been upon the field and played several good games.  I do not think 
it was so much his desire to correct abuses as it was to curtail the expenses of the club.”77 
The following day, the Chicago Daily Tribune printed a lengthy piece that, while not 
attributed to Ward, glowed in its references to the Brotherhood while demonizing National 
League ownership.  Discussing the “one-sided” contracts, it stated that they gave the clubs, 
“absolute control over every player that could be induced to sign a contract—have held their 
players in a state of bondage, and have in numerous instances sold and assigned them like so 
many slaves.”  These contracts “are clearly illegal, and have been so pronounced by the courts, 
and the practices of the league in dealing with players have been repugnant to every idea of 
freedom, if not hostile to American institutions.”  As if that was not enough, the article also 
reported, “it is only a short time since the President of a league club, in speaking of the players in 
his team, said, ‘Those men belong to me body and soul, and I’ll make them play ball,’ 
emphasizing his remarks with appropriate profanity.  An organization whose methods can justify 
such assertions does not deserve well of the American people.”  Not stopping there, “the league, 
however, appears to be considerable of a foreign element.  It claims to have done much to 
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promote the game, and possibly it has, but all its work has been of a mercenary character.”  After 
casting all these aspersions of un-Americanism at the League’s owners, the article went on to 
applaud the BPBP’s manly course, and called on all its readers to support it, should the situation 
develop into a showdown between capital and labor.  It closed by pointing out the great financial 
rewards realized by ownership, as justification of why the owners could afford to share a bit 
more with their players.78 
As September neared its end, and storm clouds continued to gather over the future of the 
game, both sides took their argument to the sporting press.  Nick Young published the exchange 
of letters between himself and Ward in The Sporting Life.  He acknowledged receiving Ward’s 
letter describing how the Brotherhood had appointed a committee to discuss the contract 
question in their August 28 meeting at Earle’s Hotel in New York City.  Young’s evasive reply 
on September 1 was to write, “in the absence of a League meeting, which could not conveniently 
be held at a very early day, I had no authority to recognize any communication from the 
Brotherhood, and at the same time suggested that he adhere to or renew his original request that 
the League officials meet a committee of its players, etc.”79  This, according to Harry Palmer at 
least, was a lie.  There was no point in Young calling a League meeting to discuss recognition of 
the Brotherhood, because the League’s magnates already had discussed it by that time, and 
decided to deny the Brotherhood any recognition even before Ward and the Brotherhood decided 
to ask for it.80  Given Palmer’s access to Al Spalding, the most important figure in the League, 
his version of is probably the correct one. 
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Ward did not buy it.  His response on September 3 called out Young for his obfuscation.  
Ward pointed out that there was no question on whether or not the League had to agree or 
discuss whether Young had authority to meet a delegation of the Brotherhood.  It had already 
done so, at its joint committee meeting on rules, as the minutes of that meeting clearly 
demonstrated.  Ward stated, “a refusal to recognize the Brotherhood now will look very much 
like hostility toward it, simply on the ground that it is an organization of the players. . . . Will the 
League go on record as opposed to any organization of the players on that ground alone?”  He 
also warned Young, “delays are always dangerous and an unsettled condition at the close of the 
season might prove a serious misfortune.”81 
While, clearly, Young’s delaying tactics perturbed Ward, there was conciliation as well 
in his September 3 letter, as he tried to repeat a theme he had brought up often, that the interests 
of the players and the owners were much the same.   
Presidents Stearns, Reach and Day are successful businessmen outside of their base ball 
interests, while, on the other hand, Hanlon, Irwin and myself are entirely dependent on 
base ball for a livelihood.  Are we not, therefore, relatively as much interested in the 
game’s welfare as they?  If then the game has nothing to fear, but the officials themselves 
have, we must conclude the interests of the game and that of the officials are two 
different things.  I am sure you will not agree to see any such distinction drawn.82 
 
 Young again split hairs in his response.  In his answering letter written September 10, he 
pointed out that at the rules committee meeting Ward referenced, the minutes merely named 
Ward, along with three other players, as prominent players interested in the proposed rule 
changes.  He further claimed that his financial records showed Ward attending at the National 
League’s expense, rather than the Brotherhood’s, in an attempt to deny that the BPBP ever 
enjoyed official status or sanction.  Ward refuted this claim also.  He pointed out that, first, the 
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League had invited him; as its guest, the League of course paid for his trip, just as it did the other 
players.  He also possessed a telegraph from Al Spalding and John Day specifically stating his 
presence as a member of the Brotherhood, and that, furthermore, John Day officially referred to 
him as such in front of the entire rules committee.83  
Young again denied having authority to recognize the Brotherhood delegation, and 
insisted “no emergency demands that I take a vote of League clubs by mail or telegraph, as 
suggested.”  He then closed with a statement that seems intended to achieve some combination 
of discrediting the need for the Brotherhood at all, casting doubt on its motives and loyalty to 
American values, and threatening what might happen if the BPBP persisted on its present course.  
He wrote, “I cannot understand what difference it makes to the players whether their proposed 
amendments to the contracts are to be considered as emanating from individual players, or from 
a secret society whose membership is mainly composed of League players.  If you accomplish 
equitable results, why quarrel with the form or method of their consummation.”  Furthermore, 
“The very marrow or essence of the good you are seeking can as well be reached by the old and 
usual means as by the new, without compromising the existing status of anyone.”84 
 Following Young’s epistle, the paper gave the Brotherhood a chance to air its side of the 
story, as president Ward gave another interview upon alighting from his train at Pittsburgh.  
“Yes, it is true that the League refuses to recognize the Brotherhood.  The League evidently 
regards us as of no importance, yet there are not nine players of any note whatever in the League 
that are not members of the Brotherhood.”  When reporters asked Ward what he and his Brothers 
proposed to do should the present impasse remain, he restated their intent not sign contracts for 
1888, and again pontificated on the evils the Brotherhood justly sought remedy for.  “Men can be 
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suspended without pay or fined at the whim of any set of directors, and still be held by an iron 
grip.  Take for instance the case of Radbourn . . . he was suspended without pay because the 
officials of the team allege that his work was not satisfactory.  Mark you, no charges were made 
against him, and he was refused his release.”  Referring to the reporters present, Ward reminded 
them, “now, if you fail to satisfy your employers they can either discharge you or you can quit.  
In Radbourn’s case they simply held him by an iron-bound contract without pay, and had he quit 
the club he would have been debarred from playing in any club recognizing the National 
Agreement in the United States.”  Going on concerning the arbitrariness of the present system, 
Ward said, “under the present contract system a player can be fined for walking around the 
corner and buying a cigar if the officials of a club in their wisdom see fit to construe the act into 
an offense.”  Finally getting to the Brotherhood’s main point, Ward told the reporters, “But what 
we most object to is being sold like cattle.  This evil must be checked, or it is going to injure the 
National game.  It is on this point that the League refuses to recognize us, for it has been a great 
source of revenue to its clubs in having the privilege of selling its best players wherever and 
whenever it liked.”85 
 Ward’s teammate and fellow Brother, “Orator” Jim O’Rourke, also spoke to the 
assemblage.  He reiterated Ward’s theme that the National League had recognized the 
Brotherhood at its rules committee meeting, and promised that should the League’s magnates 
decide on a showdown, the players were ready.  Describing the organization’s membership, he 
said, “well, we have our club, Boston, Philadelphia and Washington entire; about eight men in 
Indianapolis; all of the Pittsburg nine, except Smith, Whitney and Beecher, and they are willing 
to go in; nearly all of Detroit, and three men in Chicago, Pfeffer, Williamson and Flint.”  
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O’Rourke also sounded a note of hope, however, as he finished his comments by saying, “I don’t 
think there will be any occasion” when asked about a possible strike by the entire Brotherhood.86 
 Brother Jack Burdock of Boston said that while the players were not yet in a position to 
challenge the League directly,  
the day is near at hand when they will be in that position.  We are satisfied with the 
reserve rule and the salaries paid, but we are not at all satisfied with the form of contract 
now in use by the managers.  No player who is a member of the Brotherhood of Base-
Ball Players will ever again sign that contract.  We must and will have a new form.  The 
present contract won’t stand law.  It is too one-sided and gives the player no show.  As 
soon as a man signs it he binds himself for life to a club and becomes a mere chattel so 
long as he depends upon base-ball as a means of livelihood.  The managers can do with 
him as they please.  If they don’t want him to play ball he can’t, and must remain idle 
forever.  The manifest injustice of this appears when it is understood that in such an event 
he does not receive a salary.  The managers of a club can lay a player off without pay, 
and even, under the present ironclad contracts, prevent him from signing with another 
club that might be glad to avail itself of his services.  That means that they have it in their 
power to take the bread and butter out of our families’ mouths.87 
 
 The Sporting Life then canvassed “leading base ball men,” in other words, team owners, 
on their reaction to the developing drama with the Brotherhood, and it seems clear that they had 
been in conversation with president Young since his September 10 letter to Ward, and that the 
owners had decided to play up the angle that the BPBP was a secret organization with 
questionable loyalty to America.  They also, as a body, chose to obfuscate the questions 
surrounding the contract issue by trying to shift the terms of the debate and portray the players as 
out to injure the game with a hopeless scheme to get up a new organization.  President Young 
wrote, regarding his reasons for his refusal to recognize the Brotherhood, “in the first place, if 
the Brotherhood was organized solely for mutual benefit, as many other societies are, there might 
be no reasonable objection to its recognition by the League, though there would be no special 
reason and certainly no necessity for such action.”  Then, seeking to cast doubt on the motives of 
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the Brothers, he continued, “if, on the other hand, it is organized for the purpose of guaranteeing 
to its members immunity from the consequences of violating the laws and contracts of the 
League, its attitude is distinctly antagonistic, and its promoters have no right to expect 
recognition at our hands.”  He closed his statement by implying which of those two scenarios he 
found more likely.  “The disposition of all the officers of the League clubs is most friendly to the 
players, but they do not see that any good purpose can be served by recognizing a secret 
organization among them.”88 
 New York Giants owner John Day did not offer personal comment when The Sporting 
Life tried to obtain his views, but sent an unnamed “right hand man” instead.  This individual 
tried to uproot the basic grievance of the players by portraying the present contract as entirely 
correct and appropriate.  “The Brotherhood object to our contract and insist upon one that would 
take the control of the players out of the League, both on and off the field.  There are certain 
terms of our contract which may appear rather grinding, but they are never enforced.  For 
instance, the stipulation that the player shall assume all risk of personal injury on the field or 
otherwise is not enforced.”  One can almost hear Bobby Mathews choking, but nonetheless, the 
man went on, “it is merely a provision to guard against unreasonable litigation on the part of any 
cranky players.”89 
 The paper spoke to Al Spalding, of course, but the Chicago owner was far too sly and 
experienced in such political maneuvering to say anything too dramatic or inflammatory.  As 
usual, he took the opportunity to portray the present contract system as necessary to the present 
state of things, a reasonable act on the part of respectable businessmen that avoided placing 
control in the hands of an unruly mob of undisciplined players.  When queried on whether or not 
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the current contract was one-sided, he replied, “Necessarily so.  The power must be placed in the 
hands of the club, which is a responsible organization.  It is much safer when in such keeping 
than if it were in the hands of roving players with no special responsibility.  It is much safer in 
the hands of a club by whom it will be judiciously used.  I claim it is for the interest of the 
players themselves.”  Judicious, responsible men, doing what was best for the roving, childish 
players who did not know what was in their own best interest.  Nothing more, nothing less.90 
 Not so reserved as Spalding in his remarks, John Rogers, owner of the Philadelphia 
Quakers, joined Nick Young in tossing accusations of disloyalty and un-American principles at 
the players.  “The League really could not afford to officially recognize a secret organization 
within its ranks of whose intentions and methods nothing is known, and whose work is done in 
the dark.”  This despite the fact that the Brotherhood was not secret, having published its goals as 
well as its organizational structure back in 1886.  Nonetheless, Rogers continued on, stating the 
fallacy that a new contract preventing owners from buying and selling players at will was part of 
a grand plot of the players to take over the League.  “To make such a precedent now would be 
only the commencement of an interminable series of demands and concessions, the possibility of 
which would outstrip all conception, and would ultimately leave the League utterly powerless in 
the hands of its subordinates.”  He meant to emphasize, of course, that he feared any concessions 
to the players would embolden them and give them some control over their fate.  Like many 
Gilded Age capitalists, Rogers had difficulty conceptualizing a situation in which this could 
work, as he clearly assumed, or wanted the sporting public to assume, that given any power, the 
players would act just as tyrannically as he would.91  He was probably already sour over the fact 
that the Columbian Bank in Philadelphia, of which he was a director, was collapsing, and the 




$7,500 the Quakers had with the bank was in danger of disappearing into thin air, so perhaps this 
seemed a good opportunity to take out some personal frustrations.92 
 When interviewed later, Boston Triumvir Arthur Soden expressed similar ideas.  In his 
conversation with Boston writer “Mugwump,” he offered, “I am in favor of hearing our players 
whenever they wish to meet us in conference, but I don’t quite believe in recognizing them as a 
Brotherhood. . . . It is establishing a bad precedent.  A manufacturer will receive his own 
employees, but don’t fancy entertaining a committee of the Knights of Labor.  That is the way I 
feel in this case.”  When Mugwump pointed out to Soden that receiving the Brotherhood as an 
organization was the same thing as receiving his employees, since the organization consisted 
solely of players, including his own, he could only weakly change the subject.  Unlikely as it 
may seem, Soden was actually more favorable towards the BPBP than his fellow Triumvir, 
Billings.  “He don’t like anything secret, and is death on the Brotherhood.  He don’t want 
anything to do with the organization, and if he had the casting of Boston’s vote, I am afraid it 
would be thrown against hearing John Ward’s communication.93 
 As if all the National League’s contract drama was not enough, the American 
Association’s players considered joining the fracas as well.  Rumors about an Association 
Brotherhood, not to mention its efficacy and organization, were a bit over the top as rumors often 
are, but in this case, they probably added to the tension.  When reporters asked John Ward about 
the rumors, he replied, “the Association players have no organization at present, but the matter is 
being considered.  I have had correspondence with representatives of the Association for some 
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time, and they may form a brotherhood.  In case they do, they can and will work in harmony with 
our organization.”94 
 Returning to the impending crisis with the League, Ward continued to stand his ground in 
his interviews with the press.  He pointed out that the League could not reject the proposals of 
the Brotherhood as unreasonable, because it had not accepted any proposals.  Therefore, the 
League’s objection must be to the organization itself.  He reiterated the Brotherhood’s intent to 
discuss proposals with the owners and withdraw any demands that the owners could demonstrate 
to be unreasonable, but clearly, that could not happen until the two sides met on an equal 
footing.95  He also reversed Young’s statement that it made no difference whether changes for 
the players emanated from individual players or the Brotherhood, stating, “what possible 
difference can it make to you whether you confer with a committee of individual players or a 
committee from the brotherhood, since the brotherhood practically is the players?”  He also 
smashed the fallacy propagated by Young and Rogers that the Brotherhood was in any way a 
secret organization.  “Its business meetings, like those of many other bodies—the League, for 
example—are not open to the general public, but there is no obligation of secrecy imposed upon 
any member, and its constitution and bylaws are free at any time for your inspection.”96 
 While it might seem that playing shortstop for the Giants and serving as the lightning rod 
for the BPBP’s troubles with the National League would be more than one man could handle, 
that was not all Ward was up to in the fall of 1887.  He also married the noted actress Helen 
Dauvray (she was also known as Ida Mae Gibson and Little Nell, the California Diamond, 
among other names, and claimed to have as many home towns as names.  One paper, for 
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instance, gave her real name as Helen Gibson, claimed she was from Cincinnati, and that Helen 
first performed in Uncle Tom’s Cabin in California at age five.97) on October 12 and embarked 
on a honeymoon which featured a western tour of the country.  Although seen together often in 
1887, the pair made the arrangements hastily so as to avoid giving the New York press a chance 
to have a field day with the story.  Ward also began work on his book of how to play baseball, 
titled Base-Ball: How to Become a Player, that winter, as apparently enjoying time with his new 
wife and battling eight of the most powerful men in baseball just was not enough to keep him 
occupied.98 
 While Harry Palmer in Chicago wavered in his support of Ward and the BPBP, many 
other writers were taking Ward’s side, at least to a moderate extent.  One Baltimore writer 
observed that listening to the Brotherhood cost the League nothing, and required no concessions, 
but would convince both the players and the public that they had the game’s best interests in 
mind.  He reminded his readers that calling the BPBP a secret organization was “thoroughly 
inconsistent, for both the League and Association hold secret meetings and the latter body is red-
handed from the outrage of expelling a member merely for publishing the standing of a vote on 
one of the most senseless and damning pieces of legislation that ever disgraced the record of a 
sane assembly.”  He also pointed out that, when it came to the League or the Association, “if 
there are any good reasons why these meetings of the employers should be star chamber affairs, 
the argument would apply equally well to the employed.”  While admitting that there were some 
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players so ignorant that they could not tell their own name “from the sign of a Chinese wash 
house,” not all owners were the intellectual heirs of Voltaire, either; they often did the kind of 
petty, tyrannical, and borderline dishonest things that the players wanted to eliminate.99 
 Interestingly, this writer also expounded what we might call the Modified Labor Theory 
of Baseball Value.  In its simplest form, Karl Marx’s Labor Theory of Value held that since 
workers take raw materials and turn them into finished products, their labor creates the value of 
the product beyond its original value as a raw material.  When a capitalist then sells the finished 
product, keeping most of the profit for himself while giving only a fraction of it back to the 
workers, the capitalist is stealing from the workers, because their work is what gave the item its 
increased value.  Because they increased the value of the item, they deserve most of the profit 
from its sale.  Applied to baseball, the author stated some obvious truths.  “The public do not 
visit the Polo Ground on account of Mr. Day or Mr. Mutrie, and certainly, in Baltimore, if Barnie 
was the card offered it would not draw like an army mule.  People go to see well-known players 
play a game . . . and they would go see them whether offered as a show by Mr. Day or Mr. Ward, 
Mr. Barnie or Purcell, or even an unknown employer.”  Similarly, “How many people would the 
Jersey City or the Newark Club draw in New York even if named the New York Club?”100   
The word “modified” is appropriate here because, as the sportswriter quoted also 
realized, it is clear that the clubs provided things of value as well.  They furnished a place to play 
the games, for one thing, advertising to draw fans to the grounds, administrative time to create 
                                                 
99 “League Vs. Brotherhood” TTT, The Sporting Life, October 5, 1887, 1.  In regards to the quote 
about the red-handed behavior of the American Association, TTT refers to its treatment of O.P. 
Caylor, whom the Association barred from a recent meeting, even though Caylor was the 
manager of the New York Metropolitans, because he had the nerve to publish the record of the 
Association’s vote on the matter of blacklisting players who would not sign the contracts offered 
them by their clubs.  The decision to adopt the blacklisting measure was the “senseless and 
damning” measure mentioned in the quote. 
100 Ibid. 
 618
the schedule and make travel arrangements, and so forth.  Still, it is probably fair to say that 
sports like baseball come closer to the Labor Theory of Value than most businesses.  The 
workers at a fast food chain are expendable, because almost anyone can perform their tasks 
satisfactorily.  Few people, however, can hit a baseball traveling at ninety miles per hour, or 
throw a baseball accurately at ninety miles per hour, and so those who command those skills 
create a great deal of value through the rareness of their talents.  This is why major league 
baseball games draw tens of thousands of fans while most high school baseball games draw one 
hundred or so.  Or, as the Baltimore Herald put it,  
It is high time that the idea that crack ball-players get more than they are worth was 
exploded.  Men like Latham and Comiskey are scarce.  Ten thousand men might be 
examined before one could be found combining all the qualifications of a first-rate ball 
player, mental and physical, as they do.  They are very different from the average man, 
and are worth a great deal more.  They are experts in their business, and experts in nearly 
every other calling in life are higher paid than these men.  They may have been cart-
drivers before they became professional ball-players, but they are as different from 
ordinary cart-drivers as Daniel Webster and Rufus Choate were from the ordinary 
‘shyster’ lawyer who carries his office in his hat.  It is no argument to say that players 
like Robinson of the Browns, Hanlon, and Dunlap could not earn more than $15 a week 
at any other occupation.  Neither could the Rev. Dr. Talmage as a book-keeper.101 
 
 
* * * * *  
 
 The verbal sparring continued into October.  While the Brotherhood’s committee of 
Ward, Irwin, and Hanlon worked on their own version of a new contract, National League 
president Nick Young continued in the fantasy that “the League is in no way responsible for the 
present condition of things,” and proclaimed that “contracts will be prepared as usual and 
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submitted to the players for signature.  This test of the sincerity of the men will be a crucial one, 
and will serve in a measure to indicate how much in earnest they are in this movement.”102 
 The committee, with the help of James Blackhurst, finished its work at the Bingham 
House in Philadelphia in mid-October.  They planned to submit their work to the various 
Brotherhood chapters for ratification, which was all but assured.  They also, through Blackhurst, 
reached out to the barons of the National League by contacting Philadelphia owner and lawyer 
John Rogers in another effort to calm the seas in their relations with the League.  Despite his 
inflammatory comments earlier, Rogers appears to have cooled down a bit along with the 
October weather.  He and Blackhurst held “amicable” discussions that “led to the clearing away 
of some doubts and misconstructions” on the contract and Brotherhood recognition questions.  A 
glimmer of hope, at least, returned after these discussions.103   
Philadelphia Quakers co-owner Al Reach also offered baseball fans the possibility that 
the two sides might work out some of their differences, remarking in a Pittsburgh interview, “I 
am confident that when the league meets next week the brotherhood will be frankly recognized.  
We have nothing to fear.  If the brotherhood proposes anything that will elevate the national 
game of course we will agree to it, as our desire is to make the game as pure and honest as 
possible.”  Reach later denied saying that the League would recognize the BPBP, however, 
saying he had been misquoted and had merely said the NL would listen to suggestions only.104  
Either way, Reach would not mention how the League would react on the contract question.  
Regarding the Radbourn situation, and the Brotherhood’s request to end the practice of 
suspending players without pay generally, he said, “I don’t think that that request will be granted.  
                                                 
102 “The Next Move” Nick Young, The Sporting Life, October 19, 1887, 1. 
103 “As To Contracts” NA, The Sporting Life, October 26, 1887, 1. 
104 Quote in “The Baseball Players’ Brotherhood” NA, Washington, DC Evening Star, November 
3, 1887, 5; “Pfeffer Not Released” NA, New York Times, November 5, 1887, 5. 
 620
If that rule is abolished it will have a downward tendency.  In the absence of that rule there 
would be nothing to keep players in line. . . . It is only by forcing players to do right that the 
game has become so popular with the people, and so pure that ladies and gentlemen of the best 
classes take an interest in it.”105  Reach’s remarks are quite reminiscent of Spalding’s at this 
point.  The owners represented reasonable, principled men, who had to force the childish players 
to do right.  Only this would make baseball respectable amongst the finer classes of the country.  
As Reach said a few weeks later, “some of them are straightforward, conscientious men, with 
whom it is unnecessary to make a contract.  Their word alone is good, but there are a great many 
others whom you have to watch like a hawk in order to make them toe the mark.”106 
 At this point, the BPBP called a special session of its delegates to take stock of the 
situation.  Ward and Tim Keefe from New York, along with Arthur Irwin, Jerry Denny, Abner 
Dalrymple, Mike Kelly, Dan Brouthers, George Wood, and Fred Pfeffer representing the 
National League’s other clubs, met in Cincinnati to discuss the situation.107  Partly, it was a 
meeting of convenience, as the players of several League clubs were crossing paths on their way 
to their various winter destinations, but the men also met because, as Ward put it, “the members 
of the brotherhood think they themselves have some knowledge of their wants and rights as 
players, but the league officials do not appear to look at it that way at all, in so far, although 
frequently importuned, they have refused us recognitions as a body.”  The BPBP remained 
focused solely on the contract language issue.  “No question of salary is involved in any way.  
No member of the brotherhood has yet signed for the season of ’88, and it is probably safe to say 
that none will sign until the management of the league vouchsafe us some recognition . . . and 
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from today’s meeting will emanate another demand for the arrangement of such a joint 
conference.”108 
 The players adjourned this meeting with a challenge to the League’s magnates.  Ward 
wrote a final letter to Nick Young stating that, should the League fail to agree to a meeting prior 
to November 12, the Brotherhood and its 125 members would, in effect, secede from the 
National League on November 15.  President Young cannily replied through the press that it was 
impossible to meet this deadline, as the League’s upcoming meeting was the proper time to 
discuss the letter, and that meeting was on November 16.109  The lines were drawn.  Or so it 
seemed for a few days, until the public discovered that the whole affair was a misunderstanding.  
Ward quickly sent another missive to Young clarifying he thought the League meeting was on 
the 14th.  He then moved back his demand by two days, and the Brotherhood sat back to await 
the outcome of ownership’s deliberations.110 
 
* * * * * 
 
 The BPBP soon had other issues besides contracts, as the first desertions from the ranks 
struck as October turned to November.  Former Brothers Ned Williamson and Silver Flint of 
Chicago left the Brotherhood in order to sign contracts individually with Spalding in Chicago.  
Using a divide-and-conquer strategy, Spalding offered the men liberal increases in pay, probably 
including considerable money in advance (it appears Williamson especially was in monetary 
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straits at the time111), in order to go back on their fellows, as “Flint and Williamson signed 
regular contracts calling for limit salaries, $2,000, but other documents provide that each will 
receive considerable above that figure.”  Spalding himself said of Williamson, “He is a good 
player, and gets what he is worth.  We had no trouble about salary and we treated him right, as 
we treat all our men.  These stories that the Chicago club doesn’t treat its men right are all lies.”  
In an interview with the Chicago Daily Tribune, Spalding also continued the familiar themes of 
the childishness of players generally.  When queried about Williamson’s withdrawal from the 
BPBP, he claimed Williamson told him he had no idea why he had joined in the first place, other 
than out of fellowship for other players, but that he had done so thoughtlessly.  Spalding also 
drew out a new theme in the ideological battle over the contract issue, but one that certainly 
echoed the claims put forward by other industrial leaders of the day, the idea that labor and 
management entered into a contract on equal terms, so there was no need for any labor 
organizations at all.  He claimed that Williamson said to him that Williamson had nothing to 
complain about in his relations with Chicago management, but, “if I had, I should not expect any 
association to adjust my individual wrongs, whether those wrongs were either fancied or real.”112 
 Ward put forth a different view of events in a New York Times interview shortly after the 
desertion.  Quoting from a letter Williamson wrote to him, Ward repeated to the interviewer, 
“believe me, comrade, I am with you and yours.  Necessity compels me to adopt my present 
course, and it is with deep regret that I tender my resignation as a member of the brotherhood.  
While I am no longer a member, my sympathy is with your cause.”113  Williamson himself 
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corroborated Ward’s interpretation of events as soon as he was able.  Interviewed in Charleston, 
South Carolina, where he was playing exhibition games in late October, he claimed the 
sensational reporting of his signing as a major victory for the League against the Brotherhood 
was all wrong.  “He does not hesitate to let his friends know that he is one of the heartiest 
admirers of the Brotherhood, and is doing all in his power to advance its interests.”114  
Interestingly, O.P. Caylor had warned Ward against the possibility that indiscriminately taking in 
members might prove a weakness.  Caylor wrote that all club officials “knew there were men in 
every chapter to whom the contemplation of five winter months without the consolation of 
advance money would be a dream of terror; men, too, whose principles are represented by so 
many hundred of dollars.  And those are the fellows who will be approached first.”115 
 Flint had his own spin on things.  In an interview, he said that he conceived the purpose 
of the Brotherhood was “so that players could obtain that which they wanted from the different 
managements.”  He felt that he and Williamson had done so, and thus the BPBP had served its 
purpose for them.  The possibility that future events might require additional help from the 
Brotherhood seems not to have entered his mind, or if it did, he did not say so in the interview.116 
 The owners, meanwhile, had at least a few dark clouds on the horizon themselves in the 
contract battle.  At issue was the common practice of signing players to a contract in the fall, and 
then releasing them from their contract in the spring, before the championship season began, 
when the team decided it did not need the player any longer, thus breaking the contract.  A 
Maine court found this practice illegal because the team had no legal grounds for ending the 
contract; the mere convenience of not needing a player’s services any longer was not sufficient 
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grounds to terminate the agreement.  When a sportswriter asked Al Spalding about the legality of 
the practice (he was noted for doing so frequently, and in this case, he may also have been 
preparing for the possibility that the Brotherhood would actually follow through on its threats by 
loading up his roster with potential replacements), the Chicagoan’s response was, “well, we have 
been doing it right along.”  When the writer pointed out that the Bobby Mathews case (described 
in chapter two) was another example of how players could compel clubs to honor their contracts, 
and that what Chicago and other teams did in signing extra men and then releasing them was 
illegal, Spalding simply stated, “we’ll see about that.”117 
 As the meeting neared, speculation built in the sporting press on whether or not the 
League meant to recognize the Brotherhood.  Pittsburgh, some believed, would vote recognition 
as a matter of self-preservation.  Given the strength of the trade union movement in that city, 
some feared that attendance at Pittsburgh’s Recreation Park would fall catastrophically as 
workers would avoid the games out of sympathy for the BPBP, should Pittsburgh ownership vote 
against recognition.  There were additional rumors that some of these organizations had vowed 
to “make matters very unpleasant” for Williamson and Flint the next time Chicago visited the 
Smoky City.118  It appears that the Pittsburgh chapter of the Knights of Labor, at least, regarded 
the BPBP as a fellow labor organization, as two of its leaders expressed their support for the 
organization, along with the support of their 12,000 fellows in the Pittsburgh vicinity.119   
The workingmen of the Smoky City were quite active in baseball patronage, as it turned 
out.  Later, in 1888, they discovered that one of the stockholders of the Pittsburgh team, Henry 
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Brown, was associated with the steel mill of Singer, Nimick, & Co., which employed non-union 
labor.  Therefore, they decided to organize a boycott of Allegheny games until Pittsburgh 
severed its connection with Brown.  Brown claimed he had divested himself of the stock a year 
ago, but it appears this assertion was untrue, and so the Amalgamated Iron and Steel Association 
still planned to stay away from Pittsburgh’s grounds at Recreation Park.120  As one member of 
their association said, “I can say that scores of men in Manchester and West End, who are good 
attendants of the game, have quit going and it is because of Henry Brown’s connection with the 
Pittsburg Club.  Brown is still running the rolls at Singer, Nimick & Co’s. mill, and has four 
jobs.  This is not the first time he hasn’t done the square thing with us. . . . I’ll venture the 
assertion that I know of 300 men who have quit going.”121 
 
* * * * * 
 
 Finally, November 15 arrived and the National League’s magnates held their confab in 
Parlor F of New York’s Fifth Avenue Hotel.  As if to underscore their lack of concern for the 
Brotherhood, whose representatives waited at the nearby Barrett House, the owners put off the 
discussion of recognition until the second day.  In the meantime, they did allow for an increase in 
the salary of umpires, lifting the $1,000 cap of umpires’ salaries and increasing their pay to a 
maximum of $2,000 in an effort to secure better, more qualified men.  There was also some 
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discussion of splitting the league into an Eastern and Western circuit to save on travel expenses 
and increase the enthusiasm created by geographic rivalries, but this talk came to naught.122 
 Finally, on November 16, the moguls sent a letter, signed by League president Nick 
Young, to Ward and his two Brothers at the Barrett House, Dan Brouthers and Ned Hanlon.  
Their lawyer, James Blackhurst, was also present.  It read, “I am instructed by the League, in 
annual meeting convened, to state that they will be most happy to meet you and your associates 
of League players this evening at 8:30 o’clock, for the purpose of ascertaining the objects of the 
association for which you claim recognition.”  Once in the presence of the assembly of owners, 
Ward soliloquized, “Mr. Brouthers, Hanlon, and myself represent the Ball Players’ Brotherhood.  
I am not unconscious of the fact that you have failed to designate us as such in your invitation to 
appear here. . . . Before we make known our mission you must recognize us as a committee from 
the Brotherhood.”123 
 In an exchange that was rather farcical, given that everything stated had been hashed out 
repeatedly over the past two months, Giants owner John Day, along with Philadelphia’s 
president, John Rogers, asked about the goals of the BPBP and why it deserved legitimacy and 
recognition.  Ward repeated the by now familiar litany.  Al Spalding moved that the owners 
recognize the Brotherhood.  The motion carried unanimously.  So far, so good for Ward and his 
Brothers, they had cleared their first hurdle.  Mere recognition, however, while positive, meant 
little as far as gaining acceptance of the new form of contract they had engineered in Cincinnati 
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in October.124  That would await their discussion with the committee of owners appointed to 
meet them. 
 The meeting took place deep into the night and continued the following morning.  The 
players presented their new version of the standard contract, while the ownership committee of 
John Day, John Rogers, and Al Spalding examined the document and made revisions of their 
own.  It was, in all, rather anticlimactic, considering all the verbal sparring and threats that 
preceded the conference.  The group presented its work to all the National League owners at 3:30 
on November 17, and the group agreed to the new contract language.  Both sides seemed pleased 
with the deal, asserting that the new contract protected their vital interests while serving to 
advance the game.  Ward stated that the new agreement was “a fair one” and the owners stated 
they felt it protected them and their interests.  Somewhat surprisingly, given the reluctance of the 
owners to even meet the Brotherhood in the first place, the Chicago Daily Tribune described the 
language of the contract as “the one drawn up and presented by the brotherhood, with but slight 
changes in phraseology.”  Nick Young’s official statement on the entire situation with the BPBP 
was now to say, “It is a good thing.  I think they will do their best for the interests of the 
league.”125  Al Spalding had a similarly revised take, stating, “I am glad they are recognized, and 
there is a complete understanding between the league and the players.  If the brotherhood lives 
up to the spirit of what they outlined at New York the organization will be a good thing for the 
players, the league, and the game.”126 
In brief, section one of the new agreement defined the parties to the agreement, and 
section two the length of the contract, binding the player to play baseball at “reasonable times 
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and places from April 1 to October 31.”  Section three required the player to obey club officers, 
managers, and field captains while the fourth section allowed for the disciplining of players for 
“dishonest play or insubordination,” carelessness, or indifference, and bound the players to 
refrain “from any excess or dissipation.”  The next section provided for the blacklisting of 
players who broke contracts or conspired with anyone to lose games on purpose.  Part six further 
defined the penalties for drunkenness, those being fines of twenty-five dollars for the first 
offense, fifty for the second, one hundred dollars for the third, and a suspension for the 
remainder of the season for any further infractions.  All these, of course, protected the owners to 
make sure that they received a full and sober effort from players in exchange for pay. 
Section seven offered a bit to the players, stating that teams could not implement the 
above penalties until providing written notice justifying their actions.  Part eight meant to 
provide a plan to deal with cases such as those of Curry Foley or Bobby Mathews described 
earlier.  This said that if a player became ill from “natural causes” and could not play, the club 
could deduct from his pay during the time lost.  On the other hand, injury sustained on the field 
in the discharge of the players’ duty would not result in a loss of pay, unless the team decided to 
release the player.  If that happened, however, the release would be unconditional.  Section ten, 
while affirming the clubs’ power to fine players, capped the fines at fifty dollars per offense.127 
While there were many more sections to the contract, twenty in all, a few more merit 
description.  Sections fourteen and fifteen allowed that if either party to the contract violated the 
terms of the agreement, the aggrieved party could terminate the agreement.  If a player violated 
the deal, they forfeited all future pay; if the club did so, the player could opt out of the contract.  
Furthermore, to deal with situations such as that of the disbanding Kansas City Cowboys 
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following 1886, the league still held the right of reservation of players even if their team 
disbanded, but if the player was transferred to a new club, they must receive at least the same 
salary as during the previous season, or they would be free from the contract.  Finally, section 
eighteen expanded the number of players a club could reserve to fourteen, but stated that 
reserved players must make at least the same salary as during the previous season unless they 
agreed to play for less.128  This was a new, and important, development.  Heretofore, the clubs 
had always claimed the right to reserve players via the reserve rule, but the rule itself had never 
actually appeared in any written contract.  For better or worse, Ward and the players wanted the 
rights and responsibilities of the clubs and players as regards the reserve rule clearly stated in the 
contract signed each year.129 
 
* * * * * 
 
 In the end, the two sides averted a war.  Both groups, it seems, deserve some credit for 
the peaceful conclusion.  The players certainly did not get all they wanted, but they did succeed 
in getting some new language inserted into their contracts that they sought.  In retrospect, 
probably their wisest move was not to bite off more than they could chew.  They had no chance 
of getting rid of the reserve clause, for instance, even though doing so might have benefited most 
of them financially, and they realized this and pulled back from making any demands on that 
score.  They picked one goal, had the wisdom to pick an achievable goal, and as a result, they 
carried the day, to the extent they ended up with most of what they wanted on the contract issue. 
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 The owners, too, made some wise moves.  They now had official, standardized penalties 
for some of their greatest grievances with the players, especially on the alcohol question.  With 
the code for dealing with drunkenness clearly laid out in the view of all, they no longer had to 
worry about players complaining about random or arbitrary fines on that account.  They still had 
the blacklist available to them in extreme cases, and now they could reserve fourteen players 
from one season to the next.  The league also retained the right to transfer players from one team 
to another, should one of its teams disband or leave the league. 
 This is not to say that all owners were pleased with how things transpired.  Arthur Soden 
of Boston, especially, was not.  On recognizing the Brotherhood, Soden remarked, “they gained 
that point, but we never ought to have allowed it.  And we would never have had to recognize 
them if the Westerners had kept their mouths shut and let Rogers alone.”  Offering a backhanded 
compliment towards the new contract, he opined, “it is a fairly equitable one, in fact, as much so 
as you can make it between a responsible party and an irresponsible one.  The contract don’t 
bother me.  It is not that, but now that this so-called brotherhood has gained a foothold I fear we 
may see trouble from it in the future.”  Defeated also on the percentage or guarantee question, he 
breathed defiance.  “I estimate that we shall lose about $15,000 by the operation next year.  
However, we are not going to let that bother us.  The next thing is to get together a winning 
team, and we intend to do that if it takes a big pile of money.”130 
 Soden’s views aside, both sides, consciously or not, stepped back from the brink, 
realizing that baseball was doing well, and that now was not the time to risk the game’s public 
reputation by engaging in brinksmanship.  There was no pressing reason for the players to 
challenge owners on the salary issue, because with the salary limit of 1886 now a dead letter 
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anyway, salaries were indeed rising.  On the owners’ side, with all teams in the league making a 
profit, there was great risk in alienating the players as a body and tempting them into disrupting a 
system that was making money, when the only price to pay was revising the language in player 
contracts.  Both groups proclaimed that they only had the best interests of the game at heart, and 
only wanted what was reasonable.  In November of 1887, they could agree on what was and was 






The Winter of 1888-1889 and Spalding’s World Tour 
 
 
 In many ways, the winter of 1888-1889 differed from the one before it not so much in 
kind as in scale.  The main issues were the same—the cost of players and the difficulties of some 
teams to try to meet their costs and compete while avoiding financial loss.  A year later, 
however, these issues were more serious.  During November, National League owners secretly 
worked on a plan they hoped would fix their increasingly broken business model.  While they 
did so, two other events of major importance happened simultaneously.  One was baseball’s first 
effort at international expansion.  The other was a novel attempt at circumventing the reserve 
rule launched by a pair of veteran players in Detroit. 
The men who ran baseball in the United States, like others who ruled the corporate world 
during the Gilded Age, were always on the lookout for ways to expand their operations.  For 
baseball men such as Al Spalding in Chicago and Al Reach in Philadelphia, who had already 
branched out into the sporting goods business, there was a direct link between the fate of their 
businesses and the growth of baseball.  The more popular the game became, the better their 
businesses supplying the game would fare.  Every time a new league organized, their emporia 
had the opportunity to sell more of the implements of play.  Bats, balls, uniforms, scorebooks, 
shoes, gloves, and anything else the sporting public might require, were available by mail order.  
As the nation’s transportation grid, based around the railroads, filled in and matured, it became 
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easier for the moguls who offered sporting goods to the public to find customers and ship them 
all they needed to play the national game. 
Unlike many observers, however, whose interests and vision were local or national in 
character, Spalding especially had greater plans.  Although he was Machiavellian in his 
manipulations of others, puritanical in his distaste for alcohol in baseball, and willing to bend the 
rules when the chances of success seemed to outweigh the risks, he was also a cunning 
businessman with international plans for his sporting goods empire.  Like many other capitalists 
in Gilded Age America who, fearing that the national market for their goods might be nearing 
the saturation point, began looking abroad for further opportunities, as early as 1887 Spalding 
was forming plans to look for overseas markets and broaden the base of sales for his company. 
Every now and then during the 1880s, someone connected with baseball floated plans for 
some kind of international tour to popularize the game abroad.  The most popular destination 
was, of course, the United Kingdom.  Not only was baseball similar to cricket, distressingly so 
for those who wanted to claim purely American origins for the game of baseball; the differences 
in language and cultural norms were small compared to what Americans might find in other 
areas of the globe.  The UK seemed, therefore, the best candidate among other nations to adopt 
the American game and give American businesses another market in which to offer sporting 
goods.  As noted in chapter one, American baseball players had traveled to the British Isles for 
this purpose as far back as 1874, but they had had little luck persuading the British to take up the 
game.   
One of the problems these plans to spread baseball to the UK encountered, besides the 
fact that the British seemed firmly attached to cricket, was timing.  Because of its northerly 
latitude and weather, a baseball tour in Britain would not do well in winter months when 
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conditions would be hostile to players and spectators alike.  Therefore, a tour of any duration 
needed to take place during the summer.  This would, of course, interfere with the championship 
schedule in the United States, and no team would surrender the sure money they realized from 
healthy attendance in the US for the potential profits, uncertain at best, of a trip across the 
Atlantic, even if they could somehow get the permission of their fellow league members to 
suspend the normal schedule for such a trip.   
The answer to this conundrum, some realized, was to tour in the southern hemisphere 
over the winter instead.  Speculation about such a tour centered on Australia as the logical 
destination because it offered nearly all the same advantages, in terms of language and culture, 
which a trip to Great Britain did.  The population of Australia was much sparser than in the 
British Isles, it was true, so such a trip required much more travel time between games, but by 
the later 1880s, most baseball observers had decided that the road to popularizing baseball 
internationally began Down Under.  (One other proposal involved taking two teams of amateurs, 
possibly made up of college students, to tour in Britain.  Not only would their schedules allow 
for summer travel, but as college students largely came from the ranks of the well-to-do in the 
1880s, the social skills and standing of college students would serve ambassadorial functions as 
well.”1) 
                                                 
1 “It Might Pay, After All” Henry Chadwick, The Sporting Life, April 25, 1888, 1.  We must 
consider material trying to evaluate the Spalding tour rather carefully.  Harry Palmer, Chicago 
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Hart, Spalding’s financial manager for the trip, and Hart claimed the tour had brought in $10,000 
in exhibition games before leaving the United States, the subtitle of the article was “Hart’s 
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Once this became accepted wisdom, the question was whether such a tour would pay.  
The odds seemed against it.  Australians had no prior experience with baseball.  To many it 
seemed doubtful that they would pay to watch Americans play a game with which they were 
unfamiliar.  Besides the obvious logistical issues of planning such a tour, this question was the 
rock upon which all plans to tour internationally foundered.  By 1887, however, Al Spalding 
believed he had a plan that would untie this Gordian knot.  As a participant in the England tour 
of 1874, he knew that immediate financial reward was unlikely.  As he explained his plans to 
Harry Palmer, “in my judgment such a trip would prove a losing venture to any man who 
undertook the journey with any expectation of making money out of the gate receipts of his 
games.”  Therefore, rather than beginning the tour with the thought of immediate profit, Spalding 
stated, “in undertaking such a trip I do so more for the purpose of extending my sporting goods 
business to that quarter of the globe and creating a market for goods there, rather than with any 
idea of realizing any profit from the work of the teams I take with me.”2 
Spalding deemed the time was right for such a venture.  “We have shipped a few goods to 
Australia during the past three years, and the trade from there has been growing so steadily that I 
feel confident of being able to build up a business there, as the result of my contemplated 
venture, that will, in the end, repay me.”  When reminded of the enormous financial outlay it 
would take to tour across the Pacific with a party of twenty-two ballplayers, Spalding made clear 
he harbored no illusions about what he was getting into.  “It will take at the correct calculation 
                                                                                                                                                             
Blarney.”  Likewise, it titled other parts of its account, “Jim Hart of Milwaukee Doing 
Spalding’s Dirty Work” and “They Try to Skin The Ladies of San Francisco,” and wrote, “I can 
not tell you with what disgust the people of San Francisco look upon the recent exhibition games 
here by the Chicago and All-America teams.”  “The Chicago Fakirs” Gold Pen, The Sporting 
News, November 17, 1888, 2.  The Sporting News also referred to Harry Palmer as Spalding’s 
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when writing about what happened on the tour. 
2 “To Australia” Harry Palmer, The Sporting Life, March 28, 1888, 1. 
 636
$30,000, and that amount of money will be deposited in bank for expenses before we leave 
here.”  Furthermore, as he described his plans to Palmer, “I shall be perfectly willing . . . to 
spend a few thousand dollars to the end of establishing branch houses in Sydney and Melbourne, 
and that is principally what takes me there.”3 
As of March of 1888, Spalding was still contemplating what players to take on his tour, 
but true to his belief in recruiting “respectable” people as patrons for his games, he did say,  
every player we take with us must be not only a ball player, but a gentleman in 
appearance, intelligence, and address.  Full dress suits will, I fancy, be almost as requisite 
to each player as his base ball uniform will be, for I intend to have our party received in 
royal style at Sydney and at Melbourne, and they will doubtless be generously entertained 
by many people of high social and official position during our stay.4 
 
 
 Realizing the value of publicity in such a plan, Spalding had already arranged for an 
October tour throughout the western US to increase the hype.  On his way to Australia, he 
planned contests in Milwaukee, St. Paul, Minneapolis, Des Moines, Omaha, Kansas City, 
Topeka, Denver, Leadville, Colorado Springs, Cheyenne, Salt Lake, Sacramento, and San 
Francisco.  “On the trip, you may rest assured, that the arrival and departure of our party at each 
point I have named will be a not-to-be-forgotten event, while the series of games we shall play in 
‘Frisco, just before leaving, I anticipate, will be the biggest events in base ball that have yet taken 
place on the slope.”  Following their embarkation, the players would call on King Kalakua in the 
Sandwich Islands (Hawaii) before arriving in Melbourne, where an American friend of 
Spalding’s would host them.  Once there, “the boys will be able to tire themselves out, if they 
choose, at kangaroo shooting.”5 





 From there, the American contingent would play games in every Australian town that 
promised even a moderate audience.  The original itinerary called for games in Adalaide, 
Burabura, Gelong, Balarat, Sandhurst, Waga, Orange, Bathurst, Sydney, New Castle, and 
Brisbane, plus Launceston and Hobartown in Tasmania and Auckland, Thames, Hokaika, 
Christ’s Church, Wellington, and Dunedin in New Zealand.  Spalding’s original plan called for a 
return to San Francisco after this grand tour, although later, he would change the tour into 
something far longer and more ambitious than he was willing to discuss in March.   
Spalding predicted that, even if the tour were not an immediate financial success, the 
game itself would take root in Australia much more easily than it had in Britain.  He said 
Australians would embrace baseball “like a duck to water.  Australians have all of that love for 
outdoor sports and athletics which characterizes the English people, coupled with the push and 
enterprise of the Americans.”6  There were a few glimmers of baseball activity in Australia on 
which to base such rosy predictions.  Melbourne did have a baseball club, although it limited its 
membership to Americans only, and had been active but a single year, but the US Consul-
General to Australia, W.J. Morgan, was an honorary member, as were “a number of other 
prominent citizens of America.”7 
Joining Palmer in praising the potential of Spalding’s venture, and in his assigning certain 
national characteristics to Australians, Henry Chadwick was “confident that Mr. Spalding will 
find large profit in it; not, perhaps, in the way of gate receipts, but certainly in the wider 
extension of his sporting goods business.  With characteristic Western pluck and energy, 
however, he is going to take the chances of success or failure in his business venture, and I 
predict for him a noteworthy success.”  Chadwick was confident the Australian trip would 
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succeed where the trip to Great Britain in 1874 failed, because “he is now, too, going to a very 
different country, and among a people, who, despite of certain inherited colonial tendencies, 
have more of the characteristics of our own people, in certain respects, than their old-country 
progenitors have; and there is not likely to be such national prejudice met with in Australia by a 
party of American base ball players in 1889 as the visitors to England in 1874 encountered.”8  
Spalding later asked Chadwick, as baseball’s greatest living historian, to accompany the 
expedition and write about the grand adventure, but the Old Brooklynite declined on account of 
age and other duties.  (We should remember, of course, that Chadwick’s “other duties” included 
working on Spalding’s yearly baseball publication, so it is no surprise that he was an enthusiastic 
supporter of the whole plan.)9 
Not all were sanguine of success, however.  One Californian sportswriter, who professed 
to have met many Australians in the Golden State, did not like the odds.  “We feel sorry for Al, 
so far as the financial part of the undertaking is concerned.  Almost universally do they express 
themselves as wedded to cricket and lacrosse, affect to despise base ball, and in prejudice out-
English even a Londoner.”10  The Australian sports editor for the Referee and Sunday Times, 
Neville Forder, offered the same prognosis.  Asked by James Hart if such a trip would pay in 
Australia’s larger cities, he answered no.  He admitted that some had made efforts to organize 
baseball clubs in Australia, but “our people are educated up to cricket, and can see no fun in the 
quadrangular game. . . . Your runners and boxers do very well here, and are generally very well 
treated, if they are white. . . . So you see we support good goods, but base ball is not our game.”11 
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* * * * * 
 
Despite the naysayers, Spalding made his grand excursion.  He could not pass up such a 
visible opportunity to promote the game of baseball and his business interests.  Proclaiming his 
intent to bring America’s game to the “crowned heads, nobles, and peasantry of the Old World,” 
Spalding decoded to match his Chicago team, headed by first baseman Cap Anson and 
centerfielder Jimmy Ryan, against a second team featuring players recruited for the trip from 
other National League and American Association clubs.  The most visible player among this 
second group was, ironically considering his role in the drama to come, noted shortstop and 
BPBP president John Ward of the National League champion New York Giants.12 
 Spalding billed his second squad as the “All-American Team,” and it was somewhat akin 
to what we might today call an all-star team, although the comparison is not exact.  Most 
members of the All-Americans were good players; after all, Spalding wanted competitive games 
between closely matched teams to help stimulate interest in his tour.  However, his other primary 
criterion for selection was the deportment and reputation of the men.  Knowing that the tour 
would involve diplomatic responsibilities as well as athletic ones, he recruited players who 
would look as good at a formal dinner as they did on the diamond. 
 It is not necessary here to discuss all the details of the Australia trip, as there is already 
literature on the Spalding tour.  A few things merit further description, however, because they 
provide more insight into the milieu of which baseball was a part.  One of the most notable was 
the membership of the teams that embarked on the tour.  With all the issues between owners and 
players beginning to come to a head, the two men who were the acknowledged leaders on each 
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side, Al Spalding and John Ward, were not even in the United States for most of this critical 
winter.  Of course, it is possible that this was by Spalding’s design.  Having the National 
League’s most articulate and accomplished enemy out of the country, and thus conveniently 
unavailable to confer with his brothers on baseball matters, may well have been part of 
Spalding’s plan when he invited Ward to go on the expedition.  That Spalding’s fellow owners 
adopted the Brush Classification Scheme over this winter in Ward’s absence might not have been 
a coincidence. 
 Taking Ward was a double-edged sword, however.  The trip to Australia and beyond 
involved a lengthy sea voyage with not many responsibilities along the way, giving a man of 
Ward’s intellectual stature abundant time to think, plan, and evaluate options of what the 
Brotherhood might do in the future.  Ward’s only real responsibility, besides the social 
gatherings planned for the expedition, was to captain the All-American team.  Incidentally, while 
Ward was abroad displaying his skills in Australia and Europe, back in the United States, sports 
newspapers spent much of the winter discussing where he might play in 1889.  Rumors had him 
going to either Boston or Washington to captain their nines, based on the premise that he wanted 
to captain a team, which he could not do in New York so long as Buck Ewing remained.  When 
he finally returned to the US, Ward ended up going nowhere and playing another season in New 
York.  Some reasoned his change of heart sprang from the fact that captaining the All-Americans 
gave him all the experience he wanted in that line, along with the fact that his teammates did not 
want to see him leave.13 
 Furthermore, the timing surrounding the trip was interesting, in several respects.  On the 
whole, 1887 was a good year in major league baseball.  Despite a few hiccups, most clubs did 
                                                 
13 “Ward’s Case” Henry Chadwick, The Sporting Life, April 10, 1889, 5. 
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well financially and the popularity of the game seemed to be booming.  The 1888 campaign had 
not been as satisfactory.  Between lousy weather, the American Association’s squabble over 
ticket prices, the rising cost of fielding a team, and the general lack of cohesion amongst 
American Association owners leading to speculation about which club was moving to what 
league in 1889, the season of ’88 had not been profitable for several clubs, and major changes 
seemed in the air.  National League president Nick Young could state, with honesty, that the 
attendance at League games was better than ever in 1888, but the increase was not general.14  
Some teams, such as Boston, were more popular than ever, but others, like Detroit, saw a great 
enough decline that the Wolverine ownership decided to throw in the towel and disband its team. 
Brooklyn, even after spending big money in hopes of fielding a championship nine in 
1888, still ended up 6.5 games back of the St. Louis Browns.  Not content with their position, 
they commenced spending even more money as the 1888 season wound down, acquiring 
shortstop Tom “Oyster” Burns from Baltimore, outfielder Pop Corkhill from Cincinnati, and 
second baseman Hub Collins from Louisville, paying significant cash to buy each player.  
Apparently, Charles Byrne wanted a pennant, regardless of expense.  Perhaps he grew tired of 
the foolishness of some of his fellow Association owners.  He had stated many times, however, 
that he would not change leagues until winning the American Association pennant, hoping to 
carry that glory into a new league and dreaming of what the combination of a championship team 
and a brand new set of opponents would do for attendance at Washington Park.  This seemed to 
be his chance, and he determined not to let it pass. 
Spalding seemed to sense, as well, that this was the time for a big move.  He had stated 
many times in public that the purpose of the Australia tour was promotion of the game and his 
                                                 
14 “President Nick Young” Sam, The Sporting News, October 20, 1888, 4. 
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sporting goods business—this was no secret to anyone who read sports newspapers.  He had 
ventured a great deal to put the trip together, making contracts with many of the best players in 
baseball, and creating a vast array of promotional materials, including wall paper, lithographs 
and printed histories of each player on the two teams, wood cuts for use in newspapers, and 
more.  He planned to cover all traveling expenses for the players, as well, although he did not 
offer much in the way of remuneration beyond expenses, the contract calling for each player to 
receive fifty dollars per week.  Perhaps this turned off some potential players who might have 
joined.  Charlie Comiskey, noted first baseman and captain of the St. Louis Browns, objected on 
these grounds, according to some sources.  Other sources, however, including Spalding himself 
in a letter to Henry Chadwick, stated the Comiskey declined in order to manage business 
interests.  Other players who also turned down invitations seem to have done so from a mix of 
motivations.  Still, an international vacation lasting several months, with the occasional baseball 
game thrown in, all expenses paid, was an opportunity occurring once in a lifetime.15  Later, 
Spalding also decided to offer $5 to each player on the winning team for each game, in order to 
ensure that both teams played their best, rather than going through the motions.16 
Al Spalding hoped for official diplomatic recognition from outgoing president Grover 
Cleveland for his trip, but despite meeting the president at the White House, and the love of both 
Mr. and Mrs. Cleveland for baseball, such was not forthcoming.17  Spalding’s tourists, as most 
observers named them, steamed around the world nonetheless, with plans to make port and 
demonstrate their talents in such expected English-speaking locations as Great Britain and 
                                                 
15 “The Base Ball Event Of The Century” NA, The Sporting Life, October 17, 1888, 2; 
“Chadwick’s Chat” Henry Chadwick, The Sporting Life, October 17, 1888, 5. 
16 “Across The Continent” John Montgomery Ward, Chicago Daily Tribune, November 11, 
1888, 25. 
17 “Washington Whispers” Bob Larner, The Sporting Life, June 6, 1888, 9. 
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Australia, but also in more exotic locales (in their eyes) such as Egypt, India, and Ceylon.  An 
outbreak of disease in Calcutta, along with a tight schedule, cancelled the planned stop in India, 
but the teams did stop in Egypt and play a game of ball on the sands near the Great Pyramids.  
The tourists even posed for a photograph draped all over the Great Sphinx like Yankee tinsel.  
This act, however, along with insulting and obviously futile attempts to loft baseballs over the 
ancient tombs of the pharaohs, probably cancelled out whatever curiosity they might have 
aroused amongst the Egyptian population. 
Before departing, however, three players from the All-American team, Ward, Jim 
Fogarty, and Jim Manning, succeeded in climbing to the apex of one of the Great Pyramids and 
back down in less than ten minutes.  While the agile trio performed this feat of endurance, some 
of the Chicago players held a contest to see which of them could hit the eye of the Sphinx with a 
thrown ball first.  This led to a rebuke from one of the Chicago newspapermen accompanying the 
tour, who wrote, “when Napoleon was in Egypt he stood in awed silence before the solemn 
majesty of the forty century old Sphinx.  The members of the Chicago club, when brought into 
the presence of this impassive mystery of the desert, threw hard balls at it and hit it in the eye.  
The Sphinx has seen and suffered much. . . . But never . . . has she been hit in the eye . . . by a 
Chicago ball-player.”  The writer hoped the Chicago players would shape up before they reached 
Europe, so that “the kindly offices of the Secretary of State will not have to be invoked in a 
month or so to rescue from a French or English dungeon a merry Chicagoan who has been 
pelting the image of Napoleon or of Nelson.”18  France was in the middle of the Boulanger 
Affair, after all, and when Chicago’s Cap Anson heard of it, he remarked that, “he could furnish 
                                                 
18 No title, NA, Chicago Daily Tribune, February 11, 1889, 4.  Technically, this statement is 
incorrect, as the only player actually hitting the eye of the Sphinx was Jim Fogarty of the All-
American team, according to Harry Palmer, one Chicago sportswriter who accompanied the tour.  
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President Carnot with a Cabinet which would knock Boulanger out of the box in a single 
inning.”19   
In addition to Anson’s comment regarding France’s political problems, the tour was not 
immune to other political issues involving Europeans.  The Americans did do some pelting in 
Nice, France, but in the form of throwing flowers at masqueraders in that city’s Battle of the 
Flowers, rather than with baseballs.  It appears they took especial aim at the heir to the throne of 
England, the Prince of Wales, but “the Prince, of course, did not understand that there was really 
a little American opposition to royalty concealed in the flowery weapons and looked upon it as a 
new exhibition of the queer ways of the people across the sea.  When one especially big bunch 
fired by Healy hit the royal rider squarely on the nose, he bowed in acknowledgment of the 
precision of the shot.”20  What the prince could not have known was that Healy was a fervent 
patriot for Irish independence, and thus took special pride in his feat.  “Healy, whose special 
mission on the trip is the liberation of Ireland, uttered an exultant cry at his success.  The Prince 
frowned at this, but speedily recovered his equanimity, lifted his hat, and fired a bunch of violets 
in return.  The aim was faulty, but the boys secured the violets.  Healy still has his as token that 
Ireland will yet be free.”21  The players later atoned for the flowery barrage when they 
interrupted their March 12 game in Kennington Oval to cheer the Prince on his arrival in the 
fourth inning.22 
In contrast to their experience in Egypt, the tourists were less fortunate, historic 
monument-wise, in Italy.  For a moment, Spalding entertained hopes that the tourists would have 
                                                 
19 “Base-Ball Tourists At Naples” John Montgomery Ward, Chicago Daily Tribune, February 
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20 “Pelting A Prince With Flowers” NA, Chicago Daily Tribune, March 1, 1889, 1. 
21 “The Great Trip” Harry Palmer, The Sporting Life, March 6, 1889, 2. 
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an opportunity to play in Rome’s Colesseum.  He reportedly even offered Italian officials $5,000 
for the privilege.  His efforts did not come to fruition, however, as the Italian authorities would 
not stand for it, nor was he able to secure an exhibition of baseball for the pope, Leo XIII (His 
Holiness pled illness).  Denying the truth regarding this diplomatic setback, the Chicago Daily 
Inter Ocean chose to blame the tourists’ failure to assume the mantle of the ancient gladiators on 
the faulty state of the spectator galleries in the Colesseum instead.23 
Another thing the tour demonstrated was the extent of the social Darwinism-inspired 
racism existing in the United States in the 1880s.  Racism’s existence, and the extent of its 
popularity in those years, is no secret.  There is no need to repeat every example that surfaced on 
the trip.  Still, a few examples are in order.  Some, purposely forgetting that the trip’s itinerary 
mainly consisted of coastal cities, wrote about the dangers posed by the aboriginal Australians.  
“Base ball in the bush!  The American national game played by its ablest exponents before the 
Zulus, the bushmen and kangaroos of Australia! . . . They will be in danger from the aggressive 
female population from the time they first appear in their snow-white jersey suits in all the vigor 
of their virile powers.”  The greatest danger was that “travelers who have traversed the wilds of 
the inland continent say that one of the favorite ways of expressing love practiced by the dark-
skinned but intensely affectionate maiden of the bush is to offer her accepted lover as a 
toothsome tid-bit to her cannibalistic chieftain father.”24   
 In fact, the tourists themselves did not even make it out of the United States before some 
began demonstrating their racism.  In Omaha, on their way to San Francisco, the clubs acquired a 
                                                 
23 Levine, A.G. Spalding and the Rise of Baseball, 101, 104-105; “Honored Ball Players.” The 
Chicago Daily Inter Ocean, February 14, 1889, 2; Thorn, Baseball in the Garden of Eden, 233. 
24 “Base Ball In Australia” NA, Rocky Mountain News, October 28, 1888, 1.  The paper’s editor 
did make a note that Zulus did not actually live in Australia, but then flippantly added that the 
word worked well enough to describe the native Australians who did. 
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“mascot” for their trip, mascot in this case referring to a young black man named Clarence 
Duval, who traveled with the teams.  Duval, an extra in a traveling opera company, had been the 
White Stockings’ mascot during the 1888 season before deserting the team in New York during 
an August road trip.  He got to Omaha with this company, and there reunited with his old club, 
and he accompanied the tour around the world.  While Anson described Duval as “a little darkey 
that I had met some time before while in Philadelphia, a singer and dancer of no mean ability, 
and a little coon whose skill in handling the baton would have put to the blush many a 
bandmaster of national reputation,” he also denigrated the young man by saying “outside of his 
dancing and his power of mimicry he was, however, a ‘no account nigger,’ and more than once 
did I wish that he had been left behind.”  Duval may have wished the same when, in Egypt, 
players dressed him in catcher’s gear and led him, roped at the neck, through the Cairo rail 
station.25  (An interesting coda to the story of Clarence Duval is the fact that, when the Players 
League set up shop for the 1890 season, Duval jumped ship from the Chicago White Stockings 
and signed on as mascot with the Chicago Pirates of the Players League.26) 
 While in San Francisco waiting to embark, the tour’s chronicler, Harry Palmer, visited 
San Francisco’s Chinatown along with others in the party before the tourists took their berths.  In 
describing the experience, he wrote, “I am safe in saying that no pen, however clever, could 
adequately depict the revolting and fascinatingly hideous sights we witnessed.  The illustrations 
of the vice, crime and bestiality, so prevalent in the Chinese quarters of this city, which have 
appeared in our illustrated publications from time to time, have not been overdrawn or 
exaggerated.”  Palmer went on to describe how the Chinese lived in buildings with 400-600 
                                                 
25 Material and quote from Thorn, Baseball in the Garden of Eden, 231-232, Levine, AG 
Spalding and the Rise of Baseball, 101-102. 
26 Levine, AG Spalding and the Rise of Baseball, 60, 104. 
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residents “which could not accommodate more than 30 or 40 Americans comfortably,” thus 
playing upon fears of a “Yellow Peril” of Asians taking over the West Coast of the United States.  
Also echoing the fears that Asians would never assimilate into American society, Palmer wrote, 
“the streets swarm with Mongolians.  They have run all white people out of the district and have 
established their own government, their own mercantile houses, their own water works, their 
own courts, until, although they are under the surveillance of the city authorities, they 
nevertheless, to a great extent, live independently of the municipal laws.”27 
 Despite this, Palmer and the rest of the tourists risked an expedition “into vile-smelling 
lodging houses; into opium joints, thick with the sickening vapors that issued from the over-
crowded compartments, down through underground passage-ways . . . into Joss houses, with 
their hideous idols . . . our little party threaded its way, until we grew dizzy from the 
overpowering odors and anxious again to breath the air of a Christianized and civilized 
community.”  Only the accompanying law enforcement officers ennobled the ballplayers enough 
to risk such a journey.  This led Palmer to conclude his description of the Chinese by writing, 
“No religion save idolatry is known in Chinatown.  Virtue has never had an abiding place there.  
The people have brought the heathenish customs and horrible practices of their barbarous 
country with them to San Francisco, and cling to them with a tenacity that shows the 
hopelessness of their conforming to our views of life and religion, or of their ever becoming 
desirable citizens.”28 
 Following their foray into the warrens of San Francisco’s Chinatown, the men eventually 
set sail for the antipodes.  Along the way, Spalding decided to inform them that he planned to 
extend the trip.  The teams would still begin in Australia, but now they would also continue all 
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28 Ibid. 
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the way around the world, visiting Asia, Africa, and Europe before they returned to the United 
States.  Wisely, Spalding did not broach this plan to the players until the sea voyages was 
underway; after the incident concerning Mike Kelly, who originally agreed to go on the tour but 
later went back on his decision, Spalding understandably was wary about anyone else getting 
cold feet at the last moment.  Although the players were, almost to a man, in favor of the change, 
there was some concern that modifying the itinerary en route was a breach of contract on 
Spalding’s part, as the contract signed by each player only engaged them to go to Australia and 
play baseball there.  Ever the sly fox, Spalding escaped this pitfall by pointing out that the 
wording of the contracts did not specify the route by which the party would return to the US.29 
 In any case, the trip to Australia called for a stopover in the Sandwich Islands, today 
known as Hawaii.  This provided plentiful opportunities to demonstrate more of the racism and 
prejudice common to the late nineteenth century.  Led by their baton-wielding young mascot, 
Clarence Duval, newly attired in “a scarlet jacket, khaki pants, black boots, and a braided cap,” 
the men paraded through Honolulu to King Kalakaua’s palace.  Their marching tune was an 
interesting choice, “Marching Through Georgia,” as they sought to present themselves as 
conquering heroes in imitation of General Sherman’s Yankee troops in the Civil War.  While 
both John Ward and Harry Palmer found the Hawaiian monarch an agreeable and dignified 
leader, Cap Anson noted that, “The monarch of the Sandwich Islands needs exercise.  His flesh 
is soft and I don’t believe he could do a hundred yards in less than two minutes.”30 
 The teams were supposed to play an exhibition for the people of Honolulu, but as the 
next day was Sunday, laws forced upon the Hawaiians by American missionaries prevented such 
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a desecration of the Sabbath.  The king, who wanted to see baseball and was constantly at odds 
with the missionaries because of their interference with traditional Hawaiian culture, therefore 
requested the men attended a luau instead.  Newton MacMillan, another reporter accompanying 
the trip on behalf of the Chicago Daily Inter Ocean and New York Sun, described the luau as “a 
barbaric festival, fraught with that pagan abandon which obtained in the Sandwich Islands before 
the day when the good missionaries came and converted their Hawaiians from their wickedness 
and cannibalism.”  The fact that MacMillan described the relationship of the missionaries to the 
native people by writing “their Hawaiians” is a good indication of the lack of cultural and racial 
tolerance existing towards darker-skinned people in 1889.31 
 This was not the end, however.  King Kalakaua also scheduled a performance of the hula 
dance for Spalding’s tourists, “a dance considered so pagan and libidinous that it had been 
banned by the forces of missionary propriety.”  The group also forced Clarence Duval to perform 
“plantation dances” for their entertainment.  The missionary authorities overruled the king’s 
decision to hold a hula dance, however, on the grounds that, “a luau on the Sabbath was already 
a blasphemy; a hula dance would be untenable.”  While King Kalakaua officially announced that 
the tourists could see the hula on their next stop in Honolulu, in secret, he arranged private 
performances for each player in the queen’s royal gardens.  True to his practice of thinking about 
all events with baseball in mind, Cap Anson described the dancers by saying, “And such eyes!  If 
my boys had them we would lead the batting for years to come.”32 
Finally, when referring to the Spalding tour, both participants and press also described its 
purpose using the racist, social Darwinism-influenced language of the time.  One reporter, after 
viewing the incident with Duval in Cairo, remarked, “could a disciple of Darwin have seen the 
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mascot in his impromptu makeup, his host would have bounded with delightful visions of the 
missing link.”  For Spalding, baseball epitomized “all those essentials of manliness, courage, 
nerve, pluck and endurance, characteristic of the Anglo-Saxon race,” while some in the press 
described the achievement by stating, “a country that holds liberty dear must have . . . men of 
athletic spirit” who make “a race fit for peace and war.”33 
Despite such sordid features, the tourists returned home in April of 1889 to a rousing 
reception that included the now-famous dinner at Delmonicos in New York City, considered 
among the most fashionable restaurants in the city at that time.  This dinner, attended by Wall 
Street financiers, various and sundry baseball dignitaries, and other personages as luminous as 
Teddy Roosevelt and Mark Twain, was notable for more than just the guest list and the quantity 
of food (served in nine courses, naturally) consumed.  Speeches abounded, as Spalding, Anson, 
and Ward described the tour, Ward displaying his “singularly correct knowledge of the English 
language.”  While, predictably, listeners considered Twain’s speech the oratorical highlight of 
the evening, even it paled in drama compared to a historic pronouncement uttered by former 
National League president A.G. Mills.  It was here that Mills took the podium and announced 
that, by virtue of both patriotism and research, baseball was a distinctly American game, devoid 
of roots in any foreign land or games.  Thunderous applause greeted the verdict, along with a 
rhythmic pounding of the tables to chants of “No rounders!  No rounders!”34 
 
* * * * * 
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While this grand tour may not have resulted in other nations immediately embracing 
America’s national pastime, any more than Spalding’s discovery of the rickshaw in Ceylon 
produced the American rickshaw company he considered founding on his return to the States, in 
all, 1889 promised to be a good year for baseball’s leading men. The success of Spalding’s tour, 
and baseball’s seemingly exponential growth in popularity, exemplified by incoming president 
Benjamin Harrison’s display of a scorecard on the White House mantel, all forecast a rosy future 
for the national pastime.  (Some, however, questioned the new president’s commitment to 
baseball, as when Spalding and his tourists called on him at the White House after returning to 
the United States, he gave them somewhat of a cold shoulder according to some accounts, 
including that of tourist Jim Manning.)35  More than ever, baseball aligned itself with patriotism, 
late nineteenth century feelings of the nation’s manifest destiny, and the American Way.  Each 
November, on Election Day, the New York and Brooklyn nines squared off in celebration of the 
Republic to remind the public of this fact, and Spalding’s tour only reinforced such feelings.36 
 This does not mean, however, that all was during Spalding’s absence.  In addition to the 
usual disagreements between players and their teams regarding salary, which were similar in 
nature to those described in chapter thirteen, a serious situation arose in December.  When the 
Detroit club disbanded in October, the Wolverines commenced selling their men to the highest 
bidders around the National League, as described previously.  In a move that sent a thunderclap 
throughout baseball, two players decided to toss a monkey wrench into the entire operation.  
Third baseman Deacon White, rumored on his way to Boston, did not want to go to the Hub 
                                                 
35 Levine, AG Spalding and the Rise of Baseball, 104; “The Surprising Cowboys” Freeman, The 
Sporting Life, May 8, 1889, 1. 
36 To give just one example of this, see “A November Game” NA, The Sporting Life, November 
10, 1886, 3. 
 652
City, because of a past grievance with the management there.  Detroit also wanted to sell White’s 
teammate Jack Rowe to Pittsburgh, and Rowe likewise claimed an objection to his new 
destination.  Instead of consenting to their sale and transfer, therefore, White and Rowe decided 
to pool their resources and buy a controlling interest in the Buffalo franchise of the International 
League (both had played in Buffalo prior to going to Detroit, when that city held a National 
League franchise in 1885), then play for the team they now owned.  To justify the legality of the 
move, the two men cited the fact they had signed a contract with Detroit and fulfilled it, so 
Detroit could no longer have a claim on their services, especially as the team no longer existed 
and had sold its franchise to Cleveland by that time.37 
 Predictably, the National League responded with the blacklist, claiming that because the 
International League was a party to the National Agreement, no International League members 
could employ or play against the blacklisted men.  Any teams who did so were risking expulsion 
from the National Agreement.  Still more infuriating to the two players, the League claimed that 
Detroit was still a member until it formally resigned at the National League’s spring meeting, 
citing the fact that the club had cast votes at all meetings held by the League since the conclusion 
of the season.  Former Wolverines president Fred Stearns offered the meager consolation that, 
“they can own the club and manage it jointly, but they cannot play until they have the consent of 
the representatives of the stockholders of the old Detroit Club.”  White responded by stating, “I 
signed a contract with the Detroit Club to play ball for them from April to November, 1888, and 
have carried out that contract. . . . I am aware that in the League I should be obliged to go where 
I was sent, but I am not in the League now.  I shall play ball at Buffalo.”  While also stated that, 
should the National League attempt to blacklist him, “we shall sue the clubs refusing for 
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conspiring to prevent us from earning a living.  Our lawyers say that the reserve clause of the 
League and the claimed right to sell a player will not stand, and most of the League magnates 
privately admit as much.”38 
 The Buffalo Two appeared set on their course, and they almost became the Buffalo 
Three, as a former teammate in Detroit, Charlie Bennett, considered joining them.  After a 
stormy negotiating session with Boston’s Director Billings, Bennett said, “they must come to my 
terms or I don’t go.  If I hold out until after the Detroit League Club expires I shall be a free man 
and can go where I please.  I should like to join the boys in Buffalo or play here for Leadley.”39  
Recall that Detroit had reorganized with a new group of players and joined the International 
League, and Leadley was the manager of this new Detroit team.  This further clouded the 
National League’s position, as it claimed Detroit was still a member of its organization, but at the 
same time, the National Agreement prohibited the establishment of any new team within a five-
mile radius of an existing one.  The League countered that new teams could be established 
should the existing one give its permission.  This led Dave Rowe, Jack’s brother, to ask, “would 
Nick Young approve the contract of any player of the old Detroit Club with that club for next 
season, if sent by that defunct organization? . . . What is a club if it is not their franchise?  When 
a club is admitted, that gives them a franchise.  If they dispose of that to another party, in another 
city, and another League takes possession, it looks reasonable to suppose there is a National 
League vacancy in that town.”40 
 White also took one of the Brotherhood’s key lines of argument when he framed his 
move as a challenge to the practice of buying and selling players, rather than the reserve rule.  
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“The reserve rule is all right.  It is the bulwark of the National game.  What I protest against is 
the selling of a player without his knowledge or consent.  I am quite willing to break up that 
custom.”  He believed the League’s claim to this power would fail in the court system.  “If in law 
the Detroit Club can send me to Boston, it can also send me to New Zealand.  According to the 
contract, I simply give the Detroit Club the right to reserve my play in Detroit, not in Boston. 
The reserve rule, to the extent I have set forth, is all right and should be respected, but it never 
contemplated the buying and selling of players.”  He further charged that Boston had broken 
faith on three separate occasions in its efforts to sign White and others.  “That club first broke the 
National Agreement by negotiating with players previous to Oct. 20, and then broke faith with 
Mr. Stearns and the Detroit Club by agreeing to deprive the latter of any purchase money agreed 
on for the players to be transferred, and lastly broke faith with the players in failing to carry out 
an agreement it made with them.”41   
The incident White referred to was when Boston’s Triumvirs sent a man to act as their 
representative in negotiating with the players when Detroit played a late-season series in 
Washington on October 11-13.  The Triumvirs wanted half a dozen Detroit players as a group, 
fearing that they might fall into the hands of their competitors one by one if they did not acquire 
the whole group preemptively, somewhat similar to what Brooklyn’s Byrne had done with the 
Metropolitan players the previous off-season.  The Detroit players claimed they reached a verbal 
agreement with Boston’s representative, in front of several witnesses, but that Boston later 
reneged on the deal.  The Beaneaters then proceeded to try to sign the players separately to cover 
up their deception.  White closed his case by stating, “My contract with the Detroit Club expired 
last November.  I fulfilled my part of that contract to the letter.  There was nothing said in that 
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contract about letting them transfer me to any place they saw fit, and there is no law that allows a 
man who has a contract with me for one year to say what I shall do the next year.”42 
Bennett eventually decided not to cast his lot with Rowe and White, and signed with 
Boston in late January.  Some hoped that would break the logjam, as Boston declared it no 
longer had interest in White, which cleared the path for Pittsburgh to sign both.  Rowe and White 
stuck to their plans.  They were not necessarily angry with any team in particular, just the general 
way in which teams bought and sold players.  When Pittsburgh president Nimick went to meet 
with them in February, they had a friendly conversation, but maintained their desire to manage 
the Buffalo club rather than play in the Smoky City.43 
Complicating matters was the debate swirling around the future of the game in early 
1889.  By this time, all kinds of rumors had Brooklyn and Cincinnati joining the National League 
by 1890.  Should that happen, the American Association would need new teams, and Buffalo 
was on the Association’s short list of replacements should that become necessary.  The potential 
conflicts for the National Agreement, of having two men own a team in one major league and 
playing for a team in the other, are certainly interesting, not least for the potential conflicts of 
interest that might create. 
The controversy dragged on into the spring.  The League’s stated intent had been to 
accept Detroit’s official resignation from the National League at its spring meeting in March.  In 
the meantime, however, they realized that if any Detroit players had not accepted new offers 
when the team reserving them finally ceased to exist, the men would be free to sign wherever 
they wished, and White and Rowe could then carry out their original plan.  To circumvent this 
inconvenient truth, the League turned to paperwork shenanigans.  “After careful consideration of 
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43 “Rowe and White’s Position” NA, The Sporting News, February 9, 1889, 1. 
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the case of Rowe and White it was determined not to accept the Detroit Club’s resignation but to 
place the same in President Young’s hands, subject to his acceptance at the proper time—which 
means when Rowe and White come to terms.”44 
Detroit, meanwhile, was getting rather desperate.  Perhaps concerned it would never see a 
penny for Rowe and White any other way, it considered offering the men some of the purchase 
price offered by Pittsburgh, reasoning that getting less than everything was better than seeing the 
men retire from major league baseball and get nothing.  Its former brethren in the National 
League would be displeased, of course, but as Detroit was only in the League on a dubious 
technicality at this point anyway, that seemed the lesser of two evils.45  As a result, the team tried 
to tempt the recalcitrant duo into a compromise whereby they would play for Pittsburgh but 
pocket $2,000 of the sale price.  The men held out for $3,000 at first, and in addition, made 
provisional arrangement’s that Deacon White’s brother, former major league pitcher Will White, 
would manage the team in their stead should they go to the Smoky City.46 
Neither side budged from their positions until July.  Finally, in desperate need of 
reinforcements because of injury, Pittsburgh signed the pair for the remainder of the season at a 
salary of $2,500 each, and paid $8,000 to Detroit, or what was left of Detroit, as well.47  The two 
men lost their bid for independent status, but got respectable paychecks all the same.  It is also 
possible that Brotherhood president John Ward helped persuade them to sign, knowing that the 
players would need all the public goodwill they could muster in their upcoming showdown with 
the National League. 
                                                 
44 “The League” NA, The Sporting Life, March 13, 1889, 3.  Editor Francis Richter, who 
attended the meeting, is presumably the author of this piece. 
45 “Pittsburg Pencilings” Circle, The Sporting Life, March 20, 1889, 5. 
46 “Pittsburg News” NA, The Sporting Life, April 24, 1889, 1; “Condensed Despatches” NA, The 
Sporting Life, April 24, 1889, 1. 
47 “Pittsburgh Cranks Disgusted” NA, Chicago Daily Tribune, July 14, 1889, 12. 
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* * * * * 
 
 It is difficult to tell if he timed everything to perfection or not, and if it was all part of one 
grand plan, but he may have.  Just as his touring players left San Francisco for Hawaii, Al 
Spalding completed two other maneuvers.  One was the National League’s salary classification 
plan discussed in chapter sixteen, which some baseball historians believe he actually authored, 
even though contemporaries attributed it to John Brush of Indianapolis.  The other was to extend 
his trip all the way around the world.  How long Spalding had contemplated and planned this 
extension of his enterprise, we do not know for certain, but he confided his plan to baseball seer 
Henry Chadwick as early as August of 1887, and he completed the final arrangements before he 
left California.48  He intimated his intentions to a couple of the players on the tour, including 
John Ward, while still in San Francisco.  The new route would leave Australia on or about 
January 5, sail to India, then travel west through the Suez Canal and across Egypt before moving 
on to Italy, France, and Great Britain.49   
Spalding’s timing could not have been better personally or worse for the Brotherhood.  
Even as his fellow owners put the finishing touches on their new salary plan, his ship left San 
Francisco harbor with the BPBP’s president on board.  They left one day late.  Had weather, or 
any other type of accident, delayed the trip even a few more days, Ward would have known 
about the new salary classification plan, may well have stayed behind, and baseball history might 
have turned out differently.  There was only a one-day delay, however, Ward did sail with the 
                                                 
48 “Chadwick’s Chat” Henry Chadwick, The Sporting Life, December 5, 1888, 5. 
49 “Ward’s Base-Ball Notes” John Montgomery Ward, Chicago Daily Tribune, November 25, 
1888, 25. 
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The Brotherhood and the Brush Classification Scheme of 1889 
 
 
 As the season of 1888 wore away into late September, we could forgive a baseball 
observer for forgetting about the Brotherhood of Professional Base Ball Players.  The BPBP had 
maintained strict silence ever since its June meetings regarding the salary limit in the language of 
their contracts.  The two national sporting papers of the day, The Sporting Life and The Sporting 
News, rarely mentioned the organization, and the group took no action worthy of notice while the 
season meandered through the summer months.  Of course, this was partly because the members 
of the BPBP were busy playing baseball, and it was difficult to get enough delegates to the same 
place at the same time to hold any deliberations. 
 The first month of the off-season was likewise subdued.  Partly, this was because two 
members of the Brotherhood’s leadership, John Ward and Ned Hanlon, were involved in 
Spalding’s world tour and were about to depart the United States.  Some believed, therefore, that 
the organization would prove quiescent in whatever might happen that winter.  Unlike the year 
before, there was no movement to send a delegation to the National League’s winter meeting or 
to request a hearing on any major issue, as the BPBP believed its efforts at the previous League 
meeting had produced a satisfactory settlement, the small brouhaha over the limit rule 
notwithstanding.  As of November, in any case, the organization saw no need to involve itself in 
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the National League’s councils.  It set its next meeting for early December, after the National 
League held its winter meeting. 
 Both of these beliefs, that the Brotherhood would prove malleable without Ward and 
Hanlon, and that relations between the BPBP and the League were now harmonious, were 
incorrect.  The BPBP might have believed that their last conference had pacified relations with 
the League, but behind closed doors, the League’s owners were about to concoct a new scheme 
that would, ultimately, transform and reconfigure the landscape of professional baseball in ways 
that few foresaw in November of 1888.  Likewise, if the League’s owners believed that they 
could walk over the Brotherhood without Ward and Hanlon in the picture, they were gravely 
mistaken as well.  What they failed to grasp was the democratic nature of the BPBP.  True, its 
president was tossing the sphere in Australia and New Zealand, but the Brotherhood’s affairs 
meanwhile rested in the capable hands of its executive committee.  The Brothers’ most articulate 
spokesperson might be unavailable, but his absence hardly paralyzed the organization.  Still, 
most of the members kept a low profile even as the National League unveiled its plans, “sawing 
much wood” in the parlance of the 1880s, and awaiting the return of their president in the spring. 
 It did not take long for the National League to create a general conflagration.  At its 
yearly winter meeting, held in late November at the Fifth Avenue Hotel in New York City, they 
announced the new plan that would put all of baseball into an uproar for more than two years.  
After National League owners emerged from their council, League president Nick Young read 
the new salary plan to the assembled reporters anxious to hear about any changes planned for 
1889.  Young read: 
The compensation for all League players for services as players shall be limited, 
regulated, and determined by the classification and grade to which such players may be 
assigned by the Secretary of the League, after the termination of the championship 
season, as follows: 
 661
 
Class A, compensation $2,500; Class B, compensation $2,250; Class C, compensation 
$2,000; Class D, compensation $1,750; Class E, maximum compensation $1,500.  But 
this section shall not prohibit the payment of extra compensation for the services of one 
person to each club as field Captain or team manager. 
 
In determining such assignment, batting, fielding, base-running, battery work, earnest 
team work, and exemplary conduct, both on and off the field, at all times, shall be 
considered as a basis for classification.1 
 
Young continued, describing the technical aspects of what the League had decided to do, 
but by this point it was clear enough what had happened.  The barons of the League had broken 
their agreement made just one year before with the BPBP and declared war on the organization.  
Furthermore, when it came to player compensation, they had determined to turn back the clock 
to 1886, at least as far as average players were concerned.  Logically enough, people 
immediately questioned if this new plan would be like the salary limit adopted in 1886; that is, 
would owners live up to the letter of their law, or would they sidestep this new agreement with 
the same tactics they had used to punch holes in their last effort of this kind?  Regardless, the 
National League owners were ready to toss the dice, and a series of events followed that would 
remake the entire landscape of professional baseball. 
Incredibly, Young argued that this new plan was beneficial for the players.  He claimed, 
“it will not affect rising and ambitious players.  But it places a premium on honest and efficient 
work on the ball field, and requires good general deportment off the diamond.  It will prevent 
players drawing large salaries because of their previous records. . . . Intelligent players will 
recognize it and it depends upon their own exertions whether they shall be benefited by it.”  
When someone asked how Young and the rest of the league officials would determine in what 
class each player belonged, he stated, “I will consult certain persons and we will form a sort of 
                                                 
1 “Bombshell In Baseball” NA, New York Times, November 23, 1888, 2. 
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civil service commission and pass upon the merits of the respective players.  During the playing 
season I will make arrangements to obtain reliable reports of the playing and deportment of the 
players.  In other words, I will establish something in the nature of a secret service department.”2   
While Young refused to call it a spy system, one wonders exactly how he would obtain 
reliable reports on the deportment of the players without someone spying on them.  Furthermore, 
leaving aside for a moment his motivations and simply examining the actual workability of such 
a plan, many potential pitfalls that would create legitimate cause for complaint are plain.  How 
could any observer rate “earnest team work” or “exemplary conduct” in any reliably 
standardized way?  Personal bias or honest differences of opinion (to put it more charitably) over 
what was “earnest” made any consistency in the classification scheme impossible.  There was 
also the risk of what contemporaries called record playing.  That meant that fielders would not 
take difficult chances to get to certain balls out of fear the official scorer would charge them with 
an error if they failed to field the ball cleanly.  Instead, they would let the ball go by to avoid 
hurting their fielding record with an error that the classification committee might use against 
them when classifying players for the next season.  Finally, Young’s remark about players not 
drawing a large salary based on their previous record was truly puzzling.  If the classification 
committee were not going to base its conclusions on previous performance, what exactly would 
it use instead, short of intangible but unquantifiable things such as teamwork?  The extension of 
this last argument includes the situation of how to classify men who played in the minor leagues 
the previous season and had no record against major league competition on which to draw. 
Additionally, Young tried to evade accusations that the League had broken faith with the 
Brotherhood.  He pointed out that this scheme did not apply to anyone who had signed a contract 
                                                 
2 “The Players and the New Limit Rule” R.M. Larner, The Sporting Life, November 28, 1888, 1. 
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before December 15, which was about three weeks away at that time.  Young said, “the 
provisions of the existing contract will be carried out to the letter.  This new rule is intended to 
apply only to future agreements.  Those players held in reserve for next season cannot be 
classified at any salary below that which they received during the past season, as shown by 
existing contracts.”3  Even if this were true, this would eliminate all leverage for players 
negotiating for an increase in salary for 1889.  Ownership could simply make a take-it-or-leave-it 
offer when the only other option was the salary classification scheme. 
One final thing worth noting regarding the new plan was the composition of the vote 
regarding whether the League should adopt it.  Six clubs voted in favor, while only Arthur Soden 
of Boston and John Day of New York responded in the negative.  The League’s bylaws required 
a two-thirds majority for passage, which meant six votes out of eight, so the plan passed with the 
bare minimum of support.  Day’s vote is not surprising.  We have seen that he was on good 
terms with most of his ballplayers and believed in compensating them better than most.  
Apparently, he judged that keeping them happy, pleased to play in New York, and thus more 
likely to perform at their best because of having some loyalty to their organization, was more 
important than saving a couple thousand dollars.  When asked about how the new scheme would 
affect the money he planned to offer his players, he said, “not in the least.  There will be few of 
my men that will not receive the same salary next year that they received last season.”  Day saw 
the only merit of the new plan as preventing players from complaining their way out of town, 
because if released from their present contract they would be subject to the classification scheme, 
and in reigning in the money paid to young and unproven players.4 
                                                 
3 Ibid. 
4 “New York’s Idea” NA, The Sporting Life, December 5, 1888, 1. 
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Soden’s vote might be a surprise, however, given his reputation for stinginess.  The 
explanation for his behavior probably lies in the fact that Boston had enjoyed huge patronage in 
1887 and 1888 thanks to its purchases of King Kelly and John Clarkson from Chicago.  With its 
recent raiding of Detroit’s larder to sign some of the Wolverines’ top players for 1889, there was 
no reason for Soden to expect anything different in the coming campaign.  The team was flush, 
and could afford to carry a large payroll in order to contend for the pennant while still making 
money anyway.  Boston, therefore, gained a competitive advantage over other teams by paying 
big prices for crack players and thereby forcing up the cost of players generally.  Boston could 
afford to pay a lot more than most of its competitors could, and when their opponents dropped 
out of the bidding due to lack of funds, the Triumvirs could swoop in and sign their man.   
The sportswriters covering the game knew this, too.  Frequently, they lashed out at the 
business practices of Boston, along with Brooklyn and occasionally New York, for the 
inflationary tendencies of those practices.5  When Soden said to Tim Keefe, a New York Giants 
pitcher but a Cambridge resident, “we are going to have that championship in Boston if it costs 
$100,000.  If we want a player we don’t care what it will cost to get him, we’ll pay it,” The 
Sporting Life editorialized in return, “their plunging tactics more than any other one thing are 
responsible for the reckless extravagance prevalent the last few years, which made the new 
League salary limit rule and classification scheme imperative.”6  As A.G. Ovens of Indianapolis 
put it, “some of these players have gone to Boston and will continue to draw salaries greatly in 
excess of what they can earn.  They are worth no more to Boston, as far as they are individually 
concerned, than they were to Detroit, but the former city, by reason of its population and that fact 
that it is a great ball town, can afford to pay them what they demand.”  The result was clear.  
                                                 
5 “The League Meeting” NA, The Sporting Life, November 28, 1888, 2. 
6 No title, NA, The Sporting Life, December 19, 1888, 2. 
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“For years four, if not five, clubs have been run practically at a loss for the sake and benefit of 
the first-named three [Boston, Chicago, and New York].  Year by year the matter was growing 
worse and it was only a question of time when such cities as Indianapolis, Washington, 
Cleveland and even Pittsburg would be forced to the wall.”  While Ovens may have exaggerated 
the penury of a few of these franchises to make his point, he still expressed the general views of 
many within the baseball fraternity.7 
It is curious, then, that baseball observers blamed the ownership of clubs like Boston and 
Brooklyn for inflating salaries, but decided that the only way to keep things in check was to 
punish the players, rather than the men they believed were causing the problem.  If the 
purchasing tactics of a few teams were to blame, it might have made more sense to devise a 
stronger plan to redistribute revenue from the wealthier teams to the poorer ones.  This approach, 
or some other more direct disincentive to purchasing men for large sums (getting rid of the direct 
sale of players, for instance), seems a wiser choice than that devised by the National League for 
1889.  Out west in Kansas City, the team’s president, Speas, proposed an interesting measure 
along these lines for the American Association.  His idea was that all teams in the American 
Association would form a joint stock company, with the more valuable teams owning more 
shares in the company, and that whatever profits the new association made, it could pay teams 
proportional to their number of shares.8  In the absence of any alternate plan, however, the 
players saw the Brush Plan for what it was—a direct threat.  Yet, all they were doing was trying 
to earn the best salary that the market would bear.  Instead of penalizing the teams that engaged 
in inflationary business practices, the National League chose price controls instead. 
                                                 
7 “Indianapolis Mention” A.G. Ovens, The Sporting Life, December 5, 1888, 5. 
8 “Speas’ Specific” Freeman, The Sporting Life, February 27, 1889, 2. 
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Grandfatherly Henry Chadwick was one of the few to make this connection at the time.  
Chadwick believed that some kind of plan to control salaries was important, but that this was the 
wrong way to do it.  He wrote that a plan regarding salaries, “is not to be done in a hurry, or 
without due preparation.  Besides which, the system itself is based upon a weakness which will 
at all times threaten its failure, and that is that it does not do away with the existing unhealthy 
competition for players’ services, which, while it remains in force, will always prove an obstacle 
to the success of any interference with salaries.”  This led Chadwick, who had remained neutral 
on the subject for the most part, to announce his allegiance to the Millennium Plan.  “It is this 
and only this which will stop the existing competition with its result of the sale of players and the 
paying of exorbitant salaries.”9 
Despite such reasoned and rational protests, countering business practices like Boston’s 
appears to be the motivating factor for the rest of the League adopting the plan.  The four 
National League cities of smaller market size, Indianapolis, Cleveland, Pittsburgh, and 
Washington DC, knew that in order to keep up and secure their share of talent to contend against 
teams like Boston and New York, they needed some rule to counteract this failure of the free 
market.  They managed to talk Chicago and Philadelphia into approving their plan, giving them 
the six votes they needed for passage.10   
 In addition to the hope of leveling the financial playing field, National League owners 
also hoped this would help them defeat that persistent bugbear faced by all teams, alcohol.  
Despite the graded system of fines agreed to in their contract with the BPBP for 1888, this 
problem had not abated sufficiently in their eyes.  League owners hoped that a salary plan taking 
into account off-field conduct would provide a stronger incentive for recalcitrant drinkers to 
                                                 
9 “Chadwick’s Chat” Henry Chadwick, The Sporting Life, December 19, 1888, 3. 
10 “Classification And Limit” NA, The Sporting Life, December 5, 1888, 1. 
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brace up.  It would also help them shift the blame and, presumably, the animosity of the drinker 
at the same time.  Instead of the club leveling fines directly on its players, and possibly upsetting 
them, the teams could shift the blame for a reduction in salary to the more impersonal League 
Office that was responsible for the classifications.  The League even wrote this into the plan, as 
teams now reported violations of club rules directly to Nick Young.11  “The drinking habits of a 
player will be a fatal obstacle to his reaching class A.  Temperate habits will be the first 
qualification for this class. . . . Professional base ball has been disgraced long enough by 
excessive drinkers.”  The Brush Plan’s supporters hoped that “to be classified in class A at the 
close of the season will be his goal, and better exhibitions of ball playing may be expected as a 
consequence of this action on the part of the League.”12 
 One other notable aspect of the Brush Plan was that player grades were supposed to be a 
secret.  Clearly, a team would know where its own men stood, because it had to pay them 
appropriately, but one club would not know the grades of players on other teams.  There was 
nothing to prevent the players from revealing their own status if they wanted to, of course, but 
the grades would not be public knowledge otherwise.  Cynics must have smiled, however, when 
Washington sportswriter Bob Larner spoke with Young and reported, “‘Class A’ will not be 
heavily stocked at the beginning, and many players who are perhaps counting upon being at the 
top of the ladder, are more apt to find themselves in the middle or near the bottom.”13 
 
* * * * * 
 
                                                 
11 No title, NA, The Sporting Life, March 27, 1889, 4. 
12 “Classification And Limit” NA, The Sporting Life, December 5, 1888, 1. 
13 “The League Law” R.M. Larner, The Sporting Life, December 19, 1888, 1. 
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 One of the Brotherhood’s ranking officers still in the United States, New York pitcher 
and Secretary-Treasurer Tim Keefe, seemed to have some of these questions in mind when asked 
his views on the League’s move.   
Though I cannot say definitely what shape the action of the brotherhood will take, depend 
upon it we are not going to sit idly by and allow the league to deal as unfairly by us and 
in as bad faith as has been the case.  They broke faith with us last year, when they 
promised to abolish the $2,000 limit clause and did not.  At that time, when we asked Mr. 
Rogers why the league acted thus, he tried to throw the blame upon the American 
Association.  When we came to investigate we found, through Mr. Brunell, that Mr. 
Rogers was to blame.  The action of the league this year is in direct violation of our 
contract clause, which states that a player, when reserved, shall not receive less than he 
received the previous season.  It is certainly time to act.  There will be plenty of fun 
ahead for the league.  Why, it is the old $2,000 limit business over again.14 
 
Many doubted, as Keefe did, that this new system would turn out any different from the 
1886 rule, and reminded observers of the National League’s breach of faith.  After reviewing 
how every team had circumvented the old limit rule, the Chicago Daily Tribune wrote that the 
League meant to establish a pure baseball trust with complete control over the players, and 
pointed out, “last winter the league agree to a new form of contract submitted by the brotherhood 
of professional base-ball players.  One stipulation in that contract is that a player shall not be 
reserved at a less salary than he received under his last year’s contract. . . . The league will be 
compelled to either break the new law or overlook the clause by which it retains control of the 
players.”15 
 Other members of the Brotherhood did not need Ward around to speak for them, either.  
Arthur Irwin, field captain of the Philadelphia Quakers and a man universally regarded for his 
heady play on the field, offered the first hints that the BPBP might have some hole cards of their 
own when he told Boston sportswriter William Sullivan, “if this business is enforced and lived 
                                                 
14 “Concerning the League Meeting” NA, Chicago Daily Tribune, November 25, 1888, 10. 
15 “How Base-Ball Is Run” NA, Chicago Daily Tribune, November 25, 1888, 10. 
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up to and ball players’ salaries are all kept down to $2,500 a year, the eight League clubs will be 
owned and run by new men to the base ball world in two years.”  Irwin proceeded to drop a few 
more hints. 
Supposing all the League players sign an agreement to stick together, and they are 
divided into eight teams, which are put into the eight League cities.  Now don’t think that 
can’t be done, because it can.  Let me tell you something that perhaps you don’t know.  
We knew what we were about when we made our kick for the Brotherhood contract.  I 
know some one may cry ‘Chestnut’ when I say that there were men behind us with 
money at that time, ready to take up our cause.  Did you know that Erastus Wiman, the 
New York millionaire, informed us that if we would furnish him with the players for 
eight League clubs he would see that the money was forthcoming to run them?  Every 
one knows what Erastus Wiman is.16 
 
In St. Louis, sportswriter Joe Pritchard also seemed to have an inkling that all was not as 
it seemed with the Brotherhood.  He thought it was “possessed of a great deal more strength than 
most people think for.”  Furthermore, “if the League moguls refuse to listen to their appeals the 
members of the Brotherhood then will strike for their rights, and if they are forced to do such a 
thing they will establish clubs in the various cities now under control of the National League and 
call the new circuit the Union League.”  Pritchard wrote that a Brotherhood member told him “I 
know just about what my services are worth to my club, and this amount I shall expect to get.  If 
the bosses attempt to bulldoze us into signing, I am of the opinion that they will find they have 
bit off more than they can chew. . . . The Brotherhood is not saying much, but its members are 
doing considerable thinking, and they will act, and act promptly, too, when they see fit.”17 
Even as Irwin was breathing fire, however, Tim Keefe, after stewing over things for a 
week, was retracting his claws.  He did confirm the truth of what Irwin said, but then remarked 
he might have responded a bit hastily at first.  He said he believed Young’s statements about not 
breaking the deal with the Brotherhood, and that their agreement still held for men already under 
                                                 
16 “Hub Happenings” Mugwump, The Sporting Life, December 5, 1888, 1. 
17 “St. Louis Siftings” Joe Pritchard, The Sporting Life, December 5, 1888, 5. 
 670
reserve, stating that the initial reports he had read explaining the plan were incomplete and 
misleading.  Keefe also acknowledged that a prime motivation for adopting the plan was to keep 
players from complaining their way out of town in order to get more money elsewhere, although 
he declined to say whether he found this part of the explanation mollifying or not.18  Was Keefe 
sincere in these remarks, or merely trying to muddle the situation by throwing out false leads as 
to the BPBP’s intentions?  Throwing up a smokescreen seems the most likely explanation. 
To add to the confusion, Erastus Wiman denied being in league with the Brotherhood, 
although he admitted he had spoken with them and been part of their councils in the past.  
Interviewed by New York writer George Stackhouse, he said, “I am out of base ball.  Some time 
ago, probably a year or more, I might have done so, but not now.  At that time I had the old 
Metropolitan Club on my hands, and acknowledge that I did consider such a scheme.  Ward 
came to me and made such a proposition and I thought favorably of it at the time.  Now such a 
thing is out of the question.”19 
Further clouding matters was the fact that the implementation of the new salary rule 
seemed to work differently depending on who interpreted the rule.  The League claimed it was 
not breaking faith with the Brotherhood, but at the same time, as Nick Young said on December 
15, “the new classification rule takes effect on and after to-day and all players who are not under 
contractual obligation now will have to be graded in accordance with the provision of the law.”  
Both of these things could not be true at the same time.  Some teams in the National League 
seem to have been confused about their own rule as well.  By December 15, only two of them, 
Washington and Indianapolis, had sent Young their list of which players needed classification 
                                                 
18 “Hub Happenings” Mugwump, The Sporting Life, December 5, 1888, 1. 
19 “New York News” George Stackhouse, The Sporting Life, December 12, 1888, 4. 
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and which had come an agreement.20  The Indianapolis list included its entire roster with the 
exception of captain Jack Glasscock and one other marginal player because, in a perversion of 
the intent of the rule that should not have been difficult to see coming, Indianapolis management 
had refused to negotiate with any players so they would have to fall into the classification system 
no matter what.21 
One final notable aspect of the plan was its clear intent to divide the players against 
themselves.  If a player had respectable talent and respectable habits, his salary under the Brush 
Plan was unlikely to vary significantly from what he would make with no plan in place.  Owners 
and writers said so constantly in their attempts to persuade the public that they did not intend 
their plan to hurt the players.  The only players hurt badly by this plan would be those who made 
in excess of $2,500 per year, or those who drank and partied frequently.  The League’s owners 
hoped to turn the large body of players against their own leadership by trying to demonstrate to 
the average players that their interests were not the same as the interests of those well-off players 
such as Ward who claimed to speak for them.  This part of the Brush Plan did not work, 
however, since most baseball players hoped they might one day end up playing in New York and 
earning a larger paycheck. 
 
* * * * * 
 
 At this point, it is interesting to note that the Brush Classification Plan was one part of the 
panaceas for all things ailing baseball put forth by Francis Richter in The Sporting Life’s 
Millennium Plan, although modified in some important respects.  How, then, did writers and 
                                                 
20 “The League Law” R.M. Larner, The Sporting Life, December 19, 1888, 1. 
21 “Indianapolis Affairs” A.G. Ovens, The Sporting Life, December 19, 1888, 1. 
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public opinion respond to its promulgation?  This was a critical point, of course, because if the 
players were to attempt any large-scale protest, having the public on their side was of great 
value.  Furthermore, as newspapers were the only source of news for most cranks, what writers 
had to say was equally crucial.   
 The sundry newspapers reporting on the new scheme had a predictable mix of reactions, 
although a majority favored the move.  For its supporters, a few considerations seemed most 
meritorious.  Some, like the Philadelphia Item, believed that the plan benefited the players in the 
end, because more stability in finances would remedy the evil of teams dropping out of leagues 
during or after the season.  In fact, many minor league teams had gone bankrupt and disbanded 
in 1888, in addition to Detroit leaving the National League.  Therefore, an overall drop in team 
expenses meant greater stability in the job market.  Others, such as the Philadelphia North 
American, cited a similar reason, that uniform salaries would go a long ways towards allowing 
the clubs to compete on an even basis.  Teams from smaller markets constantly selling the 
releases of men they could no longer afford would be a thing of the past.22   
Few papers were so blunt as to simply say that ballplayers were overpaid and deserved 
less money, but a few did, such as the New York World, which opined, “this new salary limit 
will reduce the aristocratic base ball player to the level of lawyers and doctors and journalists.  
The boss barons will be made a little richer, but the country can stand it.”  Likewise, the 
Washington Capital stated, “the men will be better off under the change, as the smaller salaries 
will tend to make them more saving.  As it is now, the high salaries paid serve no other purpose, 
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except in a very few instances, than to supply funds to be squandered in the various excesses of 
life.”23 
This last point was certainly in keeping with the times.  In the 1880s, social Darwinism 
was at its height, with its belief that it was useless to help poor people or people of bad habits, 
because they would only squander whatever help they received.  Their poverty was proof that 
they were unable to do better, in the eyes of the social Darwinists.  This viewpoint came in 
different shadings, however, with some willing to allow that the poor could improve their 
situation, but only through acquiring the moral habits of their social betters.  Nick Young, 
president of the National League, often struck this tone upon receipt of letters from players 
appealing to him for one reason or another.  Whenever a player petitioned him, Young’s 
responses typically evaded the request but advised the petitioner to upgrade his moral habits in 
some fashion.  For instance, when one player sent him a letter describing his qualifications for a 
spot in the National League (an inappropriate request, as Young had no power to sign players for 
teams) Young responded by writing, “You say you drink very little.  Why not commence at 
once, and say ‘I never drink.’  The hardest drinker commenced by drinking very little.  It is very 
important that men who aspire to be ball players should be temperate in all things, to put them in 
the best possible physical condition.”24  This is not to say Young was incorrect in his views.  
Many players tarnished potentially fine careers through an over-fondness for intoxicating 
beverages.  The significance is that rather than simply responding to the question posed, which in 
this example he could have done by replying that such a request was outside of his powers to 
grant, Young chose to include an unsolicited lecture on morality as well. 
                                                 
23 Ibid. 
24 “Appeals To Young” R.M. Larner, The Sporting Life, January 30, 1889, 1. 
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 The plan’s opponents likewise took various grounds for their disagreement.  The New 
York Sun was among the few simply stating that players deserved what they could get, just like 
any other worker or business owner.  “Buck and his brothers are eminently good laborers, and 
they are worthy of their hire.  Why shouldn’t they have it?”  Others, such as the Cincinnati 
Enquirer, believed that teams would find every way imaginable to subvert the new rule and find 
loopholes, as everyone had done in 1886.  That paper even quoted Cincinnati Red Stockings 
president Aaron Stern as opposed to the American Association copying the League.  Stern said, 
“I believe in every club being master of its own affairs.  I want to be able to do business with my 
men in my own style.  I think I am able to judge what their services are worth without having 
someone to classify them for me.”  Stern also stated his belief that this classification system 
would drastically increase record playing, both in the field and at the bat.  This last complaint 
was probably the most common of all.  Many observers, like the St. Louis Globe-Democrat, 
thought players would play for their statistics, since statistics were the only fair criterion for 
judgment, and that teamwork and strategy inevitably would suffer as a result.25 
From Washington, Bob Larner called the new plan “undoubtedly a sensible and 
businesslike proceeding” that he felt would reverse the current situation in which, “the life blood 
has been slowly, but steadily ebbing from base ball for several years past.”  He wrote that the star 
players would no doubt complain, “But when they stop to consider the situation in a calm, 
reasonable spirit they will probably appreciate the policy.”  Larner also tried to assuage worries 
about the feasibility of a classification system that included intangible factors by stating that 
president Nick Young, “has the confidence of players, managers and the public, and there is no 
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doubt but he will do his work well, and at the same time earn the merited advance in his 
salary.”26 
O.P. Caylor saw some merit in the plan, but believed the teams should have graded 
salaries between $1,000 and $3,000, with jumps of $500 in between.  In addition, he thought that 
continuous and quality service with the same team should entitle a player to improve their 
standing by one grade every three years, even if the man’s performance had stayed steady and 
his classification was otherwise unchanged.  If the teams did not like this or want to pay the 
increase, they should let the player go.  He also called for the BPBP to offer a compromise plan 
if they were unhappy as a group, believing that such a plan had a chance of acceptance.   
The backbone of Caylor’s commentary was that the Brush Plan gave no reward for long 
and faithful service on the part of individual players.  All observers agreed that one of the 
reasons salaries had spiked in recent years was that talented but discontented players felt they 
could make more elsewhere, thus putting pressure on their teams to move them or else risk an 
uninspired performance by a petulant player.  This new graded salary scheme would only 
provide more reasons for dissatisfaction, which might lead to lackluster play on the field.  If 
veterans of long experience and loyalty saw younger, unproven men getting as much or more 
compensation than they did, it would not provide much incentive for loyalty to the ball club.27   
When making such comments, he possibly had in mind the situation in his former home, 
Cincinnati.  There, the Red Stockings signed young outfielder “Bug” Holliday and, as an 
American Association team, they could sign Holliday for whatever they saw fit to pay him.  
Apparently, the team saw fit to pay Holliday quite a bit (the rumored value was $2,800), because 
the signing caused three of Cincinnati’s talented veterans, John Reilly, Bid McPhee, and Hick 
                                                 
26 “Washington Whispers” Bob Larner, The Sporting Life, November 28, 1888, 6. 
27 “Caylor’s Comment” O.P. Caylor, The Sporting Life, January 23, 1889, 4. 
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Carpenter, to hold out for greater pay.28  A graded salary plan would result in the same situation, 
the only difference being that the salaries producing the jealousy would be a bit lower.  (It turned 
out that Holliday was the best hitter on the Reds in 1889, but of course, young players did not 
usually have such spectacular debuts, and no one could predict this ahead of time.)  Carpenter 
and McPhee came to terms with Sterns before too many suns had set, but Reilly proved more 
stubborn.  When interviewed, Reilly confirmed this was indeed the reason for his holdout.  “Mr. 
Stern pays Holliday a large salary, and I think I can reasonably ask for as much as he is to 
receive.  I have been with the Cincinnati Club for a number of seasons, and I feel that I have 
always given satisfaction and have improved each year in my work.”29  Reilly, because of his 
past efforts in Cincinnati, had support for his position.  “The argument made by Long John is 
that if ‘Bug’ Holliday is worth $2,800 to the Cincinnati team, he is surely entitled to as much . . . 
if there is one man in the Cincinnati team whose whole soul is in its success that man is Reilly.  
He is one of your mortals who mourns over a lost game like a man who has buried a friend.”30 
Over in Baltimore, Albert Mott was not sanguine of the plan’s chances.  He wrote that the 
Brush Plan, “has the fatal defect of depending entirely for its success upon the good faith of a 
miscellaneous assembly of human beings, with the usual human traits, among which it may be 
safely depended upon they possess at least a modest avarice and a laudable rivalry.”  Mott 
predicted,  
when fate, luck or the fortunes of the field combine with private proddings of patrons and 
public impaling by the press, the temptation to evade the law becomes too strong for 
fallible human nature, and the result is a breach of the rule such as to ultimately cause it 
to become a dead letter.  Unhealthy sentiment may ascribe a more lofty code of morals to 
                                                 
28 No title, NA, The Sporting Life, February 6, 1889, 2. 
29 “Reilly’s Ultimatum” John Reilly, The Sporting Life, February 13, 1889, 2. 
30 “Cincinnati Chips” Ren Mulford, Jr., The Sporting Life, February 13, 1889, 5. 
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‘magnates’ than to the balance of the human race, but unfortunately for the welfare of the 
game, they have always shown themselves to be possessed of the average failings.31 
 
* * * * * 
 
 As if to confirm the worst fears of the critics almost immediately, even before December 
was over, various teams behaved in ways suggesting they were not following the letter of their 
own law.  “It is understood that several of the New York, Boston and Philadelphia players have 
already made acceptable terms with their respective managers, but their contracts have not been 
formally announced.  Such proceedings are calculated to create dissatisfaction in various quarters 
and open the door to allegations of favoritism in allowing players and managers to dicker about 
terms after the 15th.”32 
 This suspicion thickened when, in early February, the New York Giants announced that 
Roger Connor, Mickey Welch, Jim O’Rourke, Danny Richardson, Art Whitney, Gil Hatfield, 
Will George, Bill Brown, Mike Slattery, George Gore, and Ledell Titcomb had signed that week, 
with Tim Keefe and Buck Ewing on the verge.  As the December 15 deadline was long gone, but 
the men signed without much news or discussion or complaint about the amount they had signed 
for, baseball observers understandably surmised that something might be afoot.33  It also turned 
out Keefe was not ready to sign, but chose to hold out instead.  Making a mockery of the Brush 
Plan’s rules, he held out all the way into May, signing after the season began.  He timed 
everything perfectly.  By the time the season opened, several New York pitchers were injured.  
Things were so bad that catcher Buck Ewing was forced to pitch a game, against the now-
                                                 
31 “Baltimore Bulletin” TTT, The Sporting Life, December 26, 1888, 5. 
32 “Washington Whispers” R.M. Larner, The Sporting Life, December 26, 1888, 1. 
33 “From League Headquarters” R.M. Larner, The Sporting Life, February 13, 1889, 1. 
 678
formidable Boston Beaneaters lineup, at that.  While Ewing did admirably, showing a terrific 
fastball, at this point New York owner John Day saw no choice but to give in and sign Keefe on 
Keefe’s terms, which were a salary of $4,500.34 
Of course, several players also kicked against their classification, and refused to accept 
the terms offered at first.  Washington’s ace pitcher, Jim Whitney, was among them, aggrieved 
despite his Class A ranking because it would violate his contract and pay a lesser salary than he 
had enjoyed in 1888.  The Grasshopper, despite a losing record for his career, was a terrific 
pitcher by modern evaluation methods.  He led the National League in fewest walks allowed per 
nine innings in five consecutive seasons, 1883-1887, and led the NL in ratio of strikeouts to 
walks four different times.  The first eight years of his career were possibly of Hall of Fame 
caliber.  By 1889, however, he was suffering from an illness that became more serious over time, 
and he died in 1891.  No one could foresee this in the off-season of 1888-1889, however, and 
while most sportswriters were praising the efforts to bring salaries down, many sympathized with 
Whitney as a man who deserved better due to his pitching work and off-field comportment.35  
Jerry Denny even vouched for Whitney’s health after a winter spent playing ball in California, 
claiming he showed no physical problems.36  Whitney did manage to complain his way out of 
Washington, as the Nationals traded him to Indianapolis in exchange for another pitcher, John 
Healy, but Whitney still had to sign for the figure at which Nick Young slotted him.37 
There was also the matter of the lingering effects of the salary limit of 1886 complicating 
matters.  Recall that, to work around the $2,000 limit, teams often offered players $2,000 in their 
                                                 
34 “New York News” W.I. Harris, The Sporting Life, May 15, 1889, 5. 
35 “Washington Whispers” R.M. Larner, The Sporting Life, February 6, 1889, 6; “The 
Washingtonians” Sam, The Sporting News, February 9, 1889, 3. 
36 “Indianapolis Mention” A.G. Ovens, The Sporting Life, April 10, 1889, 1. 
37 “Signed With the Hoosiers” NA, Pittsburg Dispatch, April 6, 1889, 6. 
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official contract, but then supplemented that amount with personal service contracts for the 
remainder of the salary they agreed on with their players.  Jack Glasscock, of Indianapolis, was 
one player affected by this situation.  In 1888, his official contract and supplemental contract 
together paid him $3,000 total.  Indianapolis offered him a straight $2,500 for 1889 (along with 
an extra stipend for being team captain, which was allowed under the Brush Plan), a clear 
decrease over the previous year.  Yet, the Hoosiers had the audacity to claim they were giving 
their infielder a raise, as his official contract would stand $500 higher than in 1888.  Glasscock 
did not see things in that light, feeling this was an act of bad faith given the provision in the 
National League’s deal with the Brotherhood on contracts disallowing the unilateral reduction of 
a player’s salary.  He decided not to sign his contract, hoping the Brotherhood would take up his 
cause.38  Glasscock later relented, however, and accepted the terms offered by the Hoosiers. 
Indianapolis created another interesting situation that the Brush Plan did not clearly 
address when they moved to sign pitcher Charlie Getzein in early March.  Getzein had obviously 
not signed by December 15, but because he had formerly been with Detroit, which disbanded 
operations, it was impossible for him to have done so.  He believed he should be exempt from 
classification, as the team that would have classified him no longer existed.  He could not sign 
with his old team, but that team had not sent him somewhere else in time to negotiate by the 
December deadline, so Getzein understandably felt aggrieved.39  He signed with Indianapolis in 
late March, lacking a better option, but without undue complaining.40  This caused one paper to 
                                                 
38 “Jack Glasscock Talks” Pickwick, The Sporting Life, February 27, 1889, 1. 
39 “Getzein Of Detroit” Lew, The Sporting News, March 9, 1889, 3. 
40 “Getzein Has Accepted the Terms” NA, Chicago Daily Tribune, March 24, 1889, 6. 
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offer, “it is no sure thing that Detroit did not divide the purchase money with Getzein.  At any 
rate, he became well satisfied with Indianapolis very suddenly.”41 
As mentioned previously, players with limited major league experience proved difficult 
to classify properly, because they had a limited record of performance against major league 
competition and little reputation, for good or ill, in terms of deportment.  Such was true of 
Chicago White Stockings outfield Hugh Duffy.  An eventual Hall of Famer, Duffy was a rookie 
in 1888, with but 298 professional at bats to his name.  He had had a nice year however, with a 
.282 batting average, possessed a reputation as a solid defensive player, and did not have an 
unsavory record in regards to alcohol or behavior.  When he found out Nick Young rated him in 
Class C and he would therefore get $2,000 just as he had the year before, Duffy felt 
underappreciated and inclined to protest his classification.  Chicago management agreed with his 
own assessment of his worth, as the team turned down a reported offer of $8,000 for his sale over 
the winter.42 
One reason Chicago offered for its behavior in the Duffy case was that, because Nick 
Young put Duffy in Class C, its hand were tied in the matter.  This was not always true, 
however, as the classification scheme was malleable when the situation required it.  At least, it 
was for Philadelphia Quakers first baseman Sid Farrar.  Farrar, slotted into Class C, held out 
because he believed he deserved better.  As April moved along and opening day of the 1889 
season approached with Farrar still not in the fold, Quakers management started getting 
desperate.  “Col. Rogers and Manager Wright then promised to use their united influences with 
President Nick Young to have Farrar placed in Class B this year.  This won Sidney over and he 
                                                 
41 “Notes And Comments” NA, The Sporting Life, April 3, 1889, 4. 
42 Ibid. 
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signed.”  Farrar himself said, “If the club wants to pay me $2,250 you can bet Old Nick will put 
me in Class B.”43 
As for Al Spalding, his attitude toward the Brush Plan depended upon when you asked 
him the question.  When he “first” heard about the situation on his tour, he stated he disliked the 
plan.  Once back in Chicago, however, and with no further need to keep the All-American team 
happy and well disposed towards him personally, his views underwent a radical change, and he 
stated his intent to support the new scheme fully.  (As mentioned earlier, some historians believe 
he was the true architect of the Brush Plan all along.  Given that nothing happened in the 
National League without his blessing, it seems almost inconceivable that his fellow owners 
would have taken such a drastic measure without his knowledge and approval.) 
 One final problem with this plan was that, when actually implemented, it did not always 
reward baseball players for being good baseball players, which is, after all, what wins games.  
For instance, National League president Nick Young classified Boston’s John Morrill, a man 
acknowledged by all observers as a gentleman with excellent personal habits, in Class A.  Jerry 
Denny of Indianapolis ended up in Class B.  Yet, Denny was a far more effective baseball player 
than Morrill by 1889.  About to turn thirty-four years old, Morrill was coming off a dismal 
season in which he hit .198, posting an OPS+ of 79 and 1.4 WAR, his WAR landing that high 
only because of his defensive skill.  Denny, on the other hand, was still in the prime of his career, 
had just finished a nice season with a 115 OPS+, a WAR of 2.4, and he was the acknowledged 
king of defensive third baseman as well.  Yes, he drank from time to time, while Morrill never 
did.  Despite this, Denny was still more valuable to his team than Morrill was.  The difference in 
contributions on the field was even greater during the 1889 season.  Morrill, on his last legs as an 
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active player, limped home with 0.1 WAR after playing in only 44 games for Washington (he 
was still with Boston when Nick Young decided his classification, but Boston transferred him to 
the Nationals before the season began).  Denny, on the other hand, essentially reproduced his 
1888 season, posting 2.3 WAR for Indianapolis.   
Observers at the time did not necessarily see things this way, however.  Not privy to such 
statistical concepts, many heralded Morrill’s move to Washington as a masterstroke that might 
finally elevate the Nationals to respectability in the National League.  “Every body knows that 
under so capable, efficient and practically experienced manager and Captain as John Morrill is 
known to be, the Washington Club, will make things mighty interesting in the League this 
season. . . . In Morrill the club gets a man who is known throughout the land, as a manager who 
possesses the requisite qualifications, and as an honorable and upright player.”44  Even though 
Washington acquired shortstop Sam Wise from Boston along with Morrill, and catcher Tom 
Daly from Chicago, as well after Al Spalding released him in anger over his drinking on the 
Spalding tour, it still did not help the Nationals be a better baseball team. In fact, they were 
worse in 1889 than they had been in 1888, their win total falling from 48 to 41, and by 
midseason, Morrill had to step down as manager with the club standing at 13 wins versus 38 
losses.  As another sportswriter wrote in lament when the club started slowly and he began 
realizing Morrill was not the answer by himself, “John Morrill, as captain, was expected to 
infuse new life and vigor into their movements, and many of the wise men interested in the game 
put them down for sixth or seventh place sure.  Some were enthusiastic enough to predict that 
they would wind up fifth or better.”  Instead, by June, “He is exceedingly weak at the bat, and 
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while I know that he does the best he can under all circumstances, I am convinced that his best 
days on the ball field have passed.45   
 This is but one example of how the Brush Plan did not always reward players for being 
good players.  It forced Washington to pay Morrill much more money than the value he actually 
produced on the field.  Its supporters claimed it would inspire players to greater performance, but 
as it actually played out, that was not the purpose of the plan, only an incidental benefit the 
League hoped it might realize.  The real purpose was to inspire players to better personal habits.  
Recall that Nick Young had said, “intelligent players will recognize it and it depends upon their 
own exertions whether they shall be benefited by it.”  Yet, if classification depended as much or 
more on a man’s deportment off the field as it did on his performance on the field, this diluted or 
almost eliminated the incentive to greater exertion.  Clearly, the exertion the National League 
had in mind was that players not exert themselves in having a good time during the late hours. 
 This is not really a surprise, however, and it fits perfectly with the National League’s 
record of relating to its players all through the later 1880s.  As was true in regards to player 
fitness, gambling, or violence in baseball, League owners did not care much how they made 
money, so long as they made money.  Spalding and others expressed, frequently, a desire to 
elevate baseball’s image amongst the “better class” of people, and believed that finding more 
moral players, or failing that, upgrading the morals of existing players, was the surest path to this 
goal.  Of course, players that drank less would most likely play better, and the team would win 
more games if that happened, but winning was not as important to most owners as profiting.  
This behavior on the part of the National League also demonstrates the paternalistic attitude it so 
often took towards the players.  If the players would not shape up on their own, the League must 
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make them shape up.  At heart, most were no better than irresponsible children, so the League 
was actually doing them a favor by reducing their pay and preventing them from wasting their 
own money. 
 
* * * * * 
 
 On the surface, despite a few little arguments here and there, things seemed more or less 
serene for the National League in the middle of March.  The opening of the season was little 
more than a month away, enthusiasm amongst the fans was on the rise, some teams had 
assembled their men already to get in shape for the coming campaign, and most NL players 
seemed content with their contract situation.  True, there were still a few holdouts and 
complaints, the League had not yet resolved the Rowe-White matter, and a few other legal 
questions hung in the air regarding the Brush Plan, such as whether some teams, New York for 
instance, had evaded. 
 Still, by the standards of most off-seasons in 1880s baseball, this was not especially 
dramatic.  The League settled its membership issue quickly and easily, with Cleveland firmly in 
place of Detroit.  It had overcome the financial problems of Indianapolis, and the Hoosiers were 
good to play at least one more season.  From all published reports save the vindictive ones 
appearing in The Sporting News, Al Spalding and his tourists had achieved a host of successes 
booming America’s national game abroad.  Baseball’s leaders had every reason to look forward 
to the new season. 
 It seems the reason things were relatively calm is that, even though the Brotherhood had 
made public comments here and there regarding the National League’s perfidy, the BPBP really 
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did need its president, Ward, in order to coordinate its response.  That is why player objections to 
the Brush Plan had been individual ones rather than the Brotherhood making any complaint on 
behalf of its members.  Perhaps this gave the National League’s owners a false sense of security 
heading into the 1889 season as well.  When no coordinated response was forthcoming from the 
BPBP, the owners might have concluded that the Brush Plan was a success and that the 
organization was not as strong as rumors claimed.  The apparent acquiescence of the players in 
the Brush Plan by the spring of 1889 contributed to this perceived feeling of success. 
 They had overlooked one thing, however.  On March 14, newspapers in the US revealed 
that one player on Spalding’s tour planned to end his odyssey a little early.  “Capt. John M. 
Ward’s intention of leaving the Spalding base-ball party and sailing for New York tomorrow has 
been no secret among the members of the two teams or to Mr. Spalding for some days.”  Like the 
rest of the tourists, Ward had had no inkling of what was going on in the US since leaving San 
Francisco the prior November.  Upon arrival in Europe, however, the ball tossers finally had the 
opportunity to receive mail, and Ward decided to alter his plans immediately.  When asked why 
Ward planned to steam home early, one member of the All-American team simply said, “Johnny 
Ward knows that the Brotherhood of American Ball-Players wants him at home and he is going 
there; that is all there is to the matter.”46 
                                                 





The Beginning of the End of the American Association 
 
 
 Most histories of 1880s baseball and the Players League of 1890 note the fact that after 
the PL failed to establish itself in 1890, the National League’s other rival, the American 
Association, also fell apart and played its last season in 1891.  The general storyline is that, with 
the Players League out of the way, the National League was free to deal with a weakened 
American Association in its own time and finish off its rival.  While true in its way, this does not 
do justice to all the maneuvers that brought this denouement about.  In fact, we can trace the real 
reasons for the American Association’s destruction to the 1888 season and its aftermath. 
 All through the 1880s, baseball writers generally observed that of the two major leagues, 
the National League seemed to have the more effective and harmonious group of leaders.  Al 
Spalding led the way, certainly, but in addition John Day of New York and John Rogers in 
Philadelphia were some of the most powerful and influential men in the game.  As a result, the 
League always seemed to outmaneuver the Association at critical times, as when it lured 
Pittsburgh away from the Association for the 1887 season to fill one of its vacancies in the place 
of Kansas City and St. Louis.  As one sportswriter put it, “the business of the League is kept 
from the public, while the Association ‘circle’ has no secrets . . . the Association grinds more 
axes in public in one year than the League will in a dozen.  The Association magnates are always 
quarreling among themselves and talking of dirty ball, etc., while the League people have their 
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little spats in some quiet nook, and the public is none the wiser.”1   Baseball was popular enough, 
however, that the Association always seemed to muddle through.  This was true up through the 
1887 season.  In 1888, however, things started to change.  The issue that initiated the eventual 
demise of the American Association was, perhaps not surprisingly, the interlocked questions 
regarding player salaries and ticket prices. 
 Even by 1887, there were a few cracks showing in the Association’s armor.  In St. Louis, 
Chris Von der Ahe was always a wild card.  No one knew what he might do next, and his moods 
swung wildly depending on the current fortunes of his beloved Browns.  However, as he had the 
best team in the Association and its best drawing card, other owners had to humor him, and Von 
der Ahe often persuaded them to go along with whatever he had in mind, regardless of the 
consequences.  The problem with this situation was that the other owner who cut the largest 
figure in the Association, Charles Byrne in Brooklyn, usually opposed whatever Von der Ahe 
wanted to do, and as Byrne also had a top team by 1888 and resided in the second largest market 
the Association had left after the Metropolitans retired from New York, his word counted for a 
great deal as well.2 
 Besides his clashes with Von der Ahe, which became increasingly frequent in 1888, 
Byrne was also partly responsible for another of the Association’s mistakes of 1887.  At a late-
season Association meeting, he combined with Billy Barnie of Baltimore to convince his fellow 
representatives to exclude O.P. Caylor from the meeting.  Caylor was the manager of the New 
York Metropolitans, and had every right to be there, but Barnie and Byrne convinced their 
brethren that Caylor was, first and foremost, a newspaper writer (he wrote a weekly column for 
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The Sporting Life, as anyone who has read the footnotes of this dissertation knows well by this 
point), and thus had no place in their councils.   
 Perhaps now would be the proper time for a few words concerning Caylor.  Oliver Perry 
Caylor wore many hats and was involved with professional baseball in many different guises 
throughout the 1880s.  When he kept his sarcasm within bounds, he was among the most 
entertaining baseball writers for any of the national publications of the day, and one of the most 
courageous as well.  He even participated in the launch of a daily paper that discussed nothing 
but baseball, the Daily Baseball Gazette, although the paper put out only a few issues before 
going under.  More important to our story is Caylor’s historic relationship with the American 
Association.  He had been part of the organization from its birth.  Caylor, along with Horace 
Phillips, late of Pittsburgh, was among the men most prominent in starting the league in the 
winter of 1881-1882.  He had also managed two Association clubs, Cincinnati and New York.  
As a result, he was deep in the councils of the Association and knew most of its dirty secrets.  
When Association owners ostracized him from their affairs at that fateful 1887 meeting, he 
turned against them in the press, and some of those secrets came into the light.3  Caylor knew 
enough about baseball and its history that, when the Brotherhood War began and Al Spalding 
purchased a New York paper called the Sporting Times as his organ to combat the players, 
Spalding tabbed Caylor, along with Harry Palmer, as the editors.  His acid wit and biting prose 
helped to undermine the position of the Brotherhood as the 1890 season unfolded.4 
 Caylor, however potent his pen, had no formal role in the American Association after 
1887.  The men who did, however, often made decisions that left the group careening from one 
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near-disaster to the next.  This was true both on the field and off.  Up until 1888, the National 
League charged fifty cents for its cheapest tickets and seventy-five for the better seats in the 
grandstand.  In the Association, teams charged twenty-five cents for the bleaching boards and 
fifty for the grandstand.  In that year, however, the Association decided to try to operate on the 
same financial level as the League, and increased its ticket prices to the League standard, as 
described in chapter eleven.  The Association believed it played just as a good a brand of 
baseball as the League did, which was more or less true, and that as the salaries of players had 
risen steadily in the past five years, it needed to jump its ticket prices to League levels to make 
sure it could compete for talent.   
By midseason, however, many regretted the change.  By that point, baseball observers 
generally believed that Brooklyn was doing well and Cincinnati reasonably well under the new 
rate.  Cincinnati owner Aaron Stern told sportswriter Ren Mulford, Jr., “the season, outside of 
Cincinnati and Brooklyn, has been a financial disappointment.  We have been credited with 
making money.  A few thousand dollars signifies what our profits have been, and if any man 
wants to buy out the Cincinnati Club I am willing to treat with him.”  Cleveland seemed to be in 
decent shape as well, but the other Association cities were kicking hard against the fifty-cent 
ticket plan.  As we will see, it is not a coincidence that by 1890, all three of these clubs were in 
the National League, replacing Detroit, Indianapolis, and Washington.  As Mulford wrote, “the 
Association prospects are not cheering—that is certain.  St. Louis is a dead rabbit town, and the 
club that is such a magnet away from home cannot draw more than mosquitoes and Joe Pritchard 
in its own bailiwick.  The high tariff has crippled Baltimore, and would have killed Philadelphia.  
Louisville is struggling along, thinking much and saying little, while Cleveland is nearer a 
paying basis . . .”  Rumors that Cincinnati and Brooklyn planned to jilt the Association and join 
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the League had been in the air for nearly a year already, and the rumors only increased as the 
American Association debated what to do about its ticket prices.5 
The experiment lasted only into July.  Surprisingly, however, a National League team 
caved first.  That the team was Philadelphia is not a surprise, as a combination of owner Rogers’ 
loyalty to quarter admissions, the death of top pitcher Charlie Ferguson, a rainy spring, a 
disappointing 26-24 record at the end of June, and the resulting weak patronage of the club made 
Rogers decide to return to his comfort zone and resume offering twenty-five cent tickets.6  The 
Philadelphia Athletics of the American Association had the right to drop their prices should this 
occur.  They did so, but when the Association met in early summer to discuss retrograde action 
on the part of the entire Association, they elected to stay with fifty-cent admissions for the time 
being, Philadelphia excepted.  Cleveland, Brooklyn, and Cincinnati wanted to keep the current 
tariff, while St. Louis, Baltimore, Louisville, and Philadelphia did not, and Kansas City 
abstained.  Needing a two-thirds vote to change their collective minds, the fifty-cent policy stood 
for the time being.7 
 This is not to say that, by its close, 1888 was a financial failure for all Association teams.  
In addition to Cincinnati and Brooklyn, Philadelphia did just fine according to its treasurer, 
Whittaker, in part because of the combination of quarter tickets and a late-season surge in the 
standings that had some observers believing, at least for a time, that the team might overtake the 
mighty Browns.  Whittaker said, “Financially the season has been very pleasant to us.  We will 
close with quite a large profit.  We are in favor of using all our profits and more besides to 
                                                 
5 “Cincinnati Chips” Ren Mulford, Jr., The Sporting Life, August 1, 1888, 7.  Recall that Joe 
Pritchard was Mulford’s St. Louis counterpart writer for The Sporting Life.  A dead rabbit town 
was one with little action taking place. 
6 “A Break In The Association High Tariff Line” Francis Richter, The Sporting Life, July 4, 
1888, 1. 
7 “The Fifty Cent Rate” NA, The Sporting News, July 7, 1888, 1. 
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improve the surroundings of the team for next season.  We are now considering the question of a 
new ground, and it is about decided that we will have new quarters next year.”8 
For the clubs that were struggling to draw patrons, however, keeping the fifty-cent 
minimum ticket price was an albatross dragging them down to the financial depths.  As a result, 
some clubs tried to find loopholes.  In Baltimore, for instance, manager Billy Barnie announced 
that while tickets sold at the team’s box office remained fifty cents, patrons could purchase their 
tickets at the old price at certain business establishments in the Monumental City.9  Clearly, this 
was against Association policy, but one observer asked, “what are the other magnates going to 
do about it?  Louisville will do the same thing when she gets back.  Von der Ahe will stand by 
Barnie and the Athletics will not vote against him.  There you have it.  That’s what the 
Association constitution is worth.”10  As a result, the American Association called an emergency 
meeting for August 7, 1888, to try to work out a plan regarding the issue of admission price.11 
 The executives met in Parlor C of the Continental Hotel in Philadelphia.  Surprisingly, 
they did reach agreement on the tariff question.  Unexpectedly, Byrne sided with the quarter-
admissions faction, giving them five votes out of six (Cleveland and Cincinnati were not present 
to vote), as Kansas City announced its willingness to side with the majority.  Considerable 
politicking accompanied the decision, however.  The Kansas City management was hoping to get 
on the good side of the rest of the Association because their franchise was a conditional one.  
The other owners of the AA retained the right to vote them out of the league at the conclusion of 
the season, so naturally enough, Cowboys management sought to make as many friends as 
                                                 
8 “In The Quaker City” HWL, The Sporting News, October 20, 1888, 5. 
9 “Baltimore Bulletin” TTT, The Sporting Life, August 1, 1888, 3. 
10 “Caylor’s Comment” O.P. Caylor, The Sporting Life, August 8, 1888, 7. 
11 “Will Meet At Last” NA, The Sporting News, August 4, 1888, 1. 
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possible whenever the opportunity arose.12  In exchange for his vote, Brooklyn’s Byrne extorted 
a concession in return.  The Association must return to the guarantee plan for distributing 
revenue to the visiting clubs, and abandon giving the visitors a percentage of the gate.  Of course, 
this would materially improve Brooklyn’s finances, as it was the most patronized team in the 
Association (in just thirteen Sunday games, it drew 59,841 spectators to Ridgewood Park, 
including over 10,000 on June 313), and it would no longer have to give a percentage of its gate 
to the rest of the league.  Some teams made side deals around this issue, however, such as the St. 
Louis Browns agreeing to continue paying Louisville the percentage whenever the Colonels 
came to town.  Still, even with the occasional exception, this was a steep price to pay, but the 
other members of the Association were desperate, so they agreed.  It is also conceivable, but 
impossible to prove, that Byrne also extorted a player from Baltimore in return for his vote.  
Coincidence or not, within a few days, Baltimore’s Tom “Oyster” Burns was a member of 
Byrne’s nine in Brooklyn.14 
 Everyone seemed happy at that point.  Except for Cleveland.  The Blues had done 
reasonably well with fifty-cent tickets, and given the rising expenses of fielding a nine, 
management there believed the only way to make baseball a permanent institution was to keep 
ticket prices at a half dollar.  Following the meeting, the team’s president, Robinson, took the 
extreme step of telegraphing all other teams in the Association that he meant to put all his men 
on waivers, so that he might sell them to the highest bidder, and asking them not to claim any of 
the players so he could dispose of his roster profitably and put together a new team to play in the 
                                                 
12 “Indiscreet Mr. Byrne” NA, The Sporting News, August 11, 1888, 1. 
13 “Chadwick’s Chat” Henry Chadwick, The Sporting Life, August 22, 1888, 4. 
14 “The Association” NA, The Sporting Life, August 15, 1888, 1; “Caylor’s Comment” O.P. 
Caylor, The Sporting Life, August 22, 1888, 2; “Brunell’s Budget” F.H. Brunell, The Sporting 
Life, November 21, 1888, 3. 
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National League in 1889.  Cincinnati refused to go along, however, and claimed some of the 
players in an effort to strengthen its nine for the stretch run in 1888, so Cleveland called off its 
plan.  This led Robinson to state, “This is a good fifty-cent ball town, and a League club would 
draw better here than in any other city in the country except Chicago, New York, and Boston.  
The Association has struck us a foul and cowardly blow and I am in favor of quitting.”  The new 
agreement did allow Cleveland to keep their fifty-cent ticket rate intact, which they did.15  By the 
end of the season, they ran a modest $3,000 in the red, and believed that 1889, once they were 
ensconced in the National League and could draw fans with new faces to compete against, would 
be a much better season.16 
 Some writers wondered how Cleveland could scheme to enter the National League when 
the League had no vacancies.  Others knew better that to believe such an inconvenient truth 
would hamper National League owners.  There had been no vacancy in the League before 1887, 
either, yet that had not stopped Spalding and company from booting Kansas City from its ranks 
and replacing the Cowboys with a Pittsburgh franchise when opportunity favored such a course.  
If Cleveland wanted to come in, and the League’s owners wanted Cleveland in their ranks, they 
would find a way.  There were also rumors that Pittsburgh’s management disliked the half dollar 
admission policy of the National League, as the team was not drawing very well.  The club’s 
secretary, Scandrett, stated in an interview that the club might return to the American 
Association if given the opportunity, now that the AA had returned its ticket prices to their 
                                                 
15 “Is It Only A Bluff?” JRR, The Sporting News, August 11, 1888, 1. 
16 “Brunell’s Budget” F.H. Brunell, The Sporting Life, December 12, 1888, 5. 
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former level.17  The team’s president contradicted Scandrett, however, leaving baseball observers 
in suspense as to just what would happen.18 
 
* * * * * 
 
 Cleveland’s anger over the proceedings came back to haunt the Association before long.  
In October, even as the New York-St. Louis World Series was still in progress, the Detroit 
Wolverines decided to pack it in and drop out of the National League.  Cleveland jumped on the 
opportunity to buy the Detroit franchise, acquiring a few young and unproven players in the 
process, and switched leagues without hesitation.  In place of Cleveland, with its respectable 
reputation as a baseball town and its population of 261,000 people (1890 census) the American 
Association fell back on Columbus, Ohio, a city with roughly one-third of Cleveland’s 
population (with about 88,000 souls, it ranked thirtieth in the nation in population in 1890) and a 
largely unsuccessful previous history of just two years in major league baseball, after which the 
team transferred its location to Pittsburgh. 
 Still, things could have been worse.  In November, Baltimore’s chief owner, Harry 
Vonderhorst, reassured Oriole fans that their city would field a team for the coming season, 
despite rumors that that Baltimore was on the brink of dissolution after a lousy season 
financially.  Some observers even believed that attendance had dropped into the double-digits at 
times in 1888.  Although team management had to admit, “next season the Baltimore 
management will have the balance on the right side of the book, a little thing that did not occur 
                                                 
17 “Poor Old Pittsburgs” Reddy, The Sporting News, August 18, 1888, 1. 
18 “Notes And Comments” NA, The Sporting Life, August 22, 1888, 2. 
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last season,”19 Vonderhorst said, “we will show people a team next season as strong as any in the 
Association.  It will be a decided improvement on that of last season.”  Vonderhorst was a man 
of his word, in this case.  The Orioles bounced back from 1888’s 57-80 disaster to go a 
respectable 70-65 in 1889, largely thanks to pitcher Matt Kilroy.20  Vonderhorst did not get to 
experience the comeback in person, however, as he sold most of his interest in the team to 
Baltimore oyster packers B.F. Farren and Fred Booth in January, 1889.21   
At the same time, Brooklyn reaffirmed its loyalty, for 1889 at least, which meant that 
Cincinnati would remain in the fold, as well.  The primary reason for Brooklyn’s return, besides 
Byrne’s pledge not to leave without a championship in his possession, was that leaving the 
Association for the League would mean the end of Sunday baseball in the City of Churches, a 
step that Byrne was not yet prepared to take, even for the fifty-cent general admissions charge in 
the League.22  There was also the possibility that, if Brooklyn did apply to the National League, 
the New York Giants might object at having a competitor so near their home territory.  The 
Giants would need two other franchises to vote with them to block a Brooklyn application, the 
National League requiring a two-thirds vote to change its membership, and if Cincinnati tied its 
fate to that of Brooklyn, two existing National League franchises would get the boot.  These two 
franchises, typically rumored to be Washington and Indianapolis, could then combine their votes 
with that of the Giants to block Brooklyn’s admission, which would also stymie Cincinnati and 
prevent their own dismissal.  Given that New York Giants owner John Day publicly expressed 
his opposition to seeing Brooklyn in the League, stating, “We want no gamblers in our 
                                                 
19 “Baltimore News” Job Lots, The Sporting News, November 24, 1888, 1. 
20 “They Will All Stick” NA, The Sporting News, November 17, 1888, 1. 
21 “A Baltimore Deal” NA, The Sporting Life, January 9, 1889, 1. 
22 “Brooklyn Aims True” NA, The Sporting News, November 17, 1888, 1. 
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organization, and Byrne will never get in with his club as long as I am in it,” this was a serious 
potential roadblock.23 
Even with this temporary affirmation, however, there was no guarantee for Brooklyn 
beyond 1889.  That is one reason why other Association teams grew extremely concerned as the 
Bridegrooms stockpiled talent as the 1888 season wound down.  Not only did this contribute to 
general salary inflation throughout baseball, it made it more likely that Brooklyn would prevail 
and win the 1889 championship (which it did), which made it more likely Brooklyn would leave 
the Association for the League (which it did), and if that happened, it would take all its star 
players to the League, leaving the Association that much poorer in terms of the drawing power of 
its players. 
 
* * * * * 
 
 Another of the American Association’s great mistakes was not replacing the New York 
Metropolitans franchise after Brooklyn’s Byrne bought the existing players before the 1888 
season.  Rather than replace that club with another New York team, the Association went 
through the farce of claiming that the New York Metropolitans franchise still existed, even 
though there was no actual team playing in New York.  Only when it was obvious that no 
grounds were available that would suit the needs of an Association franchise did the Association 
end its charade.  One consequence of this choice is obvious; the league had no team playing in 
the nation’s largest market, with the negative financial consequences one would expect.  Instead 
of New York, the Association put a team in Kansas City.  This disrupted the Association in a 
                                                 
23 “Day Speaks Of Byrne” Gotham, The Sporting News, September 21, 1889, 1.  Byrne was the 
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couple ways.  First, it unbalanced the league geographically, leaving it with five western teams, 
Kansas City, Cleveland, St. Louis, Louisville, and Cincinnati, and only three eastern ones, 
Brooklyn, Baltimore, and Philadelphia.  This necessitated classing Cleveland with the eastern 
teams for scheduling purposes, adding to that club’s travel mileage and expenses, while also 
increasing everyone’s expenses in time and money for the long train ride to Kansas City.  While 
this probably played a minimal role in Cleveland’s decision to jump to the National League after 
the season, it could not have helped retain the Forest City club’s loyalty, either. 
 The other obvious problem the loss of the Metropolitans created was the resultant 
speculation over how to replace them and put another team in New York.  Many advanced the 
idea of relocating the best team in the Association, the St. Louis Browns, who despite their 
enormous success in the standings were not drawing great crowds in the Mound City because of 
the decision to move to fifty-cent tickets in 1888.  Supporters of this plan believed that a team of 
the Browns’ quality, with the New York market to support it, would rake in the cash.  There 
were problems with such an idea, however, not least of which was that Brooklyn’s Charles 
Byrne and St. Louis’s Chris Von der Ahe did not see eye to eye very often.  While never friends 
to begin with, things grew much worse between the two men in 1888, when Von der Ahe 
accused Byrne of tampering with one of his outfielders, Tip O’Neill, believing Byrne had 
encouraged O’Neill to play poorly so the Browns would let him go.  Byrne countered that he had 
simply stated his desire to acquire the prodigious hitter, and had done nothing underhanded.24 
 Consequently, the Association did nothing in 1888, to its collective detriment.  The 
decision to grant a conditional franchise to Kansas City, meanwhile, created a new problem that 
continued festering.  In some respects, the situation became that of a dog chasing its own tail.  
                                                 
24 “The American Association” NA, The Sporting Life, August 8, 1888, 1. 
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Kansas City management was willing to spend money to bolster its ranks with better players but 
was only willing to do so if granted permanent status.  Association owners wanted to make sure 
the Cowboys had a better ballpark before granting that status.  The team countered that it was 
afraid of the large expense necessary to secure better grounds if the Association did not 
guarantee a place in the league the following season.  And so it went, round and round.25 
 The indecision resulted in other cities at least considering throwing their hats into the ring 
for Kansas City’s spot after 1888, which could not have inspired the players, fans, or owners in 
Kansas City with much confidence in the team’s future.  Now that ticket prices were back to a 
quarter, Milwaukee and Buffalo had renewed interest.  Even Omaha, billing itself as the best 
baseball city west of St. Louis, considered making a move, although the team’s manager, Frank 
Selee, later denied such intent.   He admitted he spoke with some of the Association’s leading 
men about the possibility, but that the conversations were just discussions, not negotiations.26  
A late-September American Association meeting resolved the quandary at last.  Kansas 
City finally persuaded the rest of the Association to grant it permanent status.  A businessperson 
interested in cable railways from the Cowboy City, Mr. Holmes, stepped forward to resolve the 
difficulties.  He owned the controlling interest in the Kansas City Western Association franchise, 
which had far better grounds than did the American Association team.  Holmes proposed to 
merge the two teams, giving the Association Cowboys about thirty players from which to form a 
competitive team, plus the best ballpark in the city, as well as end the costly financial 
competition between the rival Kansas City clubs.  With this promise made, the rest of the 
Association voted Kansas City a permanent franchise.27 
                                                 
25 “The Eighth Association Club” NA, The Sporting Life, August 22, 1888, 1. 
26 Ibid.; “Omaha Not Overly Anxious” NA, The Sporting Life, August 29, 1888, 5. 
27 “Results Of The Association Special Meeting” L.J.K., The Sporting Life, October 3, 1888, 1. 
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Things were looking up in Kansas City finally, but as 1888 turned to 1889, the future 
remained muddled for the American Association.  Its winter meeting in December “was chiefly 
remarkable from the fact that for almost the first time in the history of the organization no 
glaring blunder was perpetrated.”  On the down side, however, “the prospect is not of the 
brightest, with no limit to salaries and expenses, probably reduced income, an awkward circuit 
and a lopsided contest in view.”28  Furthermore, while the organization made no significant 
blunders, it was a close call.  There was a dispute when Zach Phelps, former majority 
shareholder of the Louisville Colonels but since replaced in that capacity by Mordecai Davidson, 
tried to marshal his former friends and have himself elected president of the Association, 
replacing the man currently in that position, Wheeler Wikoff.  President Wikoff may not have 
been a perfect leader, but contemporaries described him as one who, “if not a brilliant man, had 
for years shown himself to be a safe, honest, correct, and every way deserving official.”  When 
Phelps made his move, four clubs stood with him, Philadelphia, Baltimore, Louisville, and 
Kansas City, while St. Louis, Cincinnati, and Brooklyn stood opposed.  The Association had not 
yet admitted Columbus to its ranks, but that city had pledged to support Wikoff, so the Phelps 
faction attempted to delay the admission of Columbus until they could force their man upon the 
other three clubs.  This nearly produced a rift, as Columbus sensibly enough protested against 
being a hostage for the sake of one man’s ambitions, and threatened to withdraw its application 
for membership.  This made things very dicey, as no other cities stood ready to apply, and the 
league could not function with seven members.  Only some adroit maneuvering by the Wikoff 
faction managed to gain their point and admit Columbus to their ranks before taking a vote on a 
new president, and the Phelps groups saw that they had lost their battle at that time and relented.  
                                                 
28 “The Association Meeting” NA, The Sporting Life, December 12, 1888, 2. 
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The harsh feelings generated, however, did nothing to foster greater brotherhood and cooperation 
in the Association ranks.29 
This is not to say that Phelps’ defeat was necessarily a good thing.  Referring again to 
Wikoff, his saving traits seem to have been his pedestrian talents and ability to do paperwork.  
As Baltimore’s Albert Mott wrote, “there are men in the Association who prefer mediocrity to 
brilliancy in order to give their own talents for leadership full swing.  They might be arrested in 
their career of selfishness by abler minds, and that is a result strenuously fought against.  All that 
is desired by them is an honest, faithful clerk, and Mr. Wikoff fills that bill.”  Mott compared this 
to Phelps, writing, “Mr. Phelps gave promise of being an able and honest president, fearless, firm 
and equitable; but that, of course, would never do for those who wish by their talents to gain 
advantage over weaker vessels. . . . The title of president in the Association is merely 
ornamental, and analogous to a clerk of a corporation.”  Mott preferred that his league find a man 
“who could also be a wise counselor, a firm upholder of the weak and the right, a peacemaker, a 
diplomat, a master of syntax and definition, but that would be an Association millennium.”30  
The differences between Wikoff and National League leaders like Nick Young and Al Spalding 
were as pronounced as could be, and men like Mott knew it.  They realized that the Association 
suffered thereby, as men afraid of quality leadership were unlikely to work together effectively. 
 
* * * * * 
 
 The American Association allowed yet another poisonous practice to seep into its veins 
during the 1887 campaign, which became even more pronounced in 1888.  In an effort to make 
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30 “Baltimore Bulletin” TTT, The Sporting Life, December 26, 1888, 5. 
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more money, some of the weaker teams with light attendance began transferring home games 
from their grounds to cities with better patronage.  The following tables, with the teams listed in 
their order of finish for each season, tell the selfish tale.  (Not all teams have the same number of 
games, due to rainouts, ties because of darkness, etc.  The Association schedule called for 140 
championship season games, so each team would have 70 each at home and on the road if 
everything went perfectly.) 
 
Table 4 American Association Home and Away Games in 1887 
Team Home Games Away Games 
St. Louis Browns 73 62 
Cincinnati Red Stockings 73 62 
Baltimore Orioles 63 72 
Louisville Colonels 68 68 
Philadelphia Athletics 69 64 
Brooklyn Grays 73 61 
New York Metropolitans 59 74 
Cleveland Blues 58 73 
 
Table 5 American Association Home and Away Games in 1888 
Team Home Games Away Games 
St. Louis Browns 81 54 
Brooklyn Bridegrooms 73 67 
Philadelphia Athletics 75 58 
Cincinnati Red Stockings 81 53 
Baltimore Orioles 56 81 
Cleveland Blues 60 72 
Louisville Colonels 56 79 
Kansas City Cowboys 57 75 
 
 The consequences were predictable.  The better teams drew more fans because they won 
more often.  Home teams won more often than road teams, for the reasons explained in chapter 
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eight.  Therefore, the teams already doing well did even better, and the ones doing poorly, even 
worse.  This might have paid short term financial dividends in 1888, but surely hurt the league 
for 1889 and beyond, because fans of the teams at the bottom of the standings were less likely to 
attend games in the years to come, knowing that their home club was unlikely to succeed.  
Realizing this, the Association officially “banned” the practice at its next winter meeting in 1889, 
but the so-called ban did not hold up when Louisville transferred scheduled home games to 
Cincinnati early in the 1889 season. 
When one writer asked Cincinnati owner Aaron Stern about the wisdom of this practice, 
seeing that such an imbalance could affect the integrity of the pennant race, once again Stern 
demonstrated that such things as the integrity of the game, or the integrity of the American 
Association, were secondary to the bottom line.  The writer, Joe Pritchard, asked, “Do you think 
that this thing of transferring so many games to Cincinnati, is the proper thing to do?”  Stern 
answered, “Why not?  The Cincinnati Club has given these clubs large guarantees to come to 
Cincinnati, and we have done this because we know we will make money by the operation.”  
Pritchard countered, “The American Association ought not to allow anything of the kind, 
especially at this stage of the game, when the race is so close.”  Stern finished by responding, “I 
don’t think that the Association would meddle with anything that is none of its business.  If two 
clubs agree mutually to change games whose business is it?  And as for the Association, I don’t 
know as I will be in the Association next year, and I am not certain that I will be in the base ball 
business at all in 1889.”31 
 Stern was not the only owner of questionable loyalty, as the Cleveland example shows, 
but he at least was smart enough not to interfere with his team and manager, Gus Schmelz.  
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Louisville was not so lucky.  The new owner in the Falls City, Mordecai Davidson, was very 
active in the day-to-day operations of the Colonels.  The result was that a team that had always 
been respectable became, over just the 1888-1889 off-season, the first team in history to lose 100 
games in a year.  They were so poor, they also became the first team in history to lose 110 games 
as they stumbled to a 27-111 record.  In fairness, Davidson had to depend for success on two 
players who were utterly undependable, Pete Browning and Tom Ramsey, but his constant, and 
poor, personnel moves simply ran Louisville into the ground.  This weakened the Association as 
a whole because, with Louisville going an entire month (May 22 to June 22, 25 straight losses) 
without winning a single game, they simply could not draw spectators to their grounds at Eclipse 
Park.  This meant the Association ended the 1889 season with two of its best clubs leaving the 
circuit, Cincinnati and Brooklyn, and another in tenuous financial shape, tottering on the verge of 
dissolution. 
 Davidson’s knowledge of baseball was rather weak, and demonstrates the importance, 
even in the 1880s, of finding qualified men to run an operation if that operation is going to 
function successfully.  The team Davidson took over had been respectable, although short of 
championship caliber.  After about six months of his management, however, one Falls City 
writer described the state of the team by proclaiming, “the Louisville nine now has few stars in 
it.  There are only one or two men whom another club would desire to possess.”  The team’s 
greatest weakness was the infield, both offensively and defensively.  In comparison to the 
Chicago White Stockings, with their “stone wall” infield, “our infield at the close of last season 
was denominated the ‘rail fence’ infield, and it certainly deserves the title.”32 
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 Davidson pretended that a team could win baseball games without paying for quality 
players.  As April of 1889 neared its end and the championship season began, he kept up the 
fiction that hard work and individual initiative could take the place of spending money to acquire 
talent.  “I have fifteen men under contract, and I am better satisfied with them every day.  My 
plans are working out well in every respect, and while I shall make no brags, I want to repeat that 
we will make a showing that will astonish some people.  I am running my team on business 
principles this season.  The men are being worked harder than they ever were before, both in the 
games and at practice exercises.”33   
Perhaps it is too easy to run down Davidson in particular, when other owners did 
similarly unwise things but in a less obvious and dramatic way, but as the 1889 season opened, 
he continued to do silly things.  Even before the first road trip of 1889 was complete, Davidson 
contemplated releasing his team’s captain, Dude Esterbrook, for being unpopular with the men.  
“Esterbrook has made some enemies among certain members of the club who are inclined to 
shirk, by requiring them to play ball and take all chances.  These, in revenge have in divers ways 
incited the bleaching boards and some of the know-all dudes that occupy the grandstand to jeer 
and guy Esterbrook on every occasion that there was a possible chance.”  Not only did releasing 
Esterbrook call Davidson’s judgment into question, as he was the one who appointed the Dude 
captain in the first place, but in addition, he dismissed Esterbrook for demanding the team do the 
very things that Davidson had just said he wanted his team to do.34   
Furthermore, when Davidson made the move and cut the Dude loose, he attempted to 
shift the blame for the team’s poor start to Esterbrook as well, one writer stating, “The main 
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cause, in fact, of Esterbrook’s decapitation was the poor showing of the team.”  Given no 
resources to work with, and unable to pull a rabbit out of a hat, Esterbrook became the first fall 
guy for Davidson’s ineptitude.  It is true Esterbrook may not have been the perfect captain, as he 
had a tendency to scold his men on the field for their shortcomings.  He kept up the same 
behavior when the London, Ontario team tabbed him for their captaincy after his release from 
Louisville.  “In the last games here with Detroit, Esterbrook gave such an exhibition of bad 
temper and tyranny on the field that the sympathies of the audience were turned to the visitors, 
and most of the spectators showed their aversion to Esterbrook’s methods very plainly.”35  This 
begs the question, however, of why Davidson made him captain in the first place.  Esterbrook 
first appeared in the major leagues all the way back in 1880, so it was not as if no one knew what 
his personality was like.36 
The nightmare of Davidson’s ownership for the fans in the Falls City was, mercifully, 
over before the midway point of 1889, but by then it was far too late to do anything that year.  To 
finish the story of Davidson’s follies, consider his choices in early May.  Tiring of Phil 
Tomney’s performance at shortstop, he released Tomney (then changed his mind and resigned 
him within a week) and moved right fielder Chicken Wolf to that position.  Wolf, who often 
received negative press for his healthy paunch and lack of physical conditioning, made eight 
errors in ten games.  Just to cite two references to Wolf’s gastronomical prowess, in 1889 we 
read, “The Louisville team has a leader in at least one particular.  Jimmie Wolf has the reputation 
of being the biggest eater in the profession.”37  Similarly, in 1887 teammates said of Wolf, 
                                                 
35 “Esterbrook’s Ebullitions” NA, The Sporting Life, June 26, 1889, 6. 
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“When the fat boy is hungry he will often enter a restaurant and eat as many as four chickens.”38  
Wolf’s transfer to shortstop from right field meant that Red Ehret, normally a pitcher, ended up 
in the Louisville outfield, where he posted an abysmal .756 fielding percentage, meaning he 
made an error on every fourth ball hit to him.  With Louisville’s ship taking on water at an 
alarming rate, Davidson next announced his intention to sell his controlling interest in the 
franchise, further threatening that if a buyer did not step forward within a few days, he would 
disband the team, sell the players individually, and leave the American Association with just 
seven teams less than one month into the season.39   
Davidson’s putrid career in Louisville is an example of pure greed, nothing more and 
nothing less.  He bought a controlling interest in the team in late 1888 and, before that season 
ended, sold some of his best players, most notably Hub Collins and Elton Chamberlain, for cash 
so that the management realized a profit.  Making no move to sign any player of value before the 
next season, Davidson pretended that hard work and rigid discipline would win games.  The 
team just happened to perform respectably in its preseason exhibition games, allowing Davidson 
to feign disappointment with his players once the championship season began and team’s lack of 
talent began showing through.   He then shifted the blame to them rather than putting it squarely 
on his own shoulders where it belonged.  In mid-May, Davidson then held an entire city hostage 
while he demanded someone take his lousy team off his hands.   
At least the American Association had countermeasures for such a contingency.  If 
Davidson were to try to disband the team, the Association’s constitution stated that the league 
could step in and run the team jointly until a new purchaser appeared.  Milwaukee appeared 
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ready to come on board, should things go that far, with Worcester also in the field.40  After a 
week, however, the story became even more surreal, as Davidson declared the franchise off the 
market.  When no one would meet his inflated price for purchasing the team, he decided to keep 
possession himself.  In a feeble attempt to keep up attendance and the waning enthusiasm in the 
Colonels, he said, “I might as well lose money one way as another so I will hold on for a while, 
at least.  I will make a change or two that I think will put the club in pretty good shape.”41   
When that failed to help much, in June he began making arrangements for Louisville to 
transfer a  series of home games with the Red Stockings from Louisville to Cincinnati, initiating 
a practice of transforming the Colonels into sacrificial lambs in order to mitigate his financial 
losses.  Soon, he made similar arrangements with other ball clubs.42  This led The Sporting Life 
to editorialize 
It also means more than the death of the Louisville Club; in plain words, it threatens the 
integrity of the game.  To permit clubs to change their scheduled dates at will and to 
move about from city to city in search of gate receipts, like tramps, is positively insulting 
to the city which the peregrinating club is supposed to represent, and absolutely unfair to 
the leading clubs in the race, as some of them must reap undue advantage from such 
transfers.  In short, such transferring is nothing more or less than hippodroming, and the 
quicker the practice which was started last fall by Baltimore, and is already cropping out 
this year with the season so young, is stamped out the better for the game and the good 
repute of the Association.43 
 
With the situation falling apart rapidly, one writer described the state of local enthusiasm 
by comparing 1889 to previous seasons, writing, “Then when the club was away from home, 
crowds were around the bulletin boards to watch the score as it came in by innings, and if 
Louisville won there was a cheer of triumph, if she lost, everybody was blue; now nobody goes 
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to any bulletin board.  There isn’t any bulletin board to go to.  They were discontinued because 
nobody ever looked at the score.  Even the saloons don’t have them any longer.”44  This was an 
ill omen for a league trying to withstand many such omens by 1889. 
 In addition to depriving Louisville audiences of a chance of even seeing their team play, 
Davidson destroyed any semblance of cooperation with his players.  Following Esterbrook’s 
dismissal, Chicken Wolf became team captain, but immediately began berating his men in much 
the same manner as Esterbrook.  By mid-June, with the team in the midst of a catastrophic losing 
streak, 23 straight games at that point, Davidson decided to begin fining his men for poor play.  
Failing to provide the team with quality players, he chose to mulct mediocre players when they 
played down to their limited potential.  “Manager Davidson, enraged at the team’s ill success, 
yesterday imposed a twenty-five-dollar fine on Second Baseman Shannon for fielding errors, and 
on Catcher Cook for stupid base running.”  The Louisville players, knowing it was only a matter 
of time before the rest of them saw the same treatment, revolted.  “At this all the men protested 
by signing a round robin saying they would not play to-day unless this wrong was righted.”  
Captain Wolf tried to talk Davidson out of this ill-considered course of action, but Davidson 
instead decided to leave Louisville and travel to New York.  Before he left, however, he told his 
players that if the team did not play as scheduled, “he would fine every man $100, and that in 
case they did play and lost he would impose $25 on each man.”  After considering the best way 
to make their point, six of the Colonels decided to lay down their tools and strike, while the other 
six took the field against Baltimore, along with three semi-professional players native to the 
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Monumental City to fill out their lineup.  They played just one inning, however, before departing 
the grounds when rain began falling and the umpire called the game off.45   
The same six men, Chicken Wolf, Farmer Weaver, Scott Stratton, Bill Gleason, Farmer 
Vaughn, and Tom Ramsey, attempted to play with the help of the semi-pros against the Orioles 
in a doubleheader (to make up the rained out game) the next day.  The rest of the team, Guy 
Hecker, Dan Shannon, Pete Browning, Harry Raymond, Paul Cook, and Red Ehret, stayed firm 
in their purpose to play no more games until Davidson remitted the fines, which he absolutely 
refused to do.46  The situation was only resolved when both parties agreed to state their case to 
the directors of the American Association and abide by whatever decision that body made.  In 
the meantime, “a kind of truce was patched up between the players and their erratic manager, and 
the men did the best they could to win under the disheartening circumstances of an uncertain 
future and the dead weight of the management.”47   
Eventually, those players who sat out the first game of the Baltimore series got their pay 
returned to them, but those who boycotted the second game in disregard of instructions to play 
from Association president Wheeler Wikoff saw their additional $100 fines from that game 
upheld.48  Davidson finally ended the nightmare by selling his controlling interest in the team to 
a collection of Louisville capitalists in early July.  By then, of course, the team had few quality 
players and no shot at anything better than eighth place in 1889, but at least Louisville’s 
supporters could look to the future and envision better days. 
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Once Davidson was finally out of the picture, Louisville players unburdened themselves 
to the press about just how tyrannically their former owner had treated them.  Second baseman 
Dan Shannon said Davidson fined him an entire month’s pay in May, and when he asked the 
owner how he was supposed to eat, Davidson replied that was not his concern.  In a similar vein, 
pitcher John Ewing was going to accompany the team on a road trip, but Davidson instructed 
him to stay in Louisville, as he felt the team did not need Ewing’s services and he wanted to save 
on travel expenses.  Ewing did so, only to find that Davidson lied to the press, claiming Ewing 
was injured.  Davidson then changed Ewing’s status to a suspension without pay and did not 
intend to pay him for any of the twenty days the team spent on the road.  Davidson hit his 
captain, Chicken Wolf, with a twenty-five dollar fine just for trying to get Pete Browning to play 
harder.  When Wolf told the Gladiator, “I’ll smash your face if you don’t brace up and play ball,” 
it cost him the fine.  Not that Browning escaped censure, either.  He said, regarding his own 
fines, “he has fined me $335 and I find that after playing for the club for two months I am 
indebted to it $225.  At this rate I will soon owe the Louisville Club more money than I can pay 
back in a lifetime.”  When shortstop Phil Tomney made a throw that first baseman Guy Hecker 
dropped, Davidson demanded twenty-five dollars from Hecker.  Thinking he was on decent 
terms with the owner considering his quality play of late, Tomney tried to take responsibility by 
claiming it was his fault for a poor throw, and then Davidson soaked him the same amount.  
Hecker’s salary for the month of May, after deductions for various fines, amounted to two 
dollars.  In all, only three players on the team escaped fines during the month of June.49  The 
drop in team morale and performance on the field, without question, reflected this disastrous 
policy emanating from Davidson. 
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That was not all.  By this time, some players, such as Browning, had seen no pay at all 
for three consecutive paydays (normally, players received their pay twice per month).  When the 
team set out on one of its western road trips, one player related, “We had no money on all the 
trip, and Manager McKinney had received orders from Mr. Davidson to not even give us money 
with which to have our uniforms washed.  Nearly all of the players were compelled to borrow 
money from the Kansas City and St. Louis players, and several of the boys had to pawn their 
jewelry to pay their laundry bills.”50   
The new manager this player described, Buck McKinney, was a curious hire to say the 
least.  His main qualification for the job appears to have been his physical stature, as he 
reportedly stood six-foot, weighed 225 pounds, and was “a great big double-fisted fellow” who 
had spent the past twenty-five years of his life as a “doorkeeper” at Louisville theaters and at 
Eclipse Park where Louisville played.  He was, undoubtedly, a great fan of the game, and 
apparently was on good terms with the players, but given his utter lack of baseball experience, 
one writer charitably described the situation by stating, “but whether or not he will be a good 
base ball manager, of course, no one can venture a safe prediction.”51  The reason for his hire, 
ultimately, was to protect Davidson from his own players.  Regarding Davidson, “The players 
hold the bitterest feelings against him, and he is constantly apprehending bodily harm from them.  
This is the reason he didn’t accompany the team on its last trip.  He had to look around for some 
time before he could induce any one to go in charge of the men.”52 
While clearly Louisville management’s behavior was simply reprehensible when it came 
to assessing fines for poor play, other teams did so as well, with the expected results for team 
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morale.  St. Louis president Von der Ahe fined players whenever his Browns hit the skids for 
more than a game or two.  The Association’s newest member in 1889, Columbus, also took up 
this sordid practice with relish by July.  It released one of its players, catcher Jimmie Peoples, on 
July 26, and at the same time announced its intention to light a fire under the remaining players 
with threats.  “This is supposed to mean that those who continue to play poor ball will be 
suspended without pay.”53  As usual, the main cause of the poor play was drinking.   The club 
hired a detective to watch over its players, and in August, this detective reported, “that the first 
night had resulted in finding several of the men were filling up on beer, and one, especially, was 
reported as having drunk twenty-four glasses of the foaming amber.  Upon being brought up to a 
strict account he . . . confessed to having surrounded twelve glasses of beer, but held up his 
hands in holy horror at the balance of the two dozen.”54  Regardless of the cause, when it came 
time for the players to receive their pay, “Columbus offers big salaries, but on pay days the men 
find a shortage, which amounts have been deducted in the shape of fines.”55 
 
* * * * * 
 
As if these various examples of poor management were not enough on their own, fate, 
volcanic personalities, and public morality also served to damage the American Association at 
this critical time.  The most prominent example of how public morality hurt the Association’s 
cause was in 1889 when the Cincinnati Red Stockings, one of the Association’s most profitable 
clubs, had to face a new Ohio law preventing baseball on Sunday.  Team owner Aaron Stern 
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tried many strategies to evade the law, but all proved unsuccessful.  This severed the main tie 
holding Cincinnati in the Association.  Stern believed in playing Sunday baseball because large 
numbers of working class Porkopolitans attended on the Sabbath, being unable to make it to the 
ballpark any other day of the week.  This helped the Red Stockings profit even though, with a 
minimum ticket price of twenty-five cents, they received less money per patron than they would 
as a member of the National League.  If Ohio insisted on banning Sunday games, however, odds 
were that Stern would try to transfer Cincinnati’s allegiance to the National League, where the 
Red Stockings could increase their take from selling tickets.  The temptation proved too great to 
resist.56  Immediately after he received the final verdict regarding Sunday baseball in the Queen 
City, reporters asked Stern what he planned to do.  He replied, rather revealingly, “I can not say 
as yet.  We have as yet received no word from the league.  If they offer us a place, and we think 
we can better ourselves, we will jump.”57  O.P. Caylor, ruminating on the same question, was 
blunter.  Regarding it as a near certainty, he wrote, “Will the Cincinnati Club go into the League?  
Will Pete Browning take a drink if you ask him?”58 
Things in the Association grew tenser in September of 1889, due to the conflicting 
personalities of Charles Byrne and Chris Von der Ahe.   These men owned the Brooklyn and St. 
Louis franchises, respectively, and these teams just happened to be the most powerful clubs in 
the Association that year.  With their teams locked in mortal combat for the Association pennant, 
things took a surreal twist when, feeling wronged in the first game of a scheduled three-game 
series in Brooklyn, Von der Ahe became so enraged he ordered his nine not to take the field for 
the remaining two games of the series.  He accused Byrne of, first, trying to bribe umpire John 
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Kerins with both cash and a chance to earn more money umpiring in the World Series; second, of 
controlling all the umpires of the Association; and third, of trying to control the Association 
itself.  These accusations constitute just a part of Von der Ahe’s rant. His refusal to play meant 
that the Browns would forfeit two critical games in the heat of a fierce pennant race, and face a 
$3,000 fine besides, just to appease the anger of their mercurial and borderline unstable owner.  
Furthermore, St. Louis would not receive any money from gate receipts at other games on its 
road trip until it paid up.59 
 The circumstances of the controversial first game demonstrate much of what was wrong 
with baseball on the field in this era.  Brooklyn led the game at Ridgewood Park, 2-0, in the early 
innings.  The Browns therefore initiated stalling tactics immediately, hoping to stall so long that 
darkness might cancel the game and save them from defeat if it arrived before the teams finished 
five innings.  The team, fully aware that umpire Fred Goldsmith did not rank among the most 
decisive of umpires, would frequently stop playing to conference with each other, doing things as 
extreme as calling in the left fielder for a conference at first base.  However, when the Browns 
caught some good fortune and took the lead in the middle innings, then they stalled even worse, 
but for the opposite reason.  Now, they hoped to delay the game so long that it would be 
impossible to play nine innings, looking for a darkness-assisted victory.  They employed all the 
same tactics, repeating them after almost every pitch.60 
 By the seventh, with a 4-2 lead, the Browns demanded the game cease due to darkness.  
They went so far as to purchase candles, array them about their bench and on the field, and light 
them to emphasize the point.  In the process, there was almost a fire in the grandstand when 
disgusted spectators began hurling paper debris at the St. Louis bench, and finally, when 
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Goldsmith still refused to call the game in the ninth inning when one Brooklyn player reached 
base, team captain Charlie Comiskey simply ordered his men off the field.  On their way off the 
diamond, one of the Browns, Tommy McCarthy, got in a bit of a tussle with a spectator, which 
numerous law enforcement officials on the scene blamed on McCarthy.  This minor spat became 
Von der Ahe’s official reason for declining to play the next day, feigning concern for the safety 
of his players.  In the meantime, Goldsmith had not declared the game over.  Therefore, he 
awarded the game to Brooklyn by forfeit.61   
 Predictably, writers outside of St. Louis lost no time upbraiding the Browns for their 
childish tantrums.  Ren Mulford, Jr., described their boycott by writing, “The minority who 
wished St. Louis luck because they were partisan enough to want the pennant to remain in the 
West have sunk that desire in the later hope of seeing St. Louis’ blindness, its foolhardiness, its 
asininity, its criminal disregard for existing regulations, rebuked as they deserve.”62  Even those 
of a more charitable mind still believed that the Association must act to “curb Mr. Von der Ahe’s 
tendency to make wild and unjustifiable charges against managers, umpires and players.”63  
Gentlemanly Henry Chadwick, who only rarely had a harsh word for his contemporaries, wrote, 
“evidently the Heathen deities have got hold of Chris Von der Ahe, and have him on the slate for 
destruction.  Not content with smirching the good name of our national game by his unwarranted 
charges of crooked play made against Latham, what must Von der Ahe do but impugn the 
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integrity of Umpire Ferguson, whose character stands on a level with the best esteemed and 
honored players in the professional fraternity.”64 
By the time everyone involved was done appealing everything, the Association awarded 
St. Louis victory in the first game, upheld the forfeit to Brooklyn of the second, and fired umpire 
Goldsmith for not showing more resolve and better judgment.  The Association replaced 
Goldsmith on its staff with Guy Hecker, recently released from the purgatory of laboring for 
Louisville.  It also voided the fine that St. Louis earned by its refusal to finish on Saturday, 
although the fine for declining to play on Sunday stood.65  Byrne was apoplectic at the decision 
to overrule Goldsmith’s authority.  “Had the cases been considered on the weight of the 
evidence, we would have found no fault, but the whole thing was cut and dried, and it would 
have made no difference if we had had ten times as strong a case.  The result would have been 
the same.”66  It is a fact that the rules outlined in the National Agreement stated that the umpire 
had sole discretion over whether it was fit to play or not.  The fact that the Association did not 
sustain Goldsmith in his judgment, however poor that judgment might have been, was a breach 
of the rules by which all teams were supposed to play.  The Sporting Life easily saw through the 
charade, declaring, “It became a question of petty base ball politics and resulted in a weak and 
contemptible compromise, which reflects nothing but discredit upon the men who had a chance 
to show that laws are made to be respected and upheld, not violated with impunity.”  The paper 
also placed some blame before the vacillating president of the Association, Wheeler Wikoff, 
stating, “It was painfully apparent throughout the proceedings that the Association needs a 
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competent head.  A competent man in the chair would have doubtless brought the members of 
the Board to a realizing sense of their responsibilities.”67  Likewise, the grizzled Henry 
Chadwick wrote that if the Association’s owners “had intended to give a severe blow to the 
future welfare of the Association and the national game, they could not have succeeded better 
than they have done in the decision they have rendered in the case of the disputed game at 
Washington Park between the St. Louis and Brooklyn clubs.”68 
The story did not end there.  As fate would have it, Brooklyn and St. Louis fought all the 
way to the season’s final week for the American Association pennant.  On the last day of the 
season, October 14, Brooklyn’s record stood at 93-44, St. Louis at 89-44, making Brooklyn the 
clear winner.  Not ready to concede after such a bitter campaign, however, St. Louis engaged in 
some dubious maneuvers.  Even though the championship season was over, according to the 
Association’s schedule, the Browns tried to arrange to play games cancelled by rain earlier in the 
season with both Cincinnati and Philadelphia, in hopes of winning all the games, raising their 
winning percentage (baseball awarded pennants based on winning percentage, rather than 
number of wins, at the time), and thus stealing the pennant away from Brooklyn by virtue of 
playing extra games.  The Browns made plans to make up five games in this fashion—just 
enough that they would edge out Brooklyn if they won all five.  To tempt the Red Stockings and 
Athletics into such perfidy, Chris Von der Ahe offered them the opportunity to keep all gate 
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receipts from the bonus games, rather than taking the customary share to which visitors were 
entitled.  With this extra boodle dangled as bait, both franchises accepted.69 
This was clearly outside the rules, but as demonstrated many times, that did not always 
matter when it came to decision making in the American Association.  Therefore, on October 15, 
the Red Stockings and Browns took the field for a double header.  Not to be outdone, Brooklyn 
took measures that, while not exactly illegal, were shady at best, although no shadier than what 
St. Louis was trying to do.  Prior to the first of the October 15 games in the Queen City, 
Brooklyn catcher Doc Bushong arrived at the grounds.  As soon as he learned that the Red 
Stockings planned to use pitcher Jesse Duryea and catcher Jim Keenan as their battery for one 
game, Bushong offered both men a $100 bonus, courtesy if his owner, if they would be so kind 
as to help the Bridegrooms win the pennant by defeating St. Louis that day.  They did, and the 
men got their money, while St. Louis screamed theft and bribery.  The rest of the Cincinnati nine 
received orders for fur overcoats and cigars courtesy of the good doctor and his Brooklyn 
employer.70  (We should note that the same thing happened in the National League’s pennant 
race.  Boston manager Jim Hart and pitcher John Clarkson offered the round sum of $1,000 to 
Cleveland if they beat the New York Giants in the season’s final series [they did not] while New 
York’s manager, Jim Mutrie, offered undisclosed presents to Pittsburgh’s players if they did the 
same to Boston.  The Alleghenies did defeat Boston once.71) 
The Brown Stockings also accused the Association’s umpiring staff of being on 
Brooklyn’s payroll and favoring the Bridegrooms all along, citing as evidence that they had both 
out-hit and out-pitched Brooklyn all year.  Furthermore, the Browns raised suspicion that a few 
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members of the Columbus Solons might have received some boodle of their own for losing to 
Brooklyn on October 14, citing four errors by Solon third baseman Lefty Marr to make their 
case.  Lastly, as Bushong was an old teammate who still had several friends in the Mound City, 
the Browns claimed he had treated their second baseman, Yank Robinson, to drinks all night to 
be sure that he arrived at the grounds hung over and unable to play his best ball.72  It was true 
that Robinson failed to get a hit in either game, although he did draw some walks from the 
Cincinnati pitchers. 
 This series of incidents between Brooklyn and St. Louis had serious blowback for the 
Association.  While it would be absurd to say these controversies alone prompted Brooklyn to 
leave the Association for the National League for the 1890 season, it certainly did not give 
Brooklyn cause for greater loyalty to the Association.  As one Brooklynite declared, after the 
Association failed to uphold Umpire Goldsmith, “I have to add that this rank act of imposition 
has put a keen edge on the desire for jumping out of the American Association and given a new 
zest to the discussion of the possibility of Brooklyn entering the League.”73  Even if Brooklyn 
had gotten its way in that case, the prospects of dealing with such an unstable personality as Von 
der Ahe, after everything that happened in the waning days of 1889, cannot have appealed to the 
Bridegrooms or their cranks.  When piled atop all the other things discussed in this chapter, the 
evidence presents many reasons why Brooklyn might desire a change of scenery. 
 
* * * * * 
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 Following the end of the 1889 season, it did not take long for the Association to fall 
apart, albeit temporarily.  As the Brotherhood announced its independence from the National 
League in early November, and the League debated how to respond at its meeting a week later, 
the American Association also held its conference in New York at the same time.  One thing the 
National League had decided on was that this was its opportunity to snare Brooklyn and 
Cincinnati and bring them into the League.  As the Association haggled over replacing its 
president, Wheeler Wikoff, a League spy informed the League delegates of the proceedings, and 
those delegates lost no time in offering spots to the discontented owners in Cincinnati and 
Brooklyn.  Further motivated by the actual or impending loss of Sunday baseball in both cities, 
and the fact that they had already signed some key players and were thus in a strong position to 
compete in the National League in 1890, both Aaron Stern and Charles Byrne accepted the offer.  
The next day, Kansas City defected back to the Western League, and before November was over, 
Baltimore threw in the towel as well and joined the Atlantic Association.74 
 Even though the American Association still had two more years of life remaining, this 
was really the end of that body as a major league caliber organization.  With the situation rapidly 
deteriorating, on December 6 the Association was desperate enough to send out feelers regarding 
a merger with the Brotherhood.  With the BPBP fully confident of ultimate success at that time, 
it answered in the negative.75  Meeting with failure on that front, the Association instead replaced 
the departed teams with Syracuse, Toledo, Rochester, and a new Brooklyn team.  This new 
Brooklyn aggregation did not even complete the season, folding on August 26, and Baltimore 
jumped back from the Atlantic Association to replace them for the last thirty-four games on the 
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schedule.  In place of Brooklyn, Baltimore, Cincinnati, and Kansas City, towns ranking fourth, 
seventh, ninth, and twenty-fourth in the 1890 census, the Association ended up with Rochester 
(twenty-second), Syracuse (thirty-first), Toledo (thirty-fourth) and the Brooklyn-Baltimore 
hybrid.76 
 Of course, it did not help matters when the Brotherhood began taking Association players 
into its ranks before the 1890 season.  With drastically reduced markets and drastically reduced 
talent, the American Association was in poor condition even before the 1890 season began.  How 
drastic was its decline?  The Louisville club, which posted a 27-111 record and finished a titanic 
66.5 games back of first place in 1889, vaulted to an 88-44 record in 1890, fully ten games better 
than any other team in the Association.  This increase in winning percentage, from .196 to .667, 
has no equal as a one-season turnaround in major league baseball history for a team playing a 
schedule of modern length.  No other team would complete this feat of moving from last place to 
first place within a single season until the Atlanta Braves did so in 1991. 
 It is important to stress that the decline of the American Association was not due to the 
beginning of the Players’ League.  The coincidence of the timing makes this very tempting, and 
clearly, the Brotherhood had something to do with the loss of the Association’s prestige when the 
BPBP began taking luring away its players.  Clearly, however, there is so much evidence here 
that predates these events, it would be simplistic at best and inaccurate at worst to say the failure 
of the Players’ League caused the failure of the American Association.  The Brotherhood had 
nothing to do with the three key reasons that Brooklyn and Cincinnati left the Association after 
the 1889 season, followed by Baltimore and Kansas City.  The end or probable end of Sunday 
baseball in Brooklyn and Cincinnati, the desire of the National League to replace weak 
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franchises in Indianapolis and Washington with two stronger ones, and the erratic behavior of 
Chris Von der Ahe late in the 1889 season each would have happened even had the Brotherhood 
never existed.   
 As these events demonstrate, even though the American Association continued play until 
1891, by the end of 1889 it was in rapid decline with little hope of rejuvenation.  The foibles 
described in this chapter are the greatest reason why.  There were still maneuvers to come, and 
tactics employed to keep the Association going, but one did not need a crystal ball to figure out 






The Storm Gathers 
 
 
 When John Ward announced his decision to leave the Spalding tour early, it was a sign 
that there might be trouble ahead for the National League after all.  As Ward’s ship plowed the 
waves of the Atlantic, the American baseball press speculated on what would happen when he 
reached New York.  The Brotherhood’s Secretary-Treasurer, Tim Keefe, issued a call for a 
meeting of the Brotherhood’s officers and team representatives upon Ward’s arrival, although 
given that the organization had a meeting scheduled for the spring anyway, there was not much 
difference between a special meeting and the regular one.  The question was what course the 
organization would take.  Most of its men had signed contracts for 1889.  A few had not.  As 
March was nearing its end, there was little time to raise grievances or to try to negotiate.  The 
more ominous question was whether the BPBP might consider more drastic measures, perhaps 
even a strike. 
 Some papers feared the worst.  The Chicago Daily Tribune offered, “Tim Keefe has sent 
out a call for a meeting of that organization to be held in New York next Tuesday.  There is little 
doubt but this means a fight, and it looks as if the players would have all the best of it if they 
stick for a short time.  The classification clause in the contract looks weaker as its defects are 
coming to light.”1  New York’s George Stackhouse wrote, “that the Brotherhood players, as a 
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body, are decidedly opposed to the classification rule recently passed by the club owners of the 
League, is assured.”  Stackhouse quoted Tim Keefe on the Brotherhood’s current stance: 
I have read with considerable amusement about how all the troubles between players and 
managers had been settled.  But that don’t make it so by long odds.  Only a few have 
reached an amicable settlement.  Some of the misunderstandings have been heard little 
of, for the men have been reserved and have not stated their troubles through the 
newspapers.  I am not at liberty to say just what will be done, although all that the players 
will ask will be simply justice. 
 
Another, unnamed, League player told Stackhouse, 
I think that there will be some lively times in base ball before the season opens a few 
weeks from now.  I don’t think the Brotherhood will countenance that classification 
clause for several reasons.  First, if it was an absolute necessity for the welfare of base 
ball that players should be classified and salaries reduced, the men would take their 
medicine calmly, and quietly submit.  But there is no such necessity.  That rule as 
originally drawn up and since enforced is a fraud, and it will not stand.  It was made to 
protect one or two clubs, and the rule will only be enforced in one or two clubs.  Why 
should the players of the New York, Boston and Chicago clubs have their salaries 
tampered with, simply because the Indianapolis, Cleveland and Washington clubs may 
live. . . . When the Brotherhood had its hearing before the League, the League promised 
to make certain concessions.  Those promises have not been kept.2 
 
 In the meantime, however, rumors flew about what might happen.  With Ward now back 
to head the Brotherhood’s affairs, the organization could coordinate what information it wanted 
revealed and when to reveal it, and so prior to the meeting, the sporting press could only offer 
guesses.  Ward and his brothers decided to play things close to the vest, and as a result, “just 
what will be done at this meeting can only be conjectured, as the members of the order are 
unusually secretive about their intentions.”3 
 Members of the Brotherhood embraced Ward the moment he stepped off the gang plank 
in New York Harbor, some apparently even waiting overnight in order to meet him as quickly as 
they could.  Reporters flocked to interview the BPBP’s president to try and get the latest baseball 
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scoop as well, so much so that the world-renowned pianist who was also aboard the steamer 
Saale, Hans von Bülow, all but escaped notice, other than from a few German friends.  He 
remarked, “What is the use of playing the piano in this country?  I am too old to play ball, 
therefore I am nobody.  I do not understand the game at all, but it must be something splendid, 
and I cannot complain if no one comes to my concerts.”4 
 It took Ward some time to meet with other Brotherhood leaders and form a strategy 
regarding what they should do about the Brush Plan and other issues. In fact, he moved so 
deliberately that some papers prophesied the early demise of the BPBP.  While such a 
development certainly would please National League owners, it was not the case.  After some 
discussion with fellow New Yorkers like Tim Keefe, he next moved to Boston.  Former Detroit 
Brotherhood representative Dan Brouthers now played there, in addition to all the Boston men 
already members of the Brotherhood, and they held discussions at the Park Avenue Hotel, where 
“subjects of much importance were discussed.”  The one important decision they arrived at 
during this meeting was the idea of trying to negotiate with baseball’s magnates during the 
upcoming season, rather than waiting until the winter of 1889-1890.5 
 If true, this meant that the Brotherhood’s official May 19 meeting would be one of great 
significance.  Despite the efforts of Ward and others to keep things quiet until that time, rumors 
began to seep out that the BPBP might challenge the League on certain issues.  Besides the 
Brush Plan, another issue rankling with some Brothers was the fate of the four Chicago players, 
Mark Baldwin, Tom Daly, Bob Pettit, and Marty Sullivan, who traveled all the way around the 
world on the Spalding Tour, only to receive their releases from Chicago when the tourists finally 
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reached their home city.  Some members of the BPBP felt that, if Chicago planned to release 
these men, it should have done so immediately upon reaching the United States, so that the 
quartet would have had a decent opportunity to catch on with another club.  They also objected 
to the fact that Chicago continued to use these players in their exhibition games in the US in 
April, thus making money from their services, while all the time planning to dispense with them 
as soon as the tour concluded.6  (Baldwin, by a stroke of luck, actually did well in this 
transaction.  All other National League teams refused to sign him, at Spalding’s request, so he 
was able to escape the Brush Plan and sign in the American Association with the Columbus 
Solons for $3,500.7) 
 Spalding put little stock in any of the rumors, however.  He said, referring to the BPBP, 
“I should say that a battle with the League would be the last thing it would undertake.”  
Regarding any challenge to the Brush Plan, he stated, “I do not think any members of the 
brotherhood possessed of influence enough to embroil that organization in a difficulty with the 
league have suffered from it in the least.”  Furthermore, “In truth, the same dire rumor has been 
circulated before, but you see that both the league and the brotherhood continue to do business at 
the old stands.”  When his interviewer asked what the League might do if worst came to worst 
and the rumored scheme that the Brotherhood planned to challenge the League with teams of its 
own came to pass, Spalding concluded by saying, “That is the sheerest nonsense.”8 
 The reason that the BPBP wanted to make its requests during the 1889 season, rather than 
waiting until afterwards, was no mystery.  Any threat of action it might make, including a 
possible strike, was only effective in the summer when baseball games took place.  Such threats 
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had no force behind them once the season was over.  In addition, the playing season was the only 
time when each chapter of the Brotherhood could meet as a group.  Once the season ended, and 
players dispersed to their homes, it was exponentially more difficult to contact members, conduct 
business, and make decisions.  Therefore, not caring to forfeit its bargaining power, the 
Brotherhood planned to meet in mid-May. 
 
* * * * * 
 
 When the big day in New York came around, the initial news was less than earth 
shattering.  The group, represented by John Ward and Tim Keefe of New York, Dan Brouthers 
for Boston, Ned Hanlon for Pittsburgh, John “Egyptian” Healy of Washington, George Myers of 
Indianapolis, Jeff Pfeffer of Chicago, Ben Sanders of Philadelphia, and Larry Twitchell of 
Cleveland, respectively, nominated new officers.  Many other Brotherhood members attended as 
well, and discovered that the organization’s treasury was in fine condition.  They also learned 
that almost every player in the National League was now a member, as all players from the NL’s 
newest member, Cleveland, applied for and received membership, and ten new players from 
Chicago did the same.  The only immediate action the BPBP planned was to contest 
Indianapolis’s act of fining Brother Henry Boyle $100 late in the 1888 season.  Boyle became 
very ill, and although the team refused to pay him during his illness, which was within its rights, 
it also fined him for getting sick, which was not.9 
When it came to the big question on everyone’s mind, what to do regarding the Brush 
Classification Plan, the organization went on record as being against the plan, of course, but did 
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not announce exactly what it planned to do.  The Brothers ruled out any possibility of an 
immediate strike, however, sensibly deciding to try negotiating first.10  The outline of their plan, 
however, was that no player should sign a League contract before the League’s next meeting, at 
which time the BPBP would present its grievances.11 
As might be expected from such a moderate stance, the meeting produced little 
immediate outrage amongst followers of the game.  Even most League owners did not seem 
overly perturbed.  The next day, New York Giants owner John Day submitted to an interview to 
give his thoughts on the situation.  Day, often a relative supporter of player rights, saw no reason 
for alarm.  He said, “All this talk of a strike is nonsense . . . The Brotherhood is strong—strong 
enough not to fear the League, and the League does not fear the Brotherhood.  If there is any 
cause for dissatisfaction among the players as against the League, the two bodies, having a 
common interest, certainly will meet and by discussion come to an agreement.”  Asked about the 
justice of the players’ cause, Day said, “If the players demand what is unreasonable the public 
will not support them, and if the League refuses to grant a just request, the players will have all 
the backing they can want.”12 
Day then continued with some interesting statements concerning the current state of 
things between the League and Brotherhood.  After reviewing how each side had resolved their 
difference in the past, he claimed, “This time the causes which are to lead to the alleged coming 
strike, seem to be the Salary Limit law [of 1886], the classification system and the sale of players 
by one club to another.”  He added, “I, for one, am utterly opposed to all three.  The first two 
laws are dead letters, and of no value whatever to any one.”  Regarding the 1886 salary limit, 
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“The salary limit law was made for the benefit of the Louisville Club, and the wrecked condition 
of that organization shows of what little benefit the law has been.”  Furthermore, “The 
classification law was a wrong in the beginning, has been of no use whatever, and is now to all 
purposes dead.  It has injured no one that I am aware of, but it has certainly benefited none.”  He 
then concluded by stating his opposition to selling players as well, noting the only time he had 
ever done so was when requested to by one of his men.  “This sale of players is, I think, the thing 
which the Brotherhood will ask to have rectified, and I think the request would be a just one and 
would receive the support of all fair-minded people.”  (Day later corrected one part of this 
statement, as he called the classification plan a “dead rabbit,” meaning a bad rule, rather than a 
“dead letter,” meaning that others were not following the rule.)13 
Other League magnates spoke soon after Day.  In Philadelphia, Al Reach believed 
“Whatever differences there may be between the players and the proprietors, will be amicably 
adjusted.  The players who have grievances will be granted a respectful hearing and full justice 
done them. Both sides have a common interest.”  He stated optimistically, but also naively, “the 
number of dissatisfied players is exceedingly small and their grievance is more imaginary than 
real.”  Still, he believed the classification plan a good thing, and pledged his franchise to stand by 
it, come what may.14 
Arthur Soden in Boston felt about the same.  Regarding perceived grievances, he stated, 
“I should favor giving them a hearing and think matters could be arranged satisfactorily.  But as 
for anticipating that they would demand an abolishment of the classification or would think of 
striking, why, I think that is absurd.”  Like Reach, Soden favored keeping the classification 
scheme, citing his belief that only a few League teams appeared likely to make any money in 
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1889.  The rest of the League’s owners voiced similar thoughts.  Pittsburgh, Cleveland, and 
Washington announced they considered the plan the only measure that would allow them to 
continue in baseball, while of course Indianapolis, primary author of the plan, remained in 
favor.15 
While many downplayed the possibilities of what might happen, a few writers seem to 
have had their fingers on the pulse of the situation.  One New Yorker, who probably had some 
inside information, considering so many prominent Brotherhood members played in his city, 
stated, “What the players will demand will be an agreement on the part of the clubs to divide 
with the player the money received for his release and the abolition of the classification rule,” 
although he too believed “All talk about a strike during the present base ball season is idle 
gossip.”  His next statement hit the mark directly.  “The alternative the League will have to face 
will be the desertion of the entire Brotherhood, the formation of a new league, and the liveliest 
competition.  The magnates will, of course, laugh heartily at this programme, but their hilarity 
will not last after an investigation of the means at the command of the players.”16 
 
* * * * * 
 
Ward and the Brotherhood took a few measures to test the waters with the League over 
the summer.  In early June, Ward, Hanlon, and Brouthers sent a letter to National League 
president Nick Young stating their grievances, most prominently the classification plan and the 
practice of selling players.17  About a week later, John Ward gave an interview in which he 
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debunked some of the reasons given in support of the Brush Plan.  He again pointed out that it 
amounted to a breach of contract on the part of the National League.  “Of those classified the 
great majority have been held at a figure less than that received last season, and the fact that two 
or three have been given an advance is a blind too transparent to deceive anyone as to the true 
character of the steal.”  To arguments that the smaller cities of the League, places like 
Washington and Indianapolis, needed the classification plan to compete, Ward responded, “If 
Indianapolis and Washington cannot afford the rate of salaries their associate clubs play, then 
they are not entitled to the same class of ball.  They are in too fast company, and they ought to 
get out.”  He used an example to show why limiting the players to the expense that their city 
could stand was not fair.  “Indianapolis has about as much right in the National League as 
Oshkosh.  Yet if the League admitted the latter city, would it be fair to ask Denny, Myers, Boyle, 
Glasscock, etc., to play there at figures which would allow Oshkosh to clear expenses?”18   
Ward believed that the real problem in baseball was not a lack of profit, but poor 
distribution of profits.  If teams decided to group themselves together into a league, and play 
games for their mutual profit, they should divide their revenue between themselves, rather than 
some taking more than others did, just because they played in larger cities.  In other words, if the 
National League really was an association or league of clubs, it should act like one, rather than 
acting like eight disaggregated individuals.   
It is a fact that cannot be gainsaid that taking all the clubs together there is a great deal of 
money made each year from base ball.  The Boston, New York and Chicago clubs pay 
immense dividends.  The low-salaried Philadelphia Club, notwithstanding the wails of its 
owners, pays largely.  Pittsburg makes something, and Detroit, which was said to have 
lost last season, is now settling up its affairs and publicly chuckling over the division of 
$54,000 profit derived from somewhere.  Now, if the National League wishes to carry 
several weak cities along, why did it not devise some scheme by which the deficiencies in 
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those clubs would be made up out of this enormous profit, instead of taking it out of the 
pockets of the players in those clubs?19   
 
Unintentionally, perhaps, The Sporting Life reinforced Ward’s point in the article 
following his front-page interview.  It provided a table showing that eighteen Boston home 
games saw 97,111 fans in attendance, while almost that many cranks, 90,532, had shown up for 
just twelve games in Brooklyn through early June, despite the uncertain weather of spring in 
those locales.  The five clubs that had played in Boston to that point “have taken away from 
Boston $12,000 in cold cash, and the triumvirs’ net receipts for admission and grand stand have 
already reached $50,000.  The three directors are sure to divide between them over $100,000 as 
the profit of the season.”20 
In response to Ward’s letter to National League headquarters, Nick Young disseminated 
the missive to other League owners, and they agreed to appoint a committee to study the matter.  
The membership of the committee was very important, of course.  John Day of New York, John 
Rogers of Philadelphia, and, of course, Al Spalding of Chicago composed the group.  Of the 
three, Day appeared most favorably disposed towards compromise, Rogers least so, with 
Spalding in the middle.  It was true that Spalding had been one of the owners willing to 
recognize the Brotherhood in 1887, and had worked with them to revise the contract at that time.  
Since then, however, he had declared himself strongly in favor of the Brush Plan, so anything 
was possible, in terms of how the committee would decide to proceed.  Granted, such a 
committee had no power to actually do anything regarding the Brotherhood’s complaints, but 
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given the influence of its members, whatever the three men decided might well become official 
policy.21 
The meeting with Ward occurred on June 24, a private conference lasting a full two 
hours.  Despite the lengthy discussions, the interview ended inconclusively.  “President Ward is 
desirous of arranging a meeting between the two committees at once, and President Spalding has 
not fully made up his mind that the questions at issue are of a sufficiently urgent nature to 
warrant such action.”  Ward stated simply that Spalding, as the chairman of the National 
League’s commission, “is now in possession of the brotherhood’s views, and has been informed 
as to the questions we wish to discuss in joint meeting. . . . I anticipate hearing from him at an 
early day; thus the matter stands.”22  Temporarily, this calmed all the rumors circulating about a 
strike by the BPBP on Independence Day, or potential measures even more extreme. 
Still, the announcement was enough to send sportswriters scurrying to the presidents of 
their respective teams to get a reaction to the news.  Washington planned to stand firm.  The 
Nationals wanted to keep the classification plan, or replace it with something equally beneficial, 
such as a guarantee of half the gate receipts at all games.  Boston’s reaction was interesting, 
given that Arthur Soden had joined John Day in opposing the classification plan in the first 
place.  While he and the other triumvirs still believed a strike highly unlikely, he pledged that if 
things did come to that, the Beaneaters would sign new players and move forward from there.  
Soden also said he was inclined to grant most of the things the Brotherhood asked, because they 
were not an issue for Boston.  This seemed scurrilous, given how many players Boston had 
purchased from other teams in recent years, but the reasoning was typically Soden-esque.  “I am 
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willing to do away with the sale of players; we have none to sell, and we do not want to buy any 
more.”  John Brush of Indianapolis, as the plan’s author, of course supported keeping the current 
status quo, maintaining that the players had nothing significant about which to complain.  John 
Day in New York, as we have seen, wanted no part of any rule that limited what a club might 
pay its players, essentially agreeing with Ward that if a team could not compete with what it 
could afford, then the team should relocate to a league where it could compete and still make 
money.  Al Spalding in Chicago was noncommittal beyond the comments stated above, 
reminding his interlocutor that the National League did not conduct its business through the 
newspapers.  Cleveland signaled a willingness to stand by and await the outcome of negotiations 
between the Brotherhood and the League committee.  Pittsburgh vowed to stand by Washington 
and Indianapolis and support classification, and Philadelphia did the same.23 
 
* * * * * 
 
 Spalding got around to answering Ward about two weeks later.  He informed Ward, 
Keefe, Hanlon, and the other Brothers that, “It is the unanimous opinion of this committee that it 
is inadvisable to hold a meeting with the Brotherhood committee at present for the reason that no 
material interests will suffer by postponing this meeting . . . it is contrary to the past policy of the 
League to call a special meeting in mid-season except for some extraordinary emergency, and we 
fail to discover any necessity for immediate action.”24  This was a risky decision on the part of 
the League’s committee.  The benefit was that with the players dispersed and gone home for the 
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winter, collective action on the Brotherhood’s part was less likely.  The risk was that the players 
might decide to do something drastic before then, and prove harder to placate whenever the 
meeting finally took place.   
 The Brothers were boiling mad at their rebuff, and lost no time in accusing the League of 
hypocrisy on multiple fronts.  As Tim Keefe said, “Spalding says they can’t call a meeting in 
summer.  Why, didn’t they hold one at Asbury Park last summer and consider a trifling matter?  
There is one thing certain, they won’t classify as many men this fall as they think.  Why, this talk 
about Nick Young classifying the men is rot.  The clubs send in the salaries and he puts them in 
classes to correspond.”25  In actuality, the meeting at Asbury Park took place in 1887, but 
considering the fact that the “emergency” was merely to decide the outcome of a protested game 
between New York and Detroit with little impact on the standings, Keefe’s first point remained 
valid.  Other proof corroborates Keefe’s second claim, that the teams, not the League, classified 
the players.  Jay Faatz, first baseman and captain of the Cleveland Spiders, wrote a letter to Nick 
Young in the off-season, complaining that his classification was unjust.  Young wrote back “to 
the effect that the clubs, not the President of the league, classed the players.”26 
Various members of the League also continued doing things to call their own integrity 
into question.  Just a couple days later, when Washington sold second baseman Al Myers to 
Philadelphia, which needed a replacement for the injured Ed Delahanty, Washington paid Myers 
$600 out of the sale price to keep him happy and gain his willing acceptance of the transaction.27  
Considering that official League policy was dead set against sharing any of the profits from sales 
with players, this raised a few eyebrows. 
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 Ward was plainspoken on the issues when interviewed.  “They know that they have 
broken faith with their players and dared not face the issue.”  Spalding’s reasons for refusal were 
“amusing and simply absurd.”  In answer to the question of the moment, what the Brotherhood 
would do next, Ward was more reserved.  “On that question just at the present time I am neither 
able nor at liberty to say.  There is one thing, however, of which you may be certain.  The players 
have asked only what is right, and they will not rest until they get it.  The men who are playing 
ball nowadays are not of the caliber to be hoodwinked or talked out of their rights.”28 
 Spalding, meanwhile, began hatching some plans of his own.  In a letter to Nick Young, 
he laid out his thoughts, which called for a plan setting up a universal salary structure in baseball.  
His scheme divided all minor leagues into four categories, A, B, C, and D.  Class D was for the 
weakest minor leagues, and called for a team salary cap of $600 per month, and an individual 
player cap of $60 per month.  Minor league teams of superior classification could obtain players 
from Class D clubs for $250.  Those leagues in Class C would have a team salary limit of $1,000 
each month and an individual limit of $100.  Teams from a higher classification could obtain 
players from Class C teams for a $500 payment.  Clubs in Class B had monthly salary limits of 
$1,500 for the team and $150 for individuals, and Class A and major league teams could acquire 
their players for a $1,000 payment.  Finally, those minor leagues grouped in Class A had a 
monthly limit of $2,000 and an individual limit of $200, and would receive $1,500 in payment 
should a major league team want one of their men.  Spalding’s plan also called for modifying the 
Brush Plan by ignoring it for players with exceptional personal habits and three years of service 
on their present team.  Spalding favored some concessions to the Brotherhood on the issue of 
player sales, although his plan did not go as far as the Brotherhood wished.  He believed that half 
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of the sale price should go to the selling team, one quarter to the player, and the final quarter to 
the league of which the selling team was a member, presumably to give the weaker teams in each 
league a bit more financial support.  Finally, he wanted to see a so-called “Supreme Court” of 
baseball created that would rule on all matters in dispute that might arise between the major 
leagues, the minor leagues, individual teams, players, interpretations of the rules of play, and so 
forth.  This court’s membership would consist of the presidents of the National League and 
American Association, plus one man outside the game (probably he had A.G. Mills in mind) 
whom all parties recognized as interested in the good of the game.29 
 The plan, which contained elements of the Millennium Plan, met with approval, although 
often qualified approval, from most of Spalding’s colleagues.  Unsurprisingly, its money-saving 
features drew the greatest acclaim.  Al Reach in Philadelphia liked the fact that minor league 
teams could cut their expenses, and thereby they would fold less often.  In addition, major league 
teams would need fewer players on their rosters.  If they could reach down into the minor 
leagues and acquire needed players at will, there would be no need for them to carry extra men in 
case of injury.  Reach also believed the scheme provided incentive for minor league players to 
hone their skills, so they might advance up the chain and earn a greater salary.  Cleveland 
approved of the idea, as its management believed some type of classification a good idea, but 
with reservations about dividing the money for player sales.  Washington favored an equal 
division of gate receipts, if any changes to the current system took place.  Pittsburgh was 
uncertain regarding purchasing minor league players, but heartily approved of a baseball 
Supreme Court.  Indianapolis owner John Brush, as the author of the existing Brush Plan, 
remained in favor of his own scheme, naturally, while Boston offered no immediate comment.  
                                                 
29 “A Draft System” A.G. Spalding, The Sporting Life, July 17, 1889, 1. 
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New York’s John Day, finally, approved of any scheme that would help the minor leagues stay 
afloat.30 
 Others, however, were not so impressed.  The scheme clearly meant to make the minor 
leagues subservient to the needs of major league teams.  The fact that a minor league team might 
lose its star player or players at a critical time in its own league pennant race was an obvious 
flaw in the plan.  The loss of such men certainly had the potential to cost the team more money 
than it would receive in payment.  The other primary drawback was that minor league players, if 
purchased by a team in a superior classification, had no say in whether or not they actually 
wanted to move.  What if, for example, a player had the chance to play in his hometown, was 
satisfied with his pay, and did not want to go elsewhere?   
 One of the merits of Spalding’s plan was that it set in motion some serious discussion of 
how to improve the general state of baseball.  Boston manager Jim Hart, a longtime baseball 
man, published a plan of his own soon afterward.  In fact, he had sent this plan to Spalding for 
comment, and thus the Chicago owner’s own work was in many respects derivative of Hart’s 
plan, particularly in its call for a board to oversee all technical aspects of the game such as 
disputes, contracts, and the like.  Other noteworthy features of Hart’s scheme were to give 
players an option if they wished to assent to be being sold and transferred to another team, and to 
keep most of the features of the pre-Brush Plan contract between the League and the 
Brotherhood.  He also called for grading cities in categories A through G, with set contract sizes, 
prices for attending games, and many other managerial details precisely worked out for each 
category.  The one other notable aspect of the plan, however, that virtually guaranteed a poor 
universal reception, was that Hart’s plan transferred Cincinnati and Brooklyn to the National 
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League at the expense of Washington and Indianapolis, and then relegated the diminished 
American Association to a status below that of the National League.31 
 What each of these plans had in common was to look at the situation from the perspective 
of the owners and their quest for profit.  This was natural enough, considering the plans’ 
authorship.  What that also meant, however, was that no matter how the owners tweaked these 
various plans of classification, each was unpalatable to the players in most respects, no matter 
how much the magnates claimed otherwise, and did little to ward off the coming dispute, except 
perhaps for scoring a few minor public relations points.  Why bother with working out such 
schemes, then?  As was always true when Al Spalding took public action, there was more to the 
story.  Even though July 4 had come and gone with no strike, Spalding was doing his best to find 
out what the Brotherhood was up to, so he could anticipate their actions at the post-season 
meeting.  He sent detectives to shadow key members of the Brotherhood.  Spalding knew, 
therefore, that the BPBP had held a meeting on July 14 (this was the meeting where they made 
the final decision to initiate plans for their own league) but did not know exactly what decisions 
the organization had made.  The fact that July 14 was also Bastille Day, however, did not escape 
his notice.  This was the background behind his decision to lay out his new plan as a trial 
balloon.32 
 This is where the situation stood as the 1889 campaign wound through the dog days of 
August.  The Brotherhood, still simmering after the League’s rebuff, continued its work and 
                                                 
31 “Another Scheme” Jim Hart, The Sporting Life, July 31, 1889, 5. 
32 Stevens, Baseball’ Radical for All Seasons, 87.  Bastille Day marked the well-known event 
from the French Revolution where the people of Paris stormed the Bastille, a fortress in Paris 
that stood for the arbitrary rule of the Bourbon dynasty.  The fact that the Brotherhood met on 
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planning behind the scenes.  The owners, on the other hand, remained serene in their belief that 
their position was impregnable, that the players would not dare such a dramatic move as to 
challenge them directly, and that all they needed to do was continue refining a plan that would 
pad all of their pockets more consistently.   
 Meanwhile, the pennant races of both the League and Association turned into great ones.  
Four teams, two in each league, battled down to the last week of the season to see which would 
end up in the World Series.  We might forgive baseball observers, therefore, if the action on the 
field took up most of their attention.  As September dwindled and turned to October, however, 
concrete and tangible things began replacing the rumors that observers had spent the summer 





The Storm Breaks 
 
 
 The first hints that something big might be afoot in baseball began to leak out in 
September of 1889.  Of course, various rumors concerning what the Brotherhood might do had 
circulated all season long.  However, with the games on the field distracting everyone’s 
attention, the players included, the summer saw many rumors but few definitive facts or 
decisions that would either prove or disprove those rumors.  At least, few decisions that reached 
the press or the public.   
 Before describing what happened, however, we should take a moment to describe how 
the scheme for a new league organized by the Brotherhood originated in the first place.  
According to Al Johnson, the original financier behind the plan, it was Ned Hanlon, rather than 
John Ward, who first approached him with the idea.  Hanlon and Ward, along with Fred Pfeffer 
and Jim Fogarty, had been companions on the Spalding Tour of 1888-1889.  These four men, 
with nothing better to do on the long ocean voyage around the world, worked up a plan to 
liberate the players from the control of the National League.  They believed that their fellows in 
the Brotherhood would support the plan, but the organization lacked the capital to attempt it 
without outside help. 
 That is why Hanlon approached Johnson.  Johnson, based in Cleveland, was a big 
baseball fan and somewhat of an idealist who hated the lopsidedness of baseball contracts.  He 
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also, admittedly, saw visions of huge profits if he located a successful baseball park on the route 
of some of his streetcar lines.  He socialized with ballplayers often, and became sympathetic to 
their cause.  After meeting Hanlon, he then discussed possibilities with various members of the 
Spiders.  One by one, as the other teams of the National League came through Cleveland, 
Johnson met the members of each chapter and discussed plans with them.  “So as each visiting 
club came we held meeting after meeting, until every league player had heard our views and had 
been given a chance to express himself and suggest whatever he thought would be for the best 
interests of such an organization.”  As an example of how completely these players all backed 
the plan, Johnson then said, “To show how they feel I will state what happened at one of our 
meetings.  Every player of both New York and Cleveland had attended three evenings in 
succession, and our sessions were never less than three hours’ duration.”1  Johnson also took the 
appropriate precautions to avoid anyone catching on to the true nature of what he was 
contemplating, perhaps aware of the penchant of National League owners to spy on players with 
detectives.  Not only did he station a burly employee in the hallway with instructions to bounce 
anyone who tried to interrupt his meeting with the players, he also bribed the police who worked 
the beat outside the hotel to keep quiet, just to make sure that no one knew the identity of the 
men going in and out of his meetings.2 
After these early-season sessions, the players decided to ask for a meeting with the 
National League.  This was the meeting mentioned in the preceding chapter that Spalding, Day, 
and Rogers refused to schedule.  The chapters of the Brotherhood then voted on whether to hold 
a strike on July 4 or attempt a “reorganization,” meaning their own league, after the season.  The 
men voted in favor of reorganization by a decisive margin.  At that point, Johnson and some of 
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the BPBP’s leaders began working towards contacting additional financial backing, finding 
grounds for play, and so forth.  The fact that they did so without drawing any notice or leaking 
any of their plans until September, when those plans were nearly mature, was a phenomenal 
achievement.3 
 It was not quite a perfect achievement, however.  A few stories appeared by September 
that presaged the cataclysm to come.  The Chicago Daily Tribune interviewed an unnamed 
Indianapolis Brother, and learned that the plan to challenge the National League with the 
creation of an independent league featuring Brotherhood members remained alive and well.  It 
was at this time that the public also learned that Cleveland capitalist Johnson was the leader of 
the scheme on the ownership side.  This correspondent wrote, “When the various league clubs 
offer their players contracts for 1890 they will be rejected.  The players signed by Johnson are to 
be apportioned among the present league towns Pittsburg and Indianapolis.  A new national 
league is to be formed.”  While the writer had a couple of the cities wrong, the rest of the 
statement was an accurate indication of what was about to happen.4 
 Even though the statement was true, still, in early September most did not believe such a 
thing would ever happen.  Most continued to think it was a bluff on the part of the Brotherhood, 
similar to the bluff (or was it really a bluff?) it had used in 1887 to gain concessions on the 
contract issue, when Erastus Wiman was supposedly the money behind the operation.  Even the 
interviewer did not really believe it.  He admitted, “Johnson is well known in baseball circles.  
He is a businessman of a good many interests.  There is little of the visionary about him.  While 
he might be induced to handle the Cleveland corner of the trust if there was a promise of 
financial success, he certainly would not handle it nationally.”  The writer concluded, however, 
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4 Ibid. 
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“The more the story is probed the more it assumes spectral hue.”  Rather, “The Johnson plan is 
the last device in the way of a sledgehammer on this classification law.  It will be used during the 
winter and may serve its purpose.”5 
 Others were less certain.  They noted that Al Johnson, under the cover of looking after his 
St. Louis street railway interests, had spent the past several weeks in New York City and other 
eastern League cities, presumably in conference with John Ward and other Brotherhood 
members.  One of Al Johnson’s brothers, Will Johnson, was also good friends with Fred Dunlap, 
and speculation centered on the ability of the Johnson brothers (older brother Tom was also a 
wealthy businessman who dabbled in politics) to supply the baseball Brothers with ballparks in 
which to play in case they decided to challenge the League.6  When asked about his intentions 
regarding baseball, Al was noncommittal, but shortly afterwards reports spied him dining at the 
Continental Hotel with Brotherhood members Ned Hanlon of Pittsburgh and Jim Fogarty and 
George Wood of Philadelphia.  He later met with Arthur Irwin of Washington as well.7 
 Leaks of more information dribbled in to the press in mid-September.  Soon, baseball 
fans learned of plans that, if put into practice, would materially transform the business of 
baseball.  Profits would go to a pool, and each team would share in them equally, to avoid the 
constant hobgoblin menacing competition in the League and Association, that of some teams 
being weaker financially than others, and thus creating Brush Plans and others schemes to 
compensate for their weakness.  Not only that, the players would share in the profits, splitting 
them equally with their financial backers, to supplement their salaries, which would be smaller in 
                                                 
5 Ibid.  While the Daily Tribune did not print the authorship of individual articles on baseball at 
this time, the person supplying the information can be none other than A.G. Ovens, Indianapolis 
correspondent for both that paper and The Sporting Life. 
6 “The League Strike” NA, The Sporting News, September 14, 1889, 1.  
7 “The Rumored Trust” NA, The Sporting Life, September 18, 1889, 6. 
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up front money.  The new league would adopt prizes for finishing in the top of the standings, and 
like the National League (at least officially), would eschew Sunday games and liquor sales at the 
ballpark.8   
 As is clear by now, if anything major did happen, Al Spalding would be the point man for 
the League, whether in negotiations or war, with the Brotherhood.  For Spalding, one of the first 
signs that something serious was in the offing came when he tried to locate new grounds for his 
White Stockings.  He allowed the lease on his old grounds on the corner of Congress and Loomis 
streets to lapse and purchased a new site, where he planned a new park modeled on the Victorian 
Grounds in Melbourne, Australia, that he and his tourists visited the previous winter.  However, 
when the construction plans bogged down and Spalding learned they would not be ready for the 
next season, he attempted to renew his option on the old site, just in case.  It was almost too late, 
as someone else, an agent for the backers of the Brotherhood, tried preempting Spalding by 
purchasing an option on the grounds.9   
Nor was Chicago the only place where Brotherhood backers were trying to outmaneuver 
the League bosses.  On September 20, Al Johnson told an interviewer that backers had also 
acquired leases on the old Polo Grounds site in New York and one of the city of Brooklyn’s 
parks (although not either of the Bridegrooms’ two parks, Washington and Ridgewood.  
Brooklyn played in two parks in order to help dodge the always thorny issue of Sunday baseball 
in Brooklyn, Ridgewood being the designated Sunday site.), as well as two other locations.  In 
securing the Polo Grounds, the Brotherhood had the help of James Coogan, a prominent New 
York baseball figure.  Johnson also disclosed the lineup of cities for the new league, those being 
                                                 
8 “The Baseball Business to be Reorganized” NA, Los Angeles Daily Herald, September 15, 
1889, 7. 
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 746
New York, Boston, Brooklyn, and Philadelphia in the East, and Chicago, Cleveland, Pittsburgh, 
and Buffalo in the West.  Securing grounds in Buffalo was quite simple, as Jack Rowe was both 
a Brother and the part owner of the existing Buffalo franchise of the International League (see 
the Rowe-White controversy in chapter sixteen for more.)  Finally, Johnson stated that every 
single National League player, with Cap Anson of Chicago as the singular exception, was on 
board with the plans of the Brotherhood.10 
 Spalding’s concern no doubt deepened when the press reported that one of his own men, 
stalwart second baseman Fred Pfeffer, was the likely manager of a rival Chicago team.  Pfeffer, 
who not only authored a book about baseball, but frequently cornered the concession for printing 
scorecards at Chicago games throughout the 1880s as well, had saved a tidy sum from his 
combination of ball playing and entrepreneurial activities.11  Ward, meanwhile, while not giving 
out what the Brotherhood ultimately planned to do, did say, “The Brotherhood will show the 
League that it means business.  We have temporized enough.  We shall be put off no longer.  The 
League has got to consider our complaints and rectify them.”  When asked if that was a 
declaration of a new league and war, Ward did not commit, simply adding, “That is a question 
that will come afterwards.  I do not care to say what steps we will take.”12 
 It was not long before the public discovered what those steps were.  Within a week, the 
Chicago Daily Tribune and other papers reported the revolutionary financial plan agreed on by 
the Brotherhood and its backers.  Player contracts would change little from what each man 
earned in 1889.  However, out of whatever profits the league made, the first $10,000 went to the 
teams finishing first through fourth, in a distribution scheme of $5,000-$2,500-$1,500-$1,000.  
                                                 
10 “The Brotherhood” NA, The Sporting News, September 21, 1889, 1; “A Baseball Scheme” 
Pittsburg Dispatch, September 21, 1889, 7. 
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The next $80,000 of profit went to the backers, divided evenly among the eight clubs.  
Additional profits up to the next $80,000 went to the players in the same distribution 
arrangement.  After that, the players and backers split any further profits fifty-fifty.13  The plan 
underwent modifications in time, but such a profit-sharing format was radical for Gilded Age 
America, no matter what the exact details eventually became. 
 That plan, while revolutionary enough, was not nearly all.  Team management was also a 
joint venture between the players and owners.  Each ball club had a board of eight men, four 
players and four backers, while the league as a whole had a senate of sixteen members, two from 
each team, one player and one backer.14  The players and their backers even tried to answer the 
longstanding umpire question, deciding on the long-desired double umpire system, and they tried 
to get together a staff that would include the most prestigious officials in the game, including 
Gaffney, Ferguson, McQuaid, and John Kelly.15 
 With the scheme now out in the open, baseball reporters rushed to Al Spalding first to get 
his take on the explosive story.  The Chicago magnate first declared that he would keep his 
ballpark, contrary to earlier reports, and it turned out he was as good as his word on that matter.  
The Brotherhood’s maneuvers cost him a great deal of money, however.  His previous lease 
called for a payment of just $1,000 per year; in order to renew the lease for 1890, he had to part 
with $10,000 per year for three years, as the owners of the grounds used the Brotherhood’s offer 
as leverage against him.16  As he had done so many times previously, he immediately worked the 
propaganda angle by portraying the League as the responsible father to the unruly and ungrateful 
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children of the Brotherhood.  “The league has existed for fifteen years.  It wiped out the 
gambling element in baseball and cleared it of crooked playing . . . Now that the game is clean 
and on a healthy basis all the purifying work is forgotten by the players, and ‘long chance’ 
capitalists are ready to step in and assume the possible profits that may come through the game.”  
Furthermore, the BPBP was suddenly “an oathbound, secret organization of strikers which has 
plotted against the life of the league, through the care of which it became a possibility.”17 
 Spalding finished the interview with both a carrot and a stick.  While some League teams 
might struggle against this challenge, others would fight on, to the death if necessary.  However, 
despite a general feeling in the press that conciliation might be too late, he intended to try that 
route first.  “New York, Boston, Chicago, Philadelphia, and Pittsburg will fight hard and go on 
with teams made up of the best players they can secure.  It is a tremendous plot, and I hope for 
the good of the game that all the differences between the league and its players may be overcome 
and the threatened break averted.”18 
 His next move was reconnaissance.  He needed to know what the BPBP really planned to 
do.  Accordingly, on September 28 Spalding sent a public letter to Ward (despite his earlier 
statements about not doing business through the newspapers) asking the Brotherhood’s president 
to name a date following the season to hold the conference he had put off during the summer.  
Ward’s response, while not proclaiming a definitive break, was certainly not conciliatory, either.  
Referring to the BPBP’s negotiating committee appointed to meet with the League during the 
summer, Ward wrote, “the committee was, however, unable to obtain a hearing from the league 
and it so reported at a subsequent meeting of the brotherhood held July 14, and was accordingly 
discharged.  It was not a standing committee.  I will refer your communication, therefore, to the 
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18 Ibid. 
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entire brotherhood.”  In theory, this meant the BPBP might still treat with the League.  Given the 
reports from various newspapers that during the season, however, in which the Brotherhood had 
chosen reorganization (its own league) over a July 4 strike as its preferred method of retaliation 
for being stood up by Spalding, Day, and Rogers, this gave Spalding a good idea of where the 
situation was headed.19  The same day, the New York members of the Brotherhood’s financial 
support purchased land adjoining John Day’s new Polo Grounds for the purpose of constructing 
a Brotherhood ball park.  Included in the group was James Coogan, owner of both properties, 
and Erastus Wiman, former New York Metropolitans owner.  The syndicate also purchased the 
lease on Day’s existing Polo Grounds after Day’s current lease expired, which would be 
following the 1891 season.20 
 There was also the issue of the 1887 Brotherhood contract negotiated with the League, 
specifically as it related to the reserve rule.  Recall that in this contract, the Brotherhood 
explicitly recognized the reserve rule, because it wanted the exact obligations of both parties to 
the contract written into the contract.  Section eighteen of the contract said that the player agreed 
to give his club the right to reserve his services for the following season.  Some concluded, 
therefore, that the Brotherhood would be guilty of contract breaking, should the players refuse to 
sign with their League team for 1890, because the courts would consider this a binding 
agreement.  Others believed that this argument did not hold water, however, because the reserve 
rule merely gave teams the option to renew the contract of the previous season.  It did not 
obligate the player to sign the contract, although it did bar the player from playing on or against 
any team party to the National Agreement if they chose not to.   
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An additional consideration, from the National League’s view, was that if the League did 
end up in court trying to enforce this contract, it might create the opportunity for the players to 
challenge the reserve rule’s legality in the courts.  Many lawyers considered the legality of the 
rule questionable, at best, so this was a possibility that the League wanted to avoid if possible.  
John Ward pointed out another weakness in the argument, stating, “If they had any such right 
why haven’t they prevented men playing outside the League before to-day, as there have been 
several instances where men have broken contracts and gone to California and other outside 
places.  This whole question hinges on the meaning of that one little word, ‘reserve.’  It is all 
one-sided and could not hold a player who wanted to go outside.”21  Furthermore, Ward said, 
“The League can reserve players from year to year, within League limits, but they can no more 
prevent a player from playing with another organization than they can prevent him from earning 
a living by keeping a hotel or driving a dray.  The Brotherhood is, of course, interested in 
protecting the players.  That is its sole and only object.”22 
As the proposed new league did not plan to recognize the reserve rule or be a party to the 
National Agreement in any case, this would only matter if the courts decided in the League’s 
favor.  As it turned out, they did not.  National League clubs brought injunctions against both 
John Ward and Buck Ewing.  In Ewing’s case, Judge William Wallace denied the injunction, 
writing, “In a legal sense it [the baseball contract] is merely a contract to make a contract if the 
parties agree.”23 
More relevant in determining what was happening in the present was Section 2(a) of the 
National Agreement, which stated that no player could sign a contract for longer than seven 
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months, that contracts expired, at the latest, on October 31, and that negotiations for new 
contracts could not occur prior to October 20 without the club’s permission.  If the men in the 
Brotherhood had already signed an agreement to play for a new Brotherhood team during the 
month of September, they were in violation of this last provision.  If true, there was no point in 
negotiating with the League, as no compromise was possible at that point, not to mention that if 
any player went back on their Brotherhood contract to sign another agreement with the League, 
the Brotherhood could prevent this through court action.  Thus, informed observers concluded 
that the Brotherhood must be in earnest, and that both sides must prepare for battle.  Later events 
proved that both players and clubs would ignore such legal niceties in the heat of combat, but in 
late September, such arguments helped clarify the position of both the players and the League.24 
 
* * * * * 
 
 There were various reasons why the Brotherhood succeeded in attracting capital from 
interested parties.  Clearly, many investors thought that there was money in baseball, if only 
there was an even distribution of that money so that financial success did not wholly depend on 
the city where one’s team played.  Others had personal motives.  According to Tim Murnane, a 
number of Boston capitalists wanted to back the new league, because when they were 
stockholders in the Boston Beaneaters, the Triumvirs’ heavy-handed financial manipulations had 
deprived them of their stock and frozen them out of the organization.  These investors wanted 
nothing better than to get revenge on the haughty trio.25 
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 Besides the owners, several players and ex-players of means joined the rebellion.  In 
addition to Fred Pfeffer in Chicago, Boston’s John Morrill, although no longer playing, joined 
the investors in Beantown.  George Wright, a true baseball pioneer who had played professional 
baseball even before the National Association formed in 1871, joined Morrill as a Boston 
stockholder.  His old teammate, Ross Barnes, joined the Chicago investors, while New York’s 
Mayor Hugh Grant bought stock in the proposed New York club.26  Current players financially 
involved in the venture included Tim Keefe and John Ward in New York, Dan Brouthers and 
John Clarkson in Boston, Chief Zimmer and Jay Faatz of Clevaland, Jack Rowe, Deacon White, 
and George Myers for the new Buffalo team, and Fred Dunlap and Ned Hanlon in Pittsburgh.  
Keefe also was part owner of a moderately capitalized sporting goods establishment, and to no 
one’s surprise, got the contract to supply baseballs for the Brotherhood’s 1890 campaign.  They 
eventually proved somewhat livelier than the baseballs used in previous years.27 
 The only players hesitant about joining were, ironically, some of the New York players 
who founded the BPBP in the first place.  The main reason for their reluctance was their 
fondness for their owner, John Day.  As discussed many times, Day, more than any other 
National League owner, tried to do right by his players.  He paid them well, did not try to sell 
them, opposed the Brush Plan, never issued fines for poor play, and did not send detectives to 
monitor their after-hours behavior.  Even with the storm clouds gathering over Gotham in 
October, he maintained that, “The players may, of course, have some fault to find with the 
present rules, and, for my part, I think there can be one or two changes made that would be 
beneficial to all.  The classification rule, if lived up to, would be a good thing, but as it is it can 
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be dropped and never missed.”  He also said, “In the case of Rowe and White, and similar cases, 
I don’t think that was right.  No man should be compelled to play with a club that he did not 
want to join, and the rule was never made with the idea of sheltering such an evil.  It is one of the 
things that has crept into the rules that were never intended.”28 
What the players really hoped was that they might persuade Day to join them in their new 
venture.  Regardless, “the New York players feel badly about jumping from under President John 
B. Day’s management, but they feel that it must be all hands or nobody, and are figuring on 
President Day’s bobbing up in the new league.”29  The saddest part of the whole rebellion, in 
fact, might be that Day, the man least deserving of the players’ enmity, ended up suffering the 
most from their actions.  His financial situation deteriorated so badly in 1890, other National 
League owners had to prop up the New York franchise before the season was over.  With his 
tobacco business also struggling, by 1893 he had almost no role in the New York Giants 
organization, resigning in February.  He continued in major league baseball in positions of ever-
diminishing importance, falling so far that by 1910, his only source of income was the five 
dollars per day he made taking tickets at the Polo Grounds for the team he used to own.30 
There was the potential for more allies outside of the financial world as well.  Samuel 
Leffingwell, a prominent leader in the trade union movement, encouraged the Brotherhood to 
apply for membership in the American Federation of Trades and Labor Unions, the Knights of 
Labor, or both.  He believed that baseball players certainly qualified as skilled workers, and 
mentioned that the players would then “be allied to organizations representing over 1,000,000 of 
skilled mechanics.”  He added, “As the Brotherhood will have all the skilled players, and as the 
                                                 
28 “News, Notes And Gossip” NA, The Sporting Life, October 16, 1889, 5. 
29 “What George Wright Says” NA, Chicago Daily Tribune, September 23, 1889, 3. 
30 For more on Day’s tragic career in baseball, see his SABR biography at 
http://sabr.org/bioproj/person/c281a493, accessed March 22, 2015. 
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main support comes from the workingmen, it will be seen whether mere capital is to rule with 
despotic sway over the masses of the people in baseball as it would like to do in many other 
leading industries in the country.  Oh, yes, the workingmen are in sympathy with the 
Brotherhood.”31 
 There was one wildcard in the situation, and that was the American Association.  In the 
fall of 1889, it had no strong brotherhood as the League players had, despite occasional rumors 
of attempts to form one.  Yet, all knew that many Association players, those in St. Louis who had 
to play for Chris Von der Ahe especially, might well desert and join the Brotherhood League if 
given proper inducements.  Although it was probably more by luck than design, the Association 
clubs had not adopted anything like the Brush Classification Plan, and so their players did not 
have a potential salary limit over which to chafe.  There were still the reserve clause and player 
sales, however, from which Association players might want to escape.  Not only that, the 
nightmare season just concluded in Louisville, the mercurial ownership in St. Louis, the constant 
worry about which Association team might switch to the National League, and the long train 
rides to reach Kansas City for games were all reasons that Association players might want to 
play elsewhere.   
 The Brotherhood’s initial policy towards the American Association was one of non-
interference.  It made no effort to woo Association stars into its proposed league or to interfere 
with Association operations.  The Brotherhood League’s structure, however, made it difficult to 
imagine the Association would stay neutral forever.  If the Brotherhood League proved a 
success, without player reserves and player sales, it would certainly be more attractive to up and 
coming young players than an American Association that did have them, especially if the 
                                                 
31 “To Aid The Brotherhood” NA, New York Times, November 5, 1889, 8. 
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Brotherhood League succeeded in displacing the National League from the major markets the 
League possessed in 1889.  It was probably unavoidable, therefore, that the Association would 
line up with the National League against the Brotherhood eventually, and that the Brotherhood 
would respond by raiding Association rosters for more talent. 
 Although this is what happened eventually, it was no certainty in September and October 
of 1889.  At that time, both an exciting pennant race and the fallout from the recent St. Louis-
Brooklyn imbroglio (see chapter seventeen) distracted the American Association, giving its 
leaders little time to formulate a coherent policy regarding the Brotherhood.  In addition, given 
the unpredictability of the Association’s decisions in the past, no one in the Brotherhood could 
be absolutely certain that the Association would become hostile.  It seemed best, therefore, to be 
cautious and wait to see what stance the junior major league would take. 
 
* * * * * 
 
 In the last week of September, matters became rather confusing as to what was actually 
going to happen.  Some Brotherhood members gave reports to the press about the new league, 
other Brothers, including the officers of the organization, denied those same reports.  The names 
of various capitalists besides the Johnson brothers circulated as well; some of these men gave 
details of the scheme, others denied being part of it.  Certain National League owners started 
taking precautions while others voiced their disbelief that there was any plan for secession afoot 
at all.  While sportswriters went to immense lengths to dissect the details of the proposed plan 
that they knew about, and raced to interview team owners whenever the latest rumor reached 
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them, few writers seemed to know anything for certain, either.  Even The Sporting Life 
proclaimed its coverage of the situation a combination of news, gossip, and rumor. 
 Part of the reason for all the uncertainty was that, sadly for the Brotherhood, details of its 
plan leaked too early.  Writers at the Chicago Daily Tribune, including both Harry Palmer and 
Frank Brunell by this time, learned the details of the plan and published them in late September, 
before the BPBP had the chance to perfect all its arrangements.  The fact that National League 
owners had such a wide array of responses, from the deep concern of Al Spalding to the 
nonchalance of several of his fellow magnates, is a good indication that as a group, they were 
oblivious to the full scope of what the Brotherhood intended to do, even in late September.  It is 
a good bet that the reason Spalding was most concerned is that his hometown newspapermen 
knew the story, he learned it from them, and realized just how dire things were.  The other reason 
the BPBP tried to stall as long as possible was fear.  Not fear of their new leagues’ failure, but 
fear that if National League owners realized how earnest they were, those owners would 
terminate the contracts of Brotherhood players immediately, thus depriving them of a bit of pay 
at the end of the season.32  That is why Ned Williamson remarked, “I understand that the 
Chicago Club has not as yet settled in full with its players.  As soon as that is done I think some 
facts will be made public that have heretofore been kept quiet.”33 
 Spalding and the Boston Triumvirs took the most active approach to fending off a 
potential Brotherhood challenge.  Spalding began signing players from Western League 
franchises almost immediately.  Boston tried to do him one better, opening negotiations for the 
entire franchise of the Western League’s Omaha club.  At the very least, they hoped to gain up 
and coming pitcher Kid Nichols, whether the Brotherhood carried out its threat or not, but just in 
                                                 
32 “Some Corrections” NA, The Sporting Life, October 16, 1889, 5. 
33 “Ed Williamson Does Some Talking” NA, The Sporting News, October 26, 1889, 1. 
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case, wanted to be ready to import an entire team to fill their ranks, should any desertions 
occur.34 
 This actually proved a profitable development for the stronger minor league circuits.  
With their men suddenly in great demand, visions of greenbacks danced in the heads of minor 
league executives.  As Sam Morton, manager of the Western Association’s Minneapolis 
franchise put it, “It will not be long before base-ball managers will be climbing over each other’s 
shoulders in this section to get hold of good Western Association timber for their clubs next year.  
We may or may not sell.  We are like all other people in business, if somebody offers our price 
we are pretty sure to sell.”35 
 The game of bluff between the players and the League continued into the middle of 
October.  On the 11th of that month, Tim Keefe mentioned that the BPBP would hold a meeting 
and appoint a new committee to treat with the National League in an effort to resolve the “vital 
grievances” held by the players.36  Keefe also mentioned, more ominously, that the Brotherhood 
did not trust the League, especially after last year’s decisions to implement the Brush Plan.  
Queried on what the BPBP wanted, he said, “We want the abolition of the classification of 
players and want the sale of players entirely done away with.  It is not true that we want a share 
in the purchase money.”37 
 In the meantime, however, sources began confirming which Brotherhood players would 
serve in each city as its key organizers.  The men listed, most of whom already played in the city 
they represented, were as follows: 
 
                                                 
34 “A Confession” NA, The Sporting Life, October 9, 1889, 6. 
35 “Sam Morton’s Views” NA, The Chicago Daily Inter Ocean, October 10, 1889, 6. 
36 “League And Brotherhood” NA, Milwaukee Daily Journal, October 11, 1889, 6. 
37 “Tim’s View Of It” NA, Pittsburgh Dispatch, October 12, 1889, 6. 
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Philadelphia – Fred Dunlap, Hardie Richardson, Jim Fogarty, and George Wood. 
New York – John Ward, Tim Keefe, Roger Conner, and Buck Ewing. 
Boston – Dan Brouthers, Billy Nash, John Morrill, and Dick Johnston. 
Washington – Arthur Irwin, John Irwin, and Sam Wise. 
Pittsburgh – Ned Hanlon, Deacon White, Jack Rowe, and Fred Carroll. 
Chicago – Fred Pfeffer. 
Indianapolis – Jack Glasscock, Jerry Denny, Ed Andrews, and Henry Boyle. 
Cleveland – Jay Faatz, Cub Stricker, Paul Radford, and Charles Snyder.38 
 
 Based on such reports, others in the know continued to insist that the BPBP had no 
interest in negotiation, and that this was a smokescreen to buy time.  Fred Pfeffer, Chicago’s 
crack second baseman, said as much in one interview.  Frank Brunell did, too, stating he had 
seen many Brotherhood contracts already signed, and that one entire team (presumably 
Cleveland) was already in the fold.  Brunell also confirmed the League’s intent to fight.  Its plan 
was for its teams to sign as many talented players from the stronger minor leagues as possible, 
cut prices to undersell the Brotherhood league, and pull out all legal strategies to harass the new 
organization and, if possible, drive its teams into debt through escalating legal costs.  The 
National League would also do its best to entice two or three key players from each club back 
into its ranks through healthy raises or similar methods of bribery.39 
 It was also in mid-October that other National League team executives began 
acknowledging that the players were in earnest.  Tom Loftus, the manager who had just finished 
                                                 
38 “And Here You Are” Gotham, The Sporting News, October 12, 1889, 1. 
39 “Mr. Fred Pfeffer” NA, The Sporting News, October 12, 1889, 3; “The League’s Fighting 
Plan” Brunell, The Sporting News, October 12, 1889, 3; “George Wright’s Views” NA, The 
Sporting News, October 12, 1889, 3. 
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leading Cleveland to a respectable finish in its first season in the National League, shocked 
everyone when he agreed to leave the Cleveland club in order to manage in Cincinnati.  His 
reason was that every player on his roster planned to desert the team for the Brotherhood’s new 
league.  The players held no ill will against Loftus, however, which is why they warned him in 
advance so that he could find a more promising position while his baseball reputation remained 
solid.  He did not actually sign the contract until a bit later, which called for him to receive 
$3,500 and 100 shares of Cincinnati stock, but it does not appear he seriously reconsidered his 
decision.40  Further proof that something was afoot in the Forest City came in late October when 
Al Johnson purchased a lease on grounds on Wilson Avenue and set men to work on grading the 
field and constructing a grandstand.41 
 Similarly, John Rogers in Philadelphia started to believe some of the reports of what the 
BPBP planned to do.  He also hoped for reconciliation, and stated his willingness to abandon the 
Brush Plan, although in exchange he wanted the Brotherhood to agree to a rule requiring players 
to report in prime condition to play on April 1 each year. Because he did not like to see men 
arrive in April out of shape while paying them as if they were performing at the peak of their 
talents.  When asked about his knowledge of the Brotherhood’s plans, Rogers stated, “I hear that 
the brotherhood league will surely be organized, and I am ready to believe that it will.  I am told 
that five men in this city have agreed to put in $2,500 each.”42 
 Rogers’ fellow Philadelphian, Al Reach, also began to see what was happening by mid-
October.  When a reporter asked him if he believed the BPBP was serious about its plans, Reach 
said, “Why, of course I do.  That is, to this extent: If Ward and others who are the leading spirits 
                                                 
40 “Loftus And Schmelz” J.S. McDonald, The Sporting News, October 12, 1889, 1; “Stern Talks” 
NA, The Sporting Life, October 30, 1889, 1. 
41 “Brotherhood At Cleveland” NA, The Chicago Daily Inter Ocean, October 26, 1889, 2. 
42 “Asked Of The Brotherhood” NA, Chicago Daily Tribune, October 21, 1889, 6. 
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in this move can induce enough players to follow them to accomplish their purpose, I believe 
that the attempt to establish a Brotherhood league will be made.  If, on the other hand, enough 
signatures cannot be secured to warrant success, then the brotherhood men will try to get big 
concessions from the league.”43 
 October 20 was a very important day.  That was the first day that League teams could 
negotiate with players for 1890, and the day on which League teams could send new contracts to 
their reserved men.  If that day came and went, and the players took no action or returned the 
contracts unsigned, it was not quite a sign that the revolt had begun, but it did signify a plan to 
take action of some kind.  At that point, the only things standing in the way of a baseball 
rebellion against the National League was the Brotherhood meeting scheduled for November 4 
and the National League meeting planned for November 13-14.  If the two sides could not 
reconcile by that point, there would be war. 
 
* * * * * 
 
 When October 20 came, National League owners sent contracts to their players, as usual.  
Baseball observers everywhere were about to find out what the players really meant to do.  The 
initial returns were not promising for the League.  In Chicago, Al Spalding received but one 
signature, that of Cap Anson.  Typical of the response of Chicago players was that of outfielder 
George Van Haltren.  When a writer asked him where he would play next year, he answered, “In 
Chicago.”  Then came the inevitable follow-up question, “Under Anson?”  Van Haltren replied, 
                                                 
43 “World Of Sports” NA, Milwaukee Sentinel, October 21, 1889, 8. 
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“I can’t say about that.”44  When a reporter asked Al Spalding whether he would try court 
injunctions to make sure players like Van Haltren suited up for the White Stockings in 1890, he 
backtracked a bit from earlier statements, claiming, “We may decide to let such of our reserved 
players as may refuse to sign play their string out as they see fit.  I don’t say we will enjoin them, 
and I don’t say we will not.  At any rate, such action would not be taken before next spring.”45 
In Pittsburgh, meanwhile, team president William Nimick could not muster even that 
many commitments to play on his nine in 1890.  When Nimick met outfielder Billy Sunday and 
asked if he was ready to sign, Sunday answered, “if the Brotherhood matter is settled 
satisfactorily I will; otherwise I will stick by the Brotherhood.”  His teammates agreed, stating 
their intent to abstain from signing anything until the League met with the Brotherhood in 
November.  One unnamed Brother told the press, “If our requests are complied with then I 
suppose that will end the matter.  If not, why, then I guess the League will be shown that the 
Brotherhood means business.”46  Nimick responded by stating, “Well, the brotherhood has 
shown its teeth at last.  I was expecting it or something similar all along.  Sunday was the only 
man I asked to sign.  The rest of them will have to come to me when they are ready to do 
business.”47 
No other National League presidents reported signing their reserved men, either, although 
the Indianapolis club did sign a new face, pitcher Ed Eiteljorge, who had turned only eighteen 
years old a few days prior, while Boston signed Bobby Lowe.  In the Quaker City, when the 
fateful day passed and management was bereft of signed contracts, Philadelphia management 
finally began taking precautions, signing a trio of new men, catcher Jake Virtue, outfielder Eddie 
                                                 
44 “Spalding Says They Will Sign” NA, The Sporting News, October 26, 1889, 3. 
45 “Does He Want To Sell” NA, Chicago Daily Tribune, October 27, 1889, 3. 
46 “Baseball Matters” NA, New York Times, October 22, 1889, 3. 
47 “The Pittsburg Recalcitrants” Reddy, The Sporting News, October 26, 1889, 3. 
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Burke, and pitcher Tom Vickery, although Virtue ended up in Cleveland by the time the 1890 
season began.48 
The League’s leading men soon began to suspect that their worse fears might come true.  
While the Brotherhood’s leaders continued to repeat their intentions to meet with the League in 
November, a few members of the organization struggled to keep the cat in the bag.  One Chicago 
Brother, unable to hold back, stated, “The brotherhood will not make any demands of the league 
at the league meeting . . . because one week from tomorrow . . . the brotherhood will hold its 
meeting at the same hotel, uncover its work, declare its intentions and begin business on its own 
account.  These men will be astonished at the magnitude of the scheme.”  The unnamed source 
also confirmed another rumor that had circulated over the last week, saying that while Anson 
was unlikely to join the Brotherhood’s league, “It is true that one of the best men in the 
association is to take Anson’s place on first base for the Chicago team next season.”49  Nor was it 
too hard to guess who that man might be.  The most highly regarded captain and first baseman in 
the American Association was Charlie Comiskey of St. Louis.  The players in St. Louis disliked 
their owner, Von der Ahe, intensely.  Comiskey was from Chicago as well.   
In addition to claims that the Brotherhood might not even open negotiations after all, 
another unnamed member of the BPBP declared they might up their demands, almost as if they 
wanted to make sure the League would never agree to a deal.  Although the players agreed that 
the reserve rule should remain, now this source said the Brotherhood wanted the right of reserve 
                                                 
48 “Quaker City Gossip” H.W.L., The Sporting News, October 26, 1889, 1; “Just One Contract 
for Indianapolis” NA, The Sporting News, October 26, 1889, 3; “Soden Scores Von Der Ahe” 
NA, The Chicago Daily Inter Ocean, October 27, 1889, 2.  Eiteljorge was an interesting signing, 
certainly.  Because Indianapolis did not retain its National League franchise for the 1890 season, 
he ended up in Chicago with Anson’s White Stockings, who renamed themselves the Colts that 
year.  He pitched but two innings for Chicago, got a trial with Washington the next season, and 
was out of baseball before even turning twenty years old. 
49 “No Compromise” NA, Boston Daily Advertiser, October 29, 1889, 5. 
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to last four years only, at which point the player could either leave his club or negotiate to stay, 
and at that point the club might reserve him up to four more years.  Furthermore, having 
completed the initial four year period, any player released by his team in mid-season would still 
get the pay called for in the rest of the contract, instead of only what he had earned up to that 
point.50 
On November 1, just a few days before the Brotherhood’s meeting, Tim Keefe 
announced its program to the baseball world.  One writer summed up the program by stating, 
“The League magnates will not be consulted.  In other words, the players intend to go it alone.”51  
Keefe made an official statement to that effect just a couple days later, remarking, “Yes, the 
players are through with the present owners of the League clubs, and will have no further 
intercourse with them.  We have gone too far to retreat now, so we will carry, or at least try to 
carry, our plans through.”52  Papers also announced the distribution of players for the teams of 
the new league, and while some individual assignments eventually proved wrong due to the 
occasional defection from the ranks and because many American Association players eventually 
joined the revolt, for the most part the lists were on the mark.53 
There was a bit more to the plan, of course.  The players needed to decide on a name.  
Their choice might not have been very original, but they decided to go with the Players National 
League.  Brotherhood contracts stated that players would receive their 1889 salary for the next 
two seasons, plus a percentage of the profits as outline above.  The distribution of players also 
attempted to equalize the playing strengths of the clubs as much as possible, so that all cities 
                                                 
50 “This Seems Truthful” NA, Pittsburgh Dispatch, October 30, 1889, 6. 
51 “The Brotherhood Plans” NA, New York Times, November 2, 1889, 6. 
52 “Keefe’s Latest” NA, Pittsburgh Dispatch, November 3, 1889, 6. 
53 For the original listings, see “Brotherhood Assignments” NA, The Chicago Daily Inter Ocean, 
November 1, 1889, 6. 
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might have a chance at a quality team that would draw spectators and make some money.54  
Another departure from the practices of either existing league was that the home and visiting 
teams would split gate receipts on a fifty-fifty basis, which replaced the previously reported plan 
to pool all receipts of the entire league and redistribute them.  There was also talk of using a key 
feature of the Millennium Plan: the redistributing of the players after each season to make sure 
the strength of the teams remained equal from one year to the next.55 
One interesting choice was that the BPBP decided to locate a team in Brooklyn, because 
Brooklyn was an Association city.  They reasoned that Brooklyn was big enough to support two 
teams, based on the Bridegrooms drawing more than 350,000 fans in 1889, but in so doing, they 
made a powerful enemy in Brooklyn owner Charles Byrne.  Still, they decided it was worth the 
risk, rather than locating their last franchise in either Washington DC or Indianapolis.  Neither of 
those cities had fared well as National League cities even without competition, and so if the 
Brotherhood tried to compete with the League in those locations, those teams were almost 
certain to fail financially.56 
Even if informed baseball observers knew it would be anti-climatic, the BPBP held its 
grand conference in New York on November 4 and 5 as scheduled.  Imitating the authors of the 
Declaration of Independence, the Brotherhood issued a statement because, “in taking this step we 
feel that we owe it to the public and to ourselves to explain briefly some of the reasons by which 
we have been moved.”  Some observers also noted that the second day of the meeting, November 
                                                 
54 “The Brotherhood Plans” NA, New York Times, November 2, 1889, 6. 
55 “The Sporting World” NA, Galveston Daily News, November 2, 1889, 6. 
56 “No Use For The League” NA, The Chicago Daily Inter Ocean, November 2, 1889, 2. 
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5, was Guy Fawkes Day, the anniversary of the 1605 plot by English rebels to blow up the House 
of Lords.57  Whether the Brotherhood planned the dates to coincide or not, its statement read: 
There was a time when the league stood for integrity and fair dealing; today it stands for 
dollars and cents.  Once it looked to the elevation of the game and an honest exhibition of 
the sport; today its eyes are upon the turnstile.  Men have come into the business from no 
other motive than to exploit it for every dollar in sight.  Measures originally intended for 
the good of the game have been perverted to instruments for wrong; the reserve rule and 
the provisions of the national agreement gave the managers unlimited power, and they 
have not hesitated to use this in the most arbitrary and incendiary way, and players have 
been bought, sold, and exchanged as though they were sheep instead of American 
citizens!  ‘Reservations’ became with them another name for property of right in the 
player, and by a combination among themselves, stronger than the strongest trust, they 
were able to enforce the most arbitrary measures, and the player had either to submit or 
get out of the profession in which he had spent years in attaining proficiency. 
 
Even the disbandment and retirement of a club did not force the players from the octopus 
clutch, for they were then peddled around to the highest bidder.  That the player 
sometimes profited by the sale has nothing to do with the case, but only proves the 
injustice of his previous restraint.  Two years ago we met the league and attempted to 
remedy some of these evils, but through what has been politely called ‘league diplomacy’ 
we completely failed.  Unwilling longer to submit to such treatment we made a strong 
effort last spring to reach an understanding with the league. 
 
To our application for a hearing they replied that the matter was not of sufficient 
importance to warrant a meeting, and suggested that it be put off until fall.  Our 
committee replied that the players felt that the league had broken faith with them; that 
while the results might be of little importance to the managers they were of importance to 
the players; that if the league would not concede what was fair we would adopt other 
means to protect ourselves; that if postponed until fall we would be separated and at the 
mercy of the league, and that as the only course left us required time and labor to 
develop, we must therefore insist upon an immediate conference.  Then, upon the final 
refusal to meet us, we began organizing for ourselves and are now in shape to go ahead 
next year under new management and new auspices. 
 
We believe that it is possible to conduct our national game upon lines which will not 
infringe upon individual and natural rights.  We ask to be judged solely by our work, and, 
believing that the game can be played more fairly and its business conducted more 
intelligently under a plan which excludes everything arbitrary and un-American, we look 
forward with confidence to the support of the public and the future of the national 
game.58 
                                                 
57 Stevens, Baseball’s Radical for All Seasons, 105. 
58 “Ball-Players’ Meeting” NA, Chicago Daily Tribune, November 5, 1889, 6.  Baseball 
historian John Thorn believes that the Nationalist Club in Boston might have inspired the 
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 “Orator” Jim O’Rourke, true to his nickname, expressed these feelings with a somewhat 
more rhetorical flourish.  Speaking in his home town of Bridgeport, Connecticut, he told his 
audience, “We have endeavored to build on a foundation even more substantial than Earth itself.  
Our ascension from thralldom is positive, uncoupled from all doubts, notwithstanding the 
warning of the master magnates and the snapping of their whip, which has no more terror for the 
players as they stand today shorn of all physical strength to use them.”59 
After this, there is little more to say.  The Brotherhood cleared up a few more details, 
such as the exact plan for distributing profits, the language of the Brotherhood contract that all 
league members signed, and things of that nature.  They also decided to change course in regards 
to their relationship with the American Association and make a play for some of the elite 
members of that body, as all the press reports concerning the attitude of the Association indicated 
it would cooperate with the League against the players.60  Eventually, twenty-six American 
Association players joined the Brotherhood’s league. 
With this proclamation, the story shifts from the causes of the Brotherhood War to the 
history of the war itself.  That is a tale for others to tell.  It has its heroes and villains; it is a tale 
of selfishness, greed, lying, cheating, bribery, backstabbing, money, and power, but also 
heroism, virtue, self-sacrifice, loyalty, and brotherhood.  There is exciting action on the field, 
coupled with byzantine maneuverings off it.  We know that, ultimately, the players lost their 
                                                                                                                                                             
wording of the document.  The Nationalist Club was an organization recently formed by utopians 
such as Edward Bellamy, whose utopian novel Looking Backward first appeared in 1888, in an 
effort to change a society based on competition and individualism.  Thorn, Baseball in the 
Garden of Eden, 238. 
59 Lowenfish, The Imperfect Diamond, 41. 
60 “Ball-Players’ Meeting” NA, Chicago Daily Tribune, November 5, 1889, 6. 
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battle with the National League.  Now, we also know why they felt compelled to fight that battle 
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Navigating Baseball’s Statistical Seas 
 
 
 Statistics, for better or worse, or perhaps for better and worse, greatly influence how 
players, fans, and team executives see the game of baseball.  We might even say that for some 
fans, statistics dominate their interpretation of the game.  Witness, for example, the explosion of 
fantasy baseball games, relying solely on statistics, over the past twenty-five years.  Also 
consider the number of publications offering statistical analysis of all parts of baseball now 
available yearly.  Everything from managerial performance to analysis of when to bunt to what 
the probability of achieving a hit might be on any given ball-strike count.  Other researchers 
chart the number of runs a team can expect to score in a given inning when there is one out and 
baserunners on first and second base.  The tables, charts, and numbers seem endless.   
 One of the godfathers of this statistical revolution is Bill James, who set off a trend when 
he began publishing his baseball abstracts yearly in the 1980s.  There are many others, too 
numerous to name, who also contributed to the statistical revolution of the past generation.  In 
the 2010s, however, the vast array of statistics might seem like a tidal wave to an average reader, 
ready to swamp their comprehension and drown them in an onrushing wall of WAR, VORP, 
wOBA, OPS, BABIP, and the like.  For the sake of clarity, this appendix describes the main 
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statistical measures used in the following pages so the reader has an idea what all the numbers 
mean. 
 
* * * * * 
 
 Prior to the 1990s, most baseball observes relied on a set of statistics, the old school 
statistics if you will, to measure the effectiveness of a player.  For batters, that set included 
batting average, home runs, and runs batted in.  To this day, a batter that leads the league in all 
three of these wins the “Triple Crown.”  Other categories that observers valued included doubles, 
triples, run scored, and stolen bases.  For pitchers, the key statistics were wins (for starting 
pitchers) and earned run average.  Secondary pitching statistics included things such as innings 
pitched, walks allowed, and strikeouts.  By the 1970s and 1980s, there was a new statistic to 
measure the contribution of relief pitchers, saves.  Some might argue for including a few other 
stats, but baseball fans, players, sportswriters, and executives viewed all of these as important 
indicators of player quality.   
 Beginning in the 1980s, and accelerating in the 1990s, statistical analysis grew more 
complex.  Some observers noted, for instance, that the number of times a hitter walked was 
important, because a walk meant a time on base, which meant an opportunity to score a run.  
Others noticed that the handedness of batters and pitchers was significant, and changed strategy 
accordingly.  Baseball people had known for a long time that combinations with the same 
handedness (left-handed pitcher versus left-handed batter, right-handed pitcher versus right-
handed batter) typically favored the pitcher and combinations of opposite handedness generally 
favored the batter.  As far back as 1886, we have the statement, “It is said that Rochester will sell 
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Parsons, there not being enough left-hand batters in that League to make a left-handed pitcher 
desirable.  He is in fine condition and pitching good ball.”1   
For decades, managers used this knowledge when filling out their lineup cards to start the 
game.  One of the most famous examples was the 1929 World Series between the Philadelphia 
Athletics and the Chicago Cubs.  Philadelphia manager Connie Mack banished all his left-
handed pitchers, even the peerless Lefty Grove, to the bullpen, out of respect for a Cubs lineup 
overflowing with dangerous right-handed batters.  It worked, as the Athletics won the series in 
five games, with left-handed pitchers Grove and Rube Walberg pitching just 12 2/3 innings 
combined.  Starting in the late 1980s, however, strategic pioneers such as Oakland Athletics 
manager Tony LaRussa started using this knowledge in the middle of games, bringing in new 
pitchers in the middle of innings to try to gain the handedness advantage over the opposition.  
LaRussa’s Oakland teams were very successful in that era, and as a result, the trend caught on, 
and so statisticians began looking at how hitters fared against righties and lefties, and how 
pitchers performed versus right- and left-handed batters.   
 In the first half of the 2000s, a new concept revolutionized thinking about pitching in 
baseball.  This was the realization that the ability of the pitcher only influenced three statistical 
outcomes.  The pitcher influenced the number of home runs allowed, the number of walks 
allowed, and the number of strikeouts, and that was it.  If the batter hit the ball, but the ball did 
not travel over the fence, the quality of the pitcher made no difference at all.  Only the location 
of the struck ball and the ability of the defensive players mattered.2  For baseball, this was 
somewhat akin to Darwin’s description of natural selection in biology.  Baseball finally had an 
                                                 
1 “Notes and Comments” NA, The Sporting Life, August 18, 1886, 5. 
2 There are a few exceptions to this basic statement, as later analysis showed that pitchers can 
exert some influence on a few other outcomes, but on the whole, the theory that once the ball is 
put into play the pitcher’s ability no longer matters is valid. 
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explanation for why some pitchers prevented hits better than others (batters who strike out 
cannot get a hit, so high-strikeout pitchers give up fewer hits), why the frequency of hits allowed 
by a pitcher could vary wildly from year to year (random chance of hit placement combined with 
the defensive skills of the fielders), and how to separate the pitcher’s role in preventing runs 
from the fielders’ role in preventing runs. 
 The second revolution in statistical thinking of that decade came in 2003 when author 
Michael Lewis published the book Moneyball.  While not a statistician himself, Lewis spent time 
with members of the Oakland As front office, especially general manager Billy Beane and his 
staff, and described their mathematical approach to player evaluation.  Lewis also detailed the 
systematic approach the Athletics used to evaluate the offensive and defensive contributions of 
players.  The As relied heavily on non-traditional statistics, notably on-base percentage and 
slugging percentage, to build a roster that competed effectively (at least 87 wins every season 
between 1999 and 2006) against teams with vastly superior payrolls, reaching the playoffs in five 
of those seasons.  The fact that Oakland accomplished so much with so few financial resources 
got baseball’s attention, and their methods of player evaluation started to spread to at least some 
other franchises. 
 By the late 2000s, statistics continued evolving and becoming more descriptive.  
Statisticians realized, for instance, that a player might perform differently depending on the 
ballpark where they played their games.  A player who hit twenty-five home runs in a smaller 
home ballpark with shorter fences might only hit twenty in a larger park.  As a result, the 
statisticians created statistics adjusting a player’s actual performance to what that performance 
would have been in a league-average ballpark.  Ideas evolved rating the contribution to victory 
(or defeat) of every possible individual outcome that could happen in a game.  For example, any 
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positive outcome (a single, double, successful stolen base, etc.) contributed a fraction of a run 
while any negative outcome (ground out, fly out, strikeout, time caught stealing, etc.) contributed 
a negative fraction of a run.  The positive and negative fractions of a run that result from each 
play are the play’s “expected run value.”3   Using this measure, observers could add up 
everything a player did over the course of a season in order to see how much he contributed to 
the team that year.  This allowed for an idea of what a player had accomplished, and soon people 
added the notion of comparing this performance to that of a replacement player.4  This resulted 
in statistics such as VORP (Value Over Replacement Player, a number that corresponds to how 
many more [or fewer] runs that player contributed than a replacement player would have) and 
WAR (Wins Above Replacement, a number that corresponds to how many more [or fewer] 
                                                 
3 Here is an example of how expected run values work.  You begin with the fact that each year in 
baseball, all teams as a whole average a certain number of runs per game.  Because some games 
go extra innings and not all teams play the same number of innings in a season, however, a more 
precise measure is to find how many runs the average team scores in an inning.  For example, 
say that league-wide, teams score 0.55 runs per inning over the course of the season.  That means 
that when each inning starts, no outs and no one on base, the inning has an expected run value of 
0.55 runs.  Pretend the first batter hits a double and reaches second base.  For the situation of no 
outs and a baserunner on second base, the new expected run value for the inning is 1.1 runs.  
That means the double had a value of 0.55 runs. (1.1 for the new situation minus 0.55 for the old 
situation.)  If, however, the first batter had struck out instead of hitting a double, the new 
expected run value for that inning, with one out and no one on base, would be 0.3 runs.  That 
means that when the first batter of an inning makes an out, he costs his team about 0.25 runs.  
(0.55 runs for the old situation minus 0.3 runs for the new situation.)  These numbers change 
from season to season, depending on the level of offensive production of the season under 
consideration.  The numbers in this example come from Michael Lewis, Moneyball, (New York: 
WW Norton, 2003), 134. 
4 A replacement player is one the team could acquire at little or no cost, by promoting the player 
from the minor leagues, trading a player of small value to another team to acquire the player, 
signing someone as a free agent during the season that no other team wanted, etc.  Stat gurus 
consider comparing a player to a replacement player a better measure than comparing a player to 
an average major league player because average players are not freely available, and a team 
would have to part with something of value in order to gain an average player.  Depending on 
which method of calculation you use, a team consisting solely of replacement players will win 
somewhere between twenty-nine and thirty-two percent of the time. 
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games the team won with a player compared to what they would have done with a replacement 
player).   
 Finally, taking the concept of expected run value even further, statisticians added the idea 
that not all runs are equivalent in terms of the chances of winning a game.  The idea is that if a 
player hits a three-run homerun in the eighth inning of a game his team already leads 12-4, he 
has not improved the team’s chance of winning all that much, because regardless of whether the 
score is 12-4 or 15-4, teams almost always win when they hold that large a lead late in the game.  
If, on the other hand, the score was 4-4 when the player hit the homerun, that is a valuable 
homerun indeed, because the chance of winning with a 7-4 lead late in the game is much higher 
than the chance of winning when tied late in the game.  The same holds true for other events.  If 
a player strikes out as the first batter in the game, the team’s chance of winning declines slightly, 
but they still have a nearly fifty-fifty chance to win the game, because they still have twenty-six 
more outs to score runs.  However, if the same player strikes out with baserunners at second and 
third base in the eighth inning of a game his team trails 3-2, it is a very costly out.  Not only 
would any hit score at least one run and tie the game, the team does not have very many more 
chances to catch up, so this strikeout costs the team a great deal in terms of its percentage chance 
of winning the game.  This concept, of using the leverage of a situation to determine how helpful 
or harmful an outcome is for the team’s chances of winning, is similar to how a statistic like 
WAR uses run expectancies.  WAR produces a number of expected wins by adding up all the run 
expectancies from the individual outcomes a player took part in, while leverage does the same by 
summing the effect on the percentage chance of winning of all individual outcomes. 
 
* * * * *  
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 Here is a list of the statistics commonly used in this dissertation, along with their 
abbreviations and explanations of what they are and how to calculate them, if required. 
 
Batting Statistics  
Games (G) – The number of games a player participated in. 
At Bats (AB) – The number of times a player goes to bat, minus walks, times hit by pitch, and 
sacrifices. 
Runs (R) – The number of times a player scores by crossing home plate. 
Hits (H) – The number of times a player strikes the ball and the defense fails to put them out 
without committing an error. 
Doubles (2B) – Hits where the player reaches second base. 
Triples (3B) – Hits where the player reaches third base. 
Home Runs (HR) – Hits where the player circles all four bases at once. 
Runs Batted In (RBI) – The number of runs scored due to actions by the player at bat.  One 
exception is that batters do not get credit for RBI if the batter strikes the ball and the defense 
commits an error(s). 
Stolen Base (SB) – When a baserunner advances a base in the middle of an at bat without the 
batter putting the ball in play. 
Caught Stealing (CS) – When the defense puts out a baserunner trying to advance a base 
without the batter putting the ball in play. 
Walk or Base on Balls (BB) – When the pitcher throws too many errant pitches (balls) before 
the batter can put the ball in play, the batter gets a free trip to first base.  For decades, the number 
 778
of errant pitches required for a walk has been four, but in some of the years of the 1880s, the 
pitcher could pitch as many as six or seven balls (depending on the season in question) before the 
hitter received a base on balls.  In 1889, the major league standard became four balls.  
Strikeout (SO or K) – When the batter fails to hit the ball within three accurate pitches (strikes) 
by the pitcher, the batter is out.  The rules did not count a foul ball as a strike until 1901 in the 
National League and 1903 in the American League. 
Batting Average (BA or AVG) – Percentage of the time the batter achieved a hit.  Calculated by 
dividing hits by at bats. 
On-base Percentage (OBP) – Percentage of the time the batter reaches base in some manner 
excepting when the defense commits an error.  Calculated by adding hits, walks, and times hit by 
the pitch, and dividing this sum by the sum of the at bats, hits, walks, and times hit by the pitch. 
Slugging Percentage (SLG) – The percentage of total bases the batter achieves per time at bat.  
Calculated by dividing total bases by at bats.  The batter gets one total base for a single, two for a 
double, three for a triple, and four for a home run. 
 
Often, a batter’s batting average, on-base percentage, and slugging percentage will be 
listed together to give the reader an idea of how the batter performed in each regard, with the 
numbers separated by slashes.  To take St. Louis outfielder Curt Welch as an example, in 1890 
he batted .248, was on base .372, and slugged .332.  His batting line for 1890 is .248/.372/.332. 
 
On-base Plus Slugging (OPS) – On-base percentage added to slugging percentage.  
On-base Plus Slugging Plus (OPS+) – The batter’s OPS compared to the league average for 
that season.  A score of 100 is exactly average.  Scores greater than 100 are above average, 
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scores below 100 are below average.  A score of 200 would mean the player was double the 
league average for that season.5 
Wins Above Replacement (WAR) – The number of wins a player contributed above what a low 
cost or freely available player would have contributed.  A negative WAR means the player cost 
his team potential victories.  Generally speaking, a WAR above 2.0 indicates a respectable starter 
at the major league level, a WAR above 5.0 an all-star quality season, and a WAR in the 8.0 
neighborhood or greater indicates a most valuable player quality season.6 
 
Pitching Statistics 
Wins (W) – The number of times the pitcher was the winning pitcher.  To get a win, the 
pitcher’s team must win the game, his team must be ahead when the pitcher leaves the game, his 
team must not lose the lead after he leaves the game, and the pitcher, if he started the game, must 
pitch at least five innings. 
Losses (L) – The number of times the pitcher was the losing pitcher.  To get a loss, the pitcher’s 
team must lose, his team must trail when the pitcher leaves the game, and his team cannot tie or 
take the lead later in the game after the pitcher leaves.   
 
                                                 
5 This statistic is the one I will use most commonly in this dissertation to indicate the ability of 
offensive players.  Why?  In the late 1990s, Harvard graduate and future Oakland As executive 
Paul DePodesta used mathematical models and determined that there were two statistics, and two 
only, that correlated to winning games far more closely than any others.  Those two were on-base 
percentage and slugging percentage.  Of the two, DePodesta concluded that on-base percentage 
was the more important, but that these two were much more important than any others.  Using 
OPS+ allows us to compare what OPS marks indicate about performance from one season to the 
next by showing how far above or below average a player was for that season.  For more, see 
chapter six of Michael Lewis, Moneyball.   
6 For the statistically curious reader, baseballreference.com explains how to calculate WAR on 
its website, available at http://www.baseball-reference.com/about/war_explained.shtml, accessed 
May 28, 2014. 
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It is possible that a pitcher is not the winning pitcher or losing pitcher.  If, for instance, 
his team is ahead, he leaves the game, but subsequent pitchers lose the lead, the starting pitcher 
cannot get the win or the loss for that game.  The relief pitcher who lost the lead would take the 
loss for that game unless the team rallied to tie or lead the game later in the action. 
 
Earned Run Average (ERA) – The number of earned runs the pitcher allows per nine innings 
pitched.  Calculated by dividing earned runs allowed by innings pitched, then multiplying by 
nine.  An earned run is a run that scores without defensive errors helping the run to score. 
Earned Run Average Plus (ERA+) – The pitcher’s ERA compared to the league average for 
that season.  A score of 100 is exactly average.  Scores greater than 100 are above average, 
scores below 100 are below average. 
Games (G) – The number of times a pitcher appears in a game. 
Complete Games (CG) – The number of games a pitcher both starts and finishes without 
requiring relief. 
Innings Pitched (IP) – The number of innings a pitcher completed. 
Walks and Hits Per Inning Pitched (WHIP) – The number of baserunners a pitcher allows per 
inning pitched.  Calculated by adding hits allowed to walks allowed and dividing that sum by the 
number of innings pitched.   
Wins Above Replacement (WAR) – The number of wins a player contributed above what a low 
cost or freely available player would have contributed.  A negative WAR means the player cost 
his team potential victories.  Generally speaking, a WAR above 2.0 indicates a respectable starter 
at the major league level, a WAR above 5.0 an all-star quality season, and a WAR in the 8.0 
neighborhood or greater indicates a most valuable player quality season. 
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Pitchers also have several of the same categories that batters do, such as hits allowed, 
home runs allowed, walks, strikeouts, and so forth.  Often, to give an idea of how frequently a 
pitcher accomplished one of the above statistics, statisticians convert them into a number per 
nine innings pitched.  For instance, in 1890 Bob Caruthers pitched exactly 300 innings, allowing 
9 home runs, 87 walks, and getting 64 strikeouts.  This translates to (and reads as) 0.3 HR/9, 2.6 
BB/9, and 1.9 SO/9.  This conversion allows for easy qualitative comparisons with other pitchers 
who compiled different totals of innings pitched. 
 
* * * * *  
 
 Once the reader gets used to some of these new statistics that might not be familiar at 
first, their superiority to the traditional statistics should be clear.  Their greatest advantage is that 
many of them work to compare player performance across eras.  The game of the 2010s is vastly 
different from the game of the 1880s described in this dissertation.  The fences are far closer 
today.  The equipment is higher in quality.  Players have better gloves now.  They lift weights, 
train year round, and have better nutrition.  If a player is hurt, there are MRI scans that help 
diagnose the nature of the injury, and advanced methods of treatment, rather than quack 
medicines.  (Did you know that Actina cures blindness, hearing loss, paralysis, and more?)  
Electricity was a favorite treatment for a sore arm in the late 1880s.  Detroit Wolverine left-
hander Charles “Lady” Baldwin actually carried an electric battery around so he could apply 
some juice to his arm after every game.7  The rules of the late 1880s had only recently allowed 
                                                 
7 “The Southern Trip Over” MAT, The Sporting Life, April 20, 1887, 5. 
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pitchers to throw the ball fully overhand, so pitches such as the forkball and other exotic 
offerings did not even exist.  Using a statistic like WAR, however, we can see that William van 
Winkle “Chicken” Wolf’s 1890 season (WAR of 5.2, a very nice season) was about as good as 
Buster Posey’s 2013 season (WAR of 5.5) even though Wolf had a .363 batting average while 
Posey hit .294.  (Incidentally, Wolf got his nickname because he was so fond of chicken, eating 
it every day but eating no other meats.8)   
A statistic like WAR or VORP also takes into account that some eras feature more 
offense, others less.  For example, in 1894, Baltimore second baseman Heinie Reitz posted a 
.303 batting average, which by 2013 standards is very solid.  In 1894, however, Reitz placed 
eighth in batting—on his own team.  Every other regular player out hit him, and by a large 
margin—the next lowest batting average belonged to shortstop Hughie Jennings at .335.  On the 
other hand, had Reitz posted the same batting average in the American League in 1968, a very 
strong year for pitchers, he would have had the top batting average in the entire league. 
 This is where statistics like OPS+ and ERA+ are useful, as well.  These statistics with a 
plus sign compare the player’s performance to the league average in his league for that season 
after adjusting for ballpark.  This last adjustment, for ballpark, makes a much larger difference in 
some cases than one would expect, and the combination of ballpark and the offensive 
environment of a particular year can influence statistics drastically.  Just to give two examples, 
Hank Aaron hit 755 home runs in his career.  Had he played his entire career in the environment 
and ballpark of the 2000 Colorado Rockies, he would have hit 1,030 home runs.  Had he played 
his entire career as a 1968 Los Angeles Dodger, he would have just 653 home runs.  For pitchers, 
Pedro Martinez posted a career ERA of 2.93 pitching in an offense-heavy era.  However, if he 
                                                 
8 “From The Falls City” XX, The Sporting Life, September 7, 1887, 4. 
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had been a 1968 Dodger his entire career, that would drop his ERA to 1.75, which would be the 
lowest in baseball history.  Had he pitched his whole baseball life for the 2000 Rockies, 
however, his ERA would have been 3.98, which is rather average.9  Comparing stats to the 
league average for a particular year, therefore, is a very valuable tool to help us understand how 
a player performed compared to others who played in the same environment that he did.  To 
return to the example of Heinie Reitz given above, despite the fact his batting average of .303 
would be a very productive total in most seasons, in 1894 his OPS+ was 106, or just a little better 
than an average player.  
 These are some very good reasons to use some of the newer statistics.  Another is that the 
traditional statistics used prior to the 1990s were, for the most part, statistics of accumulation 
rather than quality.  Therefore, players with many opportunities to acquire a particular stat would 
probably acquire more of that stat than players with fewer opportunities.  In other words, one of 
the problems with a statistic like RBI is that it is dependent.  Someone with quality teammates 
that reach base often will have more chances to drive in runs that a player with lousy offensive 
teammates who reach base sporadically.   
A classic example of why this is important comes from the career of Joe Carter.  Carter 
was an outfielder who played from 1983 to 1998.  In those sixteen years, he amassed 396 home 
runs and 1,445 runs batted in, totals that rank fifty-fifth and sixty-first, respectively, in baseball 
history.10  Very impressive, by traditional standards.  Yet, because of a mediocre career batting 
average of .259, a reluctance to walk (.306 lifetime on-base percentage), and some defensive 
deficiencies in the field, Carter accumulated a career WAR of just 19.3, meaning that in an 
                                                 
9 These projections are from http://www.baseball-reference.com/about/equiv_stats.shtml, 
accessed April 4, 2015. 
10 As of May 24, 2014. 
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average season over the course of his career, he was only worth about 1.2 wins (the equivalent of 
about twelve runs) more than someone his team could have had for next to nothing.  He managed 
to drive in all those runs because he always hit in the middle of his team’s lineup, giving him 
many opportunities to drive in runs over the course of his career.  Why did teams allow this 
respectable, but not great, player to bat in such important spots in their lineup?  Partly it was 
because his team did not always have better options, the 1980s Cleveland Indians teams being 
rather weak, and partly it was because, by traditional standards, Carter was a productive player, 
with a career 162-game average of 29 home runs and 107 RBI.  Some baseball observers were so 
taken with Carter’s production of traditional statistics that in 1990, when he posted an OPS+ of 
85, clearly below an average major league player, he still finished seventeenth in the voting for 
the Most Valuable Player Award in the National League, simply because he hit 24 home runs 
and had 115 runs batted in. 
 Compare this to the career of Dale Murphy, an outfielder roughly contemporary to Carter 
who played between 1976 and 1993.  Carter had 9,154 at-bats, Murphy 9,041.  Carter had 2,184 
hits, Murphy 2,111.  Home runs were 396 for Carter and 398 for Murphy, while Carter had a 
.259 career batting average to Murphy’s .265.  Carter posted a career slugging percentage of 
.464, while Murphy slugged .469 for his career.  These two players seem extraordinarily similar, 
yet Murphy’s career WAR of 46.2 is more than double that of Joe Carter.  What accounts for this 
large difference?  Partly it was Murphy’s superior defensive ability, as his strong throwing arm 
in right field was one of baseball’s best, but the primary reason was that Murphy walked 986 
times in his career compared to Carter’s 527.  By earning nearly twice as many free times on 
base as Carter, Murphy greatly outdistanced Carter in career on-base percentage, .346 to .306, 
and all those extra times on base greatly enhanced his teams’ chances of winning over the years.  
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The career OPS+ of both players also reflect this difference, Murphy with a quite respectable 121 
career score, Carter with a modestly above average 105 mark. 
 The older statistics often misled the observer in other ways.  Let us consider some 
examples from pitchers this time.  As mentioned earlier, the two standard measures for starting 
pitchers were, traditionally, wins and earned run average.  Using wins, or won-loss record, as a 
measure of performance presented many problems especially.  One of the major flaws in this 
statistic is that, like RBI, it is not independent.  Whether the pitcher wins or loses a game 
depends on many things besides the quality of the pitcher.  A team with a strong offense will 
score more runs than a team with a poor offense, allowing the team, and thus the pitcher, to win 
more frequently.  Conversely, a team with a poor defense will allow more runs to score than a 
team with a strong defense, hurting the pitcher’s chance of winning.  A team with weak relief 
pitchers is more likely to lose a game they once led, while a team with strong relief pitching will 
be more likely to hold a lead, and thus allow the pitcher to win more frequently.   
 As an example, consider the 1988 and 1989 seasons of Los Angeles Dodgers pitcher Orel 
Hershiser.  Statistically, there is little difference between Hershiser’s performances in these two 
campaigns.  In 1988, he posted a 149 ERA+ and a WAR of 7.2, while in 1989 those numbers 
read 149 and 7.0.  His won-lost record, however, was 23 wins versus 8 losses in 1988, but just 15 
wins against 15 losses the following year.  The difference was, of course, that his teammates 
gave him more help in 1988 than they did in 1989, because his actual pitching performance 
barely changed at all.  As a reflection of how bound to traditional statistics baseball observers 
were in the late 1980s, however, his 1988 season earned him the Cy Young Award, given to the 
top pitcher in each league, while he finished fourth in the voting for that award in 1989.  This 
despite the fact that he led the National League in WAR for pitchers in both seasons. 
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 Earned run average is a superior statistic for measuring performance compared to wins, 
although it, too, has some drawbacks.  ERA is less dependent on teammates than wins, but it still 
suffers from the fact that it includes things outside of the pitcher’s control.  For instance, a team 
with a porous defense will allow more runs than a team with a stingy defense, and the pitcher’s 
ERA will inflate or deflate accordingly.  In addition, the home ballpark where the pitcher 
performs is important to ERA.  A small ballpark where homeruns are frequent will hurt a 
pitcher’s ERA, while the same pitcher would benefit from a home ballpark where homeruns are 
relatively difficult to come by.  Another drawback of ERA is that it does not account for 
differences in era, and thus is not a dependable statistic to compare pitchers across the decades.  
To demonstrate, let us compare the pitching of two of the best pitchers in baseball’s history, 
Walter Johnson and Lefty Grove.  In 1909, a pitching-dominated year, Johnson posted an ERA 
of 2.22, which in most seasons would be a fine mark.  In 1909, however, it was only about ten 
percent better than the overall American League ERA of 2.47, meaning that Johnson’s work that 
year was solid but hardly spectacular.  In 1931, in contrast, Lefty Grove posted an ERA of 2.06, 
slightly, but only slightly, better than what Johnson had done in 1909.  However, offense 
dominated the game in 1931, with the overall American League ERA climbing to 4.38, meaning 
that Grove’s work was so dominant, he allowed fewer than half the earned runs of an average 
pitcher that season (ERA+ of 217, the twentieth best ERA+ in history).   
 Finally, the observer may note that this section does not contain any discussion of 
defensive statistics.  The traditional defensive statistics include errors, assists, putouts, and 
double plays, as well as passed balls for catchers.  An error occurs when a fielder gets to a ball 
but muffs it in some fashion, and does not put anyone out on a play where someone should have 
been out, or allows baserunners to take extra bases due to mishandling the ball.  A fielder gets an 
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assist if he makes the throw immediately prior to putting out the baserunner.  On a ground ball to 
the shortstop where he throws out the runner at first base, the shortstop gets the assist.  A putout, 
as the name implies, goes to the person who puts out a baserunner.  In the above example, the 
first baseman gets the putout, because he had the ball when the runner was out.  A double play 
occurs when the defense records two outs on the same play.   
 The reason these statistics hardly appear in this dissertation is that they tell us very little 
about how good a player was on defense, with the exception of fielding percentage (calculated 
by taking the total chances minus errors made and dividing that number by total chances.  Total 
chances are the sum of assists plus putouts plus errors).  This is because, like the other traditional 
stats, they are dependent on many other things.  An infielder’s totals for assists and putouts 
depend on what kind of pitchers his team employs.  If the pitchers record many strikeouts, 
infielders will have fewer chances for assists and putouts because the ball is in play less often to 
begin with.  If, however, the team’s pitchers do not get many strikeouts, but pitch to contact 
instead, the infielders will have many chances to make plays.  It is also true that some pitchers 
tend to allow more fly balls, and others more ground balls, mainly due to pitch type and location.  
This also influences statistics like assists and putouts.  As a result, for virtually all of baseball’s 
history, traditional fielding stats gave observers very little solid data to work with.  Just watching 
games and judging the quality of a player’s defensive skills with your own eyes was about as 
good a rating system as anything else.   
Only in the late 2000s have baseball observers refined defensive statistics to try to 
discover how many runs a player prevents on defense.  Individual concepts such as zone rating, 
which uses the location and trajectory of a struck ball and rates how frequently a defensive 
player gets to a ball with any given location and trajectory, and how many runs the player 
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prevents thereby, show some promise.  For teams as a whole, there is the statistic called 
defensive efficiency, which simply measures what percentage of balls put in play the defense 
turns into outs.  In the coming decades, as teams increase their use of computer technology to 
refine measurements, the information teams have to work with will grow, and baseball observers 
should get a more detailed sense of the defensive abilities of individual players, and how much 
those abilities are worth.  Clearly, however, no one kept track of such things in the 1880s.  As a 
result, any commentary regarding defensive skill that appears in this dissertation comes from the 
remarks of contemporaries, an unfortunate but unavoidable situation. 
This is not to say, however, that observers in the 1880s considered defense unimportant 
just because the statistics to measure it are crude by our standards.  Indeed, in the 1880s fans and 
sportswriters paid a great deal of attention to defensive statistics, such as they were.  Box scores 
that appeared in newspapers listed the assists, putouts, and errors of each player.  When sporting 
papers published player statistics, they published defensive statistics as well as those for hitting 
and pitching.  If a club acquired a new hitter, writers often informed fans of two statistics from 
his previous season or team: batting average and fielding percentage.  Some players even 
brought down scorn upon themselves if the sporting press perceived that they were afraid to try 
for tough plays just because failure would lower their fielding statistics.   
The reasons observers paid such attention to defense are not hard to understand.  Errors 
were frequent in the 1880s, partly due to primitive equipment (many players still eschewed the 
use of a glove when the decade began, though most employed one by the end of the 1880s) and 
partly due to rough playing surfaces.  One player, Jack Glasscock, earned the nickname “Pebbly 
Jack” because he constantly tried to remove small stones from play, lessening the chance the ball 
would take a bad hop when hit to him.  Therefore, players who excelled on defense were worth a 
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great deal to their team by cutting down the number of errors committed, and the baseball public 
recognized this fact. 
Sportswriters often referred to a pitcher’s performance as good or bad, but just as 
frequently mentioned whether his teammates had supported him well or not.  Some did realize 
that teams with solid defenses did a great deal to prevent runs.  New York Giants manager Jim 
Mutrie, while not a great field tactician or crack evaluator of talent, did demonstrate this 
knowledge regarding defense when describing Chicago first baseman Cap Anson’s reputation as 
a field leader.  Mutrie believed baseball observers overrated Anson because, “that Chicago 
infield is a remarkable one and those four men are a genuine stone-wall. . . . There is the success 
of the Chicago Club.  Anson, Pfeffer, Williamson, and Burns win all the games for Chicago. . . . 
As long as he keeps that ‘stone-wall’ intact he can continue to sell $10,000 pitchers, catchers, 
and outfielders as fast as there is a market for them.”11  It is clear, therefore, that baseball people 
knew that defense mattered in the 1880s; they just had no good statistical way, aside from 
fielding percentage, to quantify how much it mattered. 
 This is why I have chosen to use statistics that may be less familiar, but provide a better 
indication of player quality, alongside the more traditional statistics in this dissertation.  The 
traditional statistics help explain why observers held some players in high (or low) regard at the 
time under discussion.  The newer stats, however, help us to see whether these perceptions were 
accurate or not, and help illuminate what each player was really worth to his team.  This is not, at 
heart, a statistical dissertation, but rather, a dissertation that occasionally uses statistics to offer a 
richer, more complete story of nineteenth century baseball.  Or, as former infielder Toby Harrah 
                                                 
11 “Mutrie On Anson” Jim Mutrie, The Sporting Life, July 4, 1888, 1. 
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Major League Baseball Standings, 1885-1890 
 
 
 Because there was quite a bit of franchise movement in the 1880s, both in and out of the 
major leagues and sometimes between the two leagues as well, I have included the year-by-year 
standings in major league baseball to help the reader keep straight which team was in what 
league at any given time.  Generally, the narrative mentions which league each team is in as well, 
but I have added this appendix as a handy supplement. 
 
1885 Season – American Association 
Winning Games Out 
Team Wins Losses Percentage of First
St. Louis Browns 79 33 .705 --
Cincinnati Red Stockings 63 49 .562 16
Pittsburgh Alleghenys 56 55 .504 22.5
Philadelphia Athletics 55 57 .491 24
Brooklyn Grays 53 59 .473 26
Louisville Colonels 53 59 .473 26
New York Metropolitans 44 64 .407 33






1885 Season – National League  
Winning Games Out 
Team Wins Losses Percentage of First
Chicago White Stockings 87 25 .777 --
New York Giants 85 27 .759 2
Philadelphia Quakers 56 54 .509 30
Providence Grays 53 57 .482 33
Boston Beaneaters 46 66 .411 41
Detroit Wolverines 41 67 .380 44
Buffalo Bisons 38 74 .339 49
St. Louis Maroons 36 72 .333 49  
1886 Season – American Association 
Winning Games Out 
Team Wins Losses Percentage of First
St. Louis Browns 93 46 .669 --
Pittsburgh Alleghenys 80 57 .584 12
Brooklyn Grays 76 61 .555 20
Louisville Colonels 66 70 .485 25.5
Cincinnati Red Stockings 65 73 .471 27.5
Philadelphia Athletics 63 72 .467 28
New York Metropolitans 53 82 .393 38
Baltimore Orioles 48 83 .366 41  
1886 Season – National League 
Winning Games Out 
Team Wins Losses Percentage of First
Chicago White Stockings 90 34 .726 --
Detroit Wolverines 87 36 .707 2.5
New York Giants 75 44 .630 12.5
Philadelphia Quakers 71 43 .623 14
Boston Beaneaters 56 61 .479 30.5
St. Louis Maroons 43 79 .352 46
Kansas City Cowboys 30 91 .248 58.5
Washington Nationals 28 92 .233 60  
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1887 Season – American Association 
Winning Games Out 
Team Wins Losses Percentage of First
St. Louis Browns 95 40 .704 --
Cincinnati Red Stockings 81 54 .600 14
Baltimore Orioles 77 58 .570 18
Louisville Colonels 76 60 .559 19.5
Philadelphia Athletics 64 69 .481 30
Brooklyn Grays 60 74 .448 34.5
New York Metropolitans 44 89 .331 50
Cleveland Blues 39 92 .298 54  
1887 Season – National League 
Winning Games Out 
Team Wins Losses Percentage of First
Detroit Wolverines 79 45 .637 --
Philadelphia Quakers 75 48 .610 3.5
Chicago White Stockings 71 50 .587 6.5
New York Giants 68 55 .553 10.5
Boston Beaneaters 61 60 .504 16.5
Pittsburgh Alleghenys 55 69 .444 24
Washington Nationals 46 76 .377 32
Indianapolis Hoosiers 37 89 .294 43  
1888 Season – American Association 
Winning Games Out 
Team Wins Losses Percentage of First
St. Louis Browns 92 43 .681 --
Brooklyn Bridegrooms 88 52 .629 6.5
Philadelphia Athletics 81 52 .609 10
Cincinnati Red Stockings 80 54 .597 11.5
Baltimore Orioles 57 80 .416 36
Cleveland Blues 50 82 .379 40.5
Louisville Colonels 48 87 .356 44
Kansas City Cowboys 43 89 .326 47.5  
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1888 Season – National League  
Winning Games Out 
Team Wins Losses Percentage of First
New York Giants 84 47 .641 --
Chicago White Stockings 77 58 .570 9
Philadelphia Quakers 69 61 .531 14.5
Boston Beaneaters 70 64 .522 15.5
Detroit Wolverines 68 63 .519 16
Pittsburgh Alleghenys 66 68 .492 19.5
Indianapolis Hoosiers 50 85 .370 36
Washington Nationals 48 86 .358 37.5  
1889 Season – American Association  
Winning Games Out 
Team Wins Losses Percentage of First
Brooklyn Bridegrooms 93 44 .679 --
St. Louis Browns 90 45 .667 2
Philadelphia Athletics 75 58 .564 16
Cincinnati Red Stockings 76 63 .547 18
Baltimore Orioles 70 65 .518 22
Columbus Solons 60 78 .435 33.5
Kansas City Cowboys 55 82 .402 38
Louisville Colonels 27 111 .196 66.5  
1889 Season – National League  
Winning Games Out 
Team Wins Losses Percentage of First
New York Giants 83 43 .659 --
Boston Beaneaters 83 45 .648 1
Chicago White Stockings 67 65 .508 19
Philadelphia Quakers 65 64 .496 20.5
Pittsburgh Alleghenys 61 71 .462 25
Cleveland Spiders 61 72 .459 25.5
Indianapolis Hoosiers 59 75 .440 28
Washington Nationals 41 83 .331 41  
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1890 Season – American Association  
Winning Games Out 
Team Wins Losses Percentage of First
Louisville Colonels 88 44 .667 --
Columbus Solons 79 55 .590 10
St. Louis Browns 77 58 .570 12.5
Toledo Maumees 68 64 .515 20
Rochester Broncos 63 63 .500 22
Baltimore Orioles 15 19 .441 24
Syracuse Stars 55 72 .433 30.5
Philadelphia Athletics 54 78 .409 34
Brooklyn Gladiators 26 72 .265 45  
1890 Season – National League  
Winning Games Out 
Team Wins Losses Percentage of First
Brooklyn Bridegrooms 86 43 .667 --
Chicago Colts 83 53 .610 6.5
Philadelphia Phillies 78 53 .595 9
Cincinnati Reds 77 55 .583 10.5
Boston Beaneaters 76 57 .571 12
New York Giants 63 68 .481 24
Cleveland Spiders 44 88 .333 43.5
Pittsburgh Alleghenys 23 113 .169 66.5  
1890 Season – Players League  
Winning Games Out 
Team Wins Losses Percentage of First
Boston Reds 81 48 .628 --
Brooklyn Ward's Wonders 76 56 .576 6.5
New York Giants 74 57 .565 8
Chicago Pirates 75 62 .547 10
Philadelphia Athletics 68 63 .519 14
Pittsburgh Burghers 60 68 .469 20.5
Cleveland Infants 55 75 .423 26.5





Coda to the 1886 Salary Limit and the Contract Language Question 
 
 
 During the Brotherhood’s negotiations with the League in the fall and winter of 1887, it 
pressed hard for modifications to the language of player contracts, and Ward and company left 
those negotiations feeling as though they had resolved this dispute amicably.  In retrospect, 
however, they overlooked one important issue that caused a flare-up just prior to the opening of 
the 1888 championship season.  Recall that clause eighteen of the new contract did two 
important things.  It enlarged the number of men each team might reserve each season to 
fourteen, but also said that a reserved player must make at least the same salary as he had the 
prior season, unless he agreed to play for less.  The club could not cut a player’s salary 
unilaterally.  In order for this second stipulation to work, of course, the contracting parties must 
write the player’s actual salary into the contract.   
 This should have been inconsequential, but for one fact.  The $2,000 salary limit that both 
the National League and American Association agreed on prior to the 1886 season was still, 
technically, in effect.  Everyone in baseball knew that the rule was a dead letter.  Every single 
team, with the possible exception of Louisville, had broken the rule repeatedly, and some even 
bragged about how they had done it in order to muster up enthusiasm for their club by 
advertising the prices paid to acquire top players, as Boston had done with Mike Kelly or 
Brooklyn with Bob Caruthers.  During the meetings between the two leagues in the winter of 
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1887-1888, there was a motion from New York Giants owner John Day to strike this rule from 
the National Agreement.  Day knew as well as anyone that the rule was worthless because no one 
followed it, and so he favored jettisoning the salary limit rule altogether.  Louisville, through its 
president, Zach Phelps, on the other hand, at least claimed that it had lived up to the letter of the 
salary law, and so favored keeping it.  The other delegates did not provide Day with sufficient 
backing, and the rule remained a part of the National Agreement. 
 The matter rested right there until observers realized and pointed out that, because of the 
salary limit rule, technically National League president Nick Young could not approve any 
contract submitted to him for 1888 that called for paying a player more than $2,000 for the 
upcoming season.  At first, and for most of that winter, no one made a big deal over this issue.  
There was no reason to.  This fact was true in 1887 as well, yet Young approved many contracts 
that paid players more than the limit, but in a roundabout way.  The idea was that the team 
would, officially in the contract, pay players $2,000 as the rule called for, and then pay the rest of 
whatever their agreement stipulated in some kind of personal services contract between the 
player and the team.  Eventually, however, it began to dawn on people that National League 
owners could use a contract that paid just $2,000 against the players the next season.  Reading 
this requirement literally, they could offer players contracts for exactly $2,000 each season 
thereafter without actually breaking their agreement. 
 This realization began a triangle of accusations between the Brotherhood, the League, 
and the Association.  When the BPBP postulated that the owners of the National League had 
bargained in bad faith on this matter, the League’s first response was to shift the blame to the 
American Association.  League owners claimed that they had requested that the AA agree to 
strike the rule from the books during the winter of 1887-1888, but that the Association refused to 
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do so.  The League also argued that it could not change this situation unilaterally because it was 
a part of the National Agreement between the two major leagues, and doing so required that both 
leagues agree to the change.  The lack of approval from the Association tied its hands. 
 One theme that should be clear to the reader by now is that, when money was at stake in 
1880s baseball, team owners would bend the rules almost any distance in order to pocket more 
greenbacks.  Such concepts as honor and honesty were irrelevant, and owners felt bound to 
follow neither the letter nor the spirit of their own rules when it seemed against their interests to 
do so.  This statement applies in this situation because, according to many observers, all these 
excuses offered by the National League were lies.  As Cleveland’s Frank Brunell relates,  
it is an open secret that the League tricked the Brotherhood in the matter. . . . The 
League’s recent assurance that it had made every effort to have the $2,000 limit farce 
stricken from the National Agreement at the Cincinnati meeting is not true.  It can, if 
necessary, be proven to Mr. Ward’s satisfaction that one of the League committee 
lobbied against the amendment of the National Agreement in this way and that the refusal 
to so amend it was another piece of courteous and time-serving legislation, for which 
base ball is infamous. . . . There is no doubt about the $2,000 limit rule being a farce, and 
no pretence that it is kept. . . . But from what I know of it, I never saw any stage of the 
game, as expounded by it, when morality stood in the way of cash.  Witness the 
temperance clause in its constitution, openly and generally violated. . . . From the first, 
there was a desire on the part of the League to juggle with the Brotherhood and that the 
juggling process is now going on.  And Mr. Phelps isn’t the chief juggler.  Mr. Ward can 
bet on that.1 
 
Further proof that team owners felt no duty to keep their word came the next week.  Ed Andrews, 
a player who earned an outstanding defensive reputation for his work in center field with the 
Philadelphia Quakers, was involved in a long and acrimonious holdout with his rather 
parsimonious employer.  Despairing of ever signing Andrews for 1888, the team agreed, in 
writing, to release him to the Boston Beaneaters in exchange for cash.  Boston even sent 
Andrews a contract, but before it arrived, he unexpectedly accepted the last offer from the 
                                                 
1 “Brunell’s Budget” F.H. Brunell, The Sporting Life, March 28, 1888, 4. 
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Quakers and signed with them.  Once they had Andrews’ name on the dotted line, the Quakers 
then refused to honor their agreement with Boston.2  Things looked different in the Quaker City, 
however, as they claimed that their agreement to release Andrews was conditional on the center 
fielder agreeing to terms with Boston.  When the Beaneaters made Andrews an offer that insulted 
him, he agreed to return to Philadelphia, thus releasing his old club from its obligation.3 
 Once Ward and his Brothers received these reports of potential perfidy on the part of the 
National League, the BPBP decided to investigate matters.  Again, in Brunell’s view, “the 
Brotherhood believed that the League had acted in good faith.  It now suspects that the League 
did not honestly try to secure the repeal of the obnoxious clause, and it suspects aright.  
Consequently there is a collection of facts going on, and a row will follow the discovery that the 
diplomacy of the League was so deftly used to nullify the concessions to the Brotherhood.”4 
 At this point, the American Association also got involved in the dispute, not wanting the 
National League to sully its reputation with unjust accusations.  Brunell was a correspondent for 
one of its members, Cleveland, and he wanted to get the truth into the light.  He wrote a private 
letter to Ward, and Ward answered him, writing, “you have a reputation as a man who does not 
fear to tell the truth.”  He wished Brunell would put his information before the public in The 
Sporting Life, and the Forest City sportswriter decided to do so.  Brunell wrote that, during 
baseball’s Board of Arbitration meeting at Cincinnati that fall, it was John Rogers of 
Philadelphia, not Zack Phelps, who was the grand architect of the decision to keep the salary 
limit in the National Agreement.  Although John Day of New York did attempt to strike out the 
salary limit, Rogers and Phelps convinced the rest of the board not to.  Brunell concluded that his 
                                                 
2 “Hub Happenings” Mugwump, The Sporting Life, April 4, 1888, 2. 
3 “Philadelphia Pointers” NA, The Sporting Life, April 4, 1888, 4. 
4 “A Coming Row” F.H. Brunell, The Sporting Life, April 25, 1888, 1. 
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facts “do not prove that the Association wanted to clean the $2,000 clause off the books.  It is not 
necessary to prove that. . . . But this does certainly prove that the League committee did not deal 
with the Brotherhood in the fullness of faith.”5 
 The Brotherhood decided to investigate further.  During its annual meeting in New York 
in  June, Ward and brothers Charlie Buffinton, Ed Morris, Fred Pfeffer, Jerry Denny, and George 
Shoch received a report form the Committee on Contracts stating that the National League had 
not lived up to its agreement to insert the official player salary into contracts.6  They also took 
action typical of brotherhoods in other industries, such as formalizing the process by which 
brothers in need could appeal to the organization for help, and they appointed a committee to 
revise their constitution in a more democratic direction, but the perceived faithlessness of the 
National League owners was their primary concern.7 
 After doing these things, the Brothers took no more action for the time being.  In fact, the 
organization made barely a peep for the next three months.  It was the calm before the storm.  
When the BPBP announced its next move, it started down a path that, in time, would shake 
baseball to its core. 
                                                 
5 “Salary Limit” F.H. Brunell, The Sporting Life, May 2, 1888, 1. 
6 “The Baseball Brotherhood” NA, New York Times, June 11, 1888, 2. 





The 1888 American Association Contract  
 
 
 If the reader is curious as to how this new contract differed from the older version 
analyzed in chapter two, here is the language of the agreement. 
 
Contract Under The Rules Of The American Association Of Base Ball Clubs 
 
This agreement made the _____ day of _____ eighteen hundred and _____ between _____ of the 
city of _____ and State of _____ a corporation created by, and existing under the laws of said 
State, being a member of the American Association of Base Ball Clubs, party of the first part, 
and _____ of _____ party of the second part. 
 
Witnesseth, that the said party of the second part for and in consideration of the sum of _____ 
dollars, to be paid by the said party of the first party in equal semi-monthly installments, 
commencing April 15th _____ and for and in consideration of the mutual covenants hereinafter 
contained, has agreed to and with the party of the first part as follows, to wit: 
 
First.  That he, the said party of the second part, will play base ball and perform any and all other 
services that may be requested of him by the said party of the first part for and during the term or 
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period of _____ commencing on the _____ day of _____ A.D. 188__ and ending on the _____ 
day of _____ A.D. 188__ inclusive. 
 
Second.  That he will fully, faithfully and honestly perform and discharge all the duties required 
of him by the said party of the first part and comply with all the terms, conditions and provisions 
of the National Agreement, the Constitution and By-Laws of the American Association of Base 
Ball Clubs, and the constitution and by-laws of the said party of the first part, all of which are 
hereby incorporated in this agreement and made part hereof; and that he will also fully and 
faithfully comply with all the rules and regulations and all other directions and requirements of 
said party of the first part, and said party of the second part agrees that he will always keep 
himself in proper moral and physical condition. 
 
Third.  It is hereby mutually agreed by the parties hereto, that should the said party of the second 
part, at any time or times, or in any manner fail to comply with the covenants and agreements 
herein contained, or any of them, or with any of the rules and regulations of the said American 
Association of Base Ball Clubs, or with the rules and regulations of the party of the first part, 
which are now or may hereafter from time to time be made, or should the said party of the 
second part at any time or times be careless, indifferent or conduct himself in such a manner as 
to prejudice the interests of the said party of the first part, or should the said party of the second 
part become ill or otherwise unfit, from any cause whatever in the judgment of the said party of 
the first part, to fulfill in a satisfactory manner the duties which may be required of him by the 
said party of the first part, then the party of the first part shall have the right to discipline, 
suspend, fine or discharge the said party of the second part as to it the party of the first part shall 
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seem fit and proper; and the said party of the first part shall be the sole judge as to the sufficiency 
of the reason for such discipline, suspension or discharge, and in the case of fines imposed by 
said party of the first part, it is agreed by said party of the second part that he will pay the same 
amount for liquidated damages. 
 
Fourth.  It is further agreed that the said party of the second part shall at the beginning of his 
term of employment provide himself, at his own cost and expense, with a uniform to be selected 
and designated by said party of the first part consisting of the following articles, viz.: Two shirts, 
two pairs of pants, two belts, two pairs of stockings, two pairs of shoes (if needed) with spikes, 
two caps, one jacket, one necktie.  All of which during the entire term of his employment he is to 
keep in thorough repair and replenish as required at his own expense; and he agrees to appear on 
the field at the beginning of each game in which he is to play in an entirely clean uniform, all 
cleaning of the same to be paid for by himself. 
 It is further agreed that while absent from _____ with the “nine” in other cities, and while 
traveling with the “nine” the sum of fifty cents per day shall be deducted from the player’s wages 
on account of his board.  While in _____ he shall pay the whole of his own board and all other 
personal expenses. 
 
Fifth.  It is hereby expressly understood and agreed by the parties hereto that should the party of 
the second part be suspended at any time for any sufficient cause in the judgment of the party of 
the first part as aforesaid, then, and during the period of such said suspension, all money or 
salary as aforesaid shall cease to accrue to the said party of the second part under this agreement 
and such sums as would otherwise have accrued to said party of the second part shall be 
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deducted by the party of the first part from any sums due or to become due to said party of the 
second part; and further, should the said party of the second part be discharged at any time as 
aforesaid, then said party of the first part shall be released from all further payments of said 
money to the party of the second part and from all obligations and demands under this 
agreement, excepting, however, from the payment of such sums of money as shall have accrued 
before such dismissal; and further, that the said party of the first part shall deduct from any sums 
due or to become due as aforesaid, any fines payable by the party of the second part, by reason of 
the violation of any of the terms or conditions of this agreement. 
 
Sixth.  It is agreed by the parties hereto, that the National Agreement, the Constitution and By-
Laws of the American Association of Base Ball Clubs and the constitution and by-laws of the 
party of the first part, as also the constitution and by-laws of all of the clubs, member of said 
American Association are made a part of this agreement and reference thereto is hereby had, and 
this agreement is made under and subject to the same. 
 
 In witness whereof the said party of the first part has hereto fixed its corporate name and 
seal, and the said party of the second part has put his hand and seal on the day and year first 
above written. 
 In presence of . . .1 
                                                 





The Terminology of the Game in the 1880s  
 
 
 All sports have their own terms and ways of referring to the action, and these terms often 
differ from the regular usage of the word.  These words might also have changed meanings since 
their use on the baseball fields of the 1880s.  Here is a short glossary of words used in this 
dissertation that fit this description. 
 
Battery – The pitcher and catcher. 
Box – In the 1880s, the pitcher delivered the ball from the pitcher’s box, rather than standing on 
the pitcher’s mound as they do today.  We still have the phrase “knocked out of the box,” which 
refers to hitting a pitcher so hard that his team decides to remove the pitcher from the game, even 
though the pitcher’s box itself is no more. 
Bulldoze – To argue angrily with, or otherwise try to intimidate, an umpire.  Bulldozing was 
different than kicking, in that bulldozers did not just whine, but often threatened the umpire with 
his position.  In the 1880s, the different leagues sometimes removed their umpires if powerful 
owners complained about the umpire’s work too vigorously. 
Championship Season – Games in the championship season were what people today call 
regular season games.  Observers called them championship season games because whoever won 
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the most won the league championship, and to differentiate them from the frequent exhibition 
games teams engaged in before, during, and after the championship season. 
Chicagoed – A team was Chicagoed if it was shut out and did not score. 
Coaching – When a player engaged in heckling, trash talking, or similar behaviors.  Unlike 
today, coaching generally did not mean trying to improve a player’s performance through 
instruction. 
Condition – A general term describing a player’s current state of physical well-being. 
Crank – A fan or spectator.  Some writers claim that the word crank was also spelled krank, but 
this was not the case between 1885 and 1889.  I noticed the second version only twice in reading 
five years of sports newspapers.  Perhaps the second term saw use in other parts of the nineteenth 
century, but it was not common usage in these years. 
Grounds – The playing field. 
Hippodroming – Dishonest playing, usually involving one team throwing a game to another to 
reward gamblers. 
Jonah – A player or team that seemed to be back luck for another player or team was that team’s 
Jonah. 
Kicking – To argue or complain, especially about the umpire’s decisions. 
Nine – Used as a synonym for a team.  Partly because there were nine players on the field at 
once, and partly because some spectators of the 1880s still remembered when teams had nine 
total players. 
Phenomenal – As today, the word signified a player believed to have exceptional talent.  
However, observers frequently applied it to up-and-coming young players surrounded by a great 
deal of hype.  Writers sometimes changed the word from an adjective to a noun and used it as a 
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blanket term for such men, saying their team had signed a phenomenal.  Baseball writers referred 
to one pitcher, John Smith, as a phenomenal so often that Phenomenal Smith became his name 
while he played ball. 
Support – On the field, this meant that a team played quality defense to back up its pitcher.  If a 
team played poor defense, people would write that the team did not support its pitcher. 
Work – A reference to the quality of a player’s performance.  Writers described a poor or 
uninspired performance by writing that a player had done indifferent work. 
 
